Opinion of the Court by
ACOBA, J.
We hold that the first circuit court (the court) erred in summarily denying the motion to withdraw guilty plea of Defendant Appellant Noel Quintua Maddagan (Defendant). The court’s denial rested on the ground that, in violation of Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 57, no withdrawal of prior counsel and substitution of the counsel who had made the motion was filed. We conclude that, under HRPP Rule 57, the court had the discretion to allow substitution on conditions other than those expressly enumerated in the Rule and that under the circumstances, Defendant should have been given a hearing to advocate substitution on that basis.
I.
Defendant originally retained Philip D. Bo-getto to represent him in the instant case. On December 8, 1998, an order granting Bogetto’s motion to withdraw as counsel was filed, and, on December 22, 1998, Birney Bervar entered his appearance as Defendant’s counsel. On March 23,1999, pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the first degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1241(l)(a)(i) (1993), and one count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993). On November 2, 1999, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty years and five years on Counts I and II, respectively, and judgment was entered accordingly. No appeal was filed from the judgment.
More than nine months after the judgment, Defendant filed, at 11:40 a.m. on August 8, 2000, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to HRPP Rule 32(d).1 Attached to the motion was Defendant’s affidavit, which stated that Bervar was no longer his attorney and that Earle A. Partington had been authorized to represent him on the motion:
1. I am the Defendant in the above case. Attorney Birney Bervar who previously represented me in this ease has ceased to be my attorney. I hereby authorize Earle A. Partington to appear on my behalf for the purpose of this motion. I hereby waive my right to be returned to Hawaii and to appear at the hearing on this motion.
At 11:42 a.m. on August 8, 2000, the court entered a written order summarily denying the motion pursuant to HRPP Rule 57, on the ground that Partington was not counsel of record:
ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
Upon review of the records and files in this case, counsel of record for [Djefendant is Birney Bervar. Although in the affidavit) [DJefendant states Mr. Bervar ceases to be his attorney, there has been no withdrawal and substitution of counsel previously filed nor submitted with this motion pursuant to HRPP Rule 57; therefore
[179]*179IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is summarily denied as Mi’. Parting-ton is not counsel of record to file this motion.
(Emphasis added.)
II.
On August 23, 2000, Defendant appealed from the order. On appeal, Defendant claims that the court erred because, “[a]s a matter of law,” Bervar “had ceased to be [Defendant’s] attorney in 1999 when Defendant was sentenced and no appeal taken” and, consequently, that “[t]here was just no attorney to withdraw and substitute for in 2000 when the motion was filed.” His position rests on the grounds that: (1) it is “well-established law that an attorney-client relationship terminates by operation of law once the purpose of the employment is completed, absent a contrary agreement”; (2) “[HRPP] Rule 57 applies to ongoing eases, not to eases finally concluded”; and (3) “[a]ny other interpretation ... [would require attorneys to] withdraw at the end of each client’s case.” The prosecution asserts that: (1) “an attorney’s employment is a contractual matter ... and is not co-extensive with the attorney’s representation before the court”;2 (2) Defendant’s affidavit “tacitly recognized” that his “case was [not] ‘finally concluded’ ”; and (3) “Defendant has failed to show that any ... impediments prevented him from having ... Bervar move for a withdrawal and substitution of counsel” “or move[ ] for withdrawal and substitution of counsel without ... Ber-var’s cooperation[.]”
III.
A criminal defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” “A criminal defendant’s right to counsel, being implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.” State v. Hutch, 75 Haw. 307, 319 n. 3, 861 P.2d 11, 18 n. 3 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this connection, “it is well settled that ‘[a]rticle I, section 14 of the [Hawai'i] Constitution parallels the sixth amendment’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to counsel in criminal eases[.]’ ” State v. Soto, 84 Hawai'i 229, 237 n. 8, 933 P.2d 66, 86 n. 8 (1997) (quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawai'i 198, 220 n. 21, 915 P.2d 672, 694 n. 21 (1996); Hutch, 75 Haw. at 319 n. 3, 861 P.2d at 18 n. 3 (citation and footnote omitted)).
The United States Constitution’s “sixth amendment right to counsel includes a right to privately retained counsel of choice.” United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22-23 (2d Cir.1982)), overruled on other grounds by 491 U.S. 600, 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989). “ ‘An accused who is financially able to retain counsel must not be deprived of the opportunity to do so.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979)). The right to privately retained counsel fosters several significant interests:
The right to retain private counsel serves to foster the trust between attorney and client that is necessary for the attorney to be a truly effective advocate. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.1, p. 4-29 (commentary) (2d ed.1980). Not only are decisions crucial to the defendant’s liberty placed in counsel’s hands, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), but the defendant’s perception of the fairness of the process, and his [or her] willingness to acquiesce in its results, depend upon his [or her] confidence in his [or her] counsel’s dedication, loyalty, and ability.
[180]*180Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
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Opinion of the Court by
ACOBA, J.
We hold that the first circuit court (the court) erred in summarily denying the motion to withdraw guilty plea of Defendant Appellant Noel Quintua Maddagan (Defendant). The court’s denial rested on the ground that, in violation of Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 57, no withdrawal of prior counsel and substitution of the counsel who had made the motion was filed. We conclude that, under HRPP Rule 57, the court had the discretion to allow substitution on conditions other than those expressly enumerated in the Rule and that under the circumstances, Defendant should have been given a hearing to advocate substitution on that basis.
I.
Defendant originally retained Philip D. Bo-getto to represent him in the instant case. On December 8, 1998, an order granting Bogetto’s motion to withdraw as counsel was filed, and, on December 22, 1998, Birney Bervar entered his appearance as Defendant’s counsel. On March 23,1999, pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the first degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1241(l)(a)(i) (1993), and one count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993). On November 2, 1999, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty years and five years on Counts I and II, respectively, and judgment was entered accordingly. No appeal was filed from the judgment.
More than nine months after the judgment, Defendant filed, at 11:40 a.m. on August 8, 2000, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to HRPP Rule 32(d).1 Attached to the motion was Defendant’s affidavit, which stated that Bervar was no longer his attorney and that Earle A. Partington had been authorized to represent him on the motion:
1. I am the Defendant in the above case. Attorney Birney Bervar who previously represented me in this ease has ceased to be my attorney. I hereby authorize Earle A. Partington to appear on my behalf for the purpose of this motion. I hereby waive my right to be returned to Hawaii and to appear at the hearing on this motion.
At 11:42 a.m. on August 8, 2000, the court entered a written order summarily denying the motion pursuant to HRPP Rule 57, on the ground that Partington was not counsel of record:
ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
Upon review of the records and files in this case, counsel of record for [Djefendant is Birney Bervar. Although in the affidavit) [DJefendant states Mr. Bervar ceases to be his attorney, there has been no withdrawal and substitution of counsel previously filed nor submitted with this motion pursuant to HRPP Rule 57; therefore
[179]*179IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is summarily denied as Mi’. Parting-ton is not counsel of record to file this motion.
(Emphasis added.)
II.
On August 23, 2000, Defendant appealed from the order. On appeal, Defendant claims that the court erred because, “[a]s a matter of law,” Bervar “had ceased to be [Defendant’s] attorney in 1999 when Defendant was sentenced and no appeal taken” and, consequently, that “[t]here was just no attorney to withdraw and substitute for in 2000 when the motion was filed.” His position rests on the grounds that: (1) it is “well-established law that an attorney-client relationship terminates by operation of law once the purpose of the employment is completed, absent a contrary agreement”; (2) “[HRPP] Rule 57 applies to ongoing eases, not to eases finally concluded”; and (3) “[a]ny other interpretation ... [would require attorneys to] withdraw at the end of each client’s case.” The prosecution asserts that: (1) “an attorney’s employment is a contractual matter ... and is not co-extensive with the attorney’s representation before the court”;2 (2) Defendant’s affidavit “tacitly recognized” that his “case was [not] ‘finally concluded’ ”; and (3) “Defendant has failed to show that any ... impediments prevented him from having ... Bervar move for a withdrawal and substitution of counsel” “or move[ ] for withdrawal and substitution of counsel without ... Ber-var’s cooperation[.]”
III.
A criminal defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” “A criminal defendant’s right to counsel, being implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.” State v. Hutch, 75 Haw. 307, 319 n. 3, 861 P.2d 11, 18 n. 3 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this connection, “it is well settled that ‘[a]rticle I, section 14 of the [Hawai'i] Constitution parallels the sixth amendment’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to counsel in criminal eases[.]’ ” State v. Soto, 84 Hawai'i 229, 237 n. 8, 933 P.2d 66, 86 n. 8 (1997) (quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawai'i 198, 220 n. 21, 915 P.2d 672, 694 n. 21 (1996); Hutch, 75 Haw. at 319 n. 3, 861 P.2d at 18 n. 3 (citation and footnote omitted)).
The United States Constitution’s “sixth amendment right to counsel includes a right to privately retained counsel of choice.” United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22-23 (2d Cir.1982)), overruled on other grounds by 491 U.S. 600, 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989). “ ‘An accused who is financially able to retain counsel must not be deprived of the opportunity to do so.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979)). The right to privately retained counsel fosters several significant interests:
The right to retain private counsel serves to foster the trust between attorney and client that is necessary for the attorney to be a truly effective advocate. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.1, p. 4-29 (commentary) (2d ed.1980). Not only are decisions crucial to the defendant’s liberty placed in counsel’s hands, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), but the defendant’s perception of the fairness of the process, and his [or her] willingness to acquiesce in its results, depend upon his [or her] confidence in his [or her] counsel’s dedication, loyalty, and ability.
[180]*180Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 645, 109 S.Ct. 2667 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On independent state constitutional grounds, we also recognize that the right to counsel in article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution encompasses a right to privately retained counsel of choice. Cf. People v. Blake, 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 164 Cal.Rptr. 480, 483 (1980) (“As has been firmly established, due process of law comprises a right to appear and defend with retained counsel of one’s own choice.”) (citations omitted).
We acknowledge that “the right to counsel of choice is qualified, and can be outweighed by countervailing governmental interests.” Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 80. But, in light of the right to counsel, and in the absence of countervailing considerations, a criminal defendant should have his, her, or its choice of retained counsel.3 Due regard for this proposition must be given by a trial court in exercising its discretion as to whether a defendant’s withdrawal and/or substitution of counsel should be granted or denied. Cf. State v. Soares, 81 Hawai'i 332, 355, 916 P.2d 1233, 1256 (App.1996) (“Whether a change in counsel should be permitted ... rests in the sound discretion of the trial eourt[.]”) (citing State v. Ahlo, 2 Haw.App. 462, 469, 634 P.2d 421, 426 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 981, 102 S.Ct. 2252, 72 L.Ed.2d 858 (1982)). We examine HRPP Rule 57 in this context.
IY.
HRPP Rule 57 states:
Rule 57. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL.
Withdrawal of counsel shall require the approval of the court and shall be subject to Rule 1.16 of the Hawai'i Rules of Profes-' sional Conduct [ (HRPC) ].[4] Where the defendant is or may be indigent, substitution of counsel shall also comply with the procedure established in the Hawai'i Revised Statutes, chapter 802.[5] Unless otlv-[181]*181ermise ordered, withdrawal of counsel shall not become effective until substitute counsel appears or is appointed, the defendant appears pro se or the defendant is deemed to have waived counsel.
(Emphasis added.) On its face, HRPP Rule 57 would appear to apply in the event an attorney moves to withdraw from a ease.6 HRPC Rule 1.16, which is incorporated into the Rule, does not expressly refer to substitution of counsel, but its provisions indicate a concern that the client not be adversely affected by withdrawal, see Comment 7 to HRPC Rule 1.16 (stating that “[t]he lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client’s interests”), and that the client’s interest in any ongoing proceeding not be compromised by the absence of “employment of other counsel [or] ... papers and property to which the client is entitled.” HRPC Rule 1.16(d). See also Comment 9 to HRPC Rule 1.16 (“Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client.”). These objectives are reiterated in HRPP Rule 57’s admonition that “withdrawal of counsel shall not become effective until substitute counsel appears or is appointed.” Read in this context, HRPP Rule 57 is intended to ensure continued representation of a crimmal defendant when counsel of record withdraws and to maintain orderly proceedings in the case. This is consonant with the well-established principle that the trial court has inherent power to govern proceedings before it. See Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 402, 876 P.2d 1335, 1341 (1994) (stating that the trial court has inherent power to “prevent undue delays and to achieve the orderly disposition of cases”).
HRPP Rule 57 does not expressly prescribe the procedure to be followed when, rather than counsel moving to withdraw, a defendant represents to the court that counsel of record has been terminated and new counsel retained. Yet, HRPC Rule 1.16 recognizes that “[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.” Comment 4 to HRPC Rule 1.16. See also People v. Turner, 7 Cal.App.4th 913, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 388, 390 (1992) (stating that, “where a defendant has retained counsel of his or her choice, the attorney may be discharged at any time with or without cause”) (citation omitted). There may also be instances when withdrawal of counsel of record cannot practicably be obtained. Accordingly, reasonably construed, HRPP Rule 57 does not mandate in every [182]*182instance that where counsel are privately retained, counsel of record must first formally move to withdraw before new counsel may appear of record. Certainly, a joint written withdrawal of counsel of record and appearance of newly retained counsel would be acceptable, inasmuch as that would have satisfied an order such as that entered in the instant case, as well as the express terms of HRPP Rule 57.
But, in prefacing the mandate that withdrawal of counsel is subject to four alternative conditions with the words “unless otherwise ordered,” HRPP Rule 57 confers discretion upon the court to grant withdrawal and/or substitution under conditions other than those expressly enumerated. Hence, a declaration of Defendant to the effect that he has retained new counsel and that counsel of record no longer represents him may be sufficient to satisfy the interests embodied in HRPP Rule 57 and HRPC Rule 1.16, especially where the time for appeal has run and there are no pending proceedings before the court.7
If the court is inclined to deny the request for substitution of counsel, it must afford a defendant a hearing on the matter because the grant of discretion under HRPP Rule 57 fairly presumes that Defendant will have due opportunity to present argument that the court should “otherwise order” withdrawal and/or substitution. Defendant’s motion was denied for violation of HRPP Rule 57, apparently without advance notice to Defendant or an opportunity for him to be heard.
We can understand the court’s desire to promptly dispose of matters before it. However, because of the summary denial and the reasons cited therein, it may be doubtful that the court exercised the discretion afforded it under HRPP Rule 57. In any event, it is plain that Defendant had no opportunity to argue to the court that it should “otherwise order,” pursuant to HRPP Rule 57, that substitution was appropriate.8 Under the circumstances and having due regard for the right of Defendant to have retained counsel of his choice, we conclude that before the court summarily denied the motion on the ground that a withdrawal and substitution of counsel had not been filed under HRPP Rule 57, Defendant was entitled to a hearing on the question of whether Partington should have been substituted as counsel.
V.
Accordingly, we vacate the August 8, 2000 order summarily denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, remand the case to the court for determination of substitution of counsel, and instruct that the court allow Defendant to supplement the record if he desires to do so.