[235]*235OPINION OF THE COURT BY
OGATA, J.
Defendant-appellant, Brant Norman Kelsey (hereinafter appellant), was found guilty by a jury of the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree in violation of Section 1242(1) (c) of the Hawaii Penal Code, as enacted by Act 9, Session Laws of Hawaii 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Code. He was thereafter sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment in the Hawaii State Prison for ten years. We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the presentation of all the evidence in the case. In this connection, appellant based his motion for acquittal on three separate grounds; 1) that the state had failed to present any evidence to show appellant was not licensed to deal in drugs; 2) that appellant was entrapped as a matter of law; and 3) that appellant was a procuring agent for the undercover police officer and was therefore immune from prosecution. In refer[236]*236ence to appellant’s grounds 2 and 3, he further contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury over his objection that the burden of proving entrapment was by preponderance of the evidence and that burden was on appellant; and that it also erred when it refused to give over appellant’s objection his requested jury instruction No. 3, relating to his defense that he was a procuring agent.
We have carefully reviewed the record in the instant case, and we reject the appellant’s contention that no evidence was presented to show that appellant was not authorized by law to distribute cocaine. Among other things, the transcript shows that in his own direct testimony, appellant testified that he is not a cocaine dealer, and further on cross examination he admitted that he is not a distributor of drugs. In State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 377 P.2d 688 (1962), we are told that the evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in its strongest light for the state by an appellate court in passing on its legal sufficiency to support a conviction. Reviewing the transcript in that light, we hold that it contains substantial evidence, albeit circumstantial, from which justifiable inferences of fact may be drawn on the factual issue of unlawfulness, which would render this a question for the consideration of the jury. State v. Laurie, 56 Haw. 664, 548 P.2d 271 (1976); State v. Iaukea, 56 Haw. 343, 537 P.2d 724 (1976); State v. Cannon, 56 Haw. 161, 532 P.2d 391 (1975); State v. Kahalewai, 55 Haw. 127, 516 P.2d 336 (1973); State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 475 P.2d 684 (1970). Moreover, we agree with the trial court’s decision in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal in that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the totality of such evidence.
The appellant admits in his opening brief that the view of the U.S. Supreme Court is that entrapment is a jury question, unless the evidence is undisputed and so clear that it presents a legal question as a matter of law. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). We agree with this view of entrapment. However, based on this record, we do not have a situation where the evidence is undisputed. Rather the evidence is in sharp conflict, the prosecution’s case not disclosing any evi[237]*237dence of entrapment, while the appellant’s showing that defense. This is a clear case where the question of entrapment must be determined by a jury, who, in arriving at its verdict, must determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. We, therefore, conclude that the motion for judgment of acquittal, based on entrapment as a matter of law, was properly denied, and the trial court properly allowed this question to go to the jury. Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); People v. Bucher, 182 Colo. 211, 511 P.2d 895 (1973).
Appellant further contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury over appellant’s objection that the burden of proof in the entrapment issue was on the appellant and that appellant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence.1
Appellant argues in this regard that after some credible evidence of entrapment is presented, the burden should be on the state to show that appellant was not entrapped, beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with appellant that this view was accepted as the law in this jurisdiction until 1972. Territory v. [238]*238Achuck, 31 Haw. 474 (1930). The provisions of the Code went into effect on January 1,1973, and the legislative mandate set forth in Sections 115 and 237 of the Code with respect to the defense of entrapment is applicable to the facts involved herein. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).2 Section 237 of the Code states that it is an affirmative defense when the defendant asserts that he engaged in the prohibited conduct or caused the prohibited result because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer, who, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, either knowingly made false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct or result was not prohibited, or employed methods of persuasion or inducement which created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it. Section 115(2) (b) of the Code states: “If the defense is an affirmative defense, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the trier of fact finds that the evidence, when considered in light of any contrary prosecution evidence, proves by a preponderance of the evidence the specified fact or facts which negative penal liability.” The burden of proving entrapment is now on the defendant, and he must prove this issue by a preponderance of the evidence. The instruction given to the jury was pursuant to these sections of the Code.
Appellant further argues that these sections, which require appellant to show entrapment by preponderance of the evidence, have shifted the burden of proof of an essential element of the crime from the state to appellant, and, to this extent, these statutes are unconstitutional because they contravene the requirements of due process. It is appellant’s position that when entrapment is raised as a defense, there is injected into the case an additional material element of non-entrapment, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. However, appellant reasons, because the [239]*239Code requires the appellant to prove entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, the state is relieved from proving non-entrapment by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
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[235]*235OPINION OF THE COURT BY
OGATA, J.
Defendant-appellant, Brant Norman Kelsey (hereinafter appellant), was found guilty by a jury of the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree in violation of Section 1242(1) (c) of the Hawaii Penal Code, as enacted by Act 9, Session Laws of Hawaii 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Code. He was thereafter sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment in the Hawaii State Prison for ten years. We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the presentation of all the evidence in the case. In this connection, appellant based his motion for acquittal on three separate grounds; 1) that the state had failed to present any evidence to show appellant was not licensed to deal in drugs; 2) that appellant was entrapped as a matter of law; and 3) that appellant was a procuring agent for the undercover police officer and was therefore immune from prosecution. In refer[236]*236ence to appellant’s grounds 2 and 3, he further contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury over his objection that the burden of proving entrapment was by preponderance of the evidence and that burden was on appellant; and that it also erred when it refused to give over appellant’s objection his requested jury instruction No. 3, relating to his defense that he was a procuring agent.
We have carefully reviewed the record in the instant case, and we reject the appellant’s contention that no evidence was presented to show that appellant was not authorized by law to distribute cocaine. Among other things, the transcript shows that in his own direct testimony, appellant testified that he is not a cocaine dealer, and further on cross examination he admitted that he is not a distributor of drugs. In State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 377 P.2d 688 (1962), we are told that the evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in its strongest light for the state by an appellate court in passing on its legal sufficiency to support a conviction. Reviewing the transcript in that light, we hold that it contains substantial evidence, albeit circumstantial, from which justifiable inferences of fact may be drawn on the factual issue of unlawfulness, which would render this a question for the consideration of the jury. State v. Laurie, 56 Haw. 664, 548 P.2d 271 (1976); State v. Iaukea, 56 Haw. 343, 537 P.2d 724 (1976); State v. Cannon, 56 Haw. 161, 532 P.2d 391 (1975); State v. Kahalewai, 55 Haw. 127, 516 P.2d 336 (1973); State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 475 P.2d 684 (1970). Moreover, we agree with the trial court’s decision in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal in that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the totality of such evidence.
The appellant admits in his opening brief that the view of the U.S. Supreme Court is that entrapment is a jury question, unless the evidence is undisputed and so clear that it presents a legal question as a matter of law. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). We agree with this view of entrapment. However, based on this record, we do not have a situation where the evidence is undisputed. Rather the evidence is in sharp conflict, the prosecution’s case not disclosing any evi[237]*237dence of entrapment, while the appellant’s showing that defense. This is a clear case where the question of entrapment must be determined by a jury, who, in arriving at its verdict, must determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. We, therefore, conclude that the motion for judgment of acquittal, based on entrapment as a matter of law, was properly denied, and the trial court properly allowed this question to go to the jury. Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); People v. Bucher, 182 Colo. 211, 511 P.2d 895 (1973).
Appellant further contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury over appellant’s objection that the burden of proof in the entrapment issue was on the appellant and that appellant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence.1
Appellant argues in this regard that after some credible evidence of entrapment is presented, the burden should be on the state to show that appellant was not entrapped, beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with appellant that this view was accepted as the law in this jurisdiction until 1972. Territory v. [238]*238Achuck, 31 Haw. 474 (1930). The provisions of the Code went into effect on January 1,1973, and the legislative mandate set forth in Sections 115 and 237 of the Code with respect to the defense of entrapment is applicable to the facts involved herein. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).2 Section 237 of the Code states that it is an affirmative defense when the defendant asserts that he engaged in the prohibited conduct or caused the prohibited result because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer, who, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, either knowingly made false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct or result was not prohibited, or employed methods of persuasion or inducement which created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it. Section 115(2) (b) of the Code states: “If the defense is an affirmative defense, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the trier of fact finds that the evidence, when considered in light of any contrary prosecution evidence, proves by a preponderance of the evidence the specified fact or facts which negative penal liability.” The burden of proving entrapment is now on the defendant, and he must prove this issue by a preponderance of the evidence. The instruction given to the jury was pursuant to these sections of the Code.
Appellant further argues that these sections, which require appellant to show entrapment by preponderance of the evidence, have shifted the burden of proof of an essential element of the crime from the state to appellant, and, to this extent, these statutes are unconstitutional because they contravene the requirements of due process. It is appellant’s position that when entrapment is raised as a defense, there is injected into the case an additional material element of non-entrapment, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. However, appellant reasons, because the [239]*239Code requires the appellant to prove entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, the state is relieved from proving non-entrapment by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree, including the requisite state of mind of appellant. Section 114 of the Code; see Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, 12th ed., Vol. IV, § 540. We note that an instruction to this effect was given to the jury by agreement of the prosecution and appellant. We are unable to discern that sections 115 and 237 in any way lessen the requisite number of the elements to be proven by the state or the degree or quantum of the proof because the accused pleads the defense of entrapment. Such a plea simply allows the accused to present any and all circumstances or evidence surrounding the alleged commission of the offense. And, if the circumstances or evidence should convince the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that- the accused was entrapped by the activities of the undercover police officer, then he is entitled to an acquittal. We do not think that these sections of the Code shift to the appellant the burden of proof as to any element of the offense with which the appellant was charged. The requirement that the accused prove by a preponderance of the evidence an affirmative defense pleaded by him would not have such an effect, and we view that there is no constitutional due process violation as contended by appellant. People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App.2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1966); Lo Buono v. United States, 454 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1971), cf. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
Appellant further contends that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal as a matter of law under the evidence adduced in this case because it showed that appellant had acted not for himself, but for the undercover police officer in purchasing the cocaine. Appellant invokes, as a defense, the theory of the procuring agent.
As we indicated earlier in this opinion, the Hawaii legislature in 1972 enacted Act 9, known as the Hawaii Penal Code, which undertook a massive and wholesale revision of the existing criminal laws in this jurisdiction. See Act 9, [240]*240S.L.H. 1972. This Code went into effect January 1,1973. The last Part IV of Chapter 12 of the Code describes offenses related to drugs and intoxicating compounds. Part IV of Chapter 12 of the Code drastically amended the law on drug traffic as it was formerly contained in Chapter 329 HRS.
Patricia K. O’Toole, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Paul H. Toyozaki, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff-appellee.
We have not expressed any opinion as to whether or not the procuring agent defense can be utilized in the sale of drugs proscribed under the former statute.3 However, we do now hold that this defense would be inapplicable against a charge of knowingly and unlawfully distributing a dangerous drug in violation of Section 1242(1) (c) of the Code. People v. Dinkel, -Colo.-, 541 P.2d 898 (1975). In fact the provisions of the Code with respect to offenses related to drugs and intoxicating compounds refer to the schedule of substances described in the new Chapter 329, which is entitled, “Uniform Controlled Substances Act.” Act 10, SLH 1972. Thus, we conclude that our statutory law on drug offenses is in this respect in accord with the federal law. Like Colorado and other jurisdictions, we follow the majority of the federal circuits and reject the procuring agency defense. People v. Dinkel, supra.
The trial court, therefore, properly refused to give appellant’s instruction on the procuring agent rule after it correctly denied the appellant’s motion for judgment on the basis of immunity as a procuring agent.
Affirmed.