IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. Nos. 2404009772 ) 2404014218 SHAKA LEWIS, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: April 7, 2025 Decided: April 16, 2025
Upon Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Postconviction Relief SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Upon Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Appointment of Counsel DENIED.
ORDER
Jillian Bender, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Shaka Lewis, SBI# 449332, Howard R. Young correctional Institution, 1301 E. 12th Street, Wilmington, DE 19809, pro se.
WHARTON, J. The 16th day of April 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Shaka Lewis’
(“Lewis”) Motion for Postconviction Relief 1 (“PCR Motion”), his Motion for
Appointment of Counsel,2 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. Lewis pled guilty to Attempted Assault First Degree, Burglary First
Degree, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”)
on November 12, 2024.3 He was sentenced the same day to an unsuspended
minimum mandatory period of seven years imprisonment followed by probation.4
Lewis did not appeal.
2. Lewis now moves for postconviction relief for the first time.5
Accompanying that motion is a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.6 Lewis raises
three claims. His first alleges, “Ineffective assistance of counsel. I feel like I was
pressured into taking the plea deal. Faced with a lengthy potential sentence, my
lawyer coerced me to take plea.”7 The second alleges, “Ineffective assistance of
counsel. My lawyer did not call witnesses that would have provided key evidence for
1 D.I. 15 (ID N. 2404014218); D.I. 16 (ID No. 2404009772). Subsequent docket item references are to ID No. 2404014218).` 2 D.I. 17. 3 D.I. 11. 4 D.I. 12. 5 D.I. 15. 6 D.I. 17. 7 Id. 2 my case.”8 The third simply states, “Mental health needs. Lack of mental health
resources such as counselling or therapy.”9
3. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).10 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim. 11 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, repetitive
motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds time
limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final or if it
asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year after it was
first recognized. 12 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and therefore barred.13
The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was convicted at trial and
the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual innocence; 14 or (2) the
application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law
rendering the conviction invalid.15 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings
leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the
8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 11 Id. 12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii). 3 movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”16 Grounds
for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal
habeas corpus hearing” are barred.17 The above bars to relief do not apply either to a
claim the court lacked jurisdiction or to one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the
application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law
rendering the conviction invalid.18 None of Rule 61(i)’s bars to relief are present here.
4. To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim,
a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2)
that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with
reliable results.19 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 20
Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and
substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.21 “[A] court must indulge in a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” 22 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a
showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 19 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 20 Id. at 667-68. 21 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 22 Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689. 4 errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 23 An inmate must
satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs to succeed on an IAC claim. Failure to
do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.24
5. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion
for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the
movant is not entitled to relief. 25 Here, it is plain to the Court from the PCR Motion
and the record in this case that Lewis is not entitled to relief.
6. The Court need only review Lewis’ Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea
Form to see that he was not pressured or coerced into pleading guilty. Barring clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, defendants are bound by the representations
they make during their plea colloquy. 26 These statements are “presumed to be
truthful”27 and pose a “formidable barrier to a collateral attack on a guilty plea.”28 At
no point during his colloquy, as reflected by the Truth-in Sentencing Guilty Plea
Form, did Lewis express that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered.29 He denied being forced into pleading guilty, informed the
23 Id. at 694. 24 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 25 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5). 26 Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632. 27 Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632 (citing Davis v. State, 1992 WL 401566 (Del. 1992)); Bramlett v. A.L. Lockhart, 876 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1989)). 28 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 64 (1977). 29 D.I. 11. 5 Court that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, and understood the
trial rights he waived by pleading guilty.30
7.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. Nos. 2404009772 ) 2404014218 SHAKA LEWIS, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: April 7, 2025 Decided: April 16, 2025
Upon Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Postconviction Relief SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Upon Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Appointment of Counsel DENIED.
ORDER
Jillian Bender, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Shaka Lewis, SBI# 449332, Howard R. Young correctional Institution, 1301 E. 12th Street, Wilmington, DE 19809, pro se.
WHARTON, J. The 16th day of April 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Shaka Lewis’
(“Lewis”) Motion for Postconviction Relief 1 (“PCR Motion”), his Motion for
Appointment of Counsel,2 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. Lewis pled guilty to Attempted Assault First Degree, Burglary First
Degree, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”)
on November 12, 2024.3 He was sentenced the same day to an unsuspended
minimum mandatory period of seven years imprisonment followed by probation.4
Lewis did not appeal.
2. Lewis now moves for postconviction relief for the first time.5
Accompanying that motion is a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.6 Lewis raises
three claims. His first alleges, “Ineffective assistance of counsel. I feel like I was
pressured into taking the plea deal. Faced with a lengthy potential sentence, my
lawyer coerced me to take plea.”7 The second alleges, “Ineffective assistance of
counsel. My lawyer did not call witnesses that would have provided key evidence for
1 D.I. 15 (ID N. 2404014218); D.I. 16 (ID No. 2404009772). Subsequent docket item references are to ID No. 2404014218).` 2 D.I. 17. 3 D.I. 11. 4 D.I. 12. 5 D.I. 15. 6 D.I. 17. 7 Id. 2 my case.”8 The third simply states, “Mental health needs. Lack of mental health
resources such as counselling or therapy.”9
3. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).10 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim. 11 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, repetitive
motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds time
limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final or if it
asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year after it was
first recognized. 12 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and therefore barred.13
The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was convicted at trial and
the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual innocence; 14 or (2) the
application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law
rendering the conviction invalid.15 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings
leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the
8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 11 Id. 12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii). 3 movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”16 Grounds
for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal
habeas corpus hearing” are barred.17 The above bars to relief do not apply either to a
claim the court lacked jurisdiction or to one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the
application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law
rendering the conviction invalid.18 None of Rule 61(i)’s bars to relief are present here.
4. To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim,
a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2)
that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with
reliable results.19 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 20
Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and
substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.21 “[A] court must indulge in a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” 22 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a
showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 19 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 20 Id. at 667-68. 21 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 22 Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689. 4 errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 23 An inmate must
satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs to succeed on an IAC claim. Failure to
do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.24
5. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion
for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the
movant is not entitled to relief. 25 Here, it is plain to the Court from the PCR Motion
and the record in this case that Lewis is not entitled to relief.
6. The Court need only review Lewis’ Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea
Form to see that he was not pressured or coerced into pleading guilty. Barring clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, defendants are bound by the representations
they make during their plea colloquy. 26 These statements are “presumed to be
truthful”27 and pose a “formidable barrier to a collateral attack on a guilty plea.”28 At
no point during his colloquy, as reflected by the Truth-in Sentencing Guilty Plea
Form, did Lewis express that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered.29 He denied being forced into pleading guilty, informed the
23 Id. at 694. 24 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 25 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5). 26 Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632. 27 Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632 (citing Davis v. State, 1992 WL 401566 (Del. 1992)); Bramlett v. A.L. Lockhart, 876 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1989)). 28 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 64 (1977). 29 D.I. 11. 5 Court that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, and understood the
trial rights he waived by pleading guilty.30
7. If any pressure or coercion was applied to Lewis, it was a result of the
difficult situation in which he found himself. As he acknowledges, he was faced
with a “lengthy potential sentence.” He is correct – he was facing a long potential
sentence of 75 years on just the charges to which he pled guilty. Other charges
included a second count of Attempted Assault First Degree, an additional two counts
of PFDCF, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Criminal Mischief (Felony),
Aggravated Menacing, Unlawful Imprisonment First Degree, and Criminal Mischief
(Misdemeanor). He faced an additional 93 years at Level V, eight of which were
minimum mandatory sentences, on the charges the State agreed to drop. But, his
lawyer had nothing to do with that type of pressure. Lewis has not made, much less
substantiated, any concrete claim of actual prejudice. His first claim is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
8. Similarly Lewis’ second claim of IAC is unsubstantiated by any evidence
of actual prejudice. He does not identify what witnesses his lawyer should have
called. Nor does he describe what evidence they would have provided. Moreover,
there was no hearing at which the witnesses would have testified. This claim too is
30 Id. 6 9. Lewis’ third claim is not really a claim at all. It is simply a statement
about a lack of mental health resources. 31 It is SUMMARILY DISMISSED as
well.
10. Finally, Lewis seeks appointment of counsel. That request is denied
due to the Court’s summary dismissal of all of his PCR claims. Further, Rule
61(e)(3)(iii) precludes appointment of counsel in guilty plea cases unless the movant
sets forth a substantial claim that he has received IAC.32 Lewis’ IAC claims fail to
meet that test.
THEREFORE, Defendant Shaka Lewis’ Motion for Postconviction Relief is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED. His Motion for Appointment of Counsel is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.
31 Id. 32 Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3)(iii). 7