State v. M. T.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: A188618
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

868 June 24, 2026 No. 577

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of M. T., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. M. T., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 25CC05023; A188618

Bradley A. Cascagnette, Judge. Submitted June 2, 2026. Liza Langford filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Jose Garcia-Fuerte, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 868 (2026) 869

TOOKEY, P. J. Appellant appeals a judgment of civil commitment. The trial court ordered that appellant be committed to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days and prohibited him from purchasing or pos- sessing a firearm based on appellant being a “person with mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5.1 Specifically, the trial court deter- mined that appellant, because of a mental disorder, is dan- gerous to others. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 4. We affirm. To meet the legal standard for a danger to others commitment, the state must prove that the person has a men- tal disorder that makes the person “highly likely to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment.” State v. S. E. R., 297 Or App 121, 122, 441 P3d 254 (2019). “A sin- gle violent act may be sufficient to establish that a person is dangerous to others, if the circumstances of the act, the per- son’s history, or other contextual evidence allows the court to rely on the act to predict future dangerousness.” State v. J. G., 302 Or App 97, 100-01, 458 P3d 721 (2020). However, “overt acts of violence are not necessary to establish danger- ousness to others. Verbal threats may be enough in appro- priate circumstances.” Id. at 101 n 3. Generally, when verbal threats are at issue, the state will have “to provide evidence that shows that the appellant’s threats of future violence are accompanied by an overt act demonstrating an intention and ability to carry out the threats or other circumstances indicating that actual future violence is highly likely.” State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 625, 391 P3d 880 (2017). The state must establish that “actual future violence is highly likely,” given “the serious deprivation of liberty and social stigma that are attendant to a civil commitment, and the fact that such a preventive confinement is predicated on a prediction of future behavior.” State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 749, 386 P3d 99 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

1 The legislature recently made significant amendments to the civil com- mitment statutes, which became operative on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under the previous version of the statutes, so our analysis is based on the previous version of the statutes. 870 State v. M. T.

The trial court determined the legal standard to be met here. On appeal, in a preserved claim of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law. Our task, therefore, is to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support civil commitment. L. R., 283 Or App at 619. “Whether the evidence presented by the state is legally sufficient to support a civil commitment is a question of law.” State v. A. D. S., 258 Or App 44, 45, 308 P3d 365 (2013). “Ultimately, in view of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceed- ings, the question for us as the reviewing court is whether a rational factfinder could have found that it was highly prob- able that appellant was a danger to * * * others because of a mental disorder.” State v. S. A. R., 308 Or App 365, 366, 479 P3d 618 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient for the trial court to deter- mine that appellant’s mental disorder made him dangerous to others. Appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia and lived in a residential treatment home with other residents. Appellant was taken into a behavioral health unit follow- ing an incident at the residential treatment home where he threw various items, including pictures, books, and a water- melon. The psychiatrist testified that he had not been able to hold “any substantial conversation with [appellant] due to various issues, including his aggression, withdrawal, [and] responding to internal stimuli.” Appellant attended his commitment hearing by remote means from the behavioral health unit. During the hearing, appellant started swearing at the judge, and he struck one of the security personnel. At another point during the hearing, appellant was “throwing things towards the two individuals who [were] with him.” The treating psychiatrist testified that appellant’s actions during the hearing were “consistent with his same behaviors since admission to our unit,” specifically, appellant was observed to be “aggressive, posturing, striking out at security staff, un-redirectable, and requiring significant staff efforts to maintain safety of Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 868 (2026) 871

himself and others.” The psychiatrist attributed appellant’s behavior to his “current ongoing * * * severe and persistent mental illness.” Based on that record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that appellant was a danger to others because of a mental dis- order. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of civil commit- ment and the order prohibiting the purchase and possession of firearms. Affirmed.