IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED NOVEMB ER SESSION, 1998 August 19, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9712-CC-00568 ) Appellee, ) ) ) MAURY COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. JAMES L. WEATHERFORD JASON ERIC BRADBURN, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Dire ct Ap pea l - Cla ss D Felo ny)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
MICHAEL J. FLANAGAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP 95 White Bridge Road, Suite 208 Attorney General and Reporter Nashville, TN 37205 DARYL J. BRAND Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243
MIKE BOTTOMS District Attorney General P. O. Box 459 Lawrenceburg, TN 38464
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE OPINION
On July 29, 1997, a Maury County jury convicted Appellant Jason E. B radburn
of Class D felony evading arrest and reckless driving. After a sentencing hearing on
October 30, 1997, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II multiple offender
to six years imprisonment for felony evading arrest and 11 months and 29 days for
reckless driving. The s entence for felony evading arrest was ordered to run
cons ecutive ly to a sentence that Appellant had received in another case and the
sentence for reckless driving was ordered to run concurrently with the other
sentences. Appellant challenges his convictions, raising the following issues:
1) whether the indictment was sufficient to charge Appellant with felony evading arrest; 2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for Class D felony eva ding arre st; 3) whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the lesser inc luded o ffenses o f Class D felony eva ding arre st; 4) whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to a statutory defense; and 5) whether principles of due proce ss an d dou ble jeopardy prohibit convictions for both Class D felony evading arrest and reckless driving that arise out of the sam e cond uct.
After a review of the record, w e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court in pa rt and
reverse in part.
I. FACTS
On July 26, 1996, Officer John Beech of the Columbia Police Department and
civilian informant John Johnston, in conjunction with the Maury County Drug Task
Force, set up a “reverse sting operation” in which they were to sell two pounds of
marijuana to Appellant for $2,000. After a series of conversations and an initial
-2- meeting to inspect the marijuana, Appellant agreed to meet Beech and Johnston in
a Wal-Mart parking lot later that afternoon.
After Appellant arrived a t the Wa l-Mart parking lot, he parked his small pickup
truck and got into Officer Beech’s car. Appellant then paid for and took the
marijuana and got back into his truck. At this point, Officer Beech signaled some
other officers who had been wa iting nearby. Office r Mike J ohns on the n drov e his
unmarked vehicle directly in front of Appellant’s truck. As he pulled in front of
Appe llant’s truck, Office r Johns on activate d his vehic le’s eme rgency e quipm ent,
which consiste d of a ban k of strobe lights with the bank of headlights. As Officer
Johnson and his passenger, Officer Lonnie Lyles, were about to get out of the car,
Appellant looked at them m omen tarily and the n ramm ed his truc k into the right front
corner of Officer Johnson’s car. Ap pellant the n sped away ac ross the p arking lot.
Officer Bill Denton then activated the blue lights and siren on his vehicle and began
pursuit.
After striking Office r John son’s car, Appellant traveled through the W al-Mart
parking lot, ran a stop sign, crossed Brookmede Drive, and entered the parking lot
of the Shady Brook Mall. Appellant then drove down a row of parke d cars in the m all
parking lot and threw the two pounds of marijuana out his truck window. Appellant
then drove tow ard the m ain exit of the mall park ing lot, but the heavy traffic forced
him to stop. Shortly thereafter, Appellant was apprehended and taken into custody.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
-3- Appe llant contends that his conviction for Class D felony evading arrest should
be reversed because the indictment did not allege a felony. Specifically, Appellant
claims that because Tennes see Cod e Annotate d section 39-1 6-603(b)(1) states that
evading arrest must oc cur on a “street, roa d, alley or highway” in order to be a
felony, the indictm ent was insufficient b ecaus e it did not alle ge that the fleeing
occurre d on a “s treet, road , alley or high way.” 1
The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that “an indictment is valid if it
provides sufficient information (1) to enable the accused to know the accu sation to
which answ er is req uired, (2 ) to furn ish the court a dequ ate ba sis for the entry o f a
proper judgment, and (3) to protect the accuse d from dou ble jeopardy.” State v. Hill,
954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 199 7) (citations omitted). Further, “an indictment need
not conform to traditionally strict pleading requirements.” Id. “Thus, we now
approach ‘attacks upon indictments, especially of this kind, from the broad and
enlightened standp oint of com mon s ense a nd right reason rather than from the
narrow standpoint of petty precio sity, pettifo gging , techn icality or h air splittin g fault
finding.’” Id. (quoting Unite d State s v. Pur vis, 580 F.2 d 853, 8 57 (5th C ir.1978)).
A “common sense” reading of count two of the indictment indicates that it was
sufficient to comply with the constitutional notice requirements recited in Hill. Count
two of the indictment alleged that on July 26, 1996, Appellant
did un lawfully w hile op erating a mo tor veh icle intentio nally flee or attem pt to elude a law enforcement officer, after having received a signal from such officer to bring the veh icle to a stop, c reating a risk of dea th or injury to
1 The State contends that Appellant waived this issue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rule s of C rim inal P roce dure by failin g to ra ise it eit her b efor e trial o r in his mo tion fo r a ne w trial. R ule 12(b)(2), however, provides that either jurisdictional defects or the failure to properly charge an offense “shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). Thus, the waiver rule does not apply when the indictment fails to assert an essential element of the offen se. State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W .2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App . 1992).
-4- innocent bystanders or others, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39- 16-603 (b)(1)(3) . . . .
Thus, the indictment informed Appellant of the date of the offense, the fact that he
operated a motor vehicle, that he intentionally fled from a law enforcement officer
after receiving a signal to stop, and that his conduct created a risk of injury or dea th
to others. Further, by specific reference to the statute, the indictment left no doubt
that Appellant was being charge d with violating Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-16-603(b)(1), (3). Eve n witho ut a sp ecific re ferenc e to “stre et, road , alley or
highwa y,” the indictment clearly put Appellant on notice of the offense he was being
charged with, appraised the trial court of the sp ecific charge for purposes of entering
an appro priate ju dgm ent an d sen tence , and p rotecte d App ellant fro m do uble
jeopard y. This issu e has n o merit.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
for Class D felony evading arrest under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-
603(b), which states,
(1) It is unlaw ful for an y perso n, while opera ting a m otor ve hicle on any s treet, road, alley or highw ay in this state , to intentiona lly flee or attem pt to elude any law enforcem ent officer, after having received any signal from su ch officer to bring the vehicle to a stop. .... (3) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony unless the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death o r injury to innocent bysta nders or othe r third parties, in which cas e a violation of subse ction (b) is a Class D felony.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(b) (1997). We agree that the evidence was
insufficient to support a c onviction for a Class D felony.
-5- When an appellant challenges the su fficienc y of the e videnc e, this C ourt is
obliged to review that challenge according to certain well-settled principles. A verdict
of guilty by the jury, appro ved by the trial ju dge, a ccred its the te stimo ny of the State’s
witnesses and resolve s all conflicts in the tes timony in favor of the State. State v.
Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253 , 259 (T enn. 19 94); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75
(Tenn. 1992). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a presumption of
innocence, a jury verdict re move s this pres umptio n and re places it w ith one of gu ilt.
State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden
of proof rests with Appellant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting
evidenc e. Id. On ap peal, “th e [S]ta te is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of
the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn
therefrom.” Id. (citing State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8)).
Wh ere the sufficiency of the evidence is contested on appeal, the relevant question
for the rev iewing court is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
accused guilty of every element of the offens e beyon d a reas onable doubt. Harris ,
839 S.W.2d at 75; Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61
L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In conducting our evaluation of the c onvictin g evide nce, th is
Court is preclud ed from reweigh ing or reco nsidering the evide nce. State v. Morgan,
929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776,
779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, this Court may not substitute its own
inferences “for those d rawn by the trier of fact fr om circum stantial evid ence.”
Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Finally, Rule 13(e) of the Tennessee Rules of
Appe llate Procedure provides, “findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the
trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Matthews, 805
S.W.2d at 780.
-6- Initially, Appella nt claims that the evid ence is in sufficient to s upport his
conviction for felony evading arrest because there was no evidence that he crossed
a “public” street during the chase. We disagree. A review of the record indicates
that there is evide nce b y which a ration al jury co uld conclude that at least part of the
vehicle chase occurred on a street, road, alley, or highwa y. When Officer Johnson
was asked whether Appellant had crossed any streets during the police chase, he
responded, “Any streets? Well, he crossed Brookm ede D rive, the stop sign here .”
Further, Officer Lyles testified that during the chase, Appellant went “through the
intersection there at Brookmede and over into Shady Brook Mall park ing lot.” In fact,
Appellant himself admitted that he crossed a road during the chase and he
spec ifically referred to Brookmede Drive as “the street between [Wal-Mart] and the
mall.” A rational jury could conclude from this evidence that Appellant had crossed
a public street during his flight from the police.2
Howeve r, we hold that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction
for a Class D felony for another reason. In order to commit Class D felony evading
arrest un der sec tion 39-1 6-603(b ), a perso n mus t “create[] a risk of death or injury
to innocent bystanders or other third parties,” “while operating a motor vehicle on any
street, road, alley or highway.” Tenn. C ode Ann . § 39-16-603 (b)(1), (3) (1997).
There is no evide nce in the record th at Appe llant create d any risk o f death or injury
to a third person while he was driving acros s Broo kme de Dr ive. In fac t, the on ly
2 The State contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(b) does not require the evad ing of police to tak e plac e on a “pub lic” roa d, bu t only on “any s treet , road , alley or highw ay in this state.” We disagree. Under the State’s interpretation, this statute would encompass evading of police while driving a moto r vehicle on any private d riveway, par king lot, or a ny other pro perty desig ned to acc om mo date the o pera tion o f mo tor ve hicles . If that had b een wha t the le gislat ure in tend ed, it w ould have us ed langu age sim ilar to that of T ennes see C ode An notated s ection 55 -10-401 , which pro hibits driving under the influence of an intoxicant “on any of the public roads and highways of the state, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park or any apartment house com plex, or an y other prem ises wh ich is gene rally frequen ted by the pu blic at large.” T enn. Co de Ann . § 55-1 0-40 1(a) (199 8). In a dditio n, be cau se s ectio n 39- 16-6 03 is a crim inal st atute , it mu st be strictly constru ed in favo r of App ellant. See State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W .2d 603, 605 (Tenn. 1997 ).
-7- evidence about whether third persons were even on Brookmede Drive came from
Appe llant, who testified that he s lowed dow n enough to see that no ca rs were
coming before he crossed Brookm ede D rive. Although we agree with the State that
there was am ple eviden ce that A ppellant created a risk a risk of inju ry or death to
third persons when he drove through the crowded parking lots, that is not what the
statute req uires.
Because there was no evidence that Appellant created a risk of injury or death
to third parties while he was driving across Brookmede Drive, we hold that
Appe llant’s conviction for Class D felony evading arrest must be reversed and the
charge dismissed. However, in finding Appellant guilty of Class D felony evading
arrest, the jury necessarily found that the elements of Class E felony evading arrest
were satisfied: that Appellant operated a moto r vehicle on a st reet wh ile inten tionally
fleeing a police o fficer after rec eiving a sig nal from the police officer to stop his
vehicle. See Tenn. C ode Ann . § 39-16-603 (b)(1) (1997). Indee d, a rational jury
could conclude, from the evidence that Officer Johnson activated his emergency
lights when he approa ched Ap pellant in the W al-Mart parking lot, that Appellant was
intentio nally fleeing a police officer who had given him a signal to stop when
Appellant drove his vehicle across Brookmede Drive. Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to support a co nviction for Class E felony evading arrest. Howeve r,
because of the erro r discuss ed in Pa rt IV, infra, we hold that this case must be
remanded for a new trial for that offense.
IV. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
-8- Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed
to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offenses of Class D felony evading
arrest. Even though we hold that Appellant’s conviction for Class D felony evading
arrest must be reversed, we must address this issue because the evidence was
sufficient to s upport a conviction for Class E felony e vading a rrest.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110(a) provides that a trial judge
must charge the jury with all lesser grades or classes of an offense supported by the
evidence, without any request on the part of the defendant to do so. See also State
v. Trusty, 919 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. 199 6); State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314,
319 (Tenn. 1986). Failure to charge such lesser offens e(s) de nies a defen dant h is
constitutional right to trial by a jury if there are any fac ts “sus ceptib le of infe rring gu ilt
on any lesser included offense or offens es.” State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 310, 315
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). This requirement is avo ided o nly whe n the re cord is
devoid of evidence to support an inference of guilt of the lesse r offense . State v.
Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 550 (Tenn. 199 4).
In this case, the proof clearly established that Appellant committed the offense
of misdemeanor evading arrest. In fact, Appellant admitted that after he crossed
Brookmede Drive, he continued to flee even though he had seen the flashing blue
lights on Officer Den ton’s vehic le and he knew th at the polic e were tryin g to
apprehend him. Ho wever, as previously discussed, whether Appellant had
committed Class E felony evading arrest depends on whether he knew that he had
received a signal from the police to stop his vehicle before he crossed Brookmede
Drive. Indeed, Appellant denied that he had seen the strobe lights on Officer
John son’s unmarked vehicle and he claimed that he did not know that Johnson and
-9- Lyle were police officers because they were wearing plain clothes and he could not
see the badges they were wearing around their necks. Appellant claimed that he
fled from Officers Johnson and Lyle because he could see that Lyle had a gun and
he believed that the two men were tr ying to ro b him . Ther efore, th e reco rd clea rly
contained evidence that wo uld support an inference of guilt for the lesser included
offense of misdemeanor evading arrest. By failing to charge the jury on the lesser
included offense, the trial court deprived Appellant of his right to have the jury
determine his guilt. As this Court stated in State v. Boyce,
“However plain it may be to the mind of the Court that one certain offense has been committed and none other, he must not confine h imself in h is charge to that offense. When he does so he invades the province of the jury, whose peculiar duty it is to ascertain the grade of the offense. However clear it may be, the Court should never decide the facts, but must leave them unem barrass ed to the ju ry.”
920 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting Poole v. State, 61 Tenn.
288, 294 (1872)). Thus, the trial court clearly erred whe n it failed to instruct the jury
on the lesser included offenses.
V. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON THE STATUTORY DEFENSE
Appellant contends that the trial court erred wh en it failed to instruct the jury
that “[i]t is a defens e to prosec ution [for eva ding arre st] that the attempted arrest was
unlawfu l.” Tenn . Cod e Ann . § 39-1 6-603 (a)(2), (b )(2) (19 97). W e disa gree. T his
Court has state d that the tria l court nee d not instru ct the jury regarding a defense
unless that defen se is fairly raise d by the p roof. State v. Shrops hire, 874 S.W.2d
-10- 634, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Appellant contends that because he was
arrested for possession of marijuana and the jury found him not guilty of possession
of marijuana by reason of entrapment, his arrest w as ne cess arily unla wful.
Howeve r, Appellant cites no authority for the proposition tha t an acquittal for a
charged offense means that the arrest for that offense was unlawful. Indeed, that
is not the standard. The lawfulness of an a rrest de pend s on w hethe r it is founded
upon probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a criminal
offense. State v. Downey, 945 S.W .2d 102 , 106 (T enn. 19 97). “Whether proba ble
cause is present depends upon whether the facts and circumstance s and reliable
information known to the police office r at the time of the arre st ‘were su fficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the [individual] had committed an offe nse.’”
Id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1964)). In this case, App ellant paid $2,000 to Officer Beech for t wo pounds of
marijuana in a transaction that was overheard through listening devices by the other
officers who su bsequ ently purs ued an d arreste d Appe llant. Thus, the arresting
officers clearly had probable cause to believe that Appellant had committed a
criminal o ffense. T his issue is without m erit.
VI. CONVICTIONS FOR BOTH EVADING ARREST AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Appellant contends that his convictions for both Class D felony evading arrest
and reckless driving cannot be sustained because they arose out of the same set of
circumstances. We agree that an accused cannot be convicted of these two
offenses for the same course of conduct. Indeed, this Court stated in State v. Kerry
D. Garfin kle, No. 01C01-9611-CC-00484, 1997 WL 709477, at *4-5 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Nashville, Nov. 7, 1997), that convictions for both reckless driving and Class
-11- D felony evading arrest for the same conduct violate principles of due process and
doub le jeopardy. However, because we have reversed Appellant’s conviction for
Class D felon y evad ing arre st, App ellant’s convic tion for re ckless driving mus t be
affirmed. Beca use th e State could decide not to prosecute Appellant or a jury could
acqu it Appellant of Class E or misdemeano r evading arrest, we need not decide
whether a conviction for both reckless driving and either of those offenses would also
violate principles of due process an d double jeop ardy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because we find that the evidenc e was insuffic ient to s uppo rt App ellant’s
conviction for Class D felony evading arrest, the conviction for that offen se is
reversed and the charge is dismisse d. Beca use the trial court erre d in failing to
instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses, Appellant is entitled to a new trial
for the offens e of Clas s E felon y or misd emea nor evad ing arres t. In all other
respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
-12-