State v. Long

140 S.W.3d 27, 2004 Mo. LEXIS 94, 2004 WL 1471051

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: July 1, 2004
• Docket: SC 85620
• Status: Published

Opinions

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge.

Jeffrey D. Long was convicted of one count of forcible rape, section 566.030, RSMo 2000,¹ and one count of forcible sodomy, section 566.060. The trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Long from introducing evidence of prior false allegations by the victim. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.

FACTS

According to the state’s evidence, the victim went to Long’s apartment with Chris Manning. Once at Long’s apartment, all three began drinking. At some point, Long and Manning beat and sexually assaulted the victim and then forced her out of Long’s apartment and into a hallway. She remained there until the next morning because she was afraid and in pain. She then walked to a nearby grocery store, where a security guard called a taxi for her. She went home, bathed, and tried to recover from the assault.

A few days later, she reported the incident to police. A medical examination revealed bruising, rectal trauma, and vaginal tears and abrasions consistent with a sexual assault. Athough there was substantial physical evidence that the victim had been assaulted, a police search of Long’s apartment recovered no evidence indicating the victim had been assaulted there. There was no physical evidence linking Long to the assault. Long denied assaulting the victim. There were no other witnesses.

In order to rebut the victim’s allegations, Long attempted to introduce testimony from three witnesses via offers of proof. In the first offer of proof, Timothy Wilson testified that the victim had told the police that he had physically assaulted her by hitting her on the head with a rock. Wilson also testified that, on another occasion, the victim had told police that he had threatened her with harm. The neighbor testified that both allegations were false.

In the second offer of proof, a police detective testified that the victim alleged that Wilson had threatened her. The detective testified that the victim later called her and said that Wilson was not the man who threatened her.

In the final offer of proof, the neighborhood property manager testified that the victim called her and accused Wilson of luring her from her home by pretending to be a security guard and then sexually assaulting her. Two weeks later, the victim called the property manager and recanted her story.

The trial court excluded the testimony in each offer of proof, concluding that it was irrelevant and not “proper character evidence.” Long’s attorney did not cross-examine the victim regarding these prior allegations.

ANALYSIS

In his first point on appeal,² Long argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the three witnesses who said that the victim had made previous false allegations of sexual or physical assault. Long maintains that the excluded testimony was central to his defense that the victim had falsely accused him of assaulting her.³ The state argues that the proffered testimony was inadmissible as an improper attempt to prove the victim’s untruthfulness with extrinsic evidence of specific acts of misconduct.

I.

Missouri law allows a party to attack the credibility of witness by demonstrating the witnesses’ bad character for truth and veracity. John C. O’Brien, MISSOURI Law of Evidence, section 5-7 (3d ed.1996). While a party may cross-examine the witness regarding specific acts of misconduct relating to credibility, these prior acts may not be proven by extrinsic evidence. Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d 576, 590 (Mo. banc 2001). Thus, when a defendant cross-examines a witness about prior misconduct, the defendant is “bound by the witness’ answer” and “cannot offer evidence to the contrary, unless, of course, the character of the witness has been put in issue on direct examination.” State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.App.1973).

The bar on extrinsic evidence of prior, specific acts of misconduct furthers the general policy focusing the fact-finder the most probative facts and conserving judicial resources by avoiding mini-trials on collateral issues. Hoffman v. Graber, 153 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Mo.App.1941). In some cases, however, the rule excluding extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations fails to serve this purpose by shielding the fact-finder not from collateral issues, but from a central issue in the case. An issue is not collateral if it is a “crucial issue directly in controversy.” State v. Williams, 849 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo.App.1993). Where, as in this case, a witness’ credibility is a key factor in determining guilt or acquittal, excluding extrinsic evidence of the witnesses’ prior false allegations deprives the fact-finder of evidence that is highly relevant to a crucial issue directly in controversy; the credibility of the witness. An evidentiary rule rendering non-collateral, highly relevant evidence inadmissible must yield to the defendant’s constitutional right to present a full defense. Mo. Const. art. 1, section 18(a).

To remedy this problem, several jurisdictions allow defendants to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that a victim has previously made false allegations.⁴ Although the exact rationales for and restrictions on the admissibility of such evidence varies, the common theme is a concern for striking the appropriate balance between avoiding misguided focus on collateral issues while allowing the accused to fully defend against the charge.

The current Missouri rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations does not strike the appropriate balance. Therefore, a criminal defendant in Missouri may, in some cases, introduce extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations. This rule is not limited to sexual assault or rape cases.

II.

Having determined that extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations may be admissible, the requirements for establishing admissibility must be defined. In cases involving rape or sexual assault, most states require trial courts to make a preliminary determination, outside the presence of the jury, that (1) the victim made another allegation of rape or sexual assault; (2) this allegation was false; and, (3) the victim knew the allegation was false. Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 337 (Alaska App.2002).

While the second and third requirements are sound, the first is not. Prior false allegations are relevant to the witness’ credibility. The relevance of the prior false allegation is thus derived primarily from the fact that the allegation was false and not entirely from the subject matter of the prior false allegation. The rule limiting the inquiry to prior false allegations that are the same as the charged offense erroneously focuses the relevance analysis entirely upon the subject matter of the allegation and ignores the fact from which relevance to witness credibility is derived; the fact that the allegation was false. Therefore, the fundamental requirement for admitting extrinsic evidence of a prior false allegation should be a showing of legal relevance⁵ in which the trial court must balance the probative value of the knowingly made prior false allegation with the potential prejudice. Of course, similarities between the prior false allegation and the charged offense as well as circumstances under which the allegation was made all factor into the relevance analysis. A prior false allegation could be so remote in time or made under circumstances so dissimilar to the charged offense that the prejudice outweighs the probative value. As with any other relevancy ruling, trial courts retain wide discretion in determining the legal relevance of prior false allegations.

Most states require a defendant to establish that the prosecuting witness previously made knowingly false allegations either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 338. The preponderance of the evidence standard is consistent with other foundational requirements⁶ for admitting or excluding evidence in Missouri and is, therefore, the applicable standard for determining whether a defendant has established that the prosecuting witness previously made knowingly false allegations. As in other cases, the defendant may rely upon the full panoply of available evidence for establishing admissibility. Documents, witnesses and other such evidence may be admissible to demonstrate the relevance of prior false allegations.

III.

The facts of this case indicate that Long is entitled to an opportunity to establish the admissibility of extrinsic evidence regarding the victim’s prior false allegations.⁷ The prosecuting witness testified that Long assaulted her. Long denies doing so. No other witnesses testified that Long sexually assaulted the victim. There was no physical evidence linking Long to the assault on the victim. The jury’s assessment of the relative credibility of Long and the prosecuting witness was the key to Long’s conviction, thereby enhancing the relevance of prior false allegations. Under these circumstances, excluding evidence of prior false allegations was prejudicial because the Long was deprived of a full opportunity to present his defense that the witness was fabricating the present allegations against him.

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.⁸

WHITE, C.J., WOLFF and STITH, JJ., concur. PRICE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. LIMBAUGH, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. BENTON, J., concurs in opinion of LIMBAUGH, J.

1 . All statutory references are to RSMo 2000.

2 . As a new trial has been granted, the other claims of error raised in this appeal need not be reviewed.

3 . Section 491.015, known as the rape shield statute, does not bar inquiry into prior false allegations of rape or sexual assault. Evidence of prior complaints, as opposed to pri- or sexual conduct, is not rendered inadmissible by section 491.015. State v. Raines, 118 S.W.3d 205, 212 (Mo.App.2003); State v. Scott, 78 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Mo.App.2002). However, it is possible that some prior allegations of sexual assault could implicate prior sexual conduct. In that case, the trial court would have to consider the applicability of section 491.015.

4 . Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska App.2002); State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824 (Ind.1999); Clibum v. State, 710 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (prior false allegation of kidnapping admissible); Beck v. State, 1991 OK CR 126, 824 P.2d 385 (1991); Miller v. State, 105 Nev. 497, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (1989); Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1989); State v. Barber, 13 Kan.App.2d 224, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (1989); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263, 263 (1988); State v. Anderson, 211 Mont. 272, 686 P.2d 193, 199-200 (1984); People v. Mikula, 84 Mich.App. 108, 269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1978); People v. McClure, 42 Ill.App.3d 952, 1 Ill.Dec. 617, 356 N.E.2d 899, 901 (1976); State v. Izzi, 115 R.I. 487, 348 A.2d 371, 372-73 (1975).

5 . Evidence is legally relevant if its probative value outweighs its costs — prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time or cumulativeness. State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. banc 2002).

6 . When a defendant challenges the admissibility of a confession, the confession is admissible only if the state proves the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Ervin 979 S.W.2d 149, 160 (Mo. banc 1998).

The state must show by a preponderance of the evidence that allegedly false statements in a search warrant were not made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. State v. Trenter, 85 S.W.3d 662, 666 (Mo.App.2002).

The state bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a motion to suppress should be denied. State v. Heyer, 962 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Mo.App.1998) (citing State v. Hoopingarner, 845 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo.App.1993)).

7 . The state argues that Mr. Long’s failure to cross-examine the victim also operates to bar him from introducing extrinsic evidence of the prior allegations. As the dissent points out, the defendant should normally first cross-examine the witness prior to introducing extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations. In this case, the decision not to cross-examine the victim regarding the prior allegations does not bar Mr. Long from introducing the evidence. Among the reasons given by the trial court for refusing Mr. Long’s offers of proof was that the proffered testimony was not relevant. It would, therefore, likely have been futile for counsel to attempt to cross-examine the victim regarding subject matter that the trial court had already ruled irrelevant. "The law does not compel the undertaking of a useless act for the lone aim of complying with a technical requirement.” State v. Barnett, 628 S.W.2d 917, 920[4] (Mo.App.1982); State v. Spulak, 720 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo.App.1986).

8 .The trial judge, who consistently displayed a concern for fairness throughout the course of the trial, reasonably interpreted existing Missouri precedent in declining to admit the proffered testimony. This opinion is thus a critique of one aspect of Missouri’s common law of evidence, not of the trial court's legal acumen and judgment.