[Cite as State v. Masters, 2025-Ohio-1763.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-28 : v. : Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR 043; : 2024 CR 132 STORMIE D. MASTERS : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Appellant : Court) :
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OPINION
Rendered on May 16, 2025
CATHY J. WEITHMAN, Attorney for Appellant
KARA N. RICHTER, Attorney for Appellee
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HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Stormie D. Masters appeals from judgments of the Champaign
County Court of Common Pleas that: (1) revoked her community control in Champaign
C.P. No. 2024 CR 043 and sentenced her to 30 months in prison for the aggravated
possession of drugs offense in that case; and (2) sentenced her to two 12-month prison
terms in Champaign C.P. No. 2024 CR 132 for two counts of possession of drugs, to be -2-
served concurrently with the 30-month prison term in Case No. 2024 CR 043. In support
of her appeal, Masters contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her
community control and by sentencing her to prison in both cases. Masters claims that the
trial court should have instead followed the State’s recommendation for the trial court to
sentence her to community control in accordance with the parties’ plea agreement. For
the reasons outlined below, we disagree with Masters’s claims and will affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On May 30, 2024, Masters pled guilty to one third-degree-felony count of
aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine) in Case No. 2024 CR 043. After
accepting Masters’s guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Masters to a three-year term of
community control with several conditions of supervision. Pursuant to the conditions of
supervision, Masters was required to abide by the following terms.
(1) Follow all orders given to her by her supervising officer or other authorized
representatives of the Court or the Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction. (Standard Condition of Supervision No. 2)
(2) Always keep her supervising officer informed of her residence and place of
employment, and obtain permission from her supervising officer before
changing her residence or employment. (Standard Condition of Supervision
No. 6)
(3) Not purchase, possess, use or have under her control any narcotic drug or -3-
other controlled substance or illegal drugs, including any instrument, device
or other object used to administer drugs or to prepare them for
administration, unless lawfully prescribed for her by a licensed physician.
(Standard Condition of Supervision No. 9)
(4) Not associate with persons having a criminal background or persons who
may have gang affiliation, or who could influence her to engage in criminal
activity, without the prior permission of her supervising officer. (Standard
Condition of Supervision No. 13)
(5) Not be in the physical presence of Winter Eggers. (Special Condition of
Supervision, p. 7)
Case No. 2024 CR 043 Judgment of Conviction (May 30, 2024) and Journal Entry
Attaching Community Control Conditions (June 7, 2024).
{¶ 3} On September 16, 2024, approximately four months after Masters was
sentenced to community control, Masters’s probation officer filed a “Notice of Supervision
Violation” with the trial court alleging that Masters had violated the five conditions of
community control listed above. Specifically, Masters’s probation officer alleged that
Masters engaged in the following violations.
(1) Violated Standard Condition of Supervision No. 2 by failing to report to her
supervising officer on or about September 11, 2024;
(2) Violated Standard Condition of Supervision No. 6 by moving without
permission from her supervising officer on or about August 30, 2024 through
September 12, 2024; -4-
(3) Violated Standard Condition of Supervision No. 9 by using
methamphetamine on or about September 10, 2024;
(4) Violated Standard Condition of Supervision No. 9 by using fentanyl on or
about September 10, 2024;
(5) Violated Standard Condition of Supervision No. 9 by possessing drug
paraphernalia on or about September 12, 2024;
(6) Violated Standard Condition of Supervision No. 13 by having contact with a
prohibited individual, Matthew Grim, on or about August 30, 2024 through
September 12, 2024; and
(7) Violated a Special Condition of Supervision by being in the physical
presence of Winter Eggers on or about August 31, 2024.
{¶ 4} As a result of the drug-use violations, on October 3, 2024, the State filed a
bill of information in Case No. 2024 CR 132 that charged Masters with one fifth-degree-
felony count of aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine) and one fifth-
degree-felony count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound. As part of a
negotiated plea agreement, Masters pled guilty to those charges and did not contest the
merits of the alleged community control violations in Case No. 2024 CR 043. In exchange
for Masters’s guilty plea and her admission to the community control violations, the State
agreed to recommend that Masters be sentenced to community control in both cases with
the special condition that she gain admission to and successfully complete the treatment
program at West Central Community Based Correctional Facility.
{¶ 5} On November 4, 2024, the trial court held a combined sentencing hearing -5-
and revocation hearing for Case Nos. 2024 CR 043 and 2024 CR 132. After reviewing a
narrative report prepared by the arresting officer in Case No. 2024 CR 043, a community
control violation report prepared by Masters’s supervising officer, and Masters’s
presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the trial court revoked Masters’s community
control and sentenced Masters to 30 months in prison for the aggravated possession of
drugs offense in Case No. 2024 CR 043. The trial court also sentenced Masters to 12
months in prison for each of the two drug possession offenses in Case No. 2024 CR 132
and ordered those terms to be served concurrently to one another and concurrently to the
30-month prison term in Case No. 2024 CR 043. Masters therefore received a total
sentence of 30 months in prison for both cases.
{¶ 6} Masters now appeals from the trial court’s judgments revoking her
community control and sentencing her to 30 months in prison. In doing so, she has raised
one assignment of error for review.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} Under her sole assignment of error, Masters contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by revoking her community control in Case No. 2024 CR 043 and
by sentencing her to prison in that case and in Case No. 2024 CR 132. Masters claims
that the trial court should have instead followed the State’s sentencing recommendation
and sentenced her to community control in accordance with the parties’ plea agreement.
We disagree.
{¶ 8} “The right to continue on community control depends upon compliance with -6-
the conditions of community control and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Eastman, 2021-Ohio-392, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). “Accordingly,
we review the trial court’s revocation of community control for an abuse of discretion.”
(Citation omitted.) Id. “An abuse of discretion most often involves an unreasonable
decision that is not supported by a sound reasoning process.” State v. Pate, 2021-Ohio-
1838, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.), citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban
Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).
{¶ 9} “When a defendant violates the conditions of his [or her] community control,
‘R.C. 2929.15(B) provides the trial court [with] a great deal of latitude in sentencing the
offender.’ ” State v. Hampton, 2023-Ohio-1591, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Brooks,
2004-Ohio-4746, ¶ 20. “A trial court has the option of imposing ‘a longer period of
community control, a more restrictive community-control sanction, or a prison term of any
length within the range of that available for the original offense, up to the maximum that
the trial court specified at the first sentencing hearing.’ ” Id., quoting Brooks at ¶ 20, citing
R.C. 2929.15(B).
{¶ 10} As previously discussed, in Case No. 2024 CR 043, the trial court decided
to revoke Masters’s community control and impose a 30-month prison term for the
aggravated possession of drugs offense in that case. Upon review, we cannot say that
revoking Masters’s community control and sentencing her to prison was an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion. We reach this conclusion because there is no dispute that Masters
violated several conditions of her community control. We find it significant that two of
those violations involved illegal drug use that led to Masters’s felony drug charges in Case -7-
No. 2024 CR 132. Masters’s other community control violations were due to Masters
disassociating with her supervising officer and having contact with prohibited individuals.
Specifically, the record indicates that Masters failed to report to her supervising officer on
multiple occasions and failed to respond to her supervising officers’ text messages and
phone calls. In addition, Masters resumed a relationship with a known drug abuser and
convicted felon, Matt Grimm, and engaged in prohibited contact with her sister, Winter
Eggers.
{¶ 11} The record also indicates that Masters has not responded favorably to
previous court-ordered substance abuse treatment programs. Masters’s PSI indicates
that Masters received residential treatment at McKinely Hall in 2019, after being
sentenced to community control for a fifth-degree-felony count of aggravated possession
of drugs in Clark County. Thereafter, Masters continued abusing drugs and was placed
in a sober-living facility while on community control in the present case. Masters, however,
left the sober-living facility on a weekend pass, relapsed, and thereafter resisted the
facility’s attempts to have her return.
{¶ 12} The record further indicates that Masters was out on bond for a fifth-degree-
felony count of aggravated possession of drugs that was pending in Greene County when
she violated her community control in the present case. Masters admitted that she had
failed to report to the probation department for her presentence investigation in the
Greene County case, which led to a capias being issued for her arrest.
{¶ 13} After considering the foregoing information, the trial court found that
Masters “need[s] the penal sanction, punishment sanction, of a time-out” because her -8-
“life is out of control.” Sentencing Tr. (Nov. 4, 2024), p. 11. Upon review, we cannot say
that it was unreasonable for the trial court to reach that conclusion and to revoke
Masters’s community control. Indeed, the record suggests that Masters was not a good
candidate for community control since she had violated several court orders and had not
responded favorably to community control in the past. Accordingly, the trial court’s
revocation of Masters’s community control was not an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 14} Masters nevertheless argues that the trial court should have followed the
State’s recommendation to impose community control because it was part of the parties’
negotiated plea agreement. According to Masters, she should have received the benefit
of her bargain from the plea agreement, i.e., community control. This argument lacks
merit because the plea agreement simply required the State to recommend community
control at sentencing. Because the State did in fact recommend community control at
sentencing, Masters received the negotiated benefit of the plea agreement. It is well
established that trial courts “ ‘may reject plea agreements and . . . are not bound by a
jointly recommended sentence.’ ” State v. Greene, 2024-Ohio-363, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.),
quoting State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 28; State v. Harrison, 2020-Ohio-4154, ¶ 19
(2d Dist.) (“[u]nless the court involves itself in plea negotiations or agrees to the terms of
the agreement, the trial court is not bound by the plea agreement”); State v. Alvarez,
2003-Ohio-5094, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.) (“the sentencing court was not in any way bound by the
state’s recommendation [that defendant receive community control]”); State v. Harvey,
2019-Ohio-715, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (”[a] recommended sentence . . . is one in which the parties
make a nonbinding recommendation to the court, which the court is not required to accept -9-
or comment on”); In re Disqualification of Mitrovich, 74 Ohio St. 3d 1219, 1220 (1990)
(“the acceptance or rejection of a plea bargain is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge”). Therefore, the trial court was free to reject the State’s recommendation for
community control and, under the circumstances of this case, did not abuse its discretion
by doing so.
{¶ 15} We note that before Masters admitted to the community control violations
and entered her guilty pleas, she was well aware of the fact that the trial court could reject
the State’s recommended sentence. During the combined community control violation
merits hearing and plea hearing, the trial court had the following discussion with Masters:
The Court: Your lawyer and the Prosecutor have talked to each other
about both of these cases. I have not been involved in those
discussions. I have not shared with anyone what I will do
regarding sentencing. The only thing that the lawyers know is
that I’ll seek to follow the law. Do you understand that?
Masters: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you understand that the Court is not required to follow the
sentencing recommendation of the Prosecutor, your attorney,
or yourself in either case?
Community Control/Plea Hearing Tr. (Oct. 7, 2024), p. 19-20.
{¶ 16} Masters also indicated that she understood the trial court could impose up
to 36 months in prison for the aggravated possession of drugs offense in Case No. 2024 -10-
CR 043 and up to 12 months in prison for each of the drug possession offenses in Case
No. 2024 CR 132. Id. at 15-16. Accordingly, Masters knew there was a possibility that
she could receive a prison sentence as opposed to the State’s recommended sentence
of community control.
{¶ 17} To the extent that Masters is claiming the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing a total of 30 months in prison for both cases, we note that : “This court no longer
applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing felony sentences, as the
Supreme Court of Ohio has made clear that felony sentences are to be reviewed in
accordance with the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. McCoy, 2016-
Ohio-7415, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10-16. See also
State v. Tolle, 2024-Ohio-4709, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.) (“[a]ppellate review of prison sentences
imposed for violations of felony community control sanctions is governed by the standard
set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)”), citing State v. Gibson, 2017-Ohio-691, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.)
and Marcum.
{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), this court may vacate or modify Masters’s
sentence only if we “determine[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that the record does
not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” Marcum at ¶ 1. In both cases at issue, the trial court was not
required to make any findings under the relevant statutes listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2);
accordingly, we must simply determine whether Masters’s sentence is otherwise contrary
to law.
{¶ 19} “ ‘[O]therwise contrary to law’ means ‘ “in violation of statute or legal -11-
regulations at a given time.” ’ ” State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, quoting State v.
Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990). This
court has also defined “contrary to law” as “ ‘a sentencing decision [that] manifestly
ignores an issue or factor which a statute requires a court to consider.’ ” State v. Morgan,
2023-Ohio-3913, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Lofton, 2004-Ohio-169, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
“For example, ‘[a] sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory
range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of
felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.). (Other citation
omitted.)
{¶ 20} Also, “[f]or all [community control] revocations, the prison term must be
within the range of prison terms available for the offense for which community control had
been imposed and the term may not exceed the prison term specified in the notice
provided to the offender at the original sentencing hearing.” State v. Monroe, 2020-Ohio-
597, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 2929.15(B)(3). At the original sentencing hearing, the trial
court must “notify the offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed for a
violation of the conditions of [a community control] sanction, as a prerequisite to imposing
a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation.” Brooks, 2004-Ohio-4746, at
¶ 29.
{¶ 21} In Case No. 2024 CR 043, the 30-month prison term that the trial court
imposed after revoking Masters’s community control is within the statutory range of prison
terms available for the third-degree-felony aggravated possession of drugs offense for -12-
which Masters’s community control was imposed. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Masters
did not file a transcript of the original sentencing hearing in Case No. 2024 CR 043 as
required by App.R. 9(B); therefore, we must presume the regularity of that proceeding
and conclude that the trial court provided the required notification, i.e., that it could impose
a specific prison term of 30-months in prison for a community control violation. See State
v. McCoy, 2024-Ohio-98, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“[a]bsent a transcript of the hearing, ‘we cannot
speculate what the testimony was at [the hearing], and we are constrained to presume
the regularity of the proceedings below unless the limited record for our review
affirmatively demonstrates error’ ”), quoting Albritton v. White, 2011-Ohio-3499, ¶ 15 (2d
Dist.), citing Banks v. Regan, 2008-Ohio-188, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.); Knapp v. Edwards
Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980) (when portions of the transcript necessary
to resolve assigned errors are not part of the record on appeal, we must presume the
validity of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm).
{¶ 22} In Case No. 2024 CR 132, the concurrent 12-month prison terms that the
trial court imposed for Masters’s two fifth-degree-felony drug possession offenses are
also within the statutory range of prison terms available. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
Masters, however, argues that these fifth-degree felonies normally involve placement on
community control. Although R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) does provide for a presumption of
community control for nonviolent fifth-degree felonies like the ones at issue here, the
presumption only applies if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions is that “the
offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony offense.” R.C.
2929.13(B)(1)(a)(i). Here, because Masters had previously been convicted of third- -13-
degree-felony aggravated possession of drugs in Case No. 2024 CR 043 and fifth-
degree-felony possession of drugs in Clark County, the presumption for community
control did not apply. Therefore, when sentencing Masters for her fifth-degree felonies,
the trial court simply had to “comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing under
[R.C. 2929.11] and with [R.C. 2929.12].” R.C. 2929.13(B)(2).
{¶ 23} Here, the record establishes that the trial court considered the principles
and purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism
factors in R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing Masters in both cases. See Sentencing Tr. (Nov.
4, 2024), p. 14 and Judgment Entry, Case No. 2024 CR 132 (Nov. 4, 2024), p. 4-7. We
note that “[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently
weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”
Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, at ¶ 42. “[W]hen reviewing felony sentences that are imposed
solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, this court does not
analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the record, but only whether they
are contrary to law.” McCoy, 2024-Ohio-98, at ¶ 27 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Dorsey, 2021-
Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). Therefore, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court with regard to the trial court’s application of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.
Rather, in cases such as this, we only determine whether the sentence imposed by the
trial court was contrary to law.
{¶ 24} For the reasons discussed above, none of Masters’s prison sentences are
contrary to law. Because Masters’s prison sentences are not contrary to law, and because -14-
the trial court was not required to accept the State’s sentencing recommendation and did
not abuse its discretion by revoking Masters’s community control, Masters’s assignment
of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} Having overruled Masters’s sole assignment of error, the judgments of the
trial court are affirmed.
EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.