State v. Jordan Lavoris Dean

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: October 8, 2025
• Docket: A25A1119
• Status: Published

Opinion

SECOND DIVISION RICKMAN, P. J., GOBEIL and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

October 8, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A1119. THE STATE v. DEAN.

GOBEIL, Judge.

The State appeals from the trial court’s entry of a what it calls a “not guilty

judgment notwithstanding the verdict” (“JNOV”) as to one count of Jordan Lavoris

Dean’s criminal case. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court’s

judgment for this count, and remand the case for additional proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.

The record here shows that Dean was indicted for the following charges: malice

murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), possession

of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4), and tampering with

evidence (Count 5). Count 4 specifically was predicated on the crime of aggravated assault against the victim, N. F. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Dean not

guilty of Counts 1-3 and guilty of Counts 4-5.

Before sentencing, Dean’s trial counsel stated that “[p]rocedurally” Dean

could not be found guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony

when he was found not guilty of the predicate felony of aggravated assault, and thus

asked the court to vacate the verdict as to Count 4. The State initially agreed, but after

a recess argued that the verdict in Count 4 was proper because the jury could have

found that Dean committed an aggravated assault to support the firearm charge other

than the one charged in Count 3. The court ultimately vacated the verdict in Count

4 based on the “logical conclusion” that Dean could not be convicted of the firearm

charge if he was acquitted of the predicate felony. On Dean’s disposition order, Count

4 is marked as “Not Guilty (JNOV).” The trial court then sentenced him as to Count

5 only. The State has appealed from the judgment.

1. We first consider our jurisdiction in this case. “In OCGA § 5-7-1 (a), the

General Assembly has set forth only a limited right of appeal for the State in criminal

cases. If the State attempts an appeal outside the ambit of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a), the

appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain it.” State v. Evans, 282 Ga. 63,

2 64 (646 SE2d 77) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial court

issued what it labeled a JNOV on Count 4. However, “there is no provision in Georgia

law authorizing a trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of not guilty

notwithstanding a verdict of guilty in a criminal case[.]” Banks v. State, 290 Ga. App.

887, 887 n. 1 (660 SE2d 873) (2008). The correct procedure for the court to achieve

what it was seeking in this case “would have been the grant of a motion in arrest of

judgment[.]” Id.; State v. Robinson, 275 Ga. App. 117, 117-118 (619 SE2d 806) (2005)

(reversing the grant of motion in arrest of judgment premised on the inconsistent

verdict rule where defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony, but was acquitted of the predicate felony); OCGA § 17-9-61

(setting forth the grounds and procedure for motion in arrest). We find that in this

case, where the trial court set aside a criminal conviction because it found there to be

a nonamendable defect in the verdict, the judgment being appealed is, in effect, an

order in arrest of judgment, which is appealable via OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (2). See State

v. Freeman, 272 Ga. 813, 815 (1) (537 SE2d 92) (2000) (where trial court “set aside the

murder conviction on legal grounds based on a defect appearing on the face of the

record[,]” order was in effect an order in arrest of judgment and State was entitled to

3 a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1), overruled on other grounds by Nalls v. State,

304 Ga. 168, 177 (3) (a) (815 SE2d 38) (2018).1

2. The State argues that the trial court erred in vacating the verdict in Count 4

because Georgia law allows for inconsistent verdicts.2 We agree. The Georgia

Supreme Court has abolished the rule against inconsistent verdicts. See Milam v.

State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) (341 SE2d 216) (1986). Our appellate courts have held

repeatedly that a defendant can be found guilty of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony, even if he or she is found not guilty of the underlying felony.

See, e.g., Ward v. State, 318 Ga. 884, 895-896 (2) (901 SE2d 189) (2024) (upholding

inconsistent verdicts where defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during

the commission of aggravated assault but acquitted of aggravated assault); Daniely v.

State, 309 Ga. App. 123, 124-125 (1) (709 SE2d 274) (2011) (upholding inconsistent

verdicts where defendant was convicted of possession of a knife during the

commission of aggravated assault but acquitted of aggravated assault).

1 And to the extent the judgment is in fact a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it would be “otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state” from which the State is permitted to appeal. OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6). 2 Dean did not file a brief in response. 4 In these situations, the question becomes whether the evidence viewed in favor

of the conviction was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Id. at 125 (1). Put another

way, “[t]he issue is not whether an acquittal on one charge would logically necessitate

acquittal on another charge on which the jury convicted the defendant; rather, the sole

question is whether the evidence viewed in favor of the conviction was sufficient to

support the guilty verdict.” Robinson, 275 Ga. App. at 118 (citation and punctuation

omitted). The State argues that in Dean’s case, the evidence was sufficient to support

the conviction for Count 4, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,

such felony being aggravated assault. We agree.

“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light

most favorable to support the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a

presumption of innocence[.]” Williams v. State, 333 Ga. App. 879, 879 (777 SE2d 711)

(2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In evaluating the sufficiency of the

evidence, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the

charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fuller v. State, 363 Ga. App. 217, 220

(1) (a) (871 SE2d 79) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

5 Count 4 charged Dean with possessing a firearm during the commission of an

aggravated assault against N. F. on April 10, 2024. At trial, evidence was presented

that Dean shot a Glock firearm through the windshield of the car he was driving

during an incident with another vehicle being driven by N. F. Specifically, Dean’s

brother testified that Dean had a firearm and the front windshield of their vehicle was

shot out. The brothers were afraid because the driver of the other vehicle was acting

aggressively and brandished a firearm at them. During the incident, N. F. suffered

multiple gunshot wounds and died. Dean himself testified that he fired the gun as a

“warning shot” to the other driver.

This evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict Dean of possession of a

firearm during the commission of aggravated assault. See OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1)

(possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2),

(a) (4) (aggravated assault).

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of a motion in arrest of judgment

and remand for sentencing on Count 4. See Robinson, 275 Ga. App. at 118.

Judgment reversed and case remanded. Rickman, P. J., and Davis, J., concur.