[192]*192EDMONDS, P. J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm. ORS 166.270(1). In the trial court, he moved to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest as the product of an illegal stop. He contended in his motion that he was stopped without reasonable suspicion. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was convicted. On appeal, defendant reasserts his argument that he was unlawfully stopped when the police started to chase him after he ran from them, relying on State v. Puffenbarger, 166 Or App 426, 998 P2d 788 (2000). We affirm.
On February 2,2000, City of Portland Police Officers Dalberg and Hattrick were patrolling in a marked police car in the area of Northeast Vancouver and Beach Streets, an area that had been designated by city ordinance as a drug-free zone. As Dalberg was driving down the street, he spotted a tall African-American male with a large build in a parking lot. The person was wearing a hood, but Dalberg was able to see his face and eyes, as well as his general silhouette. Based on his observations, Dalberg believed that the person he was observing was a person named Gainer. Dalberg had two or three prior contacts with Gainer, all of which had occurred in this particular area. During those contacts, Gainer had admitted to using drugs, and Dalberg knew that Gainer had previously been arrested for drug-related offenses. He believed that Gainer had been excluded from the area because it was a drug-free zone.1
The person that Dalberg had observed was standing about 50 feet away. Dalberg asked Hattrick to stop the patrol car, and he got out, stepped to the rear of the car, and shouted, ‘What’s up, Gainer?” Dalberg was in full uniform, [193]*193and the person he addressed was facing him. No sirens or flashing lights on the patrol car were activated at the time. The person Dalberg had addressed (defendant) did not say anything in response; instead, he turned and ran.
Dalberg followed defendant across the parking lot between a house and a fence, into an alley, believing that he was pursing Gainer. As he followed defendant, Dalberg saw him swing his right arm from his waistband as if he was in the act of throwing something. Dalberg heard a thud that sounded like a gun hitting the ground. The pursuit continued until a second patrol car arrived on the scene. The occupants of that car were able to detain defendant before Dalberg could reach him. When Dalberg was able to view the face of the person he had been pursuing, he realized for the first time that he had not pursued Gainer, but, in fact, defendant, whom he had mistakenly thought was Gainer.
Dalberg retraced the path of his pursuit and found a handgun about 20 feet away from where he had seen defendant throw something while he was running from the officer. As a result of the seizure of the weapon, defendant was charged with the crime of felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant claims that he was 'unlawfully stopped because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that either he or Gainer had committed any crime.
ORS 131.605(6) defines a stop as a “temporary restraint of a person’s liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place.” A “stop” is distinguishable from ordinary types of police-citizen encounters in which questioning occurs through mere conversation without any restraint of liberty. The former is legally justified only by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The latter requires no justification. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 161, 585 P2d 681 (1978). Defendant was clearly stopped within the meaning of the statute when he was detained by the second patrol car. However, we need not determine whether he was “stopped” before that time as the result of Dalberg’s pursuit because, even if that is the case, we conclude that Dalberg had a reasonable suspicion that Gainer, the person Dalberg thought he was pursuing, was unlawfully within a designated drug-free zone.
[194]*194The fact that defendant turned out not to be Gainer is one of several facts in this case that informs the inquiry regarding the reasonableness of Dalberg’s pursuit. Those cases that have considered facts of mistaken identity regarding issues of reasonable suspicion or probable cause have focused on the reasonableness of the mistake itself. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 US 797, 804,91 S Ct 1106, 28 L Ed 2d 484 (1971) (arrest of wrong individual was not invalid where police officers had a subjective good-faith belief that the person they had in fact arrested was the person the police had probable cause to arrest); see also United States v. Lang, 81 F3d 955 (10th Cir 1996) (suspicion not rendered unreasonable because identification was mistaken but reasonable); Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 3.2(d), 45-46 (3d ed 1996) (an arrest that is otherwise valid is not rendered illegal on the ground that the arrestee was mistaken for the person sought). Here, Dalberg based his conclusion that defendant was Gainer on his prior contacts with Gainer, his belief that Gainer was excluded from the area, and his observation of defendant’s size and stature.
Dalberg’s subjective belief that defendant was Gainer is uncontroverted. Dalberg said to his fellow officer, “Hey, I think that is Gainer. I want to talk to him for a second.” Dalberg stepped from his car and said, “What’s up, Gainer?” Defendant, however, also challenges the objective reasonableness of Dalberg’s belief. He points out that he is an African-American with a light complexion and six feet, six inches tall, while Gainer is an African-American with a medium complexion, six feet tall and weighing between 190 and 200 pounds. Defendant concludes, “It is simply not objectively reasonable for an officer to stop a black man, in a predominately African-American neighborhood, because he resembles someone who has previously admitted to drug use.”
Defendant’s argument fails to take into account the other pertinent facts in the record. Dalberg’s contact with defendant occurred at 12:30 a.m. in a high-crime area that was a drug-free zone. He had made numerous arrests in the area for drugs and was aware that “there are certain rules that state when you can be there. And * * * if you don’t follow those rules, you can be arrested for Criminal Trespass[.]” The [195]*195parking area where Dalberg observed defendant had some lighting, and there was also lighting in the area from an adjacent market. Defendant’s body was silhouetted in the lights and was “[pjrobably 50 feet or so” from the patrol car. Dalberg testified he had previously talked to Gainer on “two or three occasions” in the same area. One contact had occurred approximately two months before this contact. Dalberg explained, when asked what he could observe, that he looked at the facial features and the body type of the person in the parking lot. He added, “I could see his face. I could see his eyes. Just his basic silhouette[,] and it appeared to be * * * Gainer.”
Defendant’s argument implies that Dalberg’s suspicion was merely a generalized suspicion about African-Americans. However, Dalberg’s testimony belies that assertion. The fact that defendant is of lighter complexion than Gainer is of little import considering the lighting conditions that existed at the time.
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[192]*192EDMONDS, P. J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm. ORS 166.270(1). In the trial court, he moved to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest as the product of an illegal stop. He contended in his motion that he was stopped without reasonable suspicion. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was convicted. On appeal, defendant reasserts his argument that he was unlawfully stopped when the police started to chase him after he ran from them, relying on State v. Puffenbarger, 166 Or App 426, 998 P2d 788 (2000). We affirm.
On February 2,2000, City of Portland Police Officers Dalberg and Hattrick were patrolling in a marked police car in the area of Northeast Vancouver and Beach Streets, an area that had been designated by city ordinance as a drug-free zone. As Dalberg was driving down the street, he spotted a tall African-American male with a large build in a parking lot. The person was wearing a hood, but Dalberg was able to see his face and eyes, as well as his general silhouette. Based on his observations, Dalberg believed that the person he was observing was a person named Gainer. Dalberg had two or three prior contacts with Gainer, all of which had occurred in this particular area. During those contacts, Gainer had admitted to using drugs, and Dalberg knew that Gainer had previously been arrested for drug-related offenses. He believed that Gainer had been excluded from the area because it was a drug-free zone.1
The person that Dalberg had observed was standing about 50 feet away. Dalberg asked Hattrick to stop the patrol car, and he got out, stepped to the rear of the car, and shouted, ‘What’s up, Gainer?” Dalberg was in full uniform, [193]*193and the person he addressed was facing him. No sirens or flashing lights on the patrol car were activated at the time. The person Dalberg had addressed (defendant) did not say anything in response; instead, he turned and ran.
Dalberg followed defendant across the parking lot between a house and a fence, into an alley, believing that he was pursing Gainer. As he followed defendant, Dalberg saw him swing his right arm from his waistband as if he was in the act of throwing something. Dalberg heard a thud that sounded like a gun hitting the ground. The pursuit continued until a second patrol car arrived on the scene. The occupants of that car were able to detain defendant before Dalberg could reach him. When Dalberg was able to view the face of the person he had been pursuing, he realized for the first time that he had not pursued Gainer, but, in fact, defendant, whom he had mistakenly thought was Gainer.
Dalberg retraced the path of his pursuit and found a handgun about 20 feet away from where he had seen defendant throw something while he was running from the officer. As a result of the seizure of the weapon, defendant was charged with the crime of felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant claims that he was 'unlawfully stopped because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that either he or Gainer had committed any crime.
ORS 131.605(6) defines a stop as a “temporary restraint of a person’s liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place.” A “stop” is distinguishable from ordinary types of police-citizen encounters in which questioning occurs through mere conversation without any restraint of liberty. The former is legally justified only by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The latter requires no justification. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 161, 585 P2d 681 (1978). Defendant was clearly stopped within the meaning of the statute when he was detained by the second patrol car. However, we need not determine whether he was “stopped” before that time as the result of Dalberg’s pursuit because, even if that is the case, we conclude that Dalberg had a reasonable suspicion that Gainer, the person Dalberg thought he was pursuing, was unlawfully within a designated drug-free zone.
[194]*194The fact that defendant turned out not to be Gainer is one of several facts in this case that informs the inquiry regarding the reasonableness of Dalberg’s pursuit. Those cases that have considered facts of mistaken identity regarding issues of reasonable suspicion or probable cause have focused on the reasonableness of the mistake itself. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 US 797, 804,91 S Ct 1106, 28 L Ed 2d 484 (1971) (arrest of wrong individual was not invalid where police officers had a subjective good-faith belief that the person they had in fact arrested was the person the police had probable cause to arrest); see also United States v. Lang, 81 F3d 955 (10th Cir 1996) (suspicion not rendered unreasonable because identification was mistaken but reasonable); Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 3.2(d), 45-46 (3d ed 1996) (an arrest that is otherwise valid is not rendered illegal on the ground that the arrestee was mistaken for the person sought). Here, Dalberg based his conclusion that defendant was Gainer on his prior contacts with Gainer, his belief that Gainer was excluded from the area, and his observation of defendant’s size and stature.
Dalberg’s subjective belief that defendant was Gainer is uncontroverted. Dalberg said to his fellow officer, “Hey, I think that is Gainer. I want to talk to him for a second.” Dalberg stepped from his car and said, “What’s up, Gainer?” Defendant, however, also challenges the objective reasonableness of Dalberg’s belief. He points out that he is an African-American with a light complexion and six feet, six inches tall, while Gainer is an African-American with a medium complexion, six feet tall and weighing between 190 and 200 pounds. Defendant concludes, “It is simply not objectively reasonable for an officer to stop a black man, in a predominately African-American neighborhood, because he resembles someone who has previously admitted to drug use.”
Defendant’s argument fails to take into account the other pertinent facts in the record. Dalberg’s contact with defendant occurred at 12:30 a.m. in a high-crime area that was a drug-free zone. He had made numerous arrests in the area for drugs and was aware that “there are certain rules that state when you can be there. And * * * if you don’t follow those rules, you can be arrested for Criminal Trespass[.]” The [195]*195parking area where Dalberg observed defendant had some lighting, and there was also lighting in the area from an adjacent market. Defendant’s body was silhouetted in the lights and was “[pjrobably 50 feet or so” from the patrol car. Dalberg testified he had previously talked to Gainer on “two or three occasions” in the same area. One contact had occurred approximately two months before this contact. Dalberg explained, when asked what he could observe, that he looked at the facial features and the body type of the person in the parking lot. He added, “I could see his face. I could see his eyes. Just his basic silhouette[,] and it appeared to be * * * Gainer.”
Defendant’s argument implies that Dalberg’s suspicion was merely a generalized suspicion about African-Americans. However, Dalberg’s testimony belies that assertion. The fact that defendant is of lighter complexion than Gainer is of little import considering the lighting conditions that existed at the time. Similarly, the difference in height of the two individuals, when observed from a distance of 50 feet under those conditions, does not, in our view, substantially detract from the objective reasonableness of Dalberg’s belief that it was Gainer. Based on the circumstances of his observation and his prior contacts with Gainer, we conclude that Dalberg reasonably believed that the person he was pursuing was Gainer, a person who could not lawfully be in the area.
It follows that Dalberg’s initial pursuit of defendant was lawful. During the pursuit, defendant’s conduct prompted an additional reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. Dalberg saw defendant discard what the officer believed to be a gun under circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that defendant could not lawfully possess a firearm. Consequently, we reject defendant’s assertion that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Dalberg had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant.
The concurrence would decide the issue in this case by holding that defendant was not “stopped” when Dalberg pursued him, by distinguishing the pursuit of defendant from the pursuit of the defendant in Puffenbarger. In that case, the police initially contacted the defendant, who was walking on the sidewalk, and asked him for identifying information. In [196]*196addition, they inquired whether he had ever been arrested. The defendant told the officers that he had been arrested, but only for traffic matters. They asked him for consent to search his person but he refused. The defendant then asked if he was free to leave, and the police told him that he was. However, as the defendant left, they followed him for a distance of 12 blocks, even as he changed directions. During that time, they called out questions to him as they drove their car on the wrong side of the street. When the defendant’s route did not permit the officers to follow him in their police car, the officers got out of their car and ran after him as the defendant attempted to leave their presence. We held on those facts that it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that the police were attempting to exercise their authority and to interfere with his liberty and freedom of movement. Consequently, we concluded that a stop had occurred.
Here, it is not necessary to engage in fact-matching with Puffenbarger. Unlike in Puffenbarger, Dalberg had an initial reasonable suspicion that the person with whom he was making contact was committing a criminal offense in Dalberg’s presence. Therefore, it makes no difference to our decision when Dalberg stopped defendant.
Affirmed.