State v. Kettering

2025 Ohio 54
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 9, 2025
Docket24COA027
StatusPublished

This text of 2025 Ohio 54 (State v. Kettering) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Kettering, 2025 Ohio 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kettering, 2025-Ohio-54.]

COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. : Hon. John W. Wise, J. -vs- : : Case No. 24COA027 : KIMBERLY KETTERING : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County Municipal Court, Case No. 16-CRB- 01132

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 9, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee Andrew Hyde: For Defendant-Appellant:

GRANT MASON ERIC S. MILLER 121 N. MARKET STREET, SUITE 300 13 PARK AVENUE W., SUITE 608 WOOSTER, OHIO 44691 MANSFIELD, OHIO 44902 Ashland County, Case No. 24COA027 2

Delaney, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant Kimberly Kettering appeals from the May 13, 2024 Judgment

Order For Revivor of Judgment of the Ashland County Municipal Court. Appellee is

Andrew Hyde (“Hyde”). The state of Ohio did not appear in this appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On October 11, 2016, Appellant was charged in Ashland Municipal Court

with one count of theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02, a misdemeanor of the first degree.

Appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge and was sentenced on

November 8, 2016, to 180 days in jail with 90 days suspended, and two years of

probation. Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to the theft victim Hyde in the amount

of $18,000 and to perform 200 hours of community service.

{¶3} Relevant to this appeal, on April 23, 2018, the trial court issued an Amended

Judgment Entry of Certificate of Judgment of Restitution to Hyde in the amount of

$17,995, pursuant to R.C. 2929.28(A)(1)(E). In the entry, Hyde is designated as a

Judgment Creditor.

{¶4} On March 27, 2024, the Hyde filed a Motion to Revive Judgment of

Restitution, seeking the remaining principal restitution balance owed by Appellant and

statutory interest. Appellant did not object to the revivor of the judgment but objected to

the granting of any interest, arguing Hyde was not entitled to interest on a criminal penalty.

{¶5} On May 13, 2024, the trial court issued a Judgment Order for Revivor of the

Judgment and found Hyde was entitled to interest under R.C. 1343.03 commencing on

the issuance of the Order but that no interest would accrue during the period of dormancy.

{¶6} It is from this judgment Appellant now appeals. Ashland County, Case No. 24COA027 3

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶7} As an initial matter, Appellant failed to comply with App. R. 16(A)(3) by

failing to set forth “[a] statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with

reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected”. Instead, Appellant sets

forth a statement of issues presented for review. Appellant’s Brief, p. 5

{¶8} In the interest of justice, this Court will address the Assignment of Error as

raised in Appellant’s Reply Brief.

{¶9} “l. INTEREST CANNOT BE ACCRUED BY IMPLICATION ON A CRIMINAL

SENTENCING ORDER OF RESTITITION. A COURT CANNOT EFFECTIVELY ADD AN

ASSESSMENT OF INTEREST ONTO ITS EARLIER FINAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING

ORDER THROUGH THE SUBSEQUENT USE OF ITS AUTHORITY UNDER OHIO

REVISED CODE 2929.28(E).”

ANALYSIS

l.

{¶10} Appellant claims the trial court cannot add interest to a restitution order

because it failed to do so in its criminal sentencing order of November 8, 2016. Appellant

argues the trial court has effectively reconsidered and amended its final sentencing order

in the criminal case under the guise of R.C. 1343.03 and in doing so exceeded the

jurisdictional limit of municipal court in civil cases of $15,000. Appellant urges this Court

to modify the May 13, 2024 revivor order to delete the collection of interest.

{¶11} Hyde, now designated as a judgment creditor, asserts the trial court had

authority to award interest under R.C. 1343.03(A) because an order of restitution, as part Ashland County, Case No. 24COA027 4

of a misdemeanor sentence, can be a civil judgment in favor of the victim who becomes

a judgment creditor under R.C. 2929.28(E). We agree.

{¶12} R.C. 2929.23(A) authorizes a court imposing a sentence upon a

misdemeanor offender to make restitution, as well as other financial sanctions such as

court costs and fines. R.C. 2929.23 (E) provides, provides in relevant part:

{¶13} “A financial sanction of restitution imposed pursuant to division (A)(1) of this

section is an order in favor of the victim of the offender’s criminal act that can be collected

through a certificate of judgment as described in division (E)(1) of this section, through

execution as described in division (E)(2) of this section, or through an order as described

in division (E)(3) of this section, and the offender shall be considered for purposes of the

collection as the judgment debtor. Once the financial sanction is imposed as a judgment

or order under this division, the victim * * * may do any of the following:

{¶14} “(1) Obtain from the clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered,

at no charge, a certificate of judgment that shall be in the same manner and form as a

certificate of judgment issued in a civil action;

{¶15} “(2) Obtain execution of the judgment or order through any available

procedure, including any of the procedures identified in divisions (D)(1) and (2) of section

2929.18 of the Revised Code.

{¶16} “(3) Obtain an order for the assignment of wages of the judgment debtor

{¶17} Furthermore, R.C. 2929.281(E) states that where a restitution order is

imposed and reduced to a certificate of judgment in favor of the victim under R.C.

2929.28(E), the person required to pay restitution under the order is the judgment debtor. Ashland County, Case No. 24COA027 5

{¶18} These statutory provisions clearly provide a mechanism for a victim who is

the subject of a restitution order to obtain a civil certificate of judgment and avail him/her

self to civil remedies as provided by law, without having to file a separate civil action.

{¶19} Hyde further asserts judgment creditors under R.C. 2929.28(E) may also

avail themselves to the right to interest on judgments under R.C. 1343.03(A).

{¶20} R.C. 1343.03 (A) provides, in relevant part: “[w]hen money becomes due

and payable…upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the

payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or any other transaction,

the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate per annum determined pursuant to section

5703.47 of the Revised Code…”.

{¶21} Applying the plain language of the statute, it appears a judgment creditor

under R.C. 2929.28(E) would be entitled to seek interest on a certificate judgment similar

to all other judgments. “If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must

be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.” State ex rel. Savarese

v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 600 N.E.2d 463

(1996).

{¶22} Furthermore, there does not appear to be any statutory authority or case

law the would exempt a restitution judgment creditor from the interest provisions of R.C.

1343.03.

{¶23} While Appellant raises several policy and societal considerations against

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Bluebook (online)
2025 Ohio 54, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-kettering-ohioctapp-2025.