Underwood, J.
This is an appeal from the defendant’s conviction by jury of driving while under the influence of intoxicat[362]*362ing liquor. 23 V.S.A. § 1201 (a) (2). He argues, inter alia, that the court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by him to a state police officer which were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We agree and reverse.
The pertinent facts are as follows. On May 3,1981, defendant was arrested for DUI. He was taken to the state police barracks where he was read what were purported to be his Miranda rights. Specifically, defendant was advised of the following:
You may remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you. You may refuse to answer any questions asked of you at any time. If you cannot afford an attorney and want one, you can contact the public defender or one will be contacted for you before questioning.
After stating that he understood these rights, defendant requested to speak with a lawyer. A public defender was contacted, and defendant spoke with him on the phone. Once the call was completed, an officer asked defendant if he was willing to make a statement. Defendant replied that he was willing to do so and proceeded to answer the officer’s questions.
On October 28, 1981, defendant’s trial commenced. On that same day, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made at the barracks. The motion was heard and denied during the course of the trial.
At trial, the State put the arresting officer on the witness stand. He testified that the car defendant was driving weaved across the centerline of the road at least three times. When he stopped the car and spoke to defendant, he noticed the odor of liquor on his breath. He asked defendant to walk heel to toe along the white line at the shoulder of the road. Defendant was unable to do this satisfactorily. Based on these observations the officer stated his opinion that the defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
On cross-examination the defense counsel asked the officer if people sometimes weave over the centerline and fail the heel-toe test without being under the influence. The officer replied in the affirmative. The defense counsel then asked if a driver might cross the line and fail the test because he was sick or injured. Again, the officer responded in the affirmative.
[363]*363On redirect examination the state’s attorney proceeded to question the officer as to whether he had asked the defendant at the baracks if he suffered from any physical injuries, handicaps, or illnesses. The defense objected. The questioning stopped and a hearing was held out of the presence of the jury. After testimony from the arresting officer and defendant concerning the questioning of defendant at the barracks, the court made oral findings from the bench. It held that (1) the statement taken by the officer complied with Miranda, and (2) the defendant had opened the door. With regard to the latter, the court stated that even if its finding that the statements were lawfully taken was incorrect, they were admissible because “counsel for defendant has opened up an avenue of questioning here raising the question before the jury as to whether or not the inability of the defendant to walk the straight line could have been something other than the result of intoxication.”
The officer then testified before the jury that he had asked defendant if he was ill, suffered from recent injuries, or had any physical handicaps, and that defendant answered no to all three questions.
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that his statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda. He maintains that under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), once he invoked his right to counsel the police could not interrogate him lawfully unless counsel was made available to him or he initiated the communication. We need not reach this issue, however, since the purported Miranda warnings given to defendant were constitutionally defective in that they failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel present during questioning. State v. Shores, 143 Vt. 224, 227, 465 A.2d 269, 271 (1983). Although this defect was not raised by defendant, it constitutes plain error and as such is noticed by this Court. V.E.Cr.P. 52 (b).
The second ground for the court’s ruling was that the defense counsel “opened the door” for the admission of defendant’s statements by her cross-examination of the police officer. The court ruled that the statements were admissible to rebut the inference raised by defense counsel that defendant’s lack [364]*364of motor coordination skills was due to fatigue, illness, or injury rather than alcohol. We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has allowed the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment of a defendant’s direct or cross-examination testimony, United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) ; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), to locate witnesses identified in the tainted evidence, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and in questioning a witness during grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 133 n.117 (D.C. Cir. 1982). None of these three exceptions to the exclusionary rule are applicable to the State’s use of the illegally obtained evidence in the instant case. The State has cited us no authority, nor has our own research revealed any, which supports its position that tainted evidence is admissible to rebut inferences raised by defense counsel. Absent any authority, this Court, is not inclined, on the facts of this case, to create a further exception to the rule.
We also note that the United States Court of Appeals' for the District of Columbia has recently addressed this issue in an analogous situation and reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Hinckley, supra. In holding that illegally obtained evidence was not admissible to rebut an insanity defense, the Hinckley court wrote that:
The rationale of this [impeachment] exception to the exclusionary rule is that “[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” Harris v. New York, [401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)].
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Underwood, J.
This is an appeal from the defendant’s conviction by jury of driving while under the influence of intoxicat[362]*362ing liquor. 23 V.S.A. § 1201 (a) (2). He argues, inter alia, that the court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by him to a state police officer which were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We agree and reverse.
The pertinent facts are as follows. On May 3,1981, defendant was arrested for DUI. He was taken to the state police barracks where he was read what were purported to be his Miranda rights. Specifically, defendant was advised of the following:
You may remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you. You may refuse to answer any questions asked of you at any time. If you cannot afford an attorney and want one, you can contact the public defender or one will be contacted for you before questioning.
After stating that he understood these rights, defendant requested to speak with a lawyer. A public defender was contacted, and defendant spoke with him on the phone. Once the call was completed, an officer asked defendant if he was willing to make a statement. Defendant replied that he was willing to do so and proceeded to answer the officer’s questions.
On October 28, 1981, defendant’s trial commenced. On that same day, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made at the barracks. The motion was heard and denied during the course of the trial.
At trial, the State put the arresting officer on the witness stand. He testified that the car defendant was driving weaved across the centerline of the road at least three times. When he stopped the car and spoke to defendant, he noticed the odor of liquor on his breath. He asked defendant to walk heel to toe along the white line at the shoulder of the road. Defendant was unable to do this satisfactorily. Based on these observations the officer stated his opinion that the defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
On cross-examination the defense counsel asked the officer if people sometimes weave over the centerline and fail the heel-toe test without being under the influence. The officer replied in the affirmative. The defense counsel then asked if a driver might cross the line and fail the test because he was sick or injured. Again, the officer responded in the affirmative.
[363]*363On redirect examination the state’s attorney proceeded to question the officer as to whether he had asked the defendant at the baracks if he suffered from any physical injuries, handicaps, or illnesses. The defense objected. The questioning stopped and a hearing was held out of the presence of the jury. After testimony from the arresting officer and defendant concerning the questioning of defendant at the barracks, the court made oral findings from the bench. It held that (1) the statement taken by the officer complied with Miranda, and (2) the defendant had opened the door. With regard to the latter, the court stated that even if its finding that the statements were lawfully taken was incorrect, they were admissible because “counsel for defendant has opened up an avenue of questioning here raising the question before the jury as to whether or not the inability of the defendant to walk the straight line could have been something other than the result of intoxication.”
The officer then testified before the jury that he had asked defendant if he was ill, suffered from recent injuries, or had any physical handicaps, and that defendant answered no to all three questions.
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that his statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda. He maintains that under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), once he invoked his right to counsel the police could not interrogate him lawfully unless counsel was made available to him or he initiated the communication. We need not reach this issue, however, since the purported Miranda warnings given to defendant were constitutionally defective in that they failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel present during questioning. State v. Shores, 143 Vt. 224, 227, 465 A.2d 269, 271 (1983). Although this defect was not raised by defendant, it constitutes plain error and as such is noticed by this Court. V.E.Cr.P. 52 (b).
The second ground for the court’s ruling was that the defense counsel “opened the door” for the admission of defendant’s statements by her cross-examination of the police officer. The court ruled that the statements were admissible to rebut the inference raised by defense counsel that defendant’s lack [364]*364of motor coordination skills was due to fatigue, illness, or injury rather than alcohol. We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has allowed the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment of a defendant’s direct or cross-examination testimony, United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) ; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), to locate witnesses identified in the tainted evidence, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and in questioning a witness during grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 133 n.117 (D.C. Cir. 1982). None of these three exceptions to the exclusionary rule are applicable to the State’s use of the illegally obtained evidence in the instant case. The State has cited us no authority, nor has our own research revealed any, which supports its position that tainted evidence is admissible to rebut inferences raised by defense counsel. Absent any authority, this Court, is not inclined, on the facts of this case, to create a further exception to the rule.
We also note that the United States Court of Appeals' for the District of Columbia has recently addressed this issue in an analogous situation and reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Hinckley, supra. In holding that illegally obtained evidence was not admissible to rebut an insanity defense, the Hinckley court wrote that:
The rationale of this [impeachment] exception to the exclusionary rule is that “[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” Harris v. New York, [401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)]. This rationale simply will not support the government’s desire to extend the exception to include use of tainted evidence for rebutting the substance; of a defendant’s testimony.
Id. at 133 n.117. We agree with this reasoning, and in so doing reject the State’s position that the impeachment exception should be expanded to include the use of illegally obtained evidence for rebutting inferences raised by defense counsel.
[365]*365The door was never opened in this case for admission of tainted evidence. The evidence offered and allowed was a part of the State’s case-in-chief. The defendant had not testified and so there was nothing to impeach. Thus, the court erred in admitting the evidence. However, although the State’s use of the tainted evidence is an error of constitutional magnitude, it is not per se reversible. State v. Mosher, 143 Vt. 197, 207, 465 A.2d 261, 267 (1983). Rather, this Court must determine whether or not the admission of such evidence constituted harmless error.
We have recently stated that “ [t] o establish harmless error, the State, as the beneficiary of the error, must establish beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that there was overwhelming evidence to support the conviction; and (2) that the evidence in question did not in any way contribute to the conviction.” State v. Shores, supra, 143 Vt. at 228, 465 A.2d at 271 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) ; State v. Mosher, supra). Upon reviewing the record in the instant case, we are not convinced that the evidence did not in any way contribute to the conviction.
The State’s case rested on the testimony of the arresting officer that he believed defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol. The officer testified that his opinion was based on defendant’s weaving over the centerline while driving and his failure to perform the heel-to-toe test, On cross-examination, he admitted that the inability of defendant to keep his car in the right lane and to walk a straight line could have been the result of something other than intoxication — i.e., fatigue or illness. Subsequently, defendant testified that he did not perform well on the heel-to-toe test because he was sleepy and suffering from a head cold. Taken in conjunction with the officer’s testimony on cross-examination, the defendant’s explanation may well have raised a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds as to defendant’s guilt. However, this possibility was undercut by the tainted evidence that defendant told the officer that he was not sick, injured, or handicapped. Accordingly, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt [366]*366that the tainted evidence did not contribute to defendant’s conviction.
Reversed and remanded.