IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED APRIL SESSION, 1999 June 4, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9807-CR-00305 )
Appe llant, )
)
) WILSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. BOBBY CAPERS, KENNETH BRYAN HARRIS, ) JUDGE )
Appellee. ) (State Appe al)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF WILSON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
FRANK LANNOM JOHN KNOX WALKUP 102 East Main Street Attorney General and Reporter Lebanon, TN 37087 KIM R. HELPER
Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
TOM P. THOMPSON, JR.
District Attorney General
WILLIAM REED
District Attorney Ge neral Pro T empore 363 Court Street
Maryville, TN 37804-5906
OPINION FILED ________________________ REVERSED AND REMANDED DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The State ap peals from thre e decisions of the Wilson County Criminal Court concerning Defendant Kenneth Bryan Harris. The State contends that the trial court erred by (1) dismissing Defendant’s superseding, two-count indictment for attemp ted first deg ree mu rder and aggrava ted assa ult; (2) denying the State’s motion to nolle prosequi the initial indictment charging aggravated assault; and (3) revers ing the district a ttorney gene ral pro tempore’s decision to deny Defen dant pre trial diversion for the initial cha rge of ag gravated assau lt.
The facts we glean from the limited record reveal that Defendant and the victim in this case were neighbors engaged in a dispute. Shortly before the conflict at bar, De fendan t had acc used th e victim of th reatenin g to kill him with a gun, resulting in an indictment against the victim. Later, on January 21, 1996, Defendant saw the victim w alking his do g, stop ped a nd exite d his ca r with his .38 caliber pistol, allegedly threatened to kill the victim, and fired five shots at the victim.
Defendant claim s that w hile he was driving, the victim began to walk to the center of the stree t toward h is car. De fendan t states th at whe n the vic tim reached behin d his back, as if for a weapon, Defendant fired a warning shot, after which the victim b egan to run towa rd the ca r. Defendant then fired four more shots, injuring the victim . Defendant then called emergency assistance for the victim, who has suffered irrevocable paralysis from the chest down as a result of the shooting.
3
The Wilson County Grand Jury indicted Defendant on March 18, 1996 for one count of aggravated assault; and because of the prior indictment pending against the victim, a district attorney gene ral pro tempo re was ap pointed to prosec ute the case. On November 12, 1996, Defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion, which is authorized by law for the offense of aggravated assau lt. On December 12, 1996, the State responded by securing a superseding indictment from the grand jury for aggravated assault and attempted first degree murde r, the latter of w hich doe s not qua lify for pretrial divers ion.
The State moved the trial court on May 8, 1997 to nolle prosequi the initial indictment in favor of the supers eding ind ictmen t. On Ma rch 31, 1 998, the State denied Defendant’s motion for pretrial diversion on the original indictment, and Defendant filed a response the same day opposing the State’s motion to nolle the original ind ictmen t.
On April 14, 1998, the trial court denied the State’s motion to nolle the first indictme nt; dismissed the superseding, two-count indictment; and scheduled a hearing to review th e State’s denial of p retrial diversio n. Following the hearing, the trial court foun d that the district a ttorney gene ral pro tempore abus ed his discretion by denyin g Defe ndant p retrial diversio n and o rdered th at a Memorandum of Understanding be entered for a two-year period. On June 5, 1998, the State filed its notice o f appeal under T ennes see Ru le of App ellate Proced ure 3.
4
I. DISMISSAL OF SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT AND DENIAL OF MOTION TO NOLLE PROSEQUI
As a preliminary procedural matter, Defendant challenges the timeliness of the State’s appeal, contending that the appeal, filed under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 3, should have been filed within thirty days of April 14, 1998, the date the trial court denied the motion to nolle the original indictment and dismissed the superseding indictment. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1), (4). The State did not file its notice, however, until June 5, 1998.
The State responds by arguing in the alternative. First, it asserts that because “the proc eeding did not co nclude with the dismissal of the superseding indictme nt, . . . an appeal at that time under Rule 3 m ay have b een pre mature .” Second, the State con tends that if we find that a notice of appe al should have been filed within thirty days of April 14, we should waive proper filing in the interest of jus tice, pursu ant to Te nness ee Ru le of App ellate Pro cedure 4(a).
At the time the trial judge dism issed the superseding indictment, the original indictment remained pending in the trial court; and prohibiting a nolle of the original indictment ensured that the indictment would continue to be prosecuted in that cou rt. The unusual procedura l circum stanc es pre sente d in this case have convinced us that no benefit would result from an attempt to analyze the issue of timeline ss base d upon prior decis ions and rules of co urt.
Had the Sta te imm ediate ly appe aled th e dism issal of th e sup ersed ing indictme nt, the original indictme nt would have remained pending in the trial court during the pende ncy of the appea l. Had the trial judge not granted the Defendant
5
pretrial diversio n on the origina l indictme nt, the Sta te migh t have ele cted to proceed to trial on the original indictment rather than pursue an appeal of the dismissal of the superseding indictment, although perhaps the State could have pursued both options simultaneously. The order of the trial court granting the Defendant pretrial divers ion was not enter ed until M ay 6, 199 8. The n otice of appeal wa s filed within thirty days thereafter.
Without deciding whethe r the State should have filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of A pril 14, we c onclud e that eve n if it should h ave, the inte rests of justice nevertheless me rit this Court’s considera tion of the substan tive issues—whether the trial court erred by denying the State’s motion to nolle the original indictment and by dismissing the superseding, two-count indictmen t. See State v. Burrow, 769 S.W.2d 510, 511 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (“The notice of appeal can be waived by this Court ‘in the interes t of justice’ . . . without regard to whether it is the defe ndant or the sta te seeking wa iver.”).
A. Dismissal of Superseding Indictment Following our review of the rec ord, we conc lude that the trial court did err by dismissing the superseding indictment for aggravated assault and attempted first degree murder. In Tennessee, the district attorney general possesses “the power and autho rity to make cha rging decision s without ve to,” subjec t to constitutional constrain ts. Quillen v. Crocke tt, 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). This significant authority is also granted to a district attorney general pro tempore by appointment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-7- 106(b)(1).
6
The United States Supr eme Cour t stated in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), “[S]o long as the pros ecutor h as prob able cau se to believe that the accused committed an offense, the decision whether to prosecute, and what charge to bring before a grand jury generally rests entirely within the discretion of the prosecu tion . . . .” Id. at 364; State v. Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also held that “[a]n indictment . . . , if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the me rits.” Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 36 3 (1956 ); see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 33 8, 345 (1974 ).
In this case, the State attested in its motion (1) that the district attorney gene ral, prior to his recusal, sought and obtained the original indictment for aggravated assault from the Wilson County Grand Jury, and (2) that “[a]fter an independent evaluation by the dis trict attor ney ge neral pro tempo re of the facts, circumstances, evidenc e and th e law the d istrict attorney gene ral pro tempore resubmitted the case to the Wilson County Grand Jury,” resulting in the elevated charge.
In its order dis missing the subs equen t indictme nt, the trial court made no findings of fact and offered no reasons for dismissing the superseding indictme nt. Wh en mo ved by the State to “iss ue a written order se tting forth the basis for its ruling,” the trial court did not comply. Because the second indictment was duly obtained from the W ilson County G rand Jury by the d istrict atto rney g enera l pro tempore , within th e app ropria te exer cise of his disc retion followin g his appointment to the case and h is detailed review of the facts and circumstances,
7
we conclude that the trial court exceeded its authority by dismissing the indictme nts, and w e reverse this dism issal.
B. Denial of Motion to Nolle Prosequi The district attorney genera l is “‘answerable to no superior and has virtually unbridled discretion in determining whether to prosecute and for what offense. No court may interfere with [that] discretion to prosecute, and in the formulation of this decision he o r she is answe rable to no one.’” Dearb orne v. Sta te, 575 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting Pace v. S tate, 566 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1978) (H enry, C.J ., concurrin g)); see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (holding that “the decisio n whe ther or not to p rosec ute, an d wha t charg e to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion ”).
In State v. Gilliam, this Court stated, “Neither the appellant nor this co urt has the right to elect which applicable statute shall be the basis of [the defendant’s] indictment, subject to procedural bars and the constitutional restraints of equa l protection and do uble jeop ardy.” 901 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95). In add ition, “the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of this discretionary authority in [the district attorney general’s] control over criminal pros ecution.” Id.
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Proc edure 48 s tates, “The state may by leave of court file a dismis sal of an in dictme nt, presentment, information or complaint and the prosecu tion shall thereupo n terminate.” T enn. R. Crim. P. 48 (a) (emp hasis added). Ho wever, the trial court may not in essence comp el the Sta te
8
to prosecute a case that the S tate does no t desire or intend to prosecute. Although Rule 48 requires “leave” of the trial court to remove the c ase from its docke t, the trial court does not possess the authority or the pow er to exerc ise its own discretion to determ ine whether a case shou ld or sh ould not be prosecuted. W e revers e the tria l court’s decisio n denying the State’s motion to nolle the original ind ictmen t.
II. REVERSAL OF DENIAL OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION Although disposition of the preceding issues pretermit any decisio n by this Court on the issue of whether the trial court erred by reversing the district attorney gene ral pro tempo re’s denial of pretrial diversion,1 we address the issue solely for the purpose of facilitating future appellate review in this case.
As a preliminary procedural matter, Defendant challenges the propriety of the State’s appeal of this issue under Tennessee Rule of Appella te Procedure 3, contending that the appeal should have been filed under Rule 9 or Rule 10. He argues that under State v. Montgo mery, 623 S.W.2d 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981), and its succes sors, an app eal of pretrial diversion under R ule 3 is impermissible. In Montgom ery, this Court stated that “an appeal by either side questioning diversion decisions, either granted or denied, must be brought under Rule 9 or R ule 10, T.R.A .P., and cann ot come b y Rule 3.” Id. at 118.
1 Because we have determined that Defendant’s indictment for attempted first degree murder, a class A felony, is valid and pending, Defendant is no longer eligible for pretrial diversion.
9
W e agree with the State that the rule as stated in Montgom ery has been effective ly abrogated by T ennesse e Rule of Crim inal Procedu re 38. Effective July 1, 199 7, Rule 3 8 provide s,
A defendant who seeks and is denied pre-trial diversion pursuant to T.C.A . § 40-15-1 05 sha ll have the rig ht to petition for a writ of certiora ri to the trial court for an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. If the trial court finds that the prosecuting attorney has not com mitted an ab use o f discre tion in fa iling to grant pre-trial diversion, the defenda nt may pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to either Rule 9 or Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appe llate Proced ure. In the event that the defendant does not pursue an inte rlocuto ry app eal, the defenda nt shall have the right to appeal the decision of the trial court denying the petition for writ of certiorari pursu ant to T enne ssee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b)
following th e entry of th e final judg ment in the trial cour t.
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 38. Furthermore, the Advisory Commission Comments state, “This rule changes prior case law and practice regarding appeal of the denial of pre-trial diversion from the trial court.” Id. (advisory com mission com ments).
Rule 38, as D efenda nt sugg ests, doe s not on its face app ly to appe als by the State of diversion decisions, n or are we aware of any decisions construing this rule to app ly to appe als by the S tate. We nee d not decide whether the drafters of Rule 38 inte nded to perm it Rule 3 appe als by the State on pretrial diversion decision s by the trial co urt. W hen the trial court reversed the State’s decision to deny pretrial diversio n, this o rder ef fectively terminated prosecution of the case. We conclude that the State thereby had an appeal as of right from the judgm ent under Rule 3. Therefore, we evaluate the substantive issue appealed.2
2 Even had the appeal under Rule 3 been improper, Tennessee courts have long recognized that we may “transform an appeal improperly filed under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure into a proper appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” State v. Leath, 977 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Gallaher, 730 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tenn. 1987); State v. David C. Doyal, No. 03C01-9712-CR- 00552, 1998 WL 597081, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 10, 1998).
10
The suprem e court h as set forth the factors for cons ideration by a district attorney g eneral w hen de terminin g the pro priety of pre trial diversion :
When deciding whether to enter into a memorandum of understanding under the pretrial diversion statute a prosecutor shou ld focus on the defendant’s ame nability to correction. Any factors which tend to accurately reflect whether a particular defendant will or will not become a repeat offender should be considered. Such factors must, of course, be clearly articulable and stated in the record in order that meaningful appellate review may be had. Among the factors to be considered in addition to the circumstances of the offense are the defendant’s criminal record, social history, the physical and mental condition of a defendant where appropriate, and the likelihood that pretrial diversion will serve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the defend ant.
State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W .2d 352 , 355 (T enn. 19 83); State v. Carolyn L. Curry, No. 02S 01-970 9-CC -00079 , 1999 W L 115113, at *3 (T enn., Jackso n, Mar. 8, 1999) (fo r publicatio n); State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W .2d 956 , 959-60 (Tenn. 1997) (both quoting same from Hammersley).
In State v. Herron, 767 S.W .2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 198 9), the suprem e court described the ne cess ary de tail by which the district attorne y genera l must sta te reasons for denying an application for pretrial diversion:
If the application is denied, the factors upon which the denial is based must be clearly articulable and stated in the record in order that meaningful appellate review may be had. This requirement entails more than an abstract statement in the record that the district attorney general has considered these factors. He m ust articula te why he believes a defe ndan t in a particular case does not meet the test. If the attorney general bases his decision on less than the full complement of facto rs enu mera ted in th is opin ion he must, for the record, state why he considers that those he relies on outweigh the others submitted for his consideration.
Id. at 156 (cita tion om itted).
11
In his letter denying Defendant pretrial diversion on the original indictment for agg ravate d ass ault, the district a ttorney gene ral pro tempo re stated,
In making a decision as to the application for pre-trial diversion on the charge of aggravated assault, I have considered the following material and information: (1) The defendant’s biographical background and family relationsh ips; (2) The defendant’s lack of prior criminal c onvictions ; (3) The letters of support from the defen dant’s friends, employer, and political acquaintances; [and] (4)
The pre-sen tence inve stigation report prepared by the probation officer.
After consideration o f all the material and information it is my decision to deny Mr. Harris’ application for pre-trial diversion on the charge of aggravated assault. W hile Mr. Ha rris does a ppear to enjoy a very favorable reputation among his friends, neighbors, employers, and political contacts, the fact remains that the gentleman with whom he had an altercation on January 21, 1996 was paraly zed fro m the ches t down as a re sult of being shot by Mr.
Harris. Apparently the events of January 21, 1996 were precipitated in whole, or at leas t in part, bec ause o f prior conflicts betwee n the victim and the defendant, who were neighbors. It is certainly not unusual for neighbors a nd adjoining p roperty owners to have disputes and conflicts as they have had from the beginning of time;
however, thankfully, it is fairly infrequent that these conflicts turn into armed violence. In my estimation, others in any given com munity need to feel assured that these types of conflicts will not be ignored by law en forcem ent an d the c riminal justice system. A granting of pre-trial diversion under the circumstances of this case would only serve to further erode public confidence in the criminal justice system and would promote an atmosphere of lawless ness.
Notwithstanding, Mr. Harris’ good s tanding in the com munity as we ll as the apparent likelihood that he will not becom e a repeat offen der, it is my considered judgment that pre-trial diversion would not serve the ends of justice and th e bes t interest of the public and the defendant. I primarily ba se this op inion upo n the gre at weigh t I accord to the circums tance s of this case where in a pre viously healthy individual has been rendered permanently and irrevoc ably paralyzed by the actions of the defen dant. M oreov er, it is eq ually my opinion that the citizens in this and other communities sh ould have confidence that the criminal justice system will intervene when neighborhood and comm unity dispu tes esca late into arm ed con flict.
When making pretrial diversion decisions, a district attorney general may prope rly give nea rly exclusive w eight to the circums tances of the offen se. See State v. Carolyn L. Curry , No. 02S01-9709-CC-000 79, 1999 W L 115113, at *5
12
(Tenn. Mar. 8, 19 99) (for pu blication); State v. Stephen Freeman, No. 03C01- 9712-CC-00523, 1999 WL 96272, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Feb. 22, 1999). At the time the District Attorney Gen eral pro tempore denied the Defe ndan t’s application for pre-trial diversion for the charge of aggravated assau lt, an indictment against the Defendant for attempted first degree murder was pending.
The Tennessee Supreme Court stated in Curry that “the circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence may alone justify a denial of diversion, but only if all of the relevant factors h ave been cons idered as we ll.” Curry, 1999 W L 115113, at *5 (emphasis added). In addition, the court de clared, “T he facts and circumstances of nea rly all crimin al offen ses a re by de finition s erious ; only by analyzing all of the relevant factors, including those favorable to the defendant, can appropriate candidates for this legislative largess be identified in a manner consistent with the purpos e of the pretrial diversion ac t.” Id. Furthe rmor e, in Freeman, this Cou rt held,
Although the appellant may appear to be an excellent candid ate for pretrial diversion, the focus of diversion does not rest solely upon th e alleged offende r. In appro priate cas es, the circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence may outweigh all other rele vant factors and justify a denial of pretrial diversion.
Id.
W e find that the district attorney gen eral pro tempo re followed the requirem ents of Hammersley, Herron, and Curry when both making and reporting his decision to deny pretrial divers ion. W e conclude that the trial court erred by finding that the district attorney general abused his discretion.
13
W e reverse the order of the trial c ourt de nying th e State ’s motion to nolle prosequi the orig inal indictment for aggravated assault and dismissing the second indictm ent for aggravated assault and attempted first degree murder. We also reverse the judgment of the trial court granting the Defendant pretrial diversion. This ca se is rem anded for further pr oceed ings.
__________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE