State v. Maloye

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 4, 2025
• Docket: 24-772
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-772

Filed 4 June 2025

Mecklenburg County, Nos. 22 CR 215746-590, 22 CR 215747-590, 23 CR 009591- 590

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

LAKEVIS ANTRUAN MALOYE, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 26 January 2024 by Judge

Matthew Osman in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 23 April 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly M. Lott, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David S. Hallen, for defendant-appellant.

STADING, Judge.

Lakevis Antruan Maloye (“Defendant”) appeals from final judgment after a

jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury

(“AWDWISI”) and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant pled guilty to

obtaining habitual felon status. On appeal, Defendant asserts the trial court

committed error by denying his motion to dismiss since there was insufficient

evidence he inflicted serious injury. For the reasons below, we discern no error. STATE V. MALOYE

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

A Mecklenburg County grand jury returned true bills of indictment charging

Defendant with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious

injury (“AWDWIKISI”), possession of a firearm by a felon, and having obtained

habitual felon status. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-7.1, 14-32(a), and 14-415.1 (2023).

Defendant’s trial commenced on 23 January 2024, and the evidence tended to show

the following:

At around 10:30 p.m. on 17 May 2022, Ruby and Jerome Stewart drove to a

local convenience store to “get some cigarettes and a case of beer.” Mrs. Stewart

remained in the front passenger seat of the vehicle while Mr. Stewart went into the

store; at the time, Mr. Stewart possessed a .380 caliber handgun holstered on his

person. After purchasing “a pack of Newports and a 12-pack of Coronas,” Mr. Stewart

exited the store and walked back to his vehicle. Mr. Stewart heard “somebody say . . .

something” while walking, prompting him to turn his head. Immediately after, Mr.

Stewart saw a masked assailant pointing a revolver at his face.

Mr. Stewart attempted to grab the assailant’s gun without success. In doing

so, the assailant’s “gun went off,” striking Mr. Stewart in the leg. Mr. Stewart then

threw his beer at the assailant, ran away, and started shooting at the assailant with

his own firearm. Throughout this time, the assailant continued firing shots at Mr.

Stewart while ducking behind a car. The assailant eventually “took off and ran

around the building” before the police arrived. However, Mr. and Mrs. Stewart

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instantly identified the assailant as Defendant. Mr. Stewart recognized Defendant

based on his voice, beard, and eyes, and Mrs. Stewart recognized Defendant based on

prior dealings at her place of employment. Officer Mario Soares of the Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Police Department also “immediately recognized” Defendant as the

masked assailant upon reviewing the surveillance footage based on “prior history”

and “daily interactions.”

Law enforcement arrived on the scene shortly after the firefight ceased. Officer

James Tindall of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department was the first to

arrive, observing “a broken case of beer in the center of the parking lot” and Mr.

Stewart “leaning on his right leg.” Upon closer inspection, Officer Tindall saw “a

bullet graze wound” to Mr. Stewart’s left thigh, prompting him to call for medical

assistance. The paramedics placed Mr. Stewart in an ambulance to treat his gunshot

wound. However, Mr. Stewart did not go to the hospital at this time because he was

worried about his “son that was at home and had seizures . . . .”

Following the incident, Mr. Stewart “went to the doctor,” but treated the injury

by himself at home; he never attended a hospital for treatment. Mr. Stewart testified

he treated the gunshot wound daily by taking 800 milligrams of ibuprofen and

cleaning it with hydrogen peroxide. He also testified to missing “a little over a month”

of work because of the injury. Mr. Stewart added the gunshot wound did not “start

hurting [until] the next day,” attributing it to a surge of adrenaline at the time of the

shooting. Mrs. Stewart similarly noted that following the incident:

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[MRS. STEWART]: [Mr. Stewart] was in a lot of pain. It hurt to walk being that it was his inner thigh. We had to clean it a whole lot, a whole lot being that he didn’t go to the hospital. So it was a lot of cleaning, a lot of nasty bandages. It was pretty bad. It was -- he had a lot of trouble walking like.

[PROSECUTOR]: For about how long afterwards?

[MRS. STEWART]: Maybe a month.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And when you’re saying trouble walking because that kind of – you can take that one of two ways.

[MRS. STEWART]: Right. He could walk. He could walk. It just hurts to walk because it rubbed that wound.

By the time of trial, Mr. Stewart still felt “burning” and “tingling” sensations in his

thigh as a result of the shooting.

At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved for dismissal of his

AWDWIKISI charge, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence as to each

element of the offense. Defendant maintained “the State ha[d] not proven that [he]

was the person who committed the crime,” and there was a “lack of evidence”

demonstrating Mr. Stewart suffered a serious injury—a necessary element of

AWDWIKISI. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant elected not to present

evidence in his defense, rested, and renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all

evidence. Again, the trial court denied the motion.

Upon deliberation, the jury convicted Defendant of AWDWISI, a lesser

included offense of AWDWIKISI, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant

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then pled guilty to obtaining habitual felon status. The plea arrangement provided

the following pertinent details:

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of the class E felony of Assault with Deadly Weapon Inflicting Serious Injury (22 CR 215746) and the class G felony of Possession of Firearm by Felon (22 CR 215747). Defendant admits his status as an Habitual Felon (23 CR 9591), statutorily enhancing his sentence under the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act to a Class C felony for both of the underlying felonies. The underlying felonies will be consolidated for sentencing under 22 CR 215746. Defendant will be sentenced in the presumptive range in the discretion of the Court.

Accounting for Defendant’s habitual felon status and prior record level, he received a

consolidated sentence of 131 to 170 months imprisonment for all offenses. Defendant

entered an oral notice of appeal in open court.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen.

Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) (“From any final judgment of a superior court . . . .”) and 15A-

1444(a) (2023) (“A defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty to a criminal charge,

and who has been found guilty of a crime, is entitled to appeal as a matter of right

when final judgment has been entered.”).

III. Analysis

Defendant submits one issue for our consideration: Whether the trial court

committed error by denying his motion to dismiss the AWDWIKISI charge.

Defendant maintains “the State failed to present substantial evidence demonstrating

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he inflicted serious injury.” After careful consideration, we disagree.

“Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element

of the offense is a question of law; therefore, we review the denial of a motion to

dismiss de novo.” State v. Tucker, 380 N.C. 234, 236, 867 S.E.2d 924, 927 (2022)

(quoting State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 720, 782 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2016)). “‘Under

a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own

judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33,

669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation omitted).

“The question for a court on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence ‘is

whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense

charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the

perpetrator of such offense.’” Tucker, 380 N.C. at 236, 867 S.E.2d at 927 (quoting

State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). “Substantial evidence

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980); see also

State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574, 780 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2015) (“Substantial evidence

is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept

a conclusion.”). When there is substantial evidence, “the motion is properly denied.”

Powell, 299 N.C. at 98, 261 S.E.2d at 117. But “[i]f the evidence is sufficient only to

raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the

identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be allowed.” Id.

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“In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all

reasonable inferences.” Tucker, 380 N.C. at 237, 867 S.E.2d at 927. “Any

contradictions or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, and

evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.” State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90,

93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Tucker, 380 N.C. at 237,

867 S.E.2d at 927 (“Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the

case but are for the jury to resolve.”). In determining whether evidence is substantial,

a court must apply the following test:

The trial court is not required to determine that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior to denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the motion is the same whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial or both. That test is whether a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the evidence. If so[,] the evidence is substantial and the defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied.

State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 178–79, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983) (internal citations

omitted). “Thus, the evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt

for the case to be properly submitted to the jury.” State v. Barnett, 141 N.C. App. 378,

383, 540 S.E.2d 423, 427 (2000).

In the instant case, Defendant was charged with AWDWIKISI, but convicted

of AWDWISI—a lesser included offense of AWDWIKISI. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. §

14-32(a) (“Any person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon with intent

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to kill and inflicts serious injury shall be punished as a Class C felon.”); with N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 14-32(b) (“Any person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon

and inflicts serious injury shall be punished as a Class E felon.”); see also State v.

Nickerson, 365 N.C. 279, 282, 715 S.E.2d 845, 847 (2011) (In determining whether a

crime is a lesser-included offense, “the test is whether the essential elements of the

lesser crime are essential elements of the greater crime. If the lesser crime contains

an essential element that is not an essential element of the greater crime, then the

lesser crime is not a lesser included offense.”); see also State v. Cromartie, 177 N.C.

App. 73, 76, 627 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2006) (“The only difference in what the State must

prove for the offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and

assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury is the

element of intent to kill.”). “The elements of AWDWISI are: (1) an assault, (2) with a

deadly weapon, (3) inflicting serious injury, (4) not resulting in death.” State v. Jones,

353 N.C. 159, 164, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2000). Defendant solely contests the

sufficiency of the evidence as to the serious injury element—a necessary element to

support a conviction for both AWDWISI and AWDWIKISI. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

32(a)–(b); see also Cromartie, 177 N.C. App. at 76, 627 S.E.2d at 680.

“We have repeatedly defined the serious injury element of N.C. [Gen. Stat.] §

14-32 to mean a physical or bodily injury.” State v. Everhardt, 326 N.C. 777, 780, 392

S.E.2d 391, 392 (1990); see also State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 188–89, 446 S.E.2d

83, 87 (1994) (citations omitted) (“The term ‘inflicts serious injury,’ under G.S. 14-

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32(b), means physical or bodily injury resulting from an assault with a deadly

weapon.”); see also State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 526, 644 S.E.2d 615, 623 (2007);

see also State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 65, 243 SE.2d 367, 373 (1978); see also State v.

Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 91, 128 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1962). “[W]hether an injury is serious within

the meaning of AWDWISI is usually a factual determination that rests with the jury.”

Bagley, 183 N.C. App. at 526, 644 S.E.2d at 623; see also State v. Woods, 126 N.C.

App. 581, 592, 486 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1997) (“Whether serious injury has been inflicted

turns on the facts of each case and is generally a determination for the jury.”).

“A jury may consider such pertinent factors as hospitalization, pain, loss of

blood, and time lost at work in determining whether an injury is serious. Evidence

that the victim was hospitalized, however, is not necessary for proof of serious injury.”

State v. Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. 38, 53, 409 S.E.2d 309, 318 (1991) (internal citation

omitted); see also Woods, 126 N.C. App. at 592, 486 S.E.2d at 261; see also Joyner,

295 N.C. at 65, 243 S.E.2d at 374. “[A]s long as the State presents evidence that the

victim sustained a physical injury as a result of an assault by the defendant, it is for

the jury to determine the question of whether the injury was serious.” Alexander,

337 N.C. at 189, 446 S.E.2d at 87; see also Joyner, 295 N.C. at 65, 243 S.E.2d at 374

(“[T]here being evidence of physical or bodily injury to the victim, the question of the

nature of these injuries was also properly submitted to the jury.”).

Contrary to Defendant’s urging, the State presented substantial evidence,

allowing a juror to reasonably infer he inflicted a serious injury upon Mr. Stewart.

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See Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. at 53, 409 S.E.2d at 318; see also Smith, 300 N.C. at 78, 265

S.E.2d at 169. The record evidence shows Defendant shot Mr. Stewart in the leg with

a revolver during the altercation and suffered a “physical or bodily injury resulting

from” Defendant’s “assault with a deadly weapon.” Alexander, 337 N.C. at 188–89,

446 S.E.2d at 87. In addition, Mr. Stewart testified to missing “a little over a month”

of work because of the injury—one of the pertinent factors a jury may consider in

determining whether the injury was serious. See Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. at 53, 409

S.E.2d at 318. Moreover, when discussing the gunshot wound, Mr. Stewart testified

to being in pain following the incident, including having trouble walking, sitting, and

laying down. See Tucker, 380 N.C. at 237, 867 S.E.2d at 927; see also Hedgepeth, 330

N.C. at 53, 409 S.E.2d at 318.

Mrs. Stewart similarly testified as a result of the gunshot wound: Mr. Stewart

“was in a lot of pain”; Mr. Stewart had trouble walking; her and Mr. Stewart had to

clean the wound “a whole lot being that he didn’t go to the hospital”; and the cleaning

produced “a lot of nasty bandages.” This testimony speaks to several other pertinent

factors a jury may consider when determining whether an injury was serious. See

Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. at 53, 409 S.E.2d at 318. Although Defendant challenges the

lack of evidence demonstrating Mr. Stewart was hospitalized, our previous decisions

reflect “[e]vidence of hospitalization . . . is not necessary for proof of serious injury.”

Woods, 126 N.C. App. at 592, 486 S.E.2d at 261; see also Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. at 53,

409 S.E.2d at 318; see also Joyner, 295 N.C. at 65, 243 S.E.2d at 374.

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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, resolving any

contradictions in the evidence in favor of State, substantial evidence demonstrates

Mr. Stewart sustained a serious injury as a result of Defendant’s assault with a

deadly weapon. Tucker, 380 N.C. at 237, 867 S.E.2d at 927; see also Bradshaw, 366

N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347; see also Smith, 300 N.C. at 78, 265 S.E.2d at 169.

Substantial evidence includes the testimonies of Mr. and Mrs. Stewart articulating

his pain, “nasty bandages,” difficulty with daily tasks, and time lost at work. See also

Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. at 53, 409 S.E.2d at 318; see also Alexander, 337 N.C. at 189,

446 S.E.2d at 87. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not commit error by denying

Defendant’s motion to dismiss and submitting the charge for the jury’s consideration.

IV. Conclusion

Since the State presented substantial evidence demonstrating Defendant

inflicted a serious injury on Mr. Stewart, the trial court did not commit error by

denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

NO ERROR.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge WOOD concur.

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