[308]*308OPINION OF THE COURT BY
LUM, C.J.
The State appeals from an order of the circuit court suppressing incriminating evidence which was used to charge Dr. Michael Keith Lee with promoting drugs in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 712-1242(l)(c) and 712-1245(l)(c). At the hearing below, the parties agreed that a law enforcement officer posing as a patient, while wearing a recording device, made three visits to Dr. Lee’s private office, and recorded their conversations without first obtaining a warrant. The lower court ruled that the audio recordings violated Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii State Constitution. It therefore granted the suppression of all tapes, transcripts and reports made from the audio recordings.
We consider two issues in this appeal: (1) whether the recordings made in defendant’s office violated Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, and (2) whether the recordings violated HRS § 803-42(b)(3) of the Hawaii Wiretap Act. On both issues we answer no. Hence, we reverse.
[309]*309I.
We turn first to the question of whether the audio recordings violated Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the communication sought to be intercepted.
Article I, § 7 has been recently interpreted in State v. Okubo, 3 Haw. App. 396, 651 P.2d 494 (1982), aff'd, 67 Haw. 197, 682 P.2d 79 (1984) and State v. Lester, 64 Haw. 659, 649 P.2d 346 (1982). Okubo involved the consensual recording, monitoring, transmitting and videotaping of a conversation which took place in a public restaurant. The defendants knew they were conversing with police officers, although only the officers consented to the recording and monitoring. 67 Haw. at 198, 682 P.2d at 80. The conversation in Lester was recorded in a public park by a government agent who consented to the recording. Lester did not consent to the recording, and was not aware he was being recorded. 64 Haw. at 663, 649 P.2d at 350. In both cases, the warrantless consensual recordings were proper under the U.S. and Hawaii constitutions, because the defendants did not have reasonable expectations of privacy in the recorded conversations.
The rationale of the federal line of cases which we followed in Lester, is that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in consensual recording; the agent may testify to what was said in the conversation, and the tape merely preserves the credibility of his testimony. For example, in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), a government agent recorded a conversation of which he was a participant. There was no installation of a recording device in the defendant’s premises. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the recording did not violate the constitution, as it was the most reliable evidence of a conversation to which the agent could testify in court. Id. at 439. See Lester, 64 Haw. at 664-65, 649 P.2d at 350-52.
In Lester and Okubo, this court found that the words “invasions of privacy” in Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, did not afford [310]*310defendants greater protection than that guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Lester, 64 Haw. at 665, 649 P.2d at 352; Okubo, 67 Haw. at 200, 682 P.2d at 81. As we said in State v. Roy, 54 Haw. 513, 516, 510 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1973), “government activities in listening to a person’s words constitute an unreasonable search and seizure only if those activities violate that person’s justifiable expectations of privacy.” In Roy, we held that there was no violation of Article I, § 51 of the Hawaii Constitution where an undercover police agent without a warrant participated in a marijuana transaction in the defendant’s home.
In the instant case, although Dr. Lee contends he has a reasonable expectation of privacy because the recorded conversations occurred in his office, we see no greater protection merely because it occurred in his office, even if his office could be considered a private place. The officer consented to the recordings, and was a participant in the conversations. Since the officer was free to testify in court to what was said between him and Dr. Lee, the recordings are merely reliable corroboration of the conversations. Therefore, although the conversations occurred in his office, Dr. Lee cannot have the recordings of them excluded. See Lester, supra, 64 Haw. at 664-668, 649 P.2d at 350-353.
II.
Lee next contends that all warrantless recordings, even consensual, are prohibited under Hawaii’s Wiretap Law, HRS § 803-42(b)(3), and State v. Lo, 66 Haw. 653, 675 P.2d 754 (1983).
HRS § 803-42(b)(3) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this part for a person to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of this state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act; provided that [311]*311installation in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein, of any device for recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in that place, or use of any such unauthorized installation, or installation or use outside a private place of such device to intercept sounds originating in that place which would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein is prohibited. (Emphasis added.) We read § 803-42(b)(3) to mean that the use of a recording
device to monitor a conversation is allowed, except that (1) “installation in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein” is prohibited, and (2) “installation or use outside a private place” without such consent is prohibited. In situation (1), if the statute prohibited “installation or use”, the recordings in this case would be unlawful. However, absent such language, there is an ambiguity in the statute’s meaning that requires us to ascertain the legislative intent.
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[308]*308OPINION OF THE COURT BY
LUM, C.J.
The State appeals from an order of the circuit court suppressing incriminating evidence which was used to charge Dr. Michael Keith Lee with promoting drugs in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 712-1242(l)(c) and 712-1245(l)(c). At the hearing below, the parties agreed that a law enforcement officer posing as a patient, while wearing a recording device, made three visits to Dr. Lee’s private office, and recorded their conversations without first obtaining a warrant. The lower court ruled that the audio recordings violated Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii State Constitution. It therefore granted the suppression of all tapes, transcripts and reports made from the audio recordings.
We consider two issues in this appeal: (1) whether the recordings made in defendant’s office violated Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, and (2) whether the recordings violated HRS § 803-42(b)(3) of the Hawaii Wiretap Act. On both issues we answer no. Hence, we reverse.
[309]*309I.
We turn first to the question of whether the audio recordings violated Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the communication sought to be intercepted.
Article I, § 7 has been recently interpreted in State v. Okubo, 3 Haw. App. 396, 651 P.2d 494 (1982), aff'd, 67 Haw. 197, 682 P.2d 79 (1984) and State v. Lester, 64 Haw. 659, 649 P.2d 346 (1982). Okubo involved the consensual recording, monitoring, transmitting and videotaping of a conversation which took place in a public restaurant. The defendants knew they were conversing with police officers, although only the officers consented to the recording and monitoring. 67 Haw. at 198, 682 P.2d at 80. The conversation in Lester was recorded in a public park by a government agent who consented to the recording. Lester did not consent to the recording, and was not aware he was being recorded. 64 Haw. at 663, 649 P.2d at 350. In both cases, the warrantless consensual recordings were proper under the U.S. and Hawaii constitutions, because the defendants did not have reasonable expectations of privacy in the recorded conversations.
The rationale of the federal line of cases which we followed in Lester, is that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in consensual recording; the agent may testify to what was said in the conversation, and the tape merely preserves the credibility of his testimony. For example, in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), a government agent recorded a conversation of which he was a participant. There was no installation of a recording device in the defendant’s premises. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the recording did not violate the constitution, as it was the most reliable evidence of a conversation to which the agent could testify in court. Id. at 439. See Lester, 64 Haw. at 664-65, 649 P.2d at 350-52.
In Lester and Okubo, this court found that the words “invasions of privacy” in Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, did not afford [310]*310defendants greater protection than that guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Lester, 64 Haw. at 665, 649 P.2d at 352; Okubo, 67 Haw. at 200, 682 P.2d at 81. As we said in State v. Roy, 54 Haw. 513, 516, 510 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1973), “government activities in listening to a person’s words constitute an unreasonable search and seizure only if those activities violate that person’s justifiable expectations of privacy.” In Roy, we held that there was no violation of Article I, § 51 of the Hawaii Constitution where an undercover police agent without a warrant participated in a marijuana transaction in the defendant’s home.
In the instant case, although Dr. Lee contends he has a reasonable expectation of privacy because the recorded conversations occurred in his office, we see no greater protection merely because it occurred in his office, even if his office could be considered a private place. The officer consented to the recordings, and was a participant in the conversations. Since the officer was free to testify in court to what was said between him and Dr. Lee, the recordings are merely reliable corroboration of the conversations. Therefore, although the conversations occurred in his office, Dr. Lee cannot have the recordings of them excluded. See Lester, supra, 64 Haw. at 664-668, 649 P.2d at 350-353.
II.
Lee next contends that all warrantless recordings, even consensual, are prohibited under Hawaii’s Wiretap Law, HRS § 803-42(b)(3), and State v. Lo, 66 Haw. 653, 675 P.2d 754 (1983).
HRS § 803-42(b)(3) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this part for a person to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of this state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act; provided that [311]*311installation in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein, of any device for recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in that place, or use of any such unauthorized installation, or installation or use outside a private place of such device to intercept sounds originating in that place which would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein is prohibited. (Emphasis added.) We read § 803-42(b)(3) to mean that the use of a recording
device to monitor a conversation is allowed, except that (1) “installation in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein” is prohibited, and (2) “installation or use outside a private place” without such consent is prohibited. In situation (1), if the statute prohibited “installation or use”, the recordings in this case would be unlawful. However, absent such language, there is an ambiguity in the statute’s meaning that requires us to ascertain the legislative intent. The language of HRS § 803-42(b)(3) was taken from HRS § 711-111 l(l)(b) and (c) (1976),2 regarding violation of privacy. See Hawaii Commission on Crime’s report to the Hawaii State Legislature, “Wiretapping” (1978) at 103 and 124.
A question arises as to the meaning of the terms “installation” and “use”, since the statutory language and the Commentary of §711-111 l(l)(b) and (c) uses the terms ambiguously.3 However, we do not believe this provides a sufficient indication of legislative [312]*312intent to read the two words interchangeably in interpreting § 803-42(b)(3), especially since the language itself of § 803-42(b)(3) is clear. Although the Commentaries to statutory sections may be used as aids in understanding code provisions, they are not intended to be evidence of legislative intent. State v. Anderson, 58 Haw. 479, 483, n. 5, 572 P.2d 159 (1977). See also HRS § 701-105. And, even if we were to give more weight to the Commentary of § 711-1 111, the Comment to § 803-42(b)(3) does not adopt the language of the § 711-1111 Commentary. Therefore, we resolve the ambiguity by determining that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the installation or use in a private place.
In further support of our interpretation of §§ 803-42(b)(3) and 711-1111 is the ALI Model Penal Code, § 250.12(1).4 The Model Penal Code’s § 250.12(1), “Violation of Privacy,” which is identical to HRS § 711-1111(1), is explained in a lengthy Comment, which assists us in resolving the ambiguity presented by the language of HRS §§ 711-1111 and 803-42(b)(3). The Comment to § 250-12 explains the rationale behind the violation of privacy provisions of the model wiretap statute, which we find persuasive in interpreting HRS § 803-42(b)(3).
Section 250.12(l)(b) is intended to protect against both the unauthorized installation in a private place of “any device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in such place” and the use of any unauthorized installa[313]*313tion. Whereas § 250.12(l)(a) protects against the physical trespass for the purpose of subjecting anyone to surveillance in a private place, § 250.12(l)(b) prohibits the act of installing such surveillance devices. See Comment to § 250.12, ALI Model Penal Code, at 429-439 (1962).
Section 250.12(l)(c) protects against the installation or use outside a private place of devices for overhearing conversation originating within a private place. The principal case to which § 250.12(l)(c) is addressed is the installation on one side of a wall of a microphone capable of intercepting conversation in an adjoining apartment or office. It also addresses the use of a microphone which can be focused to pick up sound at a very specific location some distance away. ALI Model Penal Code, Comment to § 250.12(l)(c) at 435. “Whatever question might be raised about the possible coverage of the literal language of paragraphs (a) and (b), ... it is clear . .. that Section 250.12 does not make it a crime for one party to a conversation to record or transmit the words or deeds of another party.” Id. at 437. Since § 250.12 served as the basis for our § 711-1111, we find guidance from the Comments in the Model Penal Code. That the Commentary to §711-1111 indicates an interchangeable use of the words “installation” and “use” is insufficient evidence of legislative intent to depart from the rationale behind the language adopted from the Model Penal Code, especially in light of case law regarding the weight to be accorded the Hawaii Revised Statutes Commentaries, see, e.g., State v. Anderson, and HRS § 701-105, supra.
Furthermore, we do not find a prohibited “installation” in this case. We agree with the lower court that Dr. Lee’s office is a “private place,” see State v. Lo, supra, but do not find a proscribed “installation” of a recording device. Here, the officer wore the “bug”, it was not installed in Lee’s private office. Lo is therefore distinguishable, as the recording device in that case was installed in a hotel room.
The Hawaii Wiretap Act followed the recommendation of the Hawaii Commission on Crime Report, supra, which says that the installation of a “bug”, which necessitates a surreptitious entry into the premises, effects a greater invasion of privacy than does wiretapping. Bowman, Hawaii’s New Wiretap Law, 14 H.B.J. 83, 85 (1978). Since the wearing of the recording device by the under[314]*314cover agent in the case at bar did not constitute an installation in a private place by surreptitious entry, there was no violation of HRS § 803-42(b)(3). Any other interpretation of the statute would bring about the absurd result of allowing a consenting participant to a conversation to testify to what was said, but prohibiting the admission of the tape. We shall not construe statutes so as to bring about an absurd result. State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 572 P.2d 1222 (1977). The adversary system of justice is a fact-finding mission to seek the truth. The most accurate and reliable evidence of what was said in the conversation is the tape. Since the undercover agent is not prohibited from testifying to what was said,5 it would be absurd to exclude the recordings. We do not believe the legislature intended such an absurd result.
Thomas M. Pico, Jr. (Tracy A. Hino on the opening brief; Emlyn H. Higa on the reply brief), Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, for plaintiff-appellant.
Francis T. O’Brien (David D. Cheat with him on the brief; O’Brien & Char, of counsel) for defendant-appellee.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.