State v. Jester

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 29, 2026
• Docket: C-250444
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jester, 2026-Ohio-1542.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250444 TRIAL NO. 25/CRB/7827 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. :

DEMARIUS JESTER, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 4/29/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Jester, 2026-Ohio-1542.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250444 TRIAL NO. 25/CRB/7827 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

DEMARIUS JESTER, : OPINION

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 29, 2026

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, Susan Zurface, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert E. Rickey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Damarius Jester appeals his conviction for

resisting arrest under R.C. 2921.33(A). In three assignments of error, Jester argues

that the trial court erred when it struck his motion to suppress as untimely and when

it allowed the State to elicit hearsay evidence, and he contests the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. As we explain in this opinion,

we disagree with Jester’s arguments and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} On May 14, 2025, Cincinnati police received a report from Clermont

County about the unauthorized use of a vehicle. When they located the vehicle, Jester

was standing nearby. After an officer learned that Jester had a warrant for his arrest,

Jester was placed in custody. But he did not go easily. He first walked away, saying

he wanted to give his phone to his mother. Then, after an officer grabbed his right

arm, he pulled away, clasping his hands in the front to make them harder to handcuff.

It took two officers and the threat of a taser to eventually effectuate Jester’s arrest.

{¶3} For this conduct, Jester was charged with resisting arrest, a second-

degree misdemeanor, in a complaint filed in the Hamilton County Municipal Court.

The next day, he filed a motion for discovery. A few days later, the State filed its initial

response, indicating that it would forward body-worn camera (“bodycam”) footage of

the incident once it was received from the police. All of this happened in May 2025.

But by July 17, 2025, Jester had not received the bodycam footage, so he served the

State with a motion to compel.1 In response, on July 18, 2025, the State turned over

one officer’s bodycam footage. But it did not disclose footage for all of the officers who

1 The motion to compel was filed on July 18, 2025.

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were on the scene.

{¶4} On August 4, 2025, one day before trial, Jester filed a motion to

suppress evidence. In it, he explained that he had only received one officer’s bodycam

footage, which did not show the initial police contact with Jester. He argued that the

additional footage was “crucial to mounting a defense and determining what

reasonable suspicion, if any, police had to justify their seizure of Mr. Jester.”

{¶5} The following morning, before Jester’s trial began, the prosecutor

disclosed that, while she had initially turned over all the bodycam footage in her

possession, she had recently discovered another officer’s footage. In response, the trial

court said, “Well, we’re going to put these matters aside because we’re going to end

this case today, because this [the discovery issue] was an issue back from July 18th. . .

We’ll put it aside and you all see what you want to do.”

{¶6} After a recess, Jester informed the trial court that he had received the

additional bodycam footage from the State at 9:58 a.m. and that he objected to the

motion to suppress being stricken. The record does not indicate why Jester made this

objection. The State had not moved to strike Jester’s suppression motion, nor had the

trial court indicated that it intended to take this action—at least not on the record.

From this exchange, we can infer that the parties and the trial court may have had an

off-the-record conversation that was not transcribed. Although Jester objected to his

motion being stricken, he indicated that he intended to move forward with a trial that

day even if the trial court struck the motion.

{¶7} The trial court noted Jester’s objection and proceeded with a bench trial.

While it made no oral ruling on the motion to suppress, it wrote on the judge’s sheet

that the suppression motion was stricken because it was “filed late.”

{¶8} Only one witness, Officer Marsh of the Cincinnati Police Department,

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

testified at trial. Marsh indicated that on May 14, 2025, he was dispatched to assist

another officer who was attempting to locate a stolen vehicle. Upon arrival, Marsh

observed Jester interact with the vehicle. Over Jester’s objection, Marsh testified that

his partner showed him a computer screen that indicated Jester had a warrant for his

arrest. Marsh accordingly told Jester he was under arrest.

{¶9} Marsh testified that Jester then walked away and stepped off the

sidewalk into the grass. Marsh grabbed Jester’s hand and told him to place his arms

behind his back. Marsh said that Jester pulled away, clasped his hands in front of him,

and, after five requests, refused to put his hands behind his back. A fellow officer

assisted by moving Jester’s right arm while Marsh moved Jester’s left arm to place

Jester in handcuffs. Bodycam footage of the incident was admitted into evidence.

{¶10} The trial court found Jester guilty of resisting arrest and sentenced him

to 30 days in jail, which it suspended, and six months of probation, as well as court

costs. This appeal followed.

Analysis

{¶11} Jester raises three assignments of error on appeal. He argues the trial

court erred when it struck his motion to suppress as untimely and when it allowed the

State to elicit hearsay evidence. He also contests the weight and sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction.

A. Jester’s Untimely Motion to Suppress

{¶12} Jester’s first assignment of error takes issue with the trial court’s

decision to strike his motion to suppress. We review a trial court’s decision under

Crim.R. 12(D) to deny a motion to suppress as untimely for an abuse of discretion. See

State v. Ross, 2012-Ohio-536, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). An abuse of discretion “implies that the

court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.” Hayes v. Durrani,

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2021-Ohio-725, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.), quoting Boolchand v. Boolchand, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9

(1st Dist.).

{¶13} The time for filing a pretrial suppression motion is governed by Crim.R.

12(D). State v. Leahy, 2010-Ohio-2876, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). Crim.R. 12(D) provides that

pretrial motions must be filed “35 days after arraignment or seven days before trial,

whichever is earlier.” The court may extend the time for making pretrial motions “in

the interest of justice.” Crim.R. 12(D). “The failure to comply with the time

requirement of Crim.R. 12(D) constitutes a waiver of the defense or objections, but the

court for good cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.” (Cleaned up.) Leahy

at ¶ 7.

{¶14} Here, Jester filed his motion to suppress the day before trial and more

than two months after his arraignment. He therefore failed to comply with the time

requirements of Crim.R. 12(D). But he claims that his noncompliance with the

deadline was excused by the State’s failure to provide timely discovery. In particular,

he argues that the State’s disclosure of additional bodycam footage the morning of trial

negated the deadline in Crim.R. 12(D). We disagree.

{¶15} Jester filed his motion to suppress the day before he received the second

bodycam footage from the State. Thus, none of the information he learned from

watching the second video impacted the arguments he raised in the motion. While a

trial court can abuse its discretion by refusing to entertain a motion to suppress that

is untimely due to the State’s failure to provide necessary discovery, that is not what

happened here. See, e.g., Leahy at ¶ 8, citing State v. Sargent, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS

3666 (2d Dist. Aug. 17, 1994). Because the State’s late disclosure came after Jester

filed his motion to suppress, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking

Jester’s motion to suppress as untimely. We overrule Jester’s first assignment of error.

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

B. Hearsay

{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Jester argues that the trial court erred

in permitting Marsh to testify that a fellow officer’s computer revealed he had a

warrant for his arrest. The court reviews the admission of hearsay evidence for an

abuse of discretion. In re K.M., 2024-Ohio-2278, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing HSBC Bank

USA, Natl. Assn. v. Gill, 2019-Ohio-2814, ¶ 1-5 (1st Dist.).

{¶17} “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted in the statement.” Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is inadmissible when it is offered

to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See State v. Justice, 2024-Ohio-2574, ¶ 22

(1st Dist.) (holding that “testimony as to the results of a computer inquiry constitutes

a textbook example of hearsay” when it is “offered for the truth of the matter

asserted”). But hearsay can be admitted when it is offered for another purpose, such

as to prove a person’s state of mind or the effect of the statement on a person’s actions.

See State v. Boczar, 2008-Ohio-834, ¶ 57 (11th Dist.) (“testimony is not hearsay, when

it explains the actions of a witness to whom a statement was directed, such as to

explain the witness’ activities; if an out-of-court statement is offered to prove a

statement was made and not for its truth; to show a state of mind; and to explain an

act in question” (Cleaned up.)).

{¶18} Applying these principles, testimony from a police officer that a

computer system or database reflects a warrant for a person’s arrest is generally

admissible when it is offered to prove something other than its truth. See, e.g., State

v. Devillere, 2010-Ohio-2538, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.) (holding that an officer “reasonably

relied on the information from dispatch that there was a valid arrest warrant”); State

v. Bishop, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1080, *6 (8th Dist. Mar. 20, 1997) (holding that an

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

officer reasonably relied on “information available at the time of arrest, which included

the computer generated data showing the existence of the warrant.”); Arizona v.

Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that a search was valid when an officer reasonably

relied on information from a computer system, which indicated the defendant had a

valid arrest warrant, even though the warrant was actually invalid).

{¶19} This is so in resisting arrest cases because the State need not prove the

existence of the actual warrant to prove the arrest was lawful. See R.C. 2921.33(A).

Rather, the State must demonstrate that the arresting officer had either probable cause

or “a reasonable basis to believe that the offense for which the defendant has been

arrested did, in fact, occur.” State v. Pitts, 2022-Ohio-4172, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

{¶20} Here, the State did not offer Marsh’s testimony that a computer search

revealed Jester’s arrest warrant to prove that there was in fact a warrant for Jester’s

arrest. Rather, the State offered this testimony to establish Marsh’s belief that Jester

was subject to arrest.

{¶21} Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting Marsh’s statement regarding information he gleaned from a fellow

officer’s computer system. We accordingly overrule Jester’s second assignment of

error.

C. Manifest Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶22} In his final assignment of error, Jester challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction and argues that his conviction was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, he argues that the State failed to prove

that his arrest was lawful, and he challenges the evidence demonstrating that he

resisted with force, both elements required to sustain a conviction under R.C.

2921.33(A).

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶23} To assess whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, we

ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two

of the syllabus. “Where reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon

conflicting evidence, determination as to what occurred is a question for the trier of

fact. It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of

the factfinder.” State v. Gurung, 2024-Ohio-3202, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).

{¶24} By contrast, a manifest-weight challenge requires us to independently

“review the entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses,

and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Powell, 2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.), citing State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388 (1997). We afford substantial deference to the

credibility determinations of the trier of fact because the trier directly observes the

witnesses during trial proceedings. See State v. Glover, 2019-Ohio-5211, ¶ 30 (1st

Dist.), quoting Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20. Accordingly, reversal on

manifest weight grounds is warranted “only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172,

175 (1st Dist. 1983).

1. Lawful Arrest

{¶25} To obtain a conviction for resisting arrest under R.C. 2921.33(A), the

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused “recklessly or by force,

resist[ed] or interfere[d] with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” The lawfulness

of an arrest is accordingly an element of resisting arrest. See State v. Thompson, 116

Ohio App.3d 740, 743 (1st Dist.).

9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶26} Jester questions the sufficiency of the evidence that his arrest was

lawful, because the State did not offer the actual arrest warrant into evidence. Nor did

Marsh testify to the nature of the underlying crime that formed the basis of Jester’s

arrest. But the State need not introduce the warrant itself to prove the lawfulness of

Jester’s arrest, as Marsh need only have a reasonable basis to believe that the

underlying offense occurred. See Pitts, 2022-Ohio-4172, at ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). The

warrant provided this reasonable belief. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 2022-Ohio-3901, ¶

15 (1st Dist.) (“the arrest was lawful due to the outstanding warrants”). The State

therefore presented sufficient evidence of lawfulness, and Jester’s conviction was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence on this element.

2. Force

{¶27} Jester next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that he

resisted arrest “by force.” He begins by asking us to review the language of R.C.

2921.33(A). That statute permits the State to prove the offense of resisting arrest by

establishing that a person acted either “recklessly” or “by force.” But Jester contends

that the State was limited to the force element and could not prove the offense through

recklessness because its complaint solely alleged that element.

{¶28} Even if we were to agree with Jester that the State was bound to the

allegations in the complaint, sufficient evidence at trial established that Jester resisted

arrest by force. Marsh testified that Jester walked away when he was told he was under

arrest and that Jester further pulled away when Marsh grabbed his right arm to place

him in custody. This incident was captured on bodycam footage, which was entered

into evidence as well.

{¶29} As courts have observed, the act of pulling away from an officer during

the process of an arrest satisfies the force element of resisting arrest. See State v.

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Kornilov, 2012-Ohio-6218, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.). Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, Marsh’s testimony and the bodycam footage is sufficient to

prove that Jester acted by force in resisting his arrest.

{¶30} Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that this is the exceptional

case where the trier of fact clearly lost its way in convicting Jester. His conviction was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶31} We therefore overrule Jester’s third assignment of error.

Conclusion

{¶32} Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking Jester’s

motion to suppress as untimely, or in admitting Marsh’s testimony regarding the

computer-generated warrant information, we overrule Jester’s first and second

assignments of error. Because Jester’s conviction was supported by sufficient

evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we overrule Jester’s

third assignment of error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS and MOORE, JJ., concur.