State v. Koller

835 P.2d 644, 122 Idaho 409, 1992 Ida. LEXIS 138
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 17, 1992
Docket19054
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 835 P.2d 644 (State v. Koller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Koller, 835 P.2d 644, 122 Idaho 409, 1992 Ida. LEXIS 138 (Idaho 1992).

Opinions

BAKES, Chief Justice.

Evan O. Koller appeals his conviction of the misdemeanor of outfitting without a license. We affirm.

In November of 1987, Albert Lewis (Lewis), an undercover agent for the Idaho Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board, began investigating Evan Koller (Koller) for alleged violations of the Outfitters and Guides Act, I.C. § 36-2101 et seq. Lewis initiated the investigation after being given newspaper advertisements which had been placed in The Salt Lake Tribune, the Lo[410]*410gan Herald Tribune, and The Deseret News. Using the undercover name of Hal Taguen, Lewis contacted Koller and arranged for a deer hunt with Koller. Koller sent Lewis a draft brochure detailing the “guided hunts on private land for trophy mule deer.” Lewis made an advanced payment of $1,200 to secure the hunt.

On October 31, 1988, Lewis arrived at the Koller residence in Cornish, Utah and paid an additional $1,300 to Koller. The Kollers provided Lewis with accommodations for the night and served him dinner and breakfast. The next day, Koller drove' Lewis on Roller's property into Idaho in search for deer. After crossing the border from Utah into Idaho, Lewis and Koller came across a small herd of deer and Lewis spotted a buck. However, Koller advised Lewis that he could find a better buck to shoot, and they proceeded further into Idaho. Lewis and Koller then came across another buck which Lewis shot. The hunt was videotaped by Koller. The deer was taken back to Koller’s residence where Lewis and Koller skinned and caped it, and Koller put a meat sack on it to keep it clean.

As a result of this incident, Koller was cited and found guilty in magistrate court of outfitting without a license. The judgment was affirmed by the district court. Koller filed this appeal, arguing: (1) that the Outfitters and Guides Act (Act), under which he was convicted, cannot be applied to activities conducted on private land; (2) that the Act violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process; and (3) that he was entrapped by the State into committing the crime. We address each of these arguments in turn.

When this Court reviews a case appealed from a district court’s appellate review of a magistrate’s decision, we independently review the magistrate’s decision, after giving due regard to the district court’s ruling. McNelis v. McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 806 P.2d 442 (1991). If the magistrate’s findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence, we will uphold those findings on appeal. McNelis, supra. As to issues of law, we exercise free review. Matter of Hanson, 121 Idaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992).

First, Koller argues that the Outfitters and Guides Act does not apply to “outfitting” which occurs on private land. The “Declaration of Policy” of the Act is set forth at I.C. § 36-2101 and states in part:

The intent of this legislation is to promote and encourage residents and nonresidents alike to participate in the enjoyment and use of the ... natural resources of Idaho, and the fish and game therein, and to that end to regulate and license those persons who undertake for compensation to provide equipment and personal services to such persons, for the explicit purpose of safeguarding the health, safety, welfare and freedom from injury or danger of such persons, in the exercise of the police power of this state. (Emphasis added.)

It is clear from the above language that the intent of this act is to regulate commercial outfitting. The State legislature, under the broad concept of police power, may enact laws concerning the health safety and welfare of the people so long as the regulations are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Van Orden v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 102 Idaho 663, 637 P.2d 1159 (1981). The regulation and licensing of outfitters is no different than those regulations concerning licensing for barbers or physicians which have been found to be valid. See Gregersen v. Blume, 113 Idaho 220, 223, 743 P.2d 88, 91 (Ct.App.1987) (“[T]he state may regulate the haircutting trade in order to protect public health and safety.”); State v. Kellogg, 102 Idaho 628, 636 P.2d 750 (1981) (State has an interest in allowing only persons from accredited medical schools to apply for license to practice medicine.). Nothing in the Declaration of Policy or elsewhere in the Act indicates that the legislature intended to exempt the license requirement when the commercial outfitting occurs on private land. We conclude that the legislature intended to regulate commercial outfitting whether it occurs on public or private land and that such [411]*411regulation is a reasonable use of the legislature’s police power.1

Next, Roller asserts that the Act violates his right to equal protection because a private land owner can engage in outfitting without a license so long as he does not charge for the service. However, the legislature’s distinction between commercial and noncommercial outfitting is rationally related to its expressed objective of “safeguarding the health, safety, welfare and freedom” of individuals while in turn “promot[ing] and encouragpng] residents and nonresidents alike to participate in the enjoyment and use” of Idaho’s natural resources. I.C. § 36-2101. See Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 711, 791 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1990) (“[T]he appropriate test to review a statute which impacts social or economic areas is the rational basis test which requires only that the statute ‘advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion.’ ”) (Citing Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 374, 659 P.2d 111, 128 (1983).) The Act’s distinction between commercial and non-commercial outfitting does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

Roller also makes a rather unfocused due process argument suggesting that the Act is “under-inclusive” or “void for vagueness.” However, to the extent that this due process claim is discernable, it is without merit. See Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods v. State Dept. of Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 793 P.2d 675 (1989).

Finally, Roller argues that he was entrapped by the State into committing the crime. The trial court denied this claim, finding that “the activity of the state was a response to what the Defendant was openly undertaking to develop as a business----” Entrapment occurs when “an otherwise innocent person, not inclined to commit a criminal offense, is induced to do so by a State agent who, desiring grounds for prosecution, originates the criminal design and implants in the mind of the innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense.” State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 817 n. 1, 673 P.2d 416, 417 n. 1 (1983) (emphasis added).

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State v. Koller
835 P.2d 644 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
835 P.2d 644, 122 Idaho 409, 1992 Ida. LEXIS 138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-koller-idaho-1992.