State v. Lebedev

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: November 7, 2023
• Docket: 23-249
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-249

Filed 7 November 2023

Orange County, Nos. 09CR701958, 10CR701939, 11CR703669

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ANTON M. LEBEDEV, Defendant.

Appeal by pro se defendant from orders entered 7 December 2022 by Judge C.

Todd Roper in Orange County District Court and from order entered 18 January 2023

by Judge R. Allen Baddour Jr. in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court

of Appeals 20 September 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. O’Brien and Assistant Attorney General Reginaldo Enrique Williams, for the State-appellee.

Law Offices of Anton M. Lebedev, by Anton M. Lebedev, for pro se defendant- appellant.

GORE, Judge.

Defendant Anton Mikhailovich Lebedev appeals pursuant to this Court’s 20

March 2023 Order allowing his petition for writ of certiorari for the purpose of

reviewing: (1) the three orders entered 7 December 2022 by the Orange County

District Court denying his “Petition and Order of Expunction Under G.S. 15A-146(a)

OR G.S. 15A-146(a1)” and (2) the order entered 18 January 2023 in Orange County

Superior Court denying his petition for writ of certiorari. STATE V. LEBEDEV

Opinion of the Court

Defendant argues the district court erred by denying his petition to expunge

multiple unrelated traffic misdemeanors pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-146.

Additionally, defendant asserts the superior court abused its discretion by summarily

denying his petition for writ of certiorari and declining to permit review of the district

court’s orders.

Upon review, we affirm. Defendant is not eligible for expunction under section

15A-146; he cites no authority supporting his view that pleading to a lesser included

offense somehow equates to a “dismissal.” Moreover, considering defendant’s

argument is meritless, the superior court could not have abused its discretion in

denying his petition for writ of certiorari.

I.

On 29 April 2009, defendant was charged with speeding (66 mph in a 45 mph

zone). Defendant, on 15 July 2009, ultimately pled responsible to a lesser included

charge: speeding (54 mph in a 45 mph zone).

On 16 March 2010, defendant was charged with speeding (64 mph in a 35 mph

zone). On 2 August 2010, defendant pled responsible to the lesser included charge of

exceeding a safe speed.

On 29 April 2011, defendant was charged with speeding (52 mph in a 35 mph

zone). Defendant again pled responsible to a lesser included charge—improper

equipment (speedometer)—on 17 August 2011.

On 24 November 2022, defendant filed three separate expungement petitions,

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each one seeking expunction as to one of the above traffic charges. The district court

denied all three, finding that they did not show defendant was charged with “multiple

offenses,” as required by the statute.

On 15 December 2022, defendant petitioned the superior court for a writ of

certiorari to review the expungement denials. The superior court denied the writ on

18 January 2023.

II.

Considering the district court’s orders denying expungement relief, our

resolution of the instant appeal hinges upon the statutory interpretation of N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A-146. “Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law,” which

this Court reviews de novo. State v. Lamp, 383 N.C. 562, 569, 881 S.E.2d 62, 67

(2022). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely

substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362

N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation omitted).

We review the superior court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of

certiorari for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ricks, 378 N.C. 737, 740, 862 S.E.2d

835, 838 (2021). “The test for abuse of discretion requires the reviewing court to

determine whether a decision is manifestly unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary

that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Locklear, 331

N.C. 239, 248, 415 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1992) (cleaned up).

III.

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“The primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the

legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.” Dickson v. Rucho,

366 N.C. 332, 339, 737 S.E.2d 362, 368 (2013) (citation omitted).

[W]hen the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment. In these situations, the history of the legislation may be considered in connection with the object, purpose and language of the statute in order to arrive at its true meaning. However, [w]hen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.

Applewood Props., LLC v. New S. Props., LLC, 366 N.C. 518, 522, 742 S.E.2d 776,

779 (2013) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-146(a1) provides, in pertinent

part, that “[i]f a person is charged with multiple offenses and any charges are

dismissed, then that person or the district attorney may petition to have each of the

dismissed charges expunged.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-146(a1) (2022) (emphasis

added). And, within Chapter 15A, the legislature provided several ways a criminal

charge may be dismissed. See, e.g., § 15A-931 (permitting a prosecutor to voluntarily

dismiss criminal charges).

In this case, defendant was charged with three unrelated misdemeanor

speeding charges between 2009-2011. It is undisputed that the State did not formally

dismiss any charges, as defined under Chapter 15A. Cf. § 15A-931(a) (“[T]he

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prosecutor may dismiss any charges stated in a criminal pleading . . . .”). While

defendant correctly notes Chapter 15A does not statutorily define “dismissal,” he

reads ambiguity into the statute where there is none. In keeping with our well-

established principles of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the term

“dismissal” is an unambiguous word that “has a definite and well known sense in the

law.” Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 19, 803 S.E.2d 142, 148 (2017)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The plain meaning of “dismissal” is the

“[t]ermination of an action, claim, or charge without further hearing . . . esp., a judge’s

decision to stop a court case through the entry of an order or judgment that imposes

no civil or criminal liability on the defendant with respect to that case.” Dismissal,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “In the event that the General Assembly

uses an unambiguous word without providing an explicit statutory definition, that

word will be accorded its plain meaning.” Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 19, 803 S.E.2d at

149.

As such, by its plain language, defendant is not entitled to expunction under

section 15A-146. Nevertheless, defendant insists he qualifies for relief because, in

his view, “the legislature nonetheless intended defendants to be able to petition to

expunge misdemeanor charges that did not ultimately result in a conviction.” Any

conclusion otherwise, defendant continues, would “lead to the absurd result of

forbidding the expungement of charges after the State abandoned its prosecution of

the same.”

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While defendant’s interpretation of section 15A-146 is certainly imaginative,

it incorrectly conflates the concept of pleading down to a lesser included offense with

that of an actual dismissal. Moreover, defendant’s broad interpretation of section

15A-146 drastically exceeds the scope of the plain language used by the legislature

as it appears in the statute. See Dickson, 366 N.C. at 344, 737 S.E.2d at 371

(quotation marks and citation omitted) (“We presume that the General Assembly

carefully chose each word used in drafting the legislation.).

As this Court has already noted, amending a charging document to instead

charge a lesser included offense does not equate to a dismissal, as contemplated by

Chapter 15A. See State v. Goodson, 101 N.C. App. 665, 668-69, 401 S.E.2d 118, 121

(1991) (holding that because “[t]he record clearly shows that the State’s request for a

dismissal on the charge of first degree murder was predicated on its request for a

charge of second degree murder[,] . . . [t]he court’s dismissal of the charge of first

degree murder was not a final dismissal of the criminal proceeding . . .” within the

meaning of section 15A-931(a).”). And, consistent with our precedent, “dismissal”

results in “no civil or criminal liability on the defendant with respect to that case.”

Dismissal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Applying these principles here,

defendant pled down to lesser included crimes, and he still retained liability as to the

charges he pled responsible for. See § 20-141 (2023) (specifying penalties associated

with various traffic violations). The State did not dismiss the original misdemeanor

charges, and defendant did not evade criminal liability. Both the plain language of

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section 15A-146 and this Court’s precedent preclude defendant’s arguments to the

contrary. See State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004) (“Where

the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial

construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders on grounds that each petition

for expunction only listed one charge to be expunged, not multiple, and that section

15A-146(a1) plainly does not provide defendant with relief.

Considering defendant’s expunction argument is without merit, the superior

court could not have abused its discretion by denying his petition for writ of certiorari.

Further, defendant cites no authority to support his contention that the superior

court erred when it “summarily denied the petition without even requesting the State

to respond.” Upon review of defendant’s petition and in the appropriate exercise of

its discretion, the superior court permissibly declined to issue the writ based on

defendant’s failure to show “merit, or that probable error was committed” below. In

re Snelgrove, 208 N.C. 670, 672, 182 S.E. 335, 336 (1935).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s order.

AFFIRMED.

Judges DILLON and ARROWOOD concur.

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