IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1998 SESSION FILED September 24, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk ) Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9707-CC-00283 ) vs. ) Lauderdale County ) JAMIE WALKER, ) Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Judge ) Appellant. ) (Statutory Rape - Certified Question)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CHARLES P. RONEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 542 Union City, TN 38282-0542 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Ave. N., 2d Floor Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE District Attorney General
MARK DAVIDSON Asst. District Attorney General P.O. Box 562, 302 Market St. Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:________________
AFFIRMED
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Jamie Walker, entered best-interest guilty pleas1 to
three counts of statutory rape in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. With the
consent of the state and the trial court, he reserved the certified question of whether
the trial court correctly determined he was competent to stand trial. Thereafter, he
perfected his appeal to this court, and that certified question is now before us for
consideration. After studying the record and the briefs of the parties, we have
determined (1) that the certified question is properly before us, and (2) the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ruling the defendant was competent to stand trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant is a mildly mentally retarded adult. After the initiation
of the proceedings against him, he was examined by two licensed psychologists.
The trial court then conducted a hearing on the issue of competency. The defense
expert opined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial. He admitted the
defendant fell into a "gray area." The state's expert opined the defendant was
competent; however, he testified "it was somewhat borderline and marginal[.]" In
an order finding specific facts related to the defendant's competence, the trial court
ruled, "[A]lthough the defendant is marginally competent . . . he is competent
sufficient to address the issue of the charge against him."
After the competency hearing, the defendant entered his guilty pleas
subject to the certified question of the propriety of the trial court's determination of
competency. In a well-drafted pleading, the defendant set forth the certified
question and the corollary information required by State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647
1 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt if the defendant intelligently concludes his best interests would be served by a plea of guilty.
2 (Tenn. 1988) and State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1996). This
pleading was incorporated by reference in the guilty plea document, which noted,
"Defendant reserves the right to appeal the certified issue of law attached hereto
and agreed upon and consented to by the defendant, trial judge and State of
Tennessee." Thereafter, a sentencing hearing was held, and each judgment
entered reflects the notation "certified question of law." The trial court ordered that
the previously filed statement of the certified question be attached to the judgment
forms; however, it does not appear as an attachment to the judgments in the
technical record.
I
As a threshold issue, the state questions whether the certified
question is properly before the court. The state finds a fatal deficiency in the
absence of the statement of the certified question in the judgment forms. 2 We
disagree.
Our supreme court has recently addressed the proper procedure for
preserving a question of law under Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). In State v.
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, the court reiterated its admonitions from State v.
Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647:
Regardless of what has appeared in prior petitions, orders, colloquy in open court and otherwise, the final order or judgment from which the time begins to run to pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appeal must contain a statement of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by the defendant for appellate review and the question of law must be stated so as to clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue reserved. For example, where questions of law involve the validity of searches and the admissibility of statements and confessions, etc., the reasons relied upon by the defendant in the trial court at the suppression hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified question of law and review by the appellate courts will be
2 The defendant elected not to file a reply brief addressing this issue. We presume he opposes dismissal of his appeal on this basis.
3 limited to those passed upon by the trial judge and stated in the certified question, absent a constitutional requirement otherwise. Without an explicit statement of the certified question, neither the defendant, the State nor the trial judge can make a meaningful determination of whether the issue sought to be reviewed is dispositive of the case. Most of the reported and unreported cases seeking the limited appellate review pursuant to Tenn.R.Crim.P. 37 have been dismissed because the certified question was not dispositive. Also, the order must state that the certified question was expressly reserved as part of the plea agreement, that the State and the trial judge consented to the reservation and that the State and the trial judge are of the opinion that the question is dispositive of the case. Of course, the burden is on defendant to see that these prerequisites are in the final order and that the record brought to the appellate courts contains all of the proceedings below that bear upon whether the certified question of law is dispositive and the merits of the question certified. No issue beyond the scope of the certified question will be considered.
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 836-37 (quoting Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650)
(emphasis added in Pendergrass). The Pendergrass court also observed that the
Preston prerequisites would be met if the final judgment referred to or incorporated
"any other independent documents which would satisfy the Preston requirements."
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837.
In the case at bar, the defendant thoroughly summarized the certified
question and other pertinent information in a pleading entitled "Certified Question
of Law." The plea agreement was prepared with specific reference to the certified
question and the consent of the state and the trial court. The judgments reflect the
notation “certified question of law.” As reflected in the transcript of the sentencing
hearing contained in the appellate record, the trial court ordered that the certified
question pleading be attached to the final judgments. Although the certified
question pleading is not attached to the judgments in the technical record, it
appears elsewhere in the technical record and bears a file stamp with the same
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1998 SESSION FILED September 24, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk ) Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9707-CC-00283 ) vs. ) Lauderdale County ) JAMIE WALKER, ) Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Judge ) Appellant. ) (Statutory Rape - Certified Question)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CHARLES P. RONEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 542 Union City, TN 38282-0542 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Ave. N., 2d Floor Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE District Attorney General
MARK DAVIDSON Asst. District Attorney General P.O. Box 562, 302 Market St. Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:________________
AFFIRMED
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Jamie Walker, entered best-interest guilty pleas1 to
three counts of statutory rape in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. With the
consent of the state and the trial court, he reserved the certified question of whether
the trial court correctly determined he was competent to stand trial. Thereafter, he
perfected his appeal to this court, and that certified question is now before us for
consideration. After studying the record and the briefs of the parties, we have
determined (1) that the certified question is properly before us, and (2) the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ruling the defendant was competent to stand trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant is a mildly mentally retarded adult. After the initiation
of the proceedings against him, he was examined by two licensed psychologists.
The trial court then conducted a hearing on the issue of competency. The defense
expert opined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial. He admitted the
defendant fell into a "gray area." The state's expert opined the defendant was
competent; however, he testified "it was somewhat borderline and marginal[.]" In
an order finding specific facts related to the defendant's competence, the trial court
ruled, "[A]lthough the defendant is marginally competent . . . he is competent
sufficient to address the issue of the charge against him."
After the competency hearing, the defendant entered his guilty pleas
subject to the certified question of the propriety of the trial court's determination of
competency. In a well-drafted pleading, the defendant set forth the certified
question and the corollary information required by State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647
1 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt if the defendant intelligently concludes his best interests would be served by a plea of guilty.
2 (Tenn. 1988) and State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1996). This
pleading was incorporated by reference in the guilty plea document, which noted,
"Defendant reserves the right to appeal the certified issue of law attached hereto
and agreed upon and consented to by the defendant, trial judge and State of
Tennessee." Thereafter, a sentencing hearing was held, and each judgment
entered reflects the notation "certified question of law." The trial court ordered that
the previously filed statement of the certified question be attached to the judgment
forms; however, it does not appear as an attachment to the judgments in the
technical record.
I
As a threshold issue, the state questions whether the certified
question is properly before the court. The state finds a fatal deficiency in the
absence of the statement of the certified question in the judgment forms. 2 We
disagree.
Our supreme court has recently addressed the proper procedure for
preserving a question of law under Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). In State v.
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, the court reiterated its admonitions from State v.
Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647:
Regardless of what has appeared in prior petitions, orders, colloquy in open court and otherwise, the final order or judgment from which the time begins to run to pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appeal must contain a statement of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by the defendant for appellate review and the question of law must be stated so as to clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue reserved. For example, where questions of law involve the validity of searches and the admissibility of statements and confessions, etc., the reasons relied upon by the defendant in the trial court at the suppression hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified question of law and review by the appellate courts will be
2 The defendant elected not to file a reply brief addressing this issue. We presume he opposes dismissal of his appeal on this basis.
3 limited to those passed upon by the trial judge and stated in the certified question, absent a constitutional requirement otherwise. Without an explicit statement of the certified question, neither the defendant, the State nor the trial judge can make a meaningful determination of whether the issue sought to be reviewed is dispositive of the case. Most of the reported and unreported cases seeking the limited appellate review pursuant to Tenn.R.Crim.P. 37 have been dismissed because the certified question was not dispositive. Also, the order must state that the certified question was expressly reserved as part of the plea agreement, that the State and the trial judge consented to the reservation and that the State and the trial judge are of the opinion that the question is dispositive of the case. Of course, the burden is on defendant to see that these prerequisites are in the final order and that the record brought to the appellate courts contains all of the proceedings below that bear upon whether the certified question of law is dispositive and the merits of the question certified. No issue beyond the scope of the certified question will be considered.
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 836-37 (quoting Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650)
(emphasis added in Pendergrass). The Pendergrass court also observed that the
Preston prerequisites would be met if the final judgment referred to or incorporated
"any other independent documents which would satisfy the Preston requirements."
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837.
In the case at bar, the defendant thoroughly summarized the certified
question and other pertinent information in a pleading entitled "Certified Question
of Law." The plea agreement was prepared with specific reference to the certified
question and the consent of the state and the trial court. The judgments reflect the
notation “certified question of law.” As reflected in the transcript of the sentencing
hearing contained in the appellate record, the trial court ordered that the certified
question pleading be attached to the final judgments. Although the certified
question pleading is not attached to the judgments in the technical record, it
appears elsewhere in the technical record and bears a file stamp with the same
date to which the trial court referred in ordering its attachment to the judgments.
Although it is a better practice for the appellant to take care that any incorporated
documents are physically attached to the judgment when so ordered by the trial
4 court, we hold in this case that the defendant has properly certified his question to
this court consistent with the requirements of Preston and Pendergrass. See
Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 836-37; State v. Ricky Gene Wilkerson, No. 01C01-
9708-CR-00362, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 22, 1998) (Rule 20
Order) (certified question properly before the court where final judgments
incorporate by reference the agreed orders setting forth the certified question).
II
Thus, we turn to the primary issue on appeal -- whether the trial court
properly determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The
defendant argues that the expert evidence presented by his expert is more definitive
and persuasive than the "speculative" testimony offered by the state's expert.
When a trial court conducts a hearing, it has the opportunity to see
and hear the witnesses and their conflicting testimony. On appeal, the trial court's
findings have the weight of a jury verdict. State v. Tate, 615 S.W.2d 161, 162
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). When this court reviews the trial court's finding that a
defendant is competent to stand trial, the question is whether the evidence
preponderates against the trial court's determination. State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d
427, 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
In the case at bar, both expert witnesses agreed that the question of
the defendant's competency to stand trial was a close one. The state's witness
opined that the defendant’s competence was "somewhat borderline and marginal."
The witness said the defendant is "coachable" in the areas of competency in which
he is weak, and with some extra work by defense counsel, the defendant could be
improved in those areas. Ultimately, however, the state's expert opined that the
defendant is competent for trial. In comparison, the defendant's expert witness
5 testified that the defendant has "intellectual limitations as a result of physical
problems" as opposed to mental illness. As such, the defendant's mental status will
not improve in the future. He opined that the defendant is incompetent.
Specifically, the defendant is deficient in his ability to assist his attorney and
understand the consequences of a finding of guilt. He agreed with the state's expert
that certain aspects of the proceedings could be explained to the defendant as the
process unfolded.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the
defendant has some problems in understanding some aspects of the proceedings
against him and some problems with assisting counsel, but these limitations do not
rise to the level necessary for a finding of incompetency. Furthermore, the trial
court found the defendant understood the nature of the accusations. As such, the
trial court found the defendant competent for trial.
This case presents a typical "battle of the experts." Unfortunately for
the defendant, the trial court weighed the testimony of the state's expert more
heavily than that of the defense expert. The trial court addressed the essential
differences between the state's evidence and defense evidence in its findings of
fact. It resolved these issues adversely to the position advanced by the defendant.
On appeal, the defendant has not convinced us that the evidence preponderates
against the trial court's determination of competency.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_______________________________ CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
6 CONCUR:
_____________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
_____________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, SPECIAL JUDGE