State v. Jones

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE FILED DECEMB ER SESSION, 1997 February 3, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk

GEO RGE F. JON ES, JR ., ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9702-CR-00062 ) Appe llant, ) ) JOHNSON COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON. LYNN W. BROWN, JUDGE STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellee. ) (HABEAS COR PUS)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

GEORGE F. JONES, JR., pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP #163274 NECC Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 5000 Mountain City, TN 37683-5000 SANDY COPOUS PATRICK Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243

DAVID CROCKETT District Attorney General Route 19, Box 99 Johnson City, TN 37601

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION The Petitioner, G eorge F . Jones, J r., appea ls as of right the trial cou rt’s

dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgment of

the trial cou rt.

Petitioner was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated rape in violation of

Tennessee Code A nnotated se ction 39-13-50 2. All offenses we re alleged to have

been committed in November of 1989. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was

convicted on four (4) counts of aggravated rape and sentenced to four (4) concurrent

sentences of twenty (20) years. On December 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition for

habeas corpus relief in the Johnson County Criminal Court which is the subject of

this appeal. In essence, Petitioner argues that his sentence is void because the

culpa ble mental state for the offense of aggravated rape was not alleged in the

indictme nts.

In support of his argument, Petitioner relies upon the de cision of this C ourt in

State v. Rog er Da le Hill, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne County (Tenn.

Crim. App., Nashville, Jun e 20, 1 996). H owev er, our supre me c ourt re verse d this

Cou rt’s decision in Hill. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). The

Tennessee Supreme Court held in Hill as follows :

[F]or offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly d ispense with the requirement for a culpable mental state, an ind ictme nt whic h fails to allege such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution and conviction for that offense so long as

(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge against which the accused must defen d, ade quate basis

-2- for entry of a proper jud gme nt, and protec tion from doub le jeopardy;

(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202; and

(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct alleged.

Id. at 726-2 7.

The issue b efore th is Cou rt is the same issue addressed by the suprem e court

in Hill, that is, w hethe r an ind ictme nt cha rging a ggrav ated ra pe wa s void for failure

to allege a culpable mental state. Tennessee Code Annotated section § 39-13-

502(a)(3)(A) defines aggravated rape as the “un lawful s exual p enetra tion of a victim

by the defendant” where the “defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other

persons; and [f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the act.” This statute does

not specify a me ntal state, but the required mental state may be inferred from the

nature of the criminal conduct alleged in the indictments in the Petitioner’s case.

The indictments alleg ed that Petitioner o n four different d ays did “unlaw fully, sex ually

penetra te [the victim] by force or coercion while aided and abetted by one or more

persons, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-50 2, contrary to the statute, and against the

peace and dign ity of the State of Tenn essee ." Obviously, the act for which Petitioner

is indicted, “unlawfully, sexually penetrat[ing]” a victim, is “committable only if the

principal actor’s mens rea is intentional, knowing , or reckless.” Hill, 954 S.W.2d at

729. Also, the language of the indictment sufficiently apprised Defendant of the

offenses charged, and were stated in ordinary and co ncise lan guage so that a

person of common understanding would know what was intended. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-13-2 02. Furth ermor e, the language in the indictme nts ade quately p rotects

Defendant against subsequent reprosecution for this sam e offense . Hill, 954 S.W.2d

-3- at 727, 729. Therefore, the indictments in this case meet constitutional and statutory

requirements of notice and form and are, therefore, valid.

Petition er’s petition may be dism issed su mm arily if the petition fails to state

a cogniza ble claim . See Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W .2d 619 , 627 (T enn. Crim.

App. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The trial court properly dismissed

Petitioner’s petition.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES , Judge

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

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