State v. K. J. Y.

347 Or. App. 547

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: A186862
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

No. 173 February 25, 2026 547

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of K. J. Y., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. K. J. Y., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 25CC00687; A186862

Debra E. Velure, Judge. Submitted January 20, 2026. Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. 548 State v. K. J. Y.

PER CURIAM Appellant appeals a judgment of civil commitment. The trial court ordered that appellant be committed to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, based on appellant being a “person with mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5.1 Specifically, the trial court deter- mined that appellant, because of a mental disorder, is dan- gerous to others. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 4. We affirm. To meet the legal standard for a danger-to-others commitment, the state must prove that the person has a men- tal disorder that makes the person “highly likely to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment.” State v. S. E. R., 297 Or App 121, 122, 441 P3d 254 (2019). “A sin- gle violent act may be sufficient to establish that a person is dangerous to others, if the circumstances of the act, the per- son’s history, or other contextual evidence allows the court to rely on the act to predict future dangerousness.” State v. J. G., 302 Or App 97, 100-01, 458 P3d 721 (2020). However, “overt acts of violence are not necessary to establish danger- ousness to others. Verbal threats may be enough in appro- priate circumstances.” Id. at 101 n 3. Generally, when verbal threats are at issue, the state will have “to provide evidence that shows that the appellant’s threats of future violence are accompanied by an overt act demonstrating an intention and ability to carry out the threats or other circumstances indi- cating that actual future violence is highly likely.” State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 625, 391 P3d 880 (2017). We require the state to establish that “actual future violence is highly likely,” given “the serious deprivation of liberty and social stigma that are attendant to a civil commitment, and the fact that such a preventive confinement is predicated on a predic- tion of future behavior.” State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 749, 386 P3d 99 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court determined the legal standard to be met here. On review, in a preserved claim of error, appellant 1 New civil commitment standards became operative on January 1, 2026 Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under the older version of the statutes, so the new standards are not at issue in this case. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 547 (2026) 549

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law. Our task, therefore, is to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support civil commitment. L. R., 283 Or App at 619. “Whether the evidence presented by the state is legally sufficient to support a civil commit- ment is a question of law.” State v. A. D. S., 258 Or App 44, 45, 308 P3d 365 (2013). “Ultimately, in view of the clear-and- convincing-evidence standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceedings, the question for us as the review- ing court is whether a rational factfinder could have found that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger to * * * others because of a mental disorder.” State v. S. A. R., 308 Or App 365, 366, 479 P3d 618 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, having reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient for the trial court to find that appellant’s mental disorder made him dangerous to others. Appellant is a 68-year-old man who suffers from bipolar disorder. His mental disorder caused him to be involved in a significant driving incident that endangered other drivers, bystand- ers, and law enforcement. Although it could be viewed as an isolated incident in some circumstances, on this record we are persuaded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant remained dangerous to others at the time of his commitment hearing. The nature of the recent incident, appellant’s inability to discuss it, and appellant’s total lack of insight into his mental disorder together were enough to meet the legal standard. Affirmed.