State v. Lee

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: S25A1087
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 3, 2026

S25A1087. THE STATE v. LEE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Michael Donnell Lee has been charged with murder and

related offenses in connection with the shooting death of Aaron

James Grant.1 The record indicates that Lee was arrested shortly

after the shooting, which occurred around 2:15 in the morning on

June 15, 2022. Several hours later, he made incriminating

statements to Detective Charles Sendling during a custodial

interrogation at the Atlanta Police Department. The State filed a

pretrial motion in limine, seeking to admit Lee’s incriminating

statements in its case-in-chief. But the trial court denied that

On September 12, 2022, a Fulton County grand jury returned an 1

indictment against Lee, charging him with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). motion. As relevant here, the trial court ruled that Lee’s statements

were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966),

and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981), because Lee had

invoked his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent and

did not reinitiate communication with Detective Sendling before the

detective interrogated him. The State filed this interlocutory appeal

challenging the trial court’s suppression of Lee’s statements. 2 As

explained below, we affirm the trial court’s suppression of Lee’s

statements under Miranda and Edwards.3

1. During a hearing on the State’s motion in limine, the State

admitted into evidence a video recording of Lee’s custodial

interview. As relevant here, the recording showed the following.

Detective Sendling asked Lee several questions about Lee’s

education level and fluency with the English language, in response

2 See OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4) (granting the State a right to appeal “[f]rom an

order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding evidence illegally seized ... in the case of motions made and ruled upon prior to the impaneling of a jury or the defendant being put in jeopardy, whichever occurs first”). 3 We express no opinion about the trial court’s alternative ruling that

Lee’s statements were also inadmissible because they were involuntary as a matter of constitutional due process. 2 to which Lee indicated that he had a third-grade education, that he

could understand and speak the English language but could not

write in English, and that he would understand something if the

detective read it to him. Detective Sendling proceeded to read Lee

his Miranda rights, and Lee confirmed that he understood those

rights. Detective Sendling then asked if Lee “wish[ed] to speak with

[him] at this time without a lawyer,” and Lee responded in the

negative. Seeking clarification, the detective asked, “So you don’t

want to talk?” And Lee answered again in the negative. The

detective then acknowledged Lee’s answer, saying, “OK.”

Lee then asked Detective Sendling what he was charged with.

After responding that Lee was “going to be charged with murder and

aggravated assault,” the detective got up from his chair, said he

would come back after doing some paperwork, and asked Lee if he

wanted anything to drink. Lee responded that he wanted some chips

and a Gatorade, and the detective then left the room.

A few minutes later, Detective Sendling returned to the

interview room and gave Lee a bag of chips and a Gatorade. At that

3 point, Lee said, “Hey,” Detective Sendling responded, “Yes, sir,” and

Lee asked, “Why am I charged with murder, man?” In response,

Detective Sendling asked, “Why are you charged with murder? Why

do you think?” Before giving Lee a chance to respond, Detective

Sendling said, “Remember you don’t want to talk to me, so.” Lee and

Detective Sendling then stared at each other for several seconds

before Detective Sendling asked again, “So why do you think you

were charged?” Lee remained silent for several more seconds, and

Detective Sendling then turned and moved toward the door while

saying, “If you tell me you want to talk to me, I’ll talk to you.” But

before the detective exited through the open door, Lee responded,

“Let’s talk, man.” Detective Sendling then asked, “You want to talk?”

And Lee responded, “Yeah.” Detective Sendling then briefly left the

room before returning with a notepad and asking Lee, “What do you

want to talk about?” When Lee, who was eating chips, did not

promptly respond, Detective Sendling asked, “How did your lip get

busted?” Lee responded that he fell. The detective then asked Lee a

series of questions about the crime, which elicited several

4 incriminating statements over the course of an interview that lasted

less than 20 minutes.

2. On appeal, the State does not dispute the trial court’s

determination that Lee invoked his constitutional rights to counsel

and to silence, and that Detective Sendling was therefore required

to scrupulously honor Lee’s invocation by ceasing the interrogation.

The State argues only that the trial court erred in concluding that

Lee did not reinitiate communication with the detective by asking

why he was charged with murder. We review that ruling de novo

because the controlling facts here, which were ascertainable from

the recording of the interview alone, are undisputed, and we review

de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts.4 See,

e.g., State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809–10 (2025); Quintanar v.

State, 322 Ga. 61, 65–66 (2025). As explained below, we conclude

4 Although Detective Sendling testified about how the interview unfolded, his testimony was consistent with the recording, and there is no dispute about the sequence of events or what words were said during the interview. Further, the trial court did not make any credibility findings about Detective Sendling’s testimony or appear to rely in any way on his testimony when describing how the interview unfolded or when ruling on the Miranda issue. Instead, the court relied on and described what “the video recording of the interview” showed. 5 that the trial court’s determination was not erroneous.

Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Miranda, a defendant who is in custody “must be warned prior to

any questioning” that he has certain rights, including “the right to

remain silent” and “the right to the presence of an attorney.” State

v. Tripp, 320 Ga. 536, 548 (2024) (quoting Miranda, 384 US at 479).

“To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-chief, the

State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence,” based on “the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” that

“the defendant was advised of these rights and that he voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently waived them.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted).

In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court established “a

prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody

from being badgered by police officers” after invoking his Miranda

rights. State v. Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130, 133 (2020) (quotation marks

omitted). As we have explained, pursuant to Edwards, if “a suspect

invokes the right to silence or the right to counsel, or both,” “police

6 must scrupulously honor the suspect’s right[s],” meaning at a

minimum that the police “may not … subject[ ] [the suspect] to

further questioning” that “the police should know [is] reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 133–34 (cleaned

up). But if “the suspect initiates the conversation regarding his case,

no violation of the Edwards rule occurs.” Id.

“In examining the concept of ‘initiation’ under Edwards,” the

United States Supreme Court has “distinguished between inquiries

‘relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship,’ such as a

request for a drink of water, and those ‘representing a desire on the

part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating

directly or indirectly to the investigation.’” Mack v. State, 296 Ga.

239, 246 (2014) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw,

462 US 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion)). Thus, “initiation”

requires “not only that the defendant speak up first” after having

previously invoked his rights, “but also that his words reflect” a

“willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the

investigation.” Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135, 144 (quotation marks

7 omitted). See Mack, 296 Ga. at 246 (“‘[I]nitiation’ requires not only

that the defendant speak up first but also that his words reflect a

desire to discuss the investigation at hand.”).

(a) On appeal, the State argues that Detective Sendling’s

interrogation of Lee was permissible under Edwards because, after

invoking his Miranda rights, Lee reinitiated communication with

the detective. Specifically, the State contends that Lee reinitiated

communication because, after asking the detective “what” he was

being charged with and being informed that he was charged with

murder, Lee asked the detective “why” he was being charged with

that crime.

To support its argument, the State relies on our decision in

Pauldo. But the State’s reliance on that case is misplaced. The

State’s confusion about Pauldo appears to stem from the fact that,

in that case, we considered two separate parts of an interaction that

each included a question from the defendant about “why” he was

being arrested. See Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 132, 143–44. The State

focuses on the latter part of the exchange, which we held did

8 reinitiate communication. See id. at 143–44. But, as explained

below, the interaction at issue here is similar to the first part of the

interaction we addressed in Pauldo, which we held did not reinitiate

communication. See id. at 143.

In Pauldo, we explained that “initiation,” under Edwards,

requires that a defendant “speak up first” with “words [that] reflect

a desire to discuss the investigation at hand.” Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135

(quotation marks omitted). And we contrasted “clarifying questions

about [one’s] arrest,” which merely seek information from officers,

with words showing that the defendant in fact has “a willingness

and a desire” to engage in “a generalized discussion about the

investigation.” Id. at 143–44 (quotation marks omitted).

Turning to the facts of the case, Pauldo explained that, after

the defendant invoked his right to remain silent and the detective

had a brief exchange with the defendant about doing a “gun residue”

test and taking the defendant’s clothes, two parts of an interaction

occurred in sequence. Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 131–32, 143–44. And we

separately analyzed whether the defendant had reinitiated

9 communication during each part of the interaction. See id. at 143–

44.

Pauldo described the first part of the interaction as follows:

[The defendant] asked again whether he was being arrested, and the detective confirmed that he was, despite having told [the defendant] minutes before that he was not being arrested. After [the defendant] asked what he was being arrested for, the detective responded, “Homicide.” [The defendant] asked why, and the detective explained that they had talked to “a lot of people,” and they had identified him as the shooter.

Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 132. We concluded that this part of the

interaction did not constitute “a reinitiation of communication by

[the defendant]” because, in asking “what” he was being arrested for

and “why” he was being arrested for that crime, the defendant was

merely “ask[ing] clarifying questions about his arrest” to obtain

information from the officer, not “evinc[ing] a willingness and a

desire” to engage in “a generalized discussion about the

investigation.” Id. at 132, 143–44 (quotation marks omitted).

We then turned to a second part of the interaction, which

immediately followed the first, describing it as follows:

10 [The defendant] then started talking again, saying, “Sir,” but the detective interrupted to say: “You’ve already told me that you wanted your lawyer here. They told you not to talk to me. Now, if you want to talk to me, that’s up to you.” [The defendant] replied that he did not understand why he was being arrested and that he “did not do this,” asking again, “Why am I being arrested?” In response, the detective asked, “Ray, do you want to talk to me?” [The defendant] replied, “I mean, I will talk to you. I’m sitting here; I’m talking to you now. I’m telling you, like, why ....” The detective again interjected, “Do you want to talk to me about this incident?” [The defendant] replied, “I will talk to you about this incident, sir[,]” first stating that he was not there, then correcting himself to say that he was there, but asserting that he was not responsible for the shooting. [The defendant] then asked the detective, “What [do] you want to know?”

At that point, the detective stated that if [the defendant] wanted to talk to the detective, he needed to sign the waiver-of-rights form. The detective again asked [the defendant], “So you’re changing your mind, and you want to talk to me?” [The defendant] replied, “I will talk to you, yeah, to benefit me, anything .... I don’t want to be arrested for homicide.”

interaction, by contrast with the first, “reinitiated contact.” Id. at

144. As we explained, this was because, by “ma[king] statements

about the crimes being investigated” (including that “he did not

understand why he was being arrested” and that “he did not do this”)

11 and asking again “why he was being arrested” — “even after being

reminded that he had invoked his rights” — the defendant had

“evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion

about the investigation.” Id. at 132, 144 (quotation marks omitted).

We further noted that the detective had “scrupulously honor[ed]” the

defendant’s rights because, in response to the defendant’s

“continued efforts to discuss the case [that] made it unclear whether

he wished to talk to the detective or not,” the detective did not

interrogate the defendant about the crime but only made

“reasonable” “attempts to clarify” the “ambiguity” by asking the

defendant “if he wanted to talk.” Id. at 143–44. And we “f[ound] it

significant” that, after being asked for clarification about whether

he wanted to talk about “the incident,” the defendant explained that

he was willing to do so “because he did not want to be arrested.” Id.

at 143.

Here, Lee’s interaction with Detective Sendling was similar to

the first part of the interaction in Pauldo discussed above, which we

held did not reinitiate communication. See Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 143.

12 Just as the defendant in Pauldo asked “what” he was being arrested

for and “why,” Lee asked “what” he was being charged with and

“why.” Id. at 132, 143. As we explained in Pauldo, inquiries like

these are merely “clarifying questions about [one’s] arrest” that seek

information from an officer. Id. at 143. Such questions, standing

alone, do not “evince[ ]” a defendant’s “willingness” and “desire” to

participate in “a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Id.

at 143–44 (quotation marks omitted). And here, nothing about the

context in which Lee asked “what” he was charged with and “why”

created any ambiguity about whether he was signaling a new desire

to personally “discuss the investigation at hand.” 5 Id. at 135. Lee

did not express any desire to discuss “the incident” for his own

benefit or claim that he did not “do this [crime]” — statements that,

in the second part of the interaction at issue in Pauldo, indicated a

5 Although the dissenting opinion emphasizes that Lee caught Detective

Sendling’s attention by saying, “Hey,” before Lee asked “why” he was charged, the dissenting opinion does not explain why the word “Hey” or the act of catching the detective’s attention showed that Lee had a desire to engage in a generalized discussion of the investigation, as opposed to a desire to ask a clarifying question about his arrest. 13 willingness to have “a generalized discussion about the

investigation.” Id. at 132, 143–44 (quotation marks omitted). Indeed,

Lee did not say anything at all after asking “what” he was charged

with and “why.” Thus, as Pauldo makes clear, Lee’s “clarifying

questions about [his] arrest,” which showed only that he wished for

the detective to provide him information, did not constitute “a

reinitiation of communication” or create any “ambiguity” about

whether he wanted to participate in a more generalized discussion

of the investigation. Id. at 143–44. Accordingly, the State’s

argument on appeal as to why the trial court erred in concluding

that Lee did not reinitiate communication fails. 6

6 The dissenting opinion does not argue that we should overrule our decision in Pauldo, which, as described above, held on analogous facts that a defendant did not reinitiate communication simply by asking “what” he was arrested for and “why.” Compare Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 132, 143 (holding that the defendant’s questions about “what” he was being arrested for and “why” he was being arrested for that crime did not reinitiate communication, where, at that point in the interaction, there was no other evidence that the defendant was expressing a desire to engage in a generalized discussion about the investigation), with id. at 144 (holding that, in a later interaction, the defendant “reinitiated contact when he asked questions about why he was being arrested and made statements about the crimes being investigated even after being reminded that he had invoked his rights” (emphasis added)). Instead, the dissenting opinion attempts to distinguish Pauldo. Specifically,

14 (b) Advancing an argument on behalf of the State that the

State does not itself raise, the dissenting opinion appears to argue

that the entire sequence of events culminating in Lee saying, “Let’s

talk, man,” showed that Lee reinitiated communication with

Detective Sendling. In particular, the dissenting opinion focuses on

the portion of the exchange beginning with Lee saying, “Hey…. Why

am I charged with murder, man?” As we have explained, however,

“a suspect will be considered to have ‘initiated’ renewed contact with

law enforcement authorities, so as to permit further interrogation,

the dissenting opinion appears to argue that, in context, Lee’s question about “why” he was charged could reasonably have been interpreted as signaling a desire to engage in a generalized discussion of the investigation because Lee asked the question more than two minutes (approximately two minutes and 30 seconds) after receiving an answer to his question about “what” he was being charged with. The dissenting opinion appears to contend that, because Lee had already asked one clarifying question, and because there was a delay between Lee’s two questions, Lee’s follow-up question about “why” he was charged was not a necessary inquiry or clarifying question about his arrest. It is unclear, however, why the dissenting opinion thinks receiving an answer to a question about “what” one is being charged with makes a question about “why” one is being charged unnecessary. Those questions obviously seek different types of information about one’s arrest. Nor is it clear why the dissenting opinion thinks that Lee’s delay in asking “why” he was charged changed the nature of the question or otherwise signaled a desire to have a generalized discussion about the investigation — particularly when the majority of the delay (all but approximately 12 seconds) was attributable to the detective initiating a discussion with Lee about what Lee wanted to drink and then being absent from room. 15 only if the renewed contact by the suspect was not the product of

past police interrogation conducted in violation of the suspect’s

previously-invoked rights.” Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 799, 804 (2023)

(quotation marks omitted). Determining whether a suspect’s

renewed contact is the product of unlawful past police interrogation

requires consideration of

the entire sequence of events leading up to the suspect’s renewal of contact, including but not limited to the lapse of time between any unlawful interrogation and the renewed contact, any change in location or in the identity of the officers involved from one interview to the next, and any break in custody between interviews.

Russell v. State, 309 Ga. 772, 778 (2020) (cleaned up). And here, as

explained below, Detective Sendling’s unlawful interrogation —

which the dissenting opinion downplays and disregards —

precipitated Lee’s ultimate agreement to talk. For that reason, the

dissenting opinion errs to the extent that it concludes that Lee

reinitiated contact between the time he said, “Hey,” and the time he

said, “Let’s talk, man.”

As set out above, and as particularly relevant to the dissenting

16 opinion, the following exchange occurred over an approximately 20-

second period:

Lee: Hey.

Detective Sendling: Yes, sir.

Lee: Why am I charged with murder, man?

Detective Sendling: Why are you charged with murder? Why do you think? Remember you don’t want to talk to me, so.

[Lee and Detective Sendling stare at each other in silence for several seconds.]

Detective Sendling: So why do you think you were charged?

[Lee remains silent for several seconds. Detective Sendling then turns and moves toward the door as he says the following.]

Detective Sendling: If you tell me you want to talk to me, I’ll talk to you.

Lee: Let’s talk, man.

As the dissenting opinion acknowledges, because Lee had

invoked his Miranda rights, Detective Sendling was not permitted

to interrogate Lee unless Lee first reinitiated communication. And

17 as explained above, Lee did not reinitiate communication simply by

saying “Hey” and “Why am I charged with murder, man?” As a

result, Detective Sendling was not permitted to interrogate Lee at

that point. Nevertheless, the above exchange shows that Detective

Sendling’s immediate response to Lee’s question about “why” he was

charged was to unlawfully interrogate Lee. Cf. Pauldo, 309 Ga. at

143–44 (holding that the detective had scrupulously honored the

defendant’s rights because the detective had only asked “if [the

defendant] wanted to talk” and did not “ask[ ] [the defendant] any

questions about the case” until after he had fully resolved the

ambiguity about whether the defendant wanted to talk).

Specifically, Detective Sendling twice asked Lee why Lee thought he

had been charged, a question that clearly constituted “interrogation”

because any reasonable officer would know the question was

“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Russell, 309

Ga. at 777 (quotation marks omitted). These questions were not

responsive to Lee’s question about “why” he was charged. And the

fact that Detective Sendling stared at Lee in silence for several

18 seconds before he posed the question a second time showed that the

detective’s attempt to elicit incriminating statements from Lee was

both considered and deliberate. Then, Detective Sendling further

goaded Lee into responding: the detective not only encouraged Lee

to respond to the detective’s question by saying, “If you tell me you

want to talk to me, I’ll talk to you,” but also made that statement

while moving toward the exit, which created time pressure for Lee

to respond quickly before the detective could leave the room. See

Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 225, 231 (2018) (acknowledging that “any

words or actions by law enforcement calculated to elicit an

incriminating response,” including words or actions that “ask,

encourage, or engage [a defendant] to talk about [the crime],”

constitute “interrogation, or its functional equivalent”). The

detective’s interrogation and move toward the exit while verbally

encouraging Lee to respond had an effect on Lee, who promptly

agreed to talk and then made incriminating statements in response

19 to further questioning. 7

Considering the entire sequence of events, we conclude that

Lee’s agreement to speak to Detective Sendling “was the product of

improper interrogation rather than” Lee’s “own considered

deliberation.” Mack, 296 Ga. at 250. A total of three minutes elapsed

between Lee invoking his Miranda rights and saying, “Let’s talk,

man.” And the recording of the interview does not reveal anything

that could have prompted Lee to change his mind about talking to

the detective before the 20-second exchange in which Detective

Sendling interrogated Lee. Further, in the 20 seconds that

immediately preceded Lee’s agreement to talk, Detective Sendling

twice asked Lee a question that clearly qualified as “interrogation.”

As the dissenting opinion notes, after asking Lee the first time

why Lee thought he had been charged, Detective Sendling reminded

Lee that he had said he did not want to talk. But there is no evidence

7 The dissenting opinion suggests that Detective Sendling’s movement

toward the door was a mere attempt to scrupulously honor Lee’s rights by leaving him alone. Under the circumstances, however, the detective’s conduct could just as easily be interpreted as an interrogation tactic designed to elicit an incriminating response from Lee. 20 that the reminder had any impact on Lee’s later decision to talk, as

Lee did not react to that reminder and maintained his silence. It was

only after the detective asked the question a second time and made

a move toward the door, encouraging Lee to respond to the

interrogation before the detective had time to exit the room, that Lee

relented and agreed to talk.

Given that “[t]here was no break in custody” or “change in

location or identity of the interrogating officer” between Lee

invoking his Miranda rights and agreeing to speak to the detective,

and given that “a very short lapse in time” of mere seconds separated

the unlawful interrogation from Lee’s agreement to speak, the

record shows that the detective’s unlawful interrogation

precipitated Lee’s choice to discuss the investigation with the

detective. Mack, 296 Ga. at 249–50. Accordingly, Lee’s agreement to

talk “was not an effective ‘initiation’ under Edwards,” and the

statements he made in response to further interrogation must be

suppressed. Id. (holding that the defendant’s “request to speak with

[a detective],” which “was made just minutes after” he had been

21 improperly interrogated, “was the product of improper

interrogation” because “[t]here was no break in custody, a very short

lapse in time, and no change in location or identity of the

interrogating officer from the first interview … to the second”

(footnote omitted)); McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493, 500 (2004)

(holding that the defendant did not reinitiate communication

because, although the defendant had “summoned the detectives,” he

did not make any statements indicating an intent to discuss the

investigation before the detective interrogated him, and “his only

statements were made in response to [the detective’s]

recommencement of the interrogation”).

The dissenting opinion suggests that Detective Sendling’s

interrogation of Lee by asking Lee why he thought he was charged

is irrelevant here for four reasons, none of which are persuasive.

First, the dissenting opinion asserts that Detective Sendling was

asking a “rhetorical” question that did not seek to elicit a response

the first time he asked Lee why he thought he was charged. But the

record belies this characterization. The fact that Detective Sendling

22 gave Lee several seconds to respond to the question, then repeated

the question, and gave Lee several more seconds to respond shows

that the question was not rhetorical: the detective was seeking to

elicit a response.

Second, despite acknowledging that Detective Sendling’s

second question about why Lee thought he was charged “might be

considered interrogation under other circumstances,” the dissenting

opinion states that it did not constitute interrogation here because,

after asking the question, Detective Sendling told Lee that he would

talk to Lee only if Lee wanted to talk. But the dissenting opinion

ignores the fact that the detective waited several seconds for Lee to

respond to the question before saying that he would talk to Lee if

Lee wanted to talk. This delay illustrates that the question was

intended to elicit an incriminating response. And under the

circumstances — where no statements were made between the

detective’s interrogation of Lee and the detective’s move toward the

exit while saying he would talk to Lee if Lee wanted to talk — the

detective’s statement served to encourage Lee to promptly respond

23 to the detective’s interrogation.

Third, citing Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713 (1997),8 Wilson v.

State, 275 Ga. 53 (2002), State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473 (2010), Gray v.

State, 304 Ga. 799 (2018), and Driver v. State, 307 Ga. 644 (2020),

the dissenting opinion suggests that Detective Sendling’s questions

did not qualify as “interrogation” because they were asked in

response to Lee’s question about “why” he was charged, and, as a

general rule, a detective’s response to a question posed by a

defendant does not constitute “interrogation.”9 But, as explained

below, none of these cases held that responses to a defendant’s

questions categorically cannot qualify as “interrogation.”

In Walton, the defendant asked a detective what his co-indictee

had said, the detective responded by “summariz[ing] [the co-

8 Walton was disapproved of on other grounds by Toomer v. State, 292

Ga. 49 (2012). 9 The dissenting opinion characterizes both questions as “responses” to

Lee’s question, even though they were not responsive to Lee’s question. This characterization is inapt, at least with respect to the second question: the context shows that the detective’s second question, which followed several seconds of silence, was a response to Lee temporarily maintaining his silence, not to Lee’s question. Nevertheless, as explained below, nothing turns on whether the detective’s questions can be characterized as “responses.” 24 indictee’s] statement,” and the defendant made an incriminating

statement in response. Walton, 267 Ga. at 714, 717–18. Although we

acknowledged a prior case in which the defendant had responded to

an officer’s answer to the defendant’s own question and we had held

that the defendant’s response was not the product of custodial

interrogation, see id. at 718 (citing Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 231

(1988)), the dissenting opinion misrepresents Walton as holding as

a general rule that an officer’s answer to a defendant’s question

cannot qualify as interrogation.10 Walton did not rely on any such

general rule but instead proceeded to analyze whether the

detective’s answer to the defendant’s question constituted

interrogation. See id. And we concluded that, because there was no

evidence in the case that the “officer’s summary of evidence

implicating” the defendant was intended “to get the [defendant] to

make an incriminating statement,” the detective’s answer did not

10 Delay does not stand for that general rule either. See Delay, 258 Ga.

at 230–31 (holding that the officer did not initiate interrogation by telling the defendant what the officer “assumed [the defendant] was being charged with” in response to the defendant’s question, “Why am I being arrested?”). 25 qualify as interrogation, and the defendant’s response to the

detective’s answer therefore “was not the product of custodial

interrogation.” Id.

It is unclear why the dissenting opinion cites Wilson in support

of its position. In that case, the defendant “indicated to the police

that he wanted to see the autopsy photographs,” and after obtaining

a Miranda waiver and asking a clarifying question to confirm that

the defendant “still wanted to see [the autopsy photographs],” the

officer “showed him the pictures.” Wilson, 275 Ga. at 58. As we

noted, “[i]t was only after [the defendant] turned to the officer and

said he ‘wanted to know what had happened to the victim’s head,’

that the officer ‘reversed the question’ by replying ‘I would like for

you to tell me that.’” Id. (punctuation omitted). And we concluded

that the defendant had exhibited a “willingness to talk with police

… when he initiated further dialogue with them over the autopsy

photographs.” Id. at 58–59. Wilson did not hold, as the dissenting

opinion represents, that reversing a question posed by a defendant

does not constitute interrogation as a general matter. Indeed, it is

26 clear from our opinion in Wilson that we considered the officer’s

reversal of the defendant’s question to be interrogation. That is why

we emphasized that the officer did not “reverse[ ] the question” until

“after” the defendant had already reinitiated communication. Id. at

58.

Nor did Brown, Gray, or Driver hold that, as general matter, a

detective’s response to a defendant’s question cannot constitute

“interrogation.” Brown instead held that the specific comments

made by detectives in response to a defendant’s questions were

permissible because the responses did not seek to elicit

incriminating statements and therefore did not constitute

“interrogation.” See Brown, 287 Ga. at 477–78 (holding that the

detectives’ “responses [to the defendant’s questions] d[id] not

constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent” because the

detectives never “question[ed] [the defendant] about the crimes” and

“were not seeking subtly to elicit incriminating information from

[the defendant]” but were instead “answer[ing]” or “deflect[ing]” the

defendants’ “direct questions” and making comments “aimed at

27 effectuating [the defendant’s] invocation of his right to have counsel

present before questioning” (emphasis omitted)). In Gray, we

assumed without deciding that the detective’s response to the

defendant’s comment “could be characterized as an interrogation”

because whether the response qualified as “interrogation” was

irrelevant under the circumstances. Gray, 304 Ga. at 804–05. As we

explained, it did not matter whether the response constituted

“interrogation” because the detective “responded … only after [the

defendant] brought up the case first,” “initiat[ing] the renewed

contact.” Id. And Driver held that a detective’s “responses did not

violate [a defendant’s] previously invoked right to counsel under

Edwards … because [the defendant’s] questions initiated a renewed

conversation and evinced a willingness and a desire for a

generalized discussion about the investigation.” Driver, 307 Ga. at

650 (quotation marks omitted).11

11 Driver quoted Brown for the proposition that “a police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’” Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (cleaned up). But Driver cannot be construed as holding that a detective’s response to a defendant’s direct

28 Moreover, the dissenting opinion’s suggestion that a detective

is permitted to interrogate a defendant who has previously invoked

his Miranda rights if the defendant poses any questions to the

detective conflicts with our precedent. As we have made clear,

scrupulously honoring a defendant’s rights requires a detective to

refrain from “ask[ing] [a defendant who has invoked his Miranda

rights] any questions about the case” until after the defendant has

reinitiated communication by signaling “a willingness and a desire

for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Pauldo, 309

Ga. at 133, 144 (quotation marks omitted) (noting that a defendant

“may not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement”

after invoking his Miranda rights, unless “the suspect initiates the

conversation regarding his case”). And a detective’s response to a

defendant’s question that the detective should know is reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response falls squarely within the

scope of “interrogation.” See Russell, 309 Ga. at 777 (“In this context,

question cannot constitute “interrogation” even if the response is intended to elicit incriminating statements because the case did not involve any such responses. See id. at 647–48. 29 ‘interrogation’ is defined as ‘express questioning by law enforcement

officers’ or its functional equivalent — any words or actions on the

part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely

to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (cleaned up)).

Finally, the dissenting opinion suggests that, even if Detective

Sendling’s questions about why Lee thought he had been charged

constituted “interrogation in violation of Miranda and Edwards,”

the questions “did not elicit an incriminating response” from Lee,

and thus the incriminating statements that Lee ultimately made

were not “the product of” that interrogation. Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 141–

42. This argument, however, is misguided. It is undisputed here that

Lee invoked his Miranda rights and that the incriminating

statements that the State sought to introduce were produced by

interrogation occurring immediately after Lee said, “Let’s talk,

man.” Accordingly, the relevant question is whether Lee had

reinitiated communication by the time he said, “Let’s talk, man,”

such that further interrogation was permissible. See id. at 133. And

to determine whether a valid reinitiation occurred, the relevant

30 question is whether Detective Sendling’s questions about why Lee

thought he had been charged produced Lee’s agreement to speak,

not whether those questions produced incriminating statements.

See Mack, 296 Ga. at 248. As explained above, because the unlawful

interrogation produced Lee’s agreement to talk, Lee did not initiate

communication, and the incriminating statements he made in

response to later interrogation are therefore inadmissible.

***

As explained above, the trial court did not err in concluding

that Lee did not reinitiate communication after invoking his

Miranda rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s suppression

of Lee’s statements under Miranda and Edwards.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P. J., and Bethel, McMillian, and LaGrua, JJ., who dissent.

31 S25A1087. THE STATE v. LEE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice, dissenting.

Because I believe based on the undisputed video recording of

the interview that Lee reinitiated communication with Detective

Sendling, I respectfully dissent.

As correctly explained in the majority opinion, if a suspect

invokes the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, or both,

then “[p]olice must scrupulously honor” the suspect’s rights, which

requires that “the interrogation [ ] cease immediately.” State v.

Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130, 133 (2020) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). “However, where police cease interrogation and the

suspect initiates the conversation regarding his case” – which, under

these circumstances “requires not only that the defendant speak up

first but also that his words reflect a desire to discuss the

investigation at hand,” then “no violation of the Edwards [v.

Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981)] rule occurs.” Id. at 133, 135, 143.

Stated more succinctly, “police may not immediately subject a

32 defendant who has invoked his right to counsel or his right to remain

silent to further interrogation absent reinitiation by the defendant.”

Id. at 134 n.5 (emphasis omitted). And “a suspect will be considered

to have ‘initiated’ renewed contact with law enforcement

authorities, so as to permit further interrogation, only if the renewed

contact by the suspect was not the product of past police

interrogation conducted in violation of the suspect’s previously-

invoked rights.” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 248 (2014). In this case,

because the trial court denied the State’s motion in limine based on

the video recording of the interview alone and the controlling facts

are ascertainable from the recording, we review de novo the trial

court’s application of the law to those facts. See, e.g., State v.

Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809–10 (2025).

Here, after Lee sat alone in the interview room for about an

hour, Detective Sendling entered the interview room and began by

introducing himself and asking a few biographical questions to Lee,

which included confirming that Lee would be able to understand

something read to him. Detective Sendling then read Lee his rights

33 under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). Lee said that he

understood those rights and that he did not wish to speak with

Detective Sendling at that time without a lawyer. From that

moment, their conversation continued as follows:

DET: “So you don’t want to talk?”

Lee: “Nuh-uh.”

DET: “Okay.”

DET: “Alright, I guess—”

Lee: “What am I charged with?”

DET: “You’re going to be charged with murder and aggravated assault.”

DET: “Alright.”

Here, Detective Sendling gets up from the chair and walks towards the door.

DET: “I’ll be back with you in a little bit – I’ve got some paperwork to do.”

DET: “You need anything to drink?”

Lee: “Yeah, I want some, let me get some chips”

DET: “Uhh, I don’t know that I have chips, but I have soda, Gatorade, water.”

34 Lee: “Gatorade.”

DET: “Blue, yellow, red?”

Lee: “Blue.”

DET: “Blue?”

Detective Sendling leaves and shuts the door, but then opens the door again.

DET: “I’ve also got Pepsi and Mountain Dew, okay, but you want Gatorade?”

Lee: “Yeah.”

Detective Sendling leaves and shuts the door. Detective Sendling comes back into the room almost two minutes later.

DET: “I was able to find some chips but these are the only ones I can find.”

Detective Sendling puts the Gatorade and chips on the table and then turns towards the door.

Lee: “Hey.”

DET: “Yes, sir?”

Lee: “Why am I charged with murder, man?”

DET: “Why are you charged with murder? Why do you

35 think? Remember you don’t want to talk to me, so.”

Detective Sendling stops speaking, and there is silence for a few seconds.

DET: “So why do you think you were charged?”

Detective Sendling turns towards the door.

DET: “If you decide you want to talk to me, I’ll talk to you, but—”

Lee: “Let’s talk, man.”

DET: “You wanna talk?”

From the time that Lee says “Hey” until Lee says “Yeah” in response

to Detective’s Sendling question is about 21 seconds. The interview

proceeds from there.

“[W]e have recognized that substance trumps form in

determining whether the entire sequence of events indicates a

defendant’s voluntary initiation of renewed contact. Accordingly,

there is more to the analysis than merely an inquiry into ‘who said

what when,’ and we must consider the context in which a purported

‘initiation’ by the defendant was made before declaring it effective

36 to allow the resumption of police interrogation.” Mack, 296 Ga. at

247 (citation omitted).

Looking at the context of the entire sequence of events here

therefore, I would begin by recognizing – as the majority opinion

agrees – that when Lee invoked his rights, Detective Sendling

scrupulously honored Lee’s invocation by ceasing his interrogation

immediately. Id. at 243 (“The determination as to whether the

police have scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to remain

silent rests in part upon their immediate response to the defendant’s

invocation of the right; a showing of respect for the defendant’s right,

by immediately ceasing questioning upon its invocation, is a

significant factor in this analysis.”). Lee then asked “what” he was

being charged with, and Detective Sendling answered that Lee was

being charged with murder and aggravated assault. This exchange

does not constitute an interrogation because as the majority opinion

correctly recognizes, suspects may ask clarifying questions about

their arrest without evincing a willingness and desire to engage in

a generalized discussion about the investigation, and officers are

37 permitted to respond to such inquiries without it constituting a

police-initiated interrogation. See Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 143.

But it is at this point in the recording that I depart from the

majority opinion’s analysis and conclude, based on the totality of the

circumstances, that Lee reinitiated contact by saying “Hey” and

catching Detective Sendling’s attention as the detective was turning

to leave the room, and asking “[w]hy am I charged with murder,

man?” See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1045 (1983)

(distinguishing between inquiries “relating to routine incidents of

the custodial relationship,” such as a request for a drink of water,

that “will not generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense in which

that word was used in Edwards,” and those “represent[ing] a desire

on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion

relating directly or indirectly to the investigation” (emphasis

supplied)); Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 136 (“[I]nitiation under these

circumstances requires not only that the defendant speak up first

but also that his words reflect a desire to discuss the investigation

at hand.” (cleaned up)).

38 It was Lee who renewed contact without any police-initiated

interrogation or prompting, and Lee’s questions were not in

response to any questions attendant to his arrest and custody. See

Mack, 296 Ga. at 248 (“[A] suspect will be considered to have

initiated renewed contact with law enforcement authorities, so as to

permit further interrogation, only if the renewed contact by the

suspect was not the product of past police interrogation conducted

in violation of the suspect’s previously-invoked rights.” (cleaned

up)). Lee’s questioning of Detective Sendling happened as part of a

larger custodial interaction between them, wherein Lee had already

said he did not want to talk, Lee had already asked and had

answered a clarifying question about what he was being arrested

for, and Detective Sendling had scrupulously honored Lee’s

invocation before Lee renewed contact by catching Detective

Sendling’s attention as he was leaving the interview room and

further asking why Lee was being arrested for murder. See

Bradshaw, 462 US at 1045–46 (holding that suspect’s question,

“Well, what is going to happen to me now?” “[a]though ambiguous

39 … evinced a willingness and desire for a generalized discussion

about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry

arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship,” and “[i]t

could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating

generally to the investigation. That the police officer so understood

it is apparent from the fact that he immediately reminded the

accused that ‘you do not have to talk to me ….”). In Pauldo, we

concluded that the suspect “reinitiated contact when he asked

questions about why he was being arrested and made statements

about the crimes being investigated even after being reminded that

he had invoked his rights and [] these statements and questions

‘evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about

the investigation.’” Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 144 (quoting Driver v. State,

307 Ga. 644, 650 (2020)). Pauldo, therefore, supports the dissent

and need not be overruled in order to hold here that Lee reinitiated

communications under these circumstances.

The majority opinion argues that Pauldo compels us to hold

that Lee’s question, “[w]hy am I charged with murder?”, has no

40 bearing on reinitiation here because in Pauldo, we concluded that

some of the suspect’s initial questions, asking what he was being

arrested for and why, did not alone constitute reinitiation. But in

Pauldo, the detective initially told the suspect, before the suspect

invoked his rights, that he was not being arrested and then later

informed the suspect, after he had invoked his rights, that he was

being arrested for homicide. Under the totality of those

circumstances, we concluded that when the suspect asked why he

was being arrested for homicide after the detective first told him he

would be after previously saying he would not be arrested, the

suspect was asking a clarifying question about his arrest. Pauldo,

309 Ga. at 131–32, 143. Here, as noted above, Lee had already asked

a clarifying question about what he was being arrested for earlier,

and Detective Sendling told Lee that he would be charged with

murder and aggravated assault, such that when Lee asked over two

minutes later and after an intervening discussion about snacks,

“[w]hy am I being arrested?”, it was not merely a necessary inquiry

or clarifying question arising out of the custodial relationship, but

41 could reasonably have been interpreted by the detective as a general

inquiry into the investigation that reinitiated discussion with

Detective Sendling. See Mack, 296 Ga. at 247 ([T]here is more to

the analysis than merely an inquiry into ‘who said what when,’ and

we must consider the context in which a purported ‘initiation’ by the

defendant was made ….” (citation omitted)).

I also disagree with the majority opinion’s characterizations of

Detective Sendling’s response to Lee’s “why” question as unlawful

interrogation. In analyzing Detective Sendling’s response, which

included asking Lee, twice, “why do you think you were charged?”

and reminding Lee that he did not want to talk, we must recognize

that those responses were not posed in a vacuum. When Detective

Sendling responded to Lee’s question by asking “why do you think

you were charged?”, we cannot ignore, when considering the totality

of the circumstances of this particular interrogation, as evidenced

by the undisputed video, that Detective Sendling did not initiate the

discussion and only spoke at all because he was responding directly

to Lee’s unprompted question, “[w]hy am I being charged with

42 murder?” Cf. Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 231 (1988) (“By custodial

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers ….” (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 444–45 (1966)

(emphasis supplied by Delay Court)); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469

US 91, 98 (1984) (“With respect to the waiver inquiry, we

accordingly have emphasized that a valid waiver ‘cannot be

established by showing only that [the accused] responded to further

police-initiated custodial interrogation.’” (quoting Edwards, 451 US

at 484 (emphasis supplied by Smith Court)).

We have previously held that “an accused’s response to an

officer’s answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product

of custodial interrogation.” Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718 (1997),

disapproved on other grounds by Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49 (2012);

see also Gray v. State, 304 Ga. 799, 805 (2018). Moreover, we have

also concluded in past cases where detectives have “deflected” direct

questions from suspects or “reversed the question” that such

responses did not constitute interrogation or its functional

equivalent. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473, 477 (2010); Wilson

43 v. State, 275 Ga. 53, 58–59 (2002)12; see also Gray, 304 Ga. at 804–

05 (suspect’s right to remain silent not violated where detective

immediately stopped his interview and physically exited the

interview room, and while discussing non-case-related topics

afterward, “without any prompting from [another detective], [the

suspect] stated that he was being ‘framed’ for murder” and then

replied when his unsolicited comments prompted the detective to

ask if that’s why he was there). Here, it is clear in context and under

the totality of the circumstances that Detective Sendling’s two

12 The majority opinion distinguishes Wilson, arguing that it did not hold

that reversing a question posed by a defendant does not constitute interrogation as a general matter and that the suspect in that case had otherwise initiated further dialogue with police over autopsy photographs. I do not disagree that the Court in Wilson held that the suspect “initiated further dialogue with [the police] over [ ] autopsy photographs.” Wilson, 275 Ga. at 58. But that holding appears to be based on the entire sequence of events of the suspect’s initiation of further dialogue over the autopsy photographs, including the interaction in which the officer “reversed the question” the suspect had asked back to him, as the Court explained that entire interaction before holding that “the evidence established that Wilson indicated his willingness to talk with police on January 8 when he initiated further dialogue with them over the autopsy photographs.” Id. As such, I disagree with the majority’s reading of Wilson as considering the officer’s reversal of the defendant’s question to be “interrogation.” Rather, the Wilson Court viewed it as persuasive that the officer “reversed the question,” “only after Wilson turned to the officer and said he ‘wanted to know what had happened to [the victim’s] head,” and “[t]he interrogation continued from that point.” Id.

44 questions to Lee about why Lee thought he was being charged with

murder were in response to Lee’s unsolicited question about why he

was being charged with murder.

The majority opinion characterizes Detective Sendling’s

questions as “not responsive to Lee’s question about ‘why’ he was

charged” and therefore “interrogation because any reasonable officer

would know the question was ‘reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response.’” But in context, Detective Sendling’s first

question was clearly rhetorical. The majority opinion argues that

the question was not rhetorical because Detective Sendling paused

briefly after asking it, but it would be hard to interpret that brief

silence as indicating an intention to elicit a response because right

before it, Detective Sendling reminded Lee, “Remember, you don’t

want to talk to me.” As for Detective Sendling’s second question, I

recognize that it might be considered interrogation under other

circumstances. But here, it is hard to see how this question was

intended to elicit a response when after asking the question – which,

in fact, did not elicit any response – Detective Sendling told Lee that

45 the detective would only talk if Lee decided he wanted to talk. In

context and under a totality of the circumstances, Detective

Sendling’s questions cannot be considered as “reasonably likely to

elicit an incriminating response,” Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 135, when

Detective Sendling continued reminding Lee that he did not want to

talk. See Bradshaw, 462 US at 1045–46 (concluding that officer’s

immediate reminder that the accused did not have to talk indicated

officer understood accused’s ambiguous question as indicating

accused’s desire to discuss investigation generally); Brown, 287 Ga.

at 477 (no interrogation where, in response to suspect’s continued

questions, detective answered or deflected some and “[t]he

detective’s other statements and actions were aimed at effectuating

the suspect’s invocation”).

What’s more, Detective Sendling’s question, “why do you think

you were charged?” elicited no response or agreement to talk at all

– only silence. See Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 141–42 (“[E]ven if we were to

assume that the detective’s requests and statements were

interrogation in violation of Miranda and Edwards, they did not

46 elicit an incriminating response from Pauldo.”). It was only after

Detective Sendling turned again to leave while saying, “If you decide

you want to talk to me, I’ll talk to you, but—” Lee interjected, “Let’s

talk, man.”13 And before proceeding further, Detective Sendling

sought clarity, asking, “You want to talk?” To which Lee responded,

“Yeah,” confirming that he was reinitiating communications.

To conclude that Lee’s renewal of contact here was merely the

product of Detective Sendling’s question, “why do you think you

were charged?” is to ignore the totality of the circumstances that

actually led to Lee reinitiating communications. I would hold that

under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Lee reinitiated

13 Citing Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 225, 231 (2018), the majority opinion

characterizes the detective’s moving toward the exit at the same time as he was saying, “If you decide you want to talk to me, I’ll talk to you,” as an interrogation tactic to create “time pressure for Lee to respond quickly” because it was an action calculated to elicit an incriminating response. However, leaving a suspect alone seems to be a reasonable way for a law enforcement officer to scrupulously honor a suspect’s invocation of the right to silence, and under the circumstances, I cannot conclude that it was obviously an interrogation tactic rather than an effort to honor Lee’s rights. Cf. Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 134 (“On the other hand, the law does not require that after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or his right to counsel, law enforcement must leave the suspect’s presence and cease all interaction with him immediately.”). 47 communications with Detective Sendling when Lee asked, “Why am

I charged with murder, man?”, and the entire sequence of events

before and after that question, in context, supports that conclusion;

Lee’s “continued efforts to discuss the case” and confirmation of his

desire to talk “even after being reminded that he had invoked his

rights … ‘evinced a willingness and desire for a generalized

discussion about the investigation.’” Id. at 144 (quoting Driver, 307

Ga. at 650); see also Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (holding that under a

totality of the circumstances, “[the investigator’s] response to

questions [the suspect] initiated and posed to [the investigator]

when [the investigator] was preparing to walk out of the room,”

including asking the suspect where he had shot the victim after the

suspect volunteered that he had, “did not render [the suspect’s]

unsolicited and incriminating admission the product of

interrogation that must be suppressed at trial”).

Having determined that Lee reinitiated communication with

law enforcement, I would next analyze, and here reverse, the trial

court’s additional ruling that Lee’s statements were also

48 inadmissible because they were involuntary as a matter of

constitutional due process due to, among other things, coercive

police conduct. Specifically, the trial court found:

Here the police knew that Mr. Lee was illiterate with a third-grade education, was covering himself with his shirt, and was generally acting abnormally. When combined with the police restarting a conversation with Mr. Lee after he had invoked his rights alone with the choice not to re-Mirandize or to determine Mr. Lee’s level of understanding, this factor lends itself to a finding of coercive police conduct. The police were capitalizing on his mental state at the time of questioning. While a closer call than the Miranda/Edwards finding, this Court finds that the behavior of the police violated Mr. Lee’s due process rights.

(emphasis supplied). As an initial matter, because I have concluded

that Lee reinitiated the interrogation, that factor no longer supports

a due process violation. Moreover, I conclude that under the totality

of the circumstances in this case – where the record is clear that Lee

confirmed he understood English and would understand something

read to him, Lee appropriately answered the questions posed to him,

Detective Sendling read him his rights under Miranda, and Lee said

he understood them, which he demonstrated by immediately

49 invoking them – Lee voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

waived his rights under Miranda, and his statements were

voluntarily given, despite his illiteracy, his covering himself with his

shirt, and other actions prior to the interview starting. See Griffin

v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 869 (2020) (“Considering the totality of the

circumstances surrounding Griffin’s custodial statement, including

the detectives’ testimony concerning Griffin’s demeanor, conduct,

and responses to their questions during the interview, as well as our

de novo review of the video recording of the interview, we conclude

that the trial court did not err in finding that Griffin’s statement

was voluntarily made.”).

I would therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of the State’s

motion in limine to admit Lee’s statements at trial.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Warren and

Justices Bethel and LaGrua join in this dissent.