[Cite as State v. Jewell, 2025-Ohio-2496.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240406 TRIAL NO. B-2204946-A Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JAMAL JEWELL, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and the State’s argument. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/16/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Jewell, 2025-Ohio-2496.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240406 TRIAL NO. B-2204946-A Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : OPINION JAMAL JEWELL, :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 16, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Angela J. Glaser, for Defendant-Appellant. [Cite as State v. Jewell, 2025-Ohio-2496.]
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jamal Jewell was found guilty by a Hamilton
County jury of murder, kidnapping, felonious assault, tampering with evidence,
possessing a firearm while under a disability, and related firearm specifications. He
was sentenced to an aggregate term in prison of 32 years to life. Jewell now appeals,
arguing that detectives violated his right against self-incrimination, that his trial
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury, and that the evidence pointed to Jewell’s two codefendants as the
shooters. As we explain in this opinion, we reject Jewell’s arguments and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} R.H. was fatally shot on Gray Road on November 21, 2018. Police
initially suspected an individual found at the scene the night of the shooting, but
ultimately exonerated her. No other early leads developed, and the case went cold.
{¶3} Then, in September of 2022, Cincinnati Police detectives received word
from Ross Correctional Institution (“Ross”) that Jewell wanted to talk with them.
Jewell was incarcerated at Ross at the time for an unrelated crime. On September 15,
2022, Detective Marcus McNeil from the Cincinnati Police Department (“CPD”)
traveled to Ross to meet with Jewell. At their meeting, Jewell told McNeil that he was
present when R.H. was shot and that two siblings, Alexis and Michael Hill, were the
culprits.
{¶4} McNeil subsequently investigated the involvement of both the Hill
siblings and Jewell in R.H.’s murder. He spoke with the Hills and he reinterviewed
Jewell at Ross. He also collected additional physical evidence, including a surveillance
video showing Jewell and R.H. outside a nightclub together the night of the shooting OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and a Maaco receipt indicating a car had been painted to change its color just days
after R.H. died.
{¶5} On June 8, 2023, Michael Hill, Alexis Hill, and Jewell were all three
indicted for R.H.’s death. The charges against Jewell included: (1) Counts 1 and 2,
murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and (B), both felonies of the first degree; (2)
Count 3, kidnaping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree; (3)
Counts 4 and 5, felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2), both
felonies of the second degree; (4) Count 6, tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.
2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the second degree; and (5) Counts 7 and 8, having a weapon
under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a felony of the second degree.
Jewell also faced accompanying firearm specifications.
A. Motion to Suppress
{¶6} Following his indictment, Jewell filed a motion to suppress the
statements he made to McNeil. He argued that he was subjected to a custodial
interrogation during his first interview with McNeil and therefore should have
received Miranda warnings, but did not. With respect to his second interview, he
contended that his signature on a Miranda rights notification form did not constitute
an effective waiver of his self-incrimination rights.
{¶7} The trial court heard Jewell’s suppression motion on May 13, 2024.
{¶8} McNeil testified on behalf of the State at the hearing. He explained that
he began investigating R.H.’s death on November 21, 2018, the night of the shooting.
The investigation went cold when the initial suspect was cleared.
{¶9} On September 14, 2022, McNeil received word from Ross that Jewell
wanted to speak with a CPD detective about a homicide. The next day he and Detective
Todd Green went together to Ross to meet with Jewell. The meeting took place in an
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
investigator’s office at the prison. McNeil did not consider Jewell a suspect at the time
and therefore did not provide him with Miranda warnings. Jewell was not
handcuffed, shackled, or restrained, although he was not free to leave the prison
complex, and could terminate the conversation at any time. The interview lasted
approximately 75 minutes.
{¶10} McNeil met with Jewell again on May 4, 2023, this time at Warren
Correctional Institution where Jewell was then housed. Detective Brandon Field
accompanied McNeil to this interview.
{¶11} As before, the meeting took place in an office, and Jewell was not
physically restrained other than being incarcerated. But prior to this interview,
McNeil Mirandized Jewell. McNeil also asked Jewell if he could read and write and if
he had taken any drugs or alcohol that would prevent him from understanding their
conversation. Following Jewell’s answers, McNeil provided Jewell with a form
prepared by CPD that notified him of his Miranda rights and asked Jewell to sign it.
McNeil did not explain that Jewell’s signature on the form constituted a waiver of
rights. After signing the form, Jewell continued the interview, which lasted about 90
minutes.
{¶12} The State submitted audio recordings of McNeil’s interviews with Jewell
into the record, and the trial court took the matter under advisement.
B. Jury Trial
{¶13} Jewell’s jury trial began on May 14, 2024. Immediately before the start
of jury selection, the trial court denied Jewell’s motion to suppress.
{¶14} The State called nine witnesses at trial, and Jewell rested without
presenting any evidence.
{¶15} The State’s first witness was Kenneth Byrne, a CPD police specialist who
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
responded to the Gray Road shooting on November 21, 2018. Byrne found R.H.
unresponsive and unsuccessfully attempted CPR for five to ten minutes.
{¶16} Steven Alexander, a criminalist in CPD’s forensic video unit, next
testified to items he photographed and recovered at the crime scene. Among these
items were shell casings from a Winchester 9 mm Ruger and a gun he test-fired and
determined to be inoperable.
{¶17} The State also called the manager of a group home for adults with
developmental disabilities located on Cedar Road. R.H. had been a resident of the
group home for approximately two years at the time of the shooting. The group home
manager identified security camera footage from the night of the shooting that
depicted R.H. While the footage displayed an incorrect timestamp, the manager
explained that a third-party had installed the security cameras. The State intimated
that perhaps the clock was set to central time.
{¶18} A member of the family that owns Shaker’s Night Club also testified.
Shaker’s is located at the corner of Hamilton and Cedar near the group home. The
Shaker’s owner identified surveillance footage from Shaker’s from the day of the
shooting, and the footage was admitted into evidence.
{¶19} The State further called Dorothy Dean, a forensic pathologist and
deputy coroner, as an expert witness. Dean examined R.H.’s body and determined his
death to be a homicide. In her opinion, R.H. was fatally wounded by gunshot wounds
to his torso and right lower extremity. Dean testified that all of the bullet entrance
wounds were on the front of R.H.’s body, except one that was on his side. She was
unable to ascertain how far away the gun was from R.H.’s body when he was shot.
{¶20} Both Alexis and Michael Hill testified against Jewell. For her part,
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Alexis1 admitted that she had also been charged with R.H.’s murder and denied
receiving a benefit for her testimony.
{¶21} Alexis met Jewell through her brother Michael in July 2018, while
Jewell and Michael were incarcerated together. Alexis and Jewell began dating in
September 2018 while Jewell was still in prison. Alexis described Michael and Jewell’s
relationship as close. All three—Michael, Jewell, and Alexis—lived at Alexis’s
apartment after Michael and Jewell were released.
{¶22} The day of the shooting, Alexis and Jewell were at the apartment when
Michael arrived, stating he had been robbed. Michael spoke erratically and paced back
and forth in the living room. He said he knew who robbed him but never identified the
person.
{¶23} Jewell then told Alexis to drive all three of them in her car. Initially
Alexis refused and attempted to walk away, but Jewell pointed a gun at her head and
again told her to drive. Alexis admitted that she owned a black 9 mm gun she had
purchased at a gun show, although she could not remember the brand. The gun that
Jewell pointed at her head was her own gun. Alexis was scared for her life, so she
ultimately agreed to Jewell’s plan.
{¶24} Alexis owned a black Mazda, and Michael was driving a rental car at
the time. Jewell suggested they take Alexis’s car because its windows were tinted
black. Alexis was the driver, Michael was in the passenger seat, and Jewell was in the
backseat. Alexis drove from the apartment to an address on Cedar Road, under
Michael and Jewell’s direction. As Alexis drove, Jewell retained possession of Alexis’s
9 mm gun. Alexis also saw Michael with a different gun in the car.
1 Because Alexis and Michael share a last name, we use their first names to eliminate confusion.
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶25} Once they arrived on Cedar Road, Alexis pulled into the parking lot
across from Shaker’s. Jewell got out of the vehicle and approached R.H., whom Alexis
had never seen before. Alexis asked Michael what was going on, but he did not reply.
{¶26} Alexis then saw Jewell and R.H. walk down the street and into a
building. When she lost sight of them, she pulled out of the Shaker’s lot and headed
in their direction. But she was never able to see where they went so she returned to
the parking lot.
{¶27} Jewell eventually came back and got in the backseat. He directed her to
leave the parking lot and drive up Cedar. As they approached a white house, Jewell
told her to stop. R.H. came out of the house, and Jewell said to him, “Old school, let
me holler at you.” R.H. then got in the backseat of the car with Jewell.
{¶28} Through her rearview mirror, Alexis saw Jewell brandish a gun to R.H.
Jewell then asked R.H. about the location of the man who robbed Michael, as did
Michael. R.H. said that he did not know.
{¶29} Jewell instructed Alexis to pull into an apartment parking lot on Gray
Road. Jewell then told R.H. to get out of the car, following him out. Alexis did not
drive away because Jewell had a gun, and she was scared. Jewell and R.H. walked
towards a wooded area, and Alexis heard multiple shots. Jewell then returned to the
vehicle alone and told Alexis to drive away. According to Alexis, Michael never got out
of the vehicle. After the shooting, Alexis drove the group back to her apartment. When
they arrived, Michael left in his car, and Jewell left in his car.
{¶30} Shortly after the shooting, Alexis told Jewell she no longer felt
comfortable driving her black Mazda. On November 21, 2018, Jewell took Alexis to
Maaco to have the vehicle painted. Although the Maaco receipt was in Alexis’s name,
Jewell paid for the repair, and Alexis picked the new color.
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶31} Alexis moved out of the apartment that she shared with Jewell and
Michael in December 2018. She had broken up with Jewell by this point.
{¶32} In May of 2021, Alexis received what she perceived to be a threat from
Jewell through the prison email system. She spoke with McNeil three or four times
about R.H.’s murder beginning in 2022. She initially denied involvement and also
failed to mention that Jewell threatened her with a gun to coerce her to drive.
Eventually Alexis ended up telling McNeil what happened to R.H.
{¶33} Michael Hill, who went by the nickname “Beans,” testified to a similar
version of events, although Michael’s testimony differed from his sister’s in some key
respects. For one thing, Michael disputed Alexis’s contention that he was close with
Jewell. Michael only considered Jewell an associate. He also testified that Jewell did
not stay the night at Alexis’s apartment and did not live with her.
{¶34} Michael explained that, in November 2018, he made money by selling
drugs, primarily methamphetamine and cocaine. On the day of R.H.’s murder,
Michael received a call from a customer who wanted to buy drugs. He attempted to
fulfill the order but was robbed. He then sought Jewell’s assistance in addressing the
robbery, as it occurred in Jewell’s neighborhood.
{¶35} Michael went to Alexis’s apartment, where he described the robber to
Alexis and Jewell. Jewell indicated that he knew who the robber was. Michael then
drove the three of them—himself, Alexis, and Jewell—to the scene of the robbery.
Once there, Michael and Alexis switched seats in the car, and Alexis became the driver.
Michael contended that he did not have a gun and neither did Jewell.
{¶36} Jewell noticed R.H. on the street and got his attention. R.H. asked if
he could get a ride. R.H. then got in the car, sat behind Alexis, and asked to be dropped
off at an apartment down the street. Michael told Jewell that R.H. was not the robber
9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and that he had never seen R.H. before.
{¶37} As they drove, Jewell asked R.H. about the robbery, but R.H. said he did
not know anything about it. When they arrived at the apartment where R.H. asked to
be dropped off, R.H. got out of the car, and Jewell followed. Michael could see the two
talking but could not hear what they were saying. Micheal then heard gun shots.
Jewell got back into the front passenger seat with a black gun in his hand.
{¶38} They then drove back to Alexis’s apartment. Michael got into his rental
vehicle and left. Neither Michael nor Alexis called the police because they were afraid
of Jewell.
{¶39} Some time later, Michael and Jewell were housed at Madison
Correctional Institution together. While at Madison, Jewell repeatedly told Michael
that he and Alexis needed to stay quiet about what happened. Michael also received
threats from Jewell while in jail waiting to testify at trial.
{¶40} At the time of his testimony, Michael was serving a five-year sentence
for distribution of drugs and drug trafficking. He had previously served time at FMC
Lexington, a federal facility. Michael had also been convicted of a state drug-
trafficking charge, for which he had served time at the Madison and London
correctional centers. Michael admitted that he would not have testified against Jewell
if he were not also charged with R.H.’s murder.
{¶41} The State next called Bryan Wellinghoff, a former investigator at Ross
Correctional Institution. Wellinghoff testified that he relayed a message from Jewell
to McNeil that Jewell wanted to speak to a Hamilton County detective about a crime.
{¶42} The State’s final witness at trial was McNeil. He explained his initial
involvement with R.H.’s homicide and how the case remained unsolved prior to
Jewell’s request to speak with him.
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶43} McNeil described receiving a call on September 14, 2022, indicating that
Jewell, then an inmate at Ross, wanted to speak with him. McNeil met with Jewell at
Ross the following day. When he arrived, Jewell seemed pleased that he was there. At
the time of this initial meeting, Jewell was not considered a suspect in R.H.’s murder.
{¶44} McNeil authenticated, and the State played, the audio of Jewell’s
September 15, 2022 interview. In it, Jewell indicated that he was familiar with R.H.
and his killing. He also said that he knew Beans and previously dated Beans’s sister
Alexis. Jewell believed that Beans was accusing him of being involved in R.H.’s
murder, which prompted him to contact detectives. Jewell told McNeil that Beans had
been robbed the day that R.H. was shot and sought his assistance. In a search for the
robber, Jewell and Beans confronted several individuals Jewell suspected of being
involved, but nothing came of the encounter. Later that night, Jewell was at a location
on Cedar Road, when Beans called him to say he had located the robber. At the same
time, Alexis also called to indicate she intended to kill someone on Gray Road. Before
Jewell could intervene, he heard shots. He believed Michael killed the victim. Jewell
then went to Alexis’s apartment to change shoes because he was going to a club that
night. Alexis later painted her black car blue at Maaco. Alexis had also purchased a
gun at the Sharonville Convention Center, but Jewell did not know what became of it.
{¶45} Following his first interview with Jewell, McNeil spoke with Alexis. The
first time he asked her about R.H.’s murder, she denied involvement. But she later
contacted McNeil’s office to indicate that her cell phone might ping in the area of the
shooting.
{¶46} Before McNeil could schedule a follow-up interview with Alexis, Jewell
reached out to him again, this time from Warren Correctional Institution. He now
considered Jewell a person of interest and interviewed Jewell for a second time. An
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
audio recording of McNeil’s second interview with Jewell was played for the jury.
{¶47} The interview began with McNeil reading Jewell his Miranda rights and
executing a rights notification form. McNeil then confronted Jewell with the
allegation that Beans committed the murder. Jewell indicated that he wanted a benefit
for sharing information with McNeil, but McNeil could not make any promises. He
could only relay information. Jewell continued the interview nonetheless.
{¶48} Jewell repeated his version of events surrounding R.H.’s murder.
McNeil then showed Jewell a depiction of the Shaker’s parking lot taken at 9:51 p.m.
on the night of the murder. Jewell agreed that both he and R.H. were present in the
depiction and admitted that he handed R.H. drugs during the interaction.2 But when
the depiction advanced to 9:52 p.m., Jewell denied that the person in the image was
him. Instead, Jewell continued to assert that Michael was responsible for the shooting.
At the conclusion of the interview, McNeil informed Jewell that his statement
materially differed from the others and that the case was scheduled to be presented to
a grand jury.
{¶49} McNeil’s testimony resumed after the recording of Jewell’s second
interview was played. McNeil acknowledged that the timestamps on the surveillance
footage from R.H.’s group home were off by an hour. But he could not explain why.
{¶50} At the conclusion of McNeil’s testimony, defense counsel moved for
acquittal under Crim.R. 29. The motion was denied.
{¶51} Before the case was submitted to the jury, the trial court heard
arguments as to the jury instructions. The State sought a complicity instruction, but
Jewell objected on the grounds that he had not been charged with complicity. In
2 Because the State only presented an audio recording of McNeil’s interview with Jewell, it is unclear
if he showed Jewell a video or photo of Shaker’s.
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
response, the State argued that a charge of principal liability included complicity and
that it was within the jury’s province to assess whether Jewell acted as principal or as
an accomplice. The trial court agreed with the State and overruled Jewell’s objection.
{¶52} On May 23, 2024, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts
against Jewell. The trial court later sentenced him to an aggregate prison sentence of
32 years to life.3
Analysis
{¶53} On appeal, Jewell raises five assignments of error. First, Jewell asserts
that the statements he gave police violated his right against self-incrimination and
should have been suppressed. Second, he argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his motion to suppress did not cite the Ohio Constitution
as a basis for relief. Third, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion when
it gave the jury a complicity instruction. Fourth, he contends that the trial court failed
to properly admonish the jury during separation. Lastly, Jewell argues that his murder
conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Each of Jewell’s assignments of error lacks merit.
Motion to Suppress
{¶54} Jewell’s first assignment of error takes issue with the trial court’s denial
of his motion to suppress. Jewell contends that his first interview with McNeil violated
his right against self-incrimination because he was incarcerated and was therefore
entitled to Miranda warnings before speaking with a detective. He further argues that
his second interview with McNeil violated the Fifth Amendment because McNeil failed
to warn him that executing the rights notification form could be considered a waiver
3 For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged Counts 2, 4, and 5 with Count 1.
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
of his privilege against self-incrimination.
{¶55} Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Currie, 2025-Ohio-670,
¶ 23 (1st Dist.). The trial court is in the best position to evaluate credibility and
determine the facts; therefore, we accept the factual findings of the trial court as long
as they are supported by credible and competent evidence. Id. We review the trial
court’s legal conclusions in the context of a suppression motion de novo. Id.
{¶56} With regard to Jewell’s first interview, Jewell is correct that a suspect
must be Mirandized before being subjected to a custodial interrogation. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-471 (1966). But the fact that Jewell was in prison is not
by itself sufficient to establish that he was in custody. See, e.g., State v. Barker, 2017-
Ohio-596, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). Rather, the inquiry into whether an incarcerated person is
subject to a custodial interrogation focuses on all the features of the interview, not
merely the fact that the interviewee is in prison. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 514
(2012). These include “(1) the location of the questioning, (2) its duration, (3)
statements made during the interview, (4) the presence or absence of physical
restraints during the questioning, and (5) the release of the interviewee at the end of
the questioning.” State v. Nelson, 2016-Ohio-7115, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.).
{¶57} Looking at the September 15, 2022 interview in its totality, Jewell was
not subjected to a custodial interrogation. Critical to that determination is the fact
that Jewell initiated the interview by asking to speak to McNeil. Jewell thus invited
the conversation, and he remained free at all times to conclude it. The interview took
place in an investigator’s office, not a cell or other coercive location, and Jewell was
neither handcuffed nor shackled. The meeting lasted just over an hour, and Jewell did
most of the talking. At no point did he attempt to stop or leave the room, and no point
14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was McNeil hostile or threatening in his questioning.
{¶58} Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Jewell was in custody.
Rather, Jewell made a voluntary confession as to his knowledge of R.H.’s murder.
“Voluntary confessions are not merely a proper element in law enforcement, they are
an unmitigated good, essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting,
and punishing those who violate the law.” Howes at 514. Because his confession was
voluntary, and because he was not subjected to a custodial interrogation, Jewell was
not entitled to Miranda warnings during his first interview.
{¶59} Nor did Jewell’s implied waiver of his Miranda rights in his second
interview present any Fifth Amendment problems. We assess whether Jewell
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights under a totality-of-the
circumstances test. State v. Durgan, 2018-Ohio-2310, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.). Under this test,
courts consider “the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the
length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation
or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” (Cleaned up.) State v.
Jackson, 2022-Ohio-2562, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.). It is the State’s burden to prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. Id. at ¶ 33. “Absent evidence that an accused’s will was overborne
or his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired because of coercive police
conduct, a waiver of Miranda rights will be considered voluntary.” Id.
{¶60} An accused may waive his Miranda rights either expressly or by
inference. Id. at ¶ 36. Where waiver is inferred, a suspect’s behavior and the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation can be taken into account to determine
whether the suspect knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights. Id. A suspect’s decision to continue to speak with police after receiving
15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Miranda warnings can constitute a form of inferred waiver. Id.
{¶61} The totality of the circumstances in this case indicate that Jewell
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his self-incrimination rights in
speaking with McNeil a second time. Before interviewing Jewell, McNeil read Jewell
his rights and presented him with a rights notification form. Jewell expressly
indicated that he understood his rights, signed the form acknowledging them, and
began discussing R.H.’s murder immediately thereafter. Jewell also attempted to
bargain with McNeil for a benefit in his case in exchange for his participation in the
interview, exhibiting awareness of the legal system and its intricacies. Under these
circumstances, we infer that Jewell waived his Miranda rights when he acknowledged
that he understood his rights and continued to speak with McNeil nonetheless.
{¶62} Jewell’s first assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶63} In his second assignment of error, Jewell argues that defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to cite the Ohio Constitution as an
independent basis for his suppression motion. Relying on our opinion in State v.
Morris, 2023-Ohio-4105 (1st Dist.), he contends that the state Constitution affords
broader protection than the federal Constitution in suppressing un-Mirandized
statements.
{¶64} To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Jewell must
prove that (1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his ability to receive a fair trial. State v. Akins, 2024-Ohio-
1491, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.). “[T]o show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel’s
deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been
16 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
different.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143 (1989).
{¶65} Jewell cannot show that his motion to suppress would have been
resolved in his favor had his trial attorney relied on the Ohio Constitution, and the lack
of prejudice is fatal to his ineffective-assistance claim. It is true that, in Morris, we
expanded the protections afforded by the Ohio Constitution to a suspect who is
represented by counsel at the time of a custodial interrogation. See Morris at ¶ 55.
But there is no evidence that Jewell was represented by counsel at the time of either
interview with McNeil. Thus, even had Jewell’s counsel relied upon the Ohio
Constitution, Morris would not have controlled.
{¶66} Jewell points to no other authority suggesting that the Ohio
Constitution offers broader protection to unrepresented suspects than the Fifth
Amendment or that it compels the circumstances of a custodial interrogation to be
analyzed any differently. In the absence of any case law supporting his argument,
Jewell has failed to show how he was prejudiced by his attorney’s exclusive reliance on
the federal Constitution. Jewell’s second assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Complicity Instruction
{¶67} In his third assignment of error, Jewel challenges the trial court’s
insurance of a jury instruction on complicity. In support of his position, he points to
a perceived lack of evidence that he aided and abetted Michael and Alexis, instead
highlighting the State’s theory was that he was the principal actor.
{¶68} We review a trial court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Bush, 2010-Ohio-2874, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).
{¶69} By statute, the State may charge an offender under either a theory of
complicity or in terms of principal liability. See R.C. 2923.03(F). Where the evidence
permits it, the statute places a defendant on notice that he may be convicted under
17 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
either approach. See State v. Jones, 2018-Ohio-4754, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.). Thus, if the
State presents evidence that the defendant acted in concert with another person while
committing the alleged crime, a complicity instruction is proper. Id.
{¶70} The evidence presented at trial supported a complicity instruction in
Jewell’s case, and the trial court therefore acted within its sound discretion in
instructing the jury. Both Michael and Alexis testified to their involvement in R.H.’s
murder. Both claimed to have driven to the scene of the crime and to have facilitated
Jewell’s escape. Alexis admitted that Jewell used her gun and that the two went
together to a Maaco store after the shooting to disguise her car by painting it. Michael
described involving Jewell in seeking retribution for a robbery he experienced earlier
in the day while selling drugs. Given this testimony, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that Jewell was the principal actor by shooting the victim and that Alexis
and Michael aided and abetted him in the shooting. The jury also could have
concluded that Jewell aided and abetted Alexis and Michael in carrying out the crime.
{¶71} R.C. 2923.03(F) permits alternative theories of culpability in cases
where the evidence supports both complicity and principal liability. This is such a
case. Jewell’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Jury Admonishments
{¶72} In his fourth assignment of error, Jewell takes issue with the trial court’s
instructions to the jury during breaks. The trial court informally advised the jury not
to discuss the case while the evidence was still being presented, but it did not formally
deliver the admonishments required by R.C. 2945.34. Because Jewell failed to object
to the trial court’s admonishments, we review this alleged error under a plain-error
standard of review. State v. Helm, 2016-Ohio-500, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.). To demonstrate
plain error, Jewell must show, among other factors, that the error affected the outcome
18 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
of the trial. State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-259, ¶ 23.
{¶73} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.34, a trial court must instruct the jury during
breaks in a trial “not to converse with, nor permit themselves to be addressed by any
person, nor to listen to any conversation on the subject of the trial, nor form or express
any opinion thereon, until the case is finally submitted to them.” A trial court should
fully comply with the statutory requirement and admonish the jury according to its
terms. Helm at ¶ 25. However, the failure to issue the required instructions does not
require reversal on appeal. Id. This is because the statute provides no remedy for
noncompliance. Id.
{¶74} Immediately following jury selection, the trial court stated to the jury,
I’ll also ask you to please do not have any discussions with anybody
about what you are hearing in here, not with each other, not with family
members or so forth. It’s okay to say you’re on jury duty, but don’t give
any facts about this case you heard today or who the defendant is, any
of that, simply because it keeps your head clear so you can come in here
and give the State and the defendant your fullest attention possible.
{¶75} Preceding subsequent breaks, the trial court only reminded the jury not
to discuss the case. The trial court did not provide any of the other admonishments
required by R.C. 2945.34.
{¶76} This was improper. See Helm, 2016-Ohio-500, at ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). The
trial court should have given a complete admonishment to the jury every time they
separated. But, applying the plain-error standard, Jewell cannot demonstrate that the
trial court’s failure to provide complete R.C. 2945.34 admonishments affected the
outcome of his trial. There is no evidence that jury misconduct or bias resulted from
the lack of statutory admonitions or that the jury’s verdict was impacted in any way by
19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the trial court’s informality.
{¶77} We accordingly overrule Jewell’s fourth assignment of error.
Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶78} In his fifth assignment of error, Jewell argues that his conviction for
R.H.’s murder was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Specifically, Jewell argues that the State did not prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter or that he was complicit in R.H.’s murder.
{¶79} To determine whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence,
we inquire “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Curry, 2020-Ohio-1230, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).
{¶80} When considering a challenge to the weight of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, the court must consider the credibility of the witnesses and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way
and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387 (1997). A verdict can be set aside as against the manifest weight of the evidence
even though supported by legally sufficient evidence. State v. Myers, 2018-Ohio-
1903, ¶ 140. In assessing a manifest-weight challenge, the court reviews the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considers the credibility
of all witnesses. State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328.
{¶81} After review, the court must consider whether the jury clearly lost its
way in resolving conflicts in the evidence and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 140.
Unlike a sufficiency review, a manifest-weight challenge does not require the court to
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view evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution. State v. Plymale, 2016-Ohio-
3340, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.).
{¶82} R.C. 2903.02(A) states that “[n]o person shall purposely cause the
death of another or the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy.” Jewell
challenges the evidence that supported his identity as the person who caused the death
of R.H. He contends that the only evidence against him was the testimony of Michael
and Alexis, which he argues was contradictory and unreliable.
{¶83} Jewell is incorrect as to the nature of the evidence against him.
Numerous sources of evidence identified Jewell as the person who shot and killed R.H.
Both Michael and Alexis testified that they saw R.H. and Jewell leave the car. After
they heard shots, only Jewell returned to the car. Independent evidence corroborated
Michael’s and Alexis’s accounts. For one, Jewell himself admitted to being at the scene
and described similar events. For another, Jewell and R.H. were depicted on
surveillance video taken at R.H.’s group home sometime shortly before the shooting.
And a receipt from Maaco confirmed that Alexis painted her car shortly after the
incident. Thus, sufficient evidence demonstrated that Jewell murdered R.H.
{¶84} Jewell argues that discrepancies between Alexis’s and Michael’s
testimony rendered them not credible. To be fair, there were some inconsistencies
between the Hill siblings’ stories (i.e., who was driving, whether Michael had a gun).
But their testimony was more similar than it was different. Both Alexis and Michael
testified that Michael was robbed earlier in the day and that after he was robbed, he
sought help from Jewell. Both testified that the group drove together to the location
of the robbery and that R.H. got into their car. They both testified that Jewell exited
from the car with R.H. at the murder scene and that Jewell had a gun. And they both
testified that the only person out of the vehicle with R.H. when he was shot and killed
21 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was Jewell.
{¶85} The jury also heard Jewell’s interviews with McNeil, in which Jewell
corroborated Michael’s and Alexis’s stories in significant ways. First, Jewell
acknowledged trying to assist Michael in addressing the robbery. He also admitted to
being with Michael and Alexis on Gray Road and to selling drugs to R.H. on the night
of the incident. And he knew that R.H. was shot with a 9 mm gun. Notably, Dean
testified that the fatal shots to R.H. came from a 9 mm firearm.
{¶86} Considering Jewell’s statements, the Maaco receipt, the surveillance
footage, and the testimony of Michael, Alexis, and Dean, we cannot say that the jury
clearly lost its way and created a manifest weight of injustice. The State presented
evidence to show that Jewell was complicit in the murder. The jury was free to
interpret the evidence to conclude that Jewell committed the murder and/or aided and
abetted the murder.
{¶87} Jewell’s fifth assignment of error is hereby overruled.
Conclusion
{¶88} Jewell’s challenges to his convictions are without merit and are
overruled. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
BOCK and MOORE, JJ., concur.