State v. Lucas

138 S.E. 393, 103 W. Va. 743, 1927 W. Va. LEXIS 142
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMay 24, 1927
Docket5867
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 138 S.E. 393 (State v. Lucas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Lucas, 138 S.E. 393, 103 W. Va. 743, 1927 W. Va. LEXIS 142 (W. Va. 1927).

Opinion

Miller, Judge:

The defendant was indicted jointly with 0. E. Robertson and A. L. Wooten, charged with the murder of George Thompson. The State elected to try Lucas separately, and he was convicted of second degree murder, and sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for a period of eighteen years.

The first point presented by this writ of error is the action of the trial court in overruling defendant’s motion for a change of venue. The only matters of fact alleged in his affidavit in support of this motion are that a strong feeling against him existed in the community immediately after the affair which resulted in Thompson’s death; that after waiving preliminary hearing, he was taken to the Cabell county jail for safe keeping because of such feeling; that while he was in the Logan county jail, it was deemed necessary to have the jail specially guarded to prevent sympathizers of George Thompson from killing him; and that it would be impossible for him to get a fair trial in Logan county. No other affidavit or evidence was tendered in support of the motion; and from the record before us there is nothing to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the action of the court in overruling said motion. “The affidavit of the prisoner which states only his opinion that local prejiidice exists against him to such an extent that he can not obtain a fair trial is not sufficient to support his motion for a change of venue. Eacts and circumstances must be shown, preferably by disinterested persons, sufficient to satisfy the court that a fair trial can not be had.” State v. Lutz, 88 W. Va. 502.

Defendant’s motion for a continuance was overruled. This motion was based on the absence of one Sid Moore, whom defendant claimed was a material witness. The only fact defendant said he expected to prove by Moore that he could not *745 prove by any other witness was that Moore saw the deceased attempt to strike him and go through motions that warranted him in feeling that the deceased was going to shoot him. He admitted that several others were present at the time, bnt had not talked with them and did not know what they could swear to. From the testimony of the sheriff and one of his deputies it appears that Moore was also charged with the murder of Thompson, and that a warrant had been in the hands of the sheriff or his deputies for some time, and that diligent search had failed to reveal where Moore was; and it was the opinion of the officers that it was probable that he never would be found. Defendant had no idea where he was. On this evidence the trial court properly overruled the motion for a continuance.

The next point, strongly urged, is that certain steps were taken on the trial of the case in the absence of the defendant. It appears that after the defendant had pleaded “not guilty,” and the panel of twenty qualified jurors had been selected, their names were written each on a separate card and handed to the prosecuting attorney, who withdrew two of the cards and passed the remaining eighteen to defendant’s counsel. Counsel and the prisoner retired to an adjoining room to select the jurors they desired to challenge, and (quoting from the bill of exceptions) “after some time had been spent in the exercise of the challenge of the jury, the defendant’s counsel returned into the court room with a list of the petit jurors which had been challenged in one hand, and those that were to sit in the case in the other, and announced to the court that the defendant had completed his challenge. And handed another bunch of cards containing the names of the challenges to Tilda Ellis, deputy clerk of the circuit court, and thereupon the said Tilda Ellis called some of the jurors out of the full panel of jurors which were to sit on the defendant’s case and which did sit on the case, thereby excluding the challenged jurors, all of this was done in the absence of this defendant who was at that time back in a witness room with the door closed, in the rear portion of the court house. ’ ’ The only act done by the deputy clerk, and the only proceeding *746 taken in the absence of the prisoner, was to begin the separation of the twelve jurors who had been selected to sit on the trial of the case from the eight challenged by the State and the defendant, and to exclude the eight from the whole panel of twenty called and examined for qualification.

Defendant relies on section 2 of chapter 159 of the Code, that “a person indicted for a felony shall be personally present during the trial therefor,” and the decisions thereunder, particularly State v. Parsons, 39 W. Va. 464, and State v. Stevenson, 64 W. Va. 392. These and the other cases cited do hold that the accused shall be present in person when anything is done to affect him; but where was anything done to affect the defendant in this case while he was absent from the court room. The challenge was complete. The twelve had already been selected and agreed upon by the parties. All that remained before the swearing of the jury to try the case, was the placing of the twelve in the jury bos, and the dismissing of those struck off by the parties. The mere act of reading the names of those jurors who had been selected to sit in the ease could not affect the defendant. No statute or rule of law prescribes any particular procedure for placing the jury in the jury box, and strictly this act on the part of the clerk is no part of the trial, as contemplated by section 2 of chapter 159 of the Code.

The defendant claims that the fact of the homicide was not established; that the evidence does not prove that deceased came to his death by any act of the defendant.

From the evidence it appears that Lucas, Robertson and Wooten were driving about the city of Logan late in the evening in Robertson’s Dodge Coupe when they met a young man by the name of Sid Moore, whom Lucas knew. Lucas asked Moore where they eould get some whiskey. Moore replied that they could get it at George Thompson’s, about two or three miles from Logan. The four men went there. Thompson lived in a house of three rooms and a back porch. Two of the rooms had front doors or entrances from the street. The room occupied by Thompson was not connected with *747 either of the other rooms by a door. In the rear of . the other front room was a kitchen communicating with that room. This room and the kitchen were occupied by Mrs. Helena Riggs and her two small children. There were doors from the kitchen and from Thompson’s room opening on the porch. The men testified that they purchased two bottles of liquor from Mrs. Roberts, the mother of Mrs. Riggs, one of which was handed into the kitchen by Thompson through the door to the porch. They say they drank the liquor in the kitchen and in Mrs. Riggs’ bedroom. Mrs. Riggs was in bed and did not get up, but talked with them while they sat there. The women say that no liquor was sold; that there was none in the house. They say that the men, with the exception of Robertson, were intoxicated when they arrived, and that they did not know any of the men, — had never seen them before.

The women testified that after the visitors had been in the house for some time, Thompson came to the front door and asked what those men were doing there, and that Mrs. Roberts replied they wanted a pint of whiskey.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
138 S.E. 393, 103 W. Va. 743, 1927 W. Va. LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-lucas-wva-1927.