State v. Lewis

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: January 3, 2023
• Docket: 2110006423
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) v. ) Case ID No.: 2110006423 ) ) TITUS LEWIS, ) ) Defendant. )

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Reargument DENIED.

ORDER

Submitted: November 14, 2022 Decided: January 3, 2023

This 3rd day of January, 2023, upon consideration of the Motion for

Reargument brought by Defendant Titus Lewis, it appears to the Court

that:

1. On July 12, 2022, a grand jury indicted Mr. Lewis with four counts

of Robbery in the First Degree, one count of Burglary in the First

Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the

Commission of a Felony, two counts of Assault in the Second

Degree, one count of Aggravated Menacing, one count of

1 Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and one count of Terroristic

Threatening.

2. Mr. Lewis moved to dismiss all charges of the indictment on July

16, 2022, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a

speedy trial. The Court denied the motion that day. Mr. Lewis filed

this motion for reargument on July 19, 2022.

3. The Court will only grant reargument when it has overlooked

controlling precedent or legal principles, or misapprehended the law

or facts in a way that would have changed the outcome of the

underlying decision.1 Reargument is not an opportunity for a party

to revisit arguments already decided by the Court.2

4. As with his motion to dismiss, Mr. Lewis seeks reargument almost

exclusively based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in

Barker v. Wingo.3 A speedy trial challenge under Barker

necessitates the Court to balance four (4) factors: (1) the length of

the delay between arrest or indictment and trial; (2) the reason for

the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial;

and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay.

1 See Peters ex rel. Peters v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 2012 WL 1622396, at *1 (Del. Super. May 7, 2012), aff’d, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013), as revised (Jan. 9, 2013). 2 See id. 3 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

2 5. In deciding Mr. Lewis’s motion to dismiss on July 16, the Court

took into account all relevant factual circumstances of his case,

conducted a thorough Barker analysis, and found the State did not

violate his right to a speedy trial. By way of review, the Court held

that although the 234-day gap between arrest and trial date was

presumptively prejudicial, Mr. Lewis’s pre-indictment plea

negotiations were responsible for the delay.

6. The present motion presents nothing beyond the argument Mr.

Lewis made on July 16. The Court notes, again, that reargument’s

purpose is not simply to tell the Court it is wrong.

7. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Lewis’s motion for reargument of the

order denying dismissal is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

Original to Prothonotary

CC: Jeff Rigby, DAG Alicia Porter, Esq.