State v. Flanagan

26 W. Va. 116, 1885 W. Va. LEXIS 52
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedJune 27, 1885
StatusPublished
Cited by49 cases

This text of 26 W. Va. 116 (State v. Flanagan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Flanagan, 26 W. Va. 116, 1885 W. Va. LEXIS 52 (W. Va. 1885).

Opinion

Woods, Judge:

On May 23, 1884, John C. Flanagan was indicted in the circuit court of Randolph county for the murder of Frances Summerfield, on the — day of December, 1883.

The indictment was in the form prescribed by sec. 1 of ch. 118 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1882. To this indictment the defendant pleaded “Not guilty.” The case was continued until the September term, when it was tried, and the jury on September 27, 1884, returned their verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first degree, and that he be punished by confinement in the penitentiary.

The defendant moved the court to set the verdict aside and grant him a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, which motion the court overruled, and the prisoner excepted, and filed his bill of exceptions, wherein the court certified all the evidence which was before the jury on the trial, and entered a judgment upon the verdict, that the prisoner be confined in the penitentiary, during the period of his natural life. To this judgment the prisoner obtained a writ of error.

Four grounds of error are assigned by the prisoner’s counsel, but all taken together, they amount in substance to this, that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. One of the prisoner’s counsel suggests in his brief, that the indictment was insufficient, because it did not “fully and plainly inform the prisoner of the character and cause of the accusation against him.” This question has been twice before this Court, and in both cases it has been held that an indictment in the form prescribed in sec. 1 of ch. 118 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1882 is sufficient, and we regard this as a settled question. Schnelle v. State, 24 W. Va. 767; Smith v. State, Id. 814.

The only remaining question is that presented by the pris-

[119]*119oner’s bill of exceptions, viz : Is the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict ? It is evident upon inspection of the bill of exceptions, that while it purports to certify the facts proved, it amounts to nothing more than a certificate of the evidence given by the several witnesses at the trial. Whatever doubts may have .heretofore existed as to the sufficiency of a bill of exceptions, which certifies all the evidence adduced at the trial instead of the facts proved thereby, it is now well settled that the appellate court, upon a bill of exceptions certifying all the evidence, will review the opinion of the trial-court in granting or refusing a new' trial, on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, in all cases -where it is not compelled to decide upon the degree of credibility to which the witnesses or any of them, were entitled; but that- in all cases where the appellate court,-in order to grant relief, is required to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it will decline to interfere with the verdict which has been approved by the trial-court, for the very good reason, that no certificate of the evidence, of witnesses whose testimony is conflicting, can afford the appellate court an opportunity of judging of the credibility of the witness, equal to that possessed by the court and jury -which tried the cause. The testimony given by two witnesses when reduced to writing, may seem equally truthful, yet the conduct and demeanor of one of these -witnesses before the jury may have convinced both court and jury that the witness was wholly unworthy of credit, while that of the other, may have carried, conviction to the mind of every one who heard his testimony. In all cases therefore where the appellate court is asked to determine the degree of credibility, to -which the witnesses are entitled, it will decline, because it is unable to do so. But in cases where the evidence, and not the facts, is certified, the appellate court will review the opinion of the trial-court granting or refusing a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, whenever the court by excluding all the conflicting parol evidence of the exceptor, and by giving full faith and credit to all the evidence of the adverse party can see that the verdict is plainly contrary to, and unsupported by the evidence. Carrington v. Bennett, 1 Leigh 340; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh [120]*120337; Green v. Ashby, 6 Leigh 135; Rohr v. Davis, 9 Leigh 30; Slaughter’s Administrator v. Tutt, 12 Leigh 147; Parly v. English, 5 Grat. 141; Vaiden v. Commonwealth, 12 Grat. 717. This question, has been considered by this Court in the cases of Smith v. Townsend, 21 W. Va. 486, Black v. Thomas, Id. 709, and State v. Thompson, Id. 741. In the case last cited this Court laid down the rule in such cases to be, that, “where the evidence and' not the facts is certified in the bill of exceptions, the appellate court will not reverse the judgment unless after rejecting all the conflicting parol evidence of the exceptor, and giving full faith and credit to that of the adverse party the decision of the trial-court still appears to be wrong.” But the appellate court will not interfere with the verdict of the jury, on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, merely because, if upon the jury it would, upon the evidence, have given a different verdict. To justify the court in granting a new trial, the evidence should bo plainly insufficient to warrant the finding of the jury. Grayson’s Case, 6 Grat. 712, and Vaiden’s Case, supra. Applying these rules to the case under consideration, all evidence introduced by the prisoner, which is in conflict with that offered by the State must be disregarded. If therefore upon giving full faith and credit to all the evidence introduced by the State, and disregarding all evidence in conflict therewith, offered by the prisoner, the same was plainly insufficient to warrant the verdict, the judgment of the circuit court overruling his motion to set the same aside, must be reversed, otherwise, it must be affirmed.

All the evidence introduced by the State against the prisoner was circumstantial; aud it is insisted by the Attorney General in argument, that the circumstances set forth in the bill of exceptions, are not only sufficient, to establish the corpus delicti, but to fix upon the prisoner the crime of murder, and that ho was induced to commit the crime “by a jealous woman who felt outraged by the conduct of her husband.” It may be remarked here, that where a crime has been committed, and the accused has been proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence to be the guilty party, it becomes wholly immaterial to inquire what motive induced him to commit the crime; but when the perpetrator is unknown, [121]*121and an effort is made to tasten upon the accused the guilt ot the crime, then the motive, which may probably have induced him to commit the crime, may become a matter of the most earnest inquiry, for if the alleged motive be such as usually leads to the commission of such a crime, proof of its existence in the mind of the accused before or at the time of the commission thereof may possibly in some degree, tend to connect the accused with it. But if on the other hand, there is a total absence of all motive to commit such a crime, or if a motive of a wholly different character is shown to have existed in the mind of the accused, these facts would tend to relieve the accused from the charge preferred against him.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 W. Va. 116, 1885 W. Va. LEXIS 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-flanagan-wva-1885.