STEELMAN, Judge.
On 16 March 2002, Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff Robert George and Biscoe Police Officer Brant Phillips, as part of a local drug unit, responded to an anonymous call that Romeo Meza had a large quantity of cocaine coming into the city of Biscoe. George and Phillips saw Meza’s truck and proceeded to pull the vehicle over for a traffic stop. Along with the driver Meza, two other male passengers were in the cab of the pick-up truck: defendant, seated next to the passenger door, and Prentice Southerland, seated in between Meza and defendant. Other officers were called in to assist with the stop.
Deputy George approached the truck on the driver’s side while Officer Phillips and Officer Phillip Chappell, also of the Biscoe Police Department, approached the passenger’s side. At the driver’s side window, Deputy George noticed that Meza had a “large sum of cash on his lap,” and “asked Mr. Meza to step out of the vehicle.” Deputy George testified that
[698]*698[t]he money was in Mr. Meza’ lap as if he was counting. It was folded out and there was numerous hundred-dollar bills visible. And when I asked him to get out of the vehicle, he tried to pick it up and put it back in his pocket.
The amount of money in Meza’s lap was approximately $2,800.00. As Meza opened the driver’s door, Deputy George observed a semiautomatic pistol inside the door panel.
Upon seeing the gun, later determined to be loaded with a round in the chamber, Deputy George “[i]mmediately handcuffed Mr. Meza and indicated to the other officer there was a firearm in the vehicle.” At that point, Meza was passed back to other officers on the scene and Officers Phillips and Chappell, who were already at the passenger’s side of the truck, proceeded to remove defendant and Southerland.
As defendant was “sliding out,” Deputy George saw “a plastic bag on the front seat between Mr. Southerland’s right leg and Mr. Jenkins’ left leg,” which was later determined to contain 51.5 grams of cocaine base and 27.8 grams of cocaine hydrochloride. Defendant and Southerland were also placed into custody and taken to the Biscoe Police Department.
Officer Chappell’s testimony was consistent with that of Deputy George: the bag was not visible when both defendant and Southerland were in the truck, but “[a]s [defendant] was getting out, as Sergeant Phillips was asking them to get out and as they were getting out of the vehicle, it was laying there in the seat.” Officer Chappell described the bag as a “clear plastic bag . . . [that was] wrapped up ... [and] knotted up.” Although Officer Chappell testified he could not see into the bag, he stated that in his experience “drugs are packaged that way.” He also testified that while in custody at jail, Southerland attempted to dispose of some cocaine in the toilet.
Officer Phillips testified that after he asked defendant to step out of the car and placed him in custody, Officer Chappell began to assist Southerland out of the car. “And before he got to get [Southerland] out of the vehicle, he noticed a bag, which he handed to me.” Officer Phillips testified the bag was rolled up, not clear, and that he could not ascertain its contents until he took them out. The bag itself was described by the forensic chemist as a “vegetable grocery style bag that. . . then [had] three . . . other bags that were knotted little plastic bags containing the material.”
[699]*699On 27 May 2002 defendant was tried in Montgomery Superior Court for trafficking in cocaine by possession of at least 28 grams but less than 200 grams, trafficking in cocaine by manufacturing (of the same amount), conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by possession (of the same amount), and possession of cocaine. Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and acquitted of the remaining charges. He received an active sentence of 35 to 42 months. Defendant appeals.
At the close of the State’s case, defendant made a motion to dismiss all charges for lack of sufficient evidence. This motion was denied. The defendant put on no evidence, and renewed his motion to dismiss. It was also denied. Our review is limited to the conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.
In defendant’s first and second assignments of error, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by possession. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Sams, 148 N.C. App. 141, 143-44, 557 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2001); State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). The State bears the burden of proving each element of the offense charged and must show substantial evidence of each element. State v. Brinkley, 10 N.C. App. 160, 161, 177 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1970).
“Substantial evidence is evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find the fact to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 108, 347 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1986). The State may meet this burden by either direct or circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be accorded to direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Salters, 137 N.C. App. 553, 557, 528 S.E.2d 386, 390 (2000) (citation omitted).
“In order to prove conspiracy, the State need not prove an express agreement; evidence tending to show a mutual, implied understanding will suffice. Nor is it necessary that the unlawful act be completed.” State v. Morgan 329 N.C. 654, 658, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991) (internal citations omitted). A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, or by a defendant’s behavior. State v. [700]*700Harris, 145 N.C. App. 570, 579, 551 S.E.2d 499, 505 (2001), disc. rev. denied, appeal dismissed 355 N.C. 218, 560 S.E.2d 146 (2002) (citation omitted). Conspiracy may also be inferred from the conduct of the other parties to the conspiracy. State v. Batchelor, 157 N.C. App. 421, 427, 579 S.E.2d 422, 427 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 462, 586 S.E.2d 101 (2003) (citation omitted). “[P]roof of a conspiracy [is generally] established by a number of indefinite acts, each of which, standing alone, might have little weight, but, taken collectively, they point unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“Trafficking in cocaine by possession of at least 28 grams but not more than 200 grams of cocaine is a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3)(a). Possession of the drugs need not be exclusive.” State v. Outlaw, 159 N.C. App.
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STEELMAN, Judge.
On 16 March 2002, Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff Robert George and Biscoe Police Officer Brant Phillips, as part of a local drug unit, responded to an anonymous call that Romeo Meza had a large quantity of cocaine coming into the city of Biscoe. George and Phillips saw Meza’s truck and proceeded to pull the vehicle over for a traffic stop. Along with the driver Meza, two other male passengers were in the cab of the pick-up truck: defendant, seated next to the passenger door, and Prentice Southerland, seated in between Meza and defendant. Other officers were called in to assist with the stop.
Deputy George approached the truck on the driver’s side while Officer Phillips and Officer Phillip Chappell, also of the Biscoe Police Department, approached the passenger’s side. At the driver’s side window, Deputy George noticed that Meza had a “large sum of cash on his lap,” and “asked Mr. Meza to step out of the vehicle.” Deputy George testified that
[698]*698[t]he money was in Mr. Meza’ lap as if he was counting. It was folded out and there was numerous hundred-dollar bills visible. And when I asked him to get out of the vehicle, he tried to pick it up and put it back in his pocket.
The amount of money in Meza’s lap was approximately $2,800.00. As Meza opened the driver’s door, Deputy George observed a semiautomatic pistol inside the door panel.
Upon seeing the gun, later determined to be loaded with a round in the chamber, Deputy George “[i]mmediately handcuffed Mr. Meza and indicated to the other officer there was a firearm in the vehicle.” At that point, Meza was passed back to other officers on the scene and Officers Phillips and Chappell, who were already at the passenger’s side of the truck, proceeded to remove defendant and Southerland.
As defendant was “sliding out,” Deputy George saw “a plastic bag on the front seat between Mr. Southerland’s right leg and Mr. Jenkins’ left leg,” which was later determined to contain 51.5 grams of cocaine base and 27.8 grams of cocaine hydrochloride. Defendant and Southerland were also placed into custody and taken to the Biscoe Police Department.
Officer Chappell’s testimony was consistent with that of Deputy George: the bag was not visible when both defendant and Southerland were in the truck, but “[a]s [defendant] was getting out, as Sergeant Phillips was asking them to get out and as they were getting out of the vehicle, it was laying there in the seat.” Officer Chappell described the bag as a “clear plastic bag . . . [that was] wrapped up ... [and] knotted up.” Although Officer Chappell testified he could not see into the bag, he stated that in his experience “drugs are packaged that way.” He also testified that while in custody at jail, Southerland attempted to dispose of some cocaine in the toilet.
Officer Phillips testified that after he asked defendant to step out of the car and placed him in custody, Officer Chappell began to assist Southerland out of the car. “And before he got to get [Southerland] out of the vehicle, he noticed a bag, which he handed to me.” Officer Phillips testified the bag was rolled up, not clear, and that he could not ascertain its contents until he took them out. The bag itself was described by the forensic chemist as a “vegetable grocery style bag that. . . then [had] three . . . other bags that were knotted little plastic bags containing the material.”
[699]*699On 27 May 2002 defendant was tried in Montgomery Superior Court for trafficking in cocaine by possession of at least 28 grams but less than 200 grams, trafficking in cocaine by manufacturing (of the same amount), conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by possession (of the same amount), and possession of cocaine. Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and acquitted of the remaining charges. He received an active sentence of 35 to 42 months. Defendant appeals.
At the close of the State’s case, defendant made a motion to dismiss all charges for lack of sufficient evidence. This motion was denied. The defendant put on no evidence, and renewed his motion to dismiss. It was also denied. Our review is limited to the conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.
In defendant’s first and second assignments of error, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by possession. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Sams, 148 N.C. App. 141, 143-44, 557 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2001); State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). The State bears the burden of proving each element of the offense charged and must show substantial evidence of each element. State v. Brinkley, 10 N.C. App. 160, 161, 177 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1970).
“Substantial evidence is evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find the fact to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 108, 347 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1986). The State may meet this burden by either direct or circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be accorded to direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Salters, 137 N.C. App. 553, 557, 528 S.E.2d 386, 390 (2000) (citation omitted).
“In order to prove conspiracy, the State need not prove an express agreement; evidence tending to show a mutual, implied understanding will suffice. Nor is it necessary that the unlawful act be completed.” State v. Morgan 329 N.C. 654, 658, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991) (internal citations omitted). A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, or by a defendant’s behavior. State v. [700]*700Harris, 145 N.C. App. 570, 579, 551 S.E.2d 499, 505 (2001), disc. rev. denied, appeal dismissed 355 N.C. 218, 560 S.E.2d 146 (2002) (citation omitted). Conspiracy may also be inferred from the conduct of the other parties to the conspiracy. State v. Batchelor, 157 N.C. App. 421, 427, 579 S.E.2d 422, 427 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 462, 586 S.E.2d 101 (2003) (citation omitted). “[P]roof of a conspiracy [is generally] established by a number of indefinite acts, each of which, standing alone, might have little weight, but, taken collectively, they point unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“Trafficking in cocaine by possession of at least 28 grams but not more than 200 grams of cocaine is a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3)(a). Possession of the drugs need not be exclusive.” State v. Outlaw, 159 N.C. App. 423, 426, 583 S.E.2d 625, 628 (2003) (citation omitted). “It is well established in North Carolina that possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or constructive. A person is said to have constructive possession when he, without actual physical possession of a controlled substance, has both the intent and the capability to maintain dominion and control over it.” State v. Jackson, 103 N.C. App. 239, 243, 405 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
As the terms “intent” and “capability” suggest, constructive possession depends on the totality of circumstances in each case. No single factor controls, but ordinarily the question will be for the jury. . . . The fact that a person is present in a [vehicle] where drugs are located, nothing else appearing, does not mean that person has constructive possession of the drugs.... [T]here must be evidence of other incriminating circumstances to support constructive possession.
State v. James, 81 N.C. App. 91, 93, 344 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1986) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In order to find defendant guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine in the instant case, the State must prove that defendant entered into an agreement to traffic by possessing cocaine weighing at least 28 grams but less than 200 grams, and intended the agreement to be carried out at the time it was made. See State v. Diaz, 155 N.C. App. 307, 319, 575 S.E.2d 523, 531 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 464, 586 S.E.2d 271 (2003). Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support either the element of agreement, or the element of possession.
[701]*701In this matter, the defendant stipulated that the stop of the pickup truck by the officers was valid and legal, and the amount of cocaine is not in dispute. When the truck was stopped by the officers, Meza was driving, Southerland was seated in the middle and defendant was next to the passenger window. They were seated together on the bench seat of the pickup truck. Meza had a pile of money in his lap. When Meza exited the vehicle, there was a pistol plainly visible in the driver’s door of the truck. When defendant exited the truck, there was a bag of drugs on the seat between defendant and Southerland.
We hold that this evidence was sufficient to submit the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by possession to the jury. A reasonable juror could infer that three grown men riding around in a pickup truck had a relationship and were conversing with one another. With evidence tending to show that Meza was in the process of counting thousands of dollars in cash when he was pulled over, and that 27.8 grams of powdered cocaine, 51.5 grams of crack cocaine and a loaded handgun were in the open cabin of the truck, there is also a reasonable inference that the subject of their conversation was a drug deal and not something more innocuous. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the cocaine was found in a bag on the seat of the truck between defendant and Southerland. A jury could reasonably infer that Meza would not count thousands of dollars in drug money in front of defendant and Southerland if they were not involved in a drug deal, nor would there be 79.3 grams of cocaine on the seat between the two passengers. “In ‘borderline’ or close cases, our courts have consistently expressed a preference for submitting issues to the jury . . . .” Jackson, 103 N.C. App. at 244, 405 S.E.2d at 357 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (Case finding adequate evidence to submit trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine to the jury on facts similar to the instant case). Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence of both a mutual, implied understanding, and of other incriminating circumstances to support the elements of conspiracy and constructive possession. These assignments of error are without merit.
In his third assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for an instruction on constructive possession. We disagree.
“Every substantial feature of the case arising on the evidence must be presented to the jury even without a special request for instructions on the issue.” State v. Watson, 80 N.C. App. 103, 106, 341 S.E.2d 366, 369 (1986) (citation omitted). The trial court initially [702]*702denied defendant’s request for an instruction on constructive possession at the charge conference. However, in charging the jury on the offense of trafficking by possession, the judge did include the pattern jury instruction on constructive possession (NCPI Criminal 104.41). The judge’s charge on conspiracy to traffic in cocaine referred the jury to his prior instruction on trafficking by possession. This complied with defendant’s request for an instruction on constructive possession. This assignment of error is without merit.
NO ERROR.
Judge CALABRIA concurs.
Judge ELMORE dissents.