SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
State v. Jamal Wade (A-31-21) (085198)
Argued September 12, 2022 -- Decided November 16, 2022
SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the State concedes that police violated defendant Jamal Wade’s Miranda rights by continuing a custodial interrogation after his unambiguous request for counsel. The Court considers whether it was harmless error to introduce at defendant’s trial inculpatory statements he made during that continued interrogation.
After determining that defendant was a suspect in a shooting, two detectives approached defendant on the street, handcuffed him, and told him that he was under arrest for murder. Defendant was brought to headquarters for questioning.
A detective read defendant his Miranda rights and explained that “if you want to speak to us, you know you have to waive the rights.” Defendant stated, “I got a lawyer,” and said, “Let me talk to him.” After further discussion, during which a detective told defendant that he was not under arrest, another detective asked, “Are you verbally agreeing to speak to [us] without your lawyer?” Defendant responded, “Yeah, verbally. . . . If I’m not under arrest, I don’t have to talk to anybody.”
The interview continued, and defendant admitted that he was depicted in a video from a store where a stolen car tied to the murder had been captured on camera on the night of the shooting. After the detectives explained that additional footage placed him at different locations throughout the night and connected him to the stolen car, defendant stated, “Now I need to call my lawyer. This just got bad.” The detectives ended the interview and formally charged and booked defendant.
The State moved to admit defendant’s statements from the interrogation. After a hearing, the judge ruled defendant’s statements admissible, finding that defendant waived his rights. Defendant’s statements were played at trial, and defendant was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that defendant had never exercised his right to an attorney and had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court granted certification limited to the waiver issue. 249 N.J. 77 (2021).
1 HELD: It was error to admit defendant’s statements after detectives failed to honor his invocation of the right to counsel, and that error was not harmless in light of the circumstantial nature of the evidence against defendant and his statements’ capacity to undermine his credibility before the jury.
1. As all parties now agree, defendant’s interrogation should have ended as soon as defendant invoked his right to counsel by stating, “I got a lawyer. . . . Let me talk to him.” Defendant’s subsequent statements were obtained in violation of Miranda and were subject to suppression. The Court thus considers whether it was harmless error to admit defendant’s statements. (pp. 14-15)
2. An error is rarely found to be harmless when the State violates a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. In State v. Tillery, any error in the admission of the defendant’s statement to police was found harmless (a) in light of the “overwhelming” evidence against the defendant and (b) because the disputed statements contained “little -- if any -- incriminating evidence relevant to [the crime of conviction].” 238 N.J. 293, 320-22 (2019). In that case, admission of the statement was not capable of changing the outcome of the trial. (pp. 15-16)
3. This case is not like Tillery -- this is not an instance of overwhelming, direct evidence. Defendant’s statements identifying himself in the store footage strengthened the State’s theory of the case and the circumstantial evidence supporting it. Any doubt about whether defendant was the man on the surveillance tape was eliminated by the introduction of his statements. Further, defendant’s statement -- made after police failed to honor his invocation of the right to counsel -- that he had been at the store at the time of the murder was shown to be false by the surveillance footage. This undoubtedly tarnished defendant’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. In a case such as this -- where the State’s theory hinges on circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s location at a particular time -- a self- identifying, self-inculpatory statement that colors the defendant as a liar is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. While police may extract such statements through interrogation, they must do so within the confines of the law. Only a new trial, one untainted by defendant’s unlawfully obtained admissions, can rectify the detectives’ failure to honor defendant’s Miranda rights. (pp. 16-18)
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, and FASCIALE; and JUDGES FISHER and SABATINO (both temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-31 September Term 2021 085198
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Jamal Wade, a/k/a, Jamal Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Argued Decided September 12, 2022 November 16, 2022
Steven E. Braun argued the cause for appellant (Bruno & Ferraro, attorneys; Steven E. Braun and John Latoracca, on the briefs).
Amanda G. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Amanda G. Schwartz, of counsel and on the briefs).
Surinder K. Aggarwal argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Stone Conroy, attorneys; Surinder K. Aggarwal, Shalom D. Stone, and Rebekah R. Conroy, on the brief).
1 JUSTICE Solomon delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, defendant Jamal Wade challenges the introduction at his
trial of inculpatory statements made to detectives during a custodial
interrogation. The parties agree that police violated defendant’s Miranda1
rights by failing to honor his unambiguous request for counsel. The State
nevertheless contends that defendant’s inculpatory statements were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the State cannot meet its heavy
burden of proving that this Miranda violation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division.
Because the interrogation should have ended when defendant invoked
his right to counsel, we decline to consider whether police coerced defendant’s
statements or whether misstatements by interrogating police officers render a
Miranda waiver per se invalid.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 I.
A.
The trial court record establishes that in September 2016, Sergeant
Timothy Tabor of the Paterson Police Department (PPD) responded to a report
that someone had been shot in Paterson. When he arrived at the scene,
Sergeant Tabor found Cosmeik Gee in his car, unresponsive and bleeding from
apparent gunshot wounds to his torso. Gee later died from those wounds.
The next day, Lead PPD Detective Anthony Petrazzuolo recovered
footage of the shooting from a nearby surveillance camera. This footage
showed a dark-colored Audi sedan park next to Gee’s car. After the Audi
stopped, a man wearing a black jacket over a gray hooded sweatshirt exited the
passenger seat and shot Gee several times. The shooter then re-entered the
Audi and fled.
Two days later, State Police Detective Sergeant Vittorio Flora of the
Auto Theft Task Force (Task Force) contacted PPD detectives with
information concerning the shooting. The Task Force had been conducting an
unrelated investigation into car thefts in the Paterson area. As part of that
investigation, the Task Force obtained a communication data warrant
authorizing installation of a GPS tracking device on a black 2012 Audi A6
sedan, which had been reported stolen. The warrant allowed instant and
3 continuous monitoring of the car for thirty days; the shooting occurred during
that time.
After learning that a dark-colored Audi sedan had been involved in a
Paterson shooting, Sergeant Flora reviewed the GPS data. The data placed the
Audi at the scene of Gee’s murder and then at a nearby address, where the car
remained for approximately seven hours. Detectives recovered the vehicle and
obtained additional surveillance footage from where the Audi had parked,
which confirmed the GPS data. The footage also revealed that, after parking,
the driver and passenger exited the vehicle. The driver wore a gray sweatshirt
with a black line across the front and a logo on the chest. He also wore gray
sweatpants and black shoes. The passenger wore a black jacket over a gray
sweatshirt, gray sweatpants, and dark shoes. After getting out of the car, the
passenger wiped down the exterior doorhandles.
Detectives continued to review the GPS data and found that, before the
shooting, the Audi stopped near a local liquor store and did not move for
approximately two hours. Detectives recovered surveillance video footage
from the liquor store that showed clear images of two men walking away from
the Audi and entering the store. Other cameras captured the men walking
toward the Audi about two hours later. Although the footage did not show the
pair enter or exit the Audi, their clothing and appearances matched those of the
4 driver and passenger shown in surveillance footage from near the murder
scene.
When reviewing the liquor store footage, PPD Detective Jimmy
Maldonado recognized the driver from prior interactions and identified him as
defendant Jamal Wade. PPD Officer Jason English identified the passenger as
codefendant Gyasi Allen, who is not a party to this appeal.
At around noon the next day, Detectives Petrazzuolo and Maldonado
saw defendant standing outside a convenience store. The detectives pulled
over and approached with their guns drawn. They identified themselves as
PPD detectives, handcuffed defendant, and told him that he was under arrest
for murder. Defendant was brought to PPD headquarters for questioning.
At PPD headquarters, the detectives brought defendant to an interview
room. Detective Petrazzuolo stated, “So we told you why you’re here. All
right,” and then administered Miranda warnings. Defendant verbally affirmed
his understanding and signed a Miranda form, demonstrating that he
understood his rights. As Detective Petrazzuolo began to read the waiver-of-
rights section out loud, the following exchange occurred:
Detective Petrazzuolo: So if you want to speak to us, you know you have to waive the rights. If not --
Defendant: I got a lawyer, though.
Detective Petrazzuolo: You have a lawyer?
5 Defendant: Yeah.
Detective Petrazzuolo: So you want a lawyer?
Defendant: I got a lawyer. I don’t -- yeah. Let me talk to him.
Detective Maldonado: Does he have a lawyer for something else, or you --
Defendant: He’s paid for everything. I got a case in Delaware, a case here. He’s paid for everything.
Detective Maldonado: Oh, okay.
Detective Petrazzuolo: All right, so you -- you don’t want to speak to us without your lawyer; is that what you’re saying?
Defendant: There’s nothing to be mad at, I’m a man.
Detective Petrazzuolo: All right, well, you’re going to have to wait to speak --
Defendant: Yeah, but I got a lawyer. So you said I’m under arrest. Right?
Detective Maldonado: No, I didn’t say you’re under arrest.
Defendant: You just read me my rights.
Detective Maldonado: If you -- he hasn’t been charged with anything --
....
Defendant: So then talk. I don’t need to tell you s*** if I ain’t under arrest. I know I ain’t do nothing wrong.
6 Detective Petrazzuolo: Are you . . . verbally agreeing to speak to us?
Defendant: Yeah. I’m a man.
Detective Petrazzuolo: Without your lawyer here?
Defendant: (indiscernible). He knew you.
Detective Petrazzuolo: Are you verbally agreeing to speak to [us] without your lawyer?
Defendant: Yeah, verbally. (indiscernible) I think you think I’m stupid, [be]cause I got --
Detective Maldonado: I don’t think you’re stupid. I’m just saying that you said --
Defendant: You[’re] saying the only way you need a lawyer is [if] I’m under arrest. If I’m not under arrest, I don’t have to talk to anybody.
Notwithstanding that exchange, Detective Maldonado continued with the
interview, asking defendant about his whereabouts on the night of the
shooting. Defendant admitted that he was at the liquor store on the night of
the shooting and identified himself in photographs taken from the liquor store
footage. This confirmed Detective Maldonado’s identification of defendant as
the driver. However, defendant contended that he was at the liquor store until
around 2:00 a.m. on the night in question. After the detectives explained that
additional footage placed him at different locations throughout the night and
connected him to the stolen Audi, defendant stated, “Now I need to call my
7 lawyer. This just got bad.” The detectives ended the interview and formally
charged and booked defendant.
B.
1.
A Passaic County grand jury returned a six-count indictment, charging
defendant with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, first-degree
purposeful or knowing murder, first-degree conspiracy to commit murder,
fourth-degree certain persons not to have weapons, second-degree possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and third-degree receiving stolen
property.
The State moved to admit defendant’s statements from the interrogation,
and the court conducted a hearing to determine their admissibility. At the
hearing, Detectives Petrazzuolo and Maldonado testified. Detective
Petrazzuolo affirmed that he told defendant he was under arrest for murder
before taking him back to PPD headquarters. Detective Petrazzuolo also
explained that defendant was arrested based on probable cause, not pursuant to
a warrant. Both detectives acknowledged that Detective Maldonado
incorrectly told defendant that he was not under arrest when he stated, “No. I
didn’t say you’re under arrest.” Instead, Maldonado claimed that he meant to
8 say that defendant had not been charged with anything, but he admitted that
neither detective corrected the misstatement.
The hearing judge ruled defendant’s statements admissible. The judge
found that defendant’s age and experiences with the justice system, combined
with the detectives’ clear administration of Miranda warnings and the lack of
coercion, supported a finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived
his rights. The judge dismissed Detective Maldonado’s misstatement as
immaterial because defendant “understood what was going on.”
2.
At defendant’s trial, the State played a recording of defendant’s
statements and used a transcript to refresh Detective Petrazzuolo’s memory
when testifying. The State also introduced expert testimony that, based on
defendant’s cell phone data, his cell phone could have been in the same
location as the Audi at the time of the shooting. In addition, the State
presented the surveillance footage described above and defendant’s
identification of himself in the liquor store footage; during closing arguments
the prosecutor reminded jurors that defendant admitted he was in the video.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and the judge sentenced
him to an aggregate forty-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
9 C.
Defendant appealed, arguing that his statements should have been
suppressed because he did not validly waive his Miranda rights. According to
defendant, the police never informed him of the charges he was facing, and
they lied to him by stating that he was not under arrest. Accordingly, he
argued that his waiver was invalid under State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68
(2003) (holding that a Miranda waiver is per se invalid when police withhold
the fact that a criminal complaint has been filed against the suspect or a
warrant has been issued for his arrest).
The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed in an unpublished
decision, finding no error in admitting defendant’s statements. Because
defendant had not yet been charged and no warrant had been issued at the time
of the interrogation, the Appellate Division reasoned that this case was more
like State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 406-08 (2009) (police need not tell an
interrogee that he is a suspect for Miranda purposes), than State v. Vincenty,
237 N.J. 122, 133-34 (2019) (reaffirming A.G.D.), such that the bright line of
A.G.D. had not been crossed. Moreover, the Appellate Division explained that
the totality of the circumstances “screamed out” that defendant was a suspect
in the investigation.
10 Last, the Appellate Division concluded that defendant never exercised
his right to remain silent, his right to speak to an attorney, or his right to have
an attorney present during questioning “at any point” during the interview.
Therefore, the Appellate Division determined that defendant had knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
We granted certification limited to whether “defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.” 249 N.J. 77 (2021).
The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL)
filed a motion to appear as amicus curiae, which we granted.
II.
Defendant urges this Court to reverse the Appellate Division. He argues
that the detectives violated his privilege against self-incrimination by
continuing the interrogation after he invoked his right to counsel. He argues
that his statement, “I got a lawyer. . . . Let me talk to him,” was an invocation
of the right to counsel. Defendant also contends that his waiver was not
knowing or voluntary because he waived his rights in reliance on Detective
Maldonado’s misstatement that he had not been arrested and because he had
not been informed of the charges against him. Defendant asks this Court to
adopt a bright-line rule that misstatements by police -- such as Detective
11 Maldonado’s statement to defendant that, “No. I didn’t say you’re under
arrest” -- render a Miranda waiver per se invalid. Defendant contends that,
because arrest status is an objective and discrete fact, the logic of A.G.D.
supports the creation of a bright-line rule.
The State concedes that defendant invoked his right to counsel and that
the detectives should have ended the interrogation as soon as he did so, but it
argues that this error was harmless. According to the State, any evidence
obtained through the interrogation lacked material significance because the
jury “would have heard the same evidence” through the rest of the State’s case.
The State also argues that Detective Maldonado’s misstatement is
insufficient to invalidate defendant’s waiver because the totality of the
circumstances supports a finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights. In support, the State cites to defendant’s age, prior
experience with the justice system, and the fact that he was told he was under
arrest prior to the interrogation. The State thus maintains that the detectives
did not need to clarify the circumstances of defendant’s arrest; in the State’s
view, defendant was on sufficient notice that he was under arrest.
12 C.
The ACDL contends that defendant unequivocally invoked his right to
counsel but the detectives continued to interrogate him until he made
incriminating statements. The ACDL asserts that this alone necessitates
reversal. In addition, the ACDL argues that defendant did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his Miranda rights. According to the ACDL, defendant
misunderstood his rights and only waived them, if at all, in reliance on
Detective Maldonado’s misstatement regarding his arrest.
Like defendant, the ACDL urges this Court to create a bright-line rule
that, when police make factually erroneous representations to a defendant
regarding his arrest status and those representations cause the defendant to
waive his privilege against self-incrimination, any waiver that follows should
be invalid per se. The ACDL contends that this rule follows logically from
A.G.D.
III.
We turn to the issue at the heart of this appeal -- was the acknowledged
Miranda violation harmless? Because the answer to that question is no, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.
Although not all constitutional errors call for reversal, “some may go so
plainly to the integrity of the proceedings that a new trial is mandated.” State
13 v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338 (1971). “The right to counsel holds a high
preferred place in our constitutional scheme because the presence of counsel is
an essential safeguard to the exercise of many other valued rights.” State v.
Rivas, 251 N.J. 132, 136 (2022). Indeed, the right to remain silent and to
counsel during custodial interrogations “are necessary ‘to guarantee full
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.’” State v. McCloskey,
90 N.J. 18, 25 (1982) (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729
(1966)).
Accordingly, if a suspect “states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present,” State v. Gonzalez, 249
N.J. 612, 628 (2022) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)),
even if the request for counsel is “ambiguous” or “equivocal,” State v. Clark,
251 N.J. 266, 292 (2022). When officers do not honor such a request, the
suspect’s statements are “presumed involuntary” and thus inadmissible at trial,
any purported waiver notwithstanding. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
177 (1991).
All parties now agree that defendant’s interrogation should have ended
as soon as defendant invoked his right to counsel by stating, “I got a
lawyer. . . . Let me talk to him.” It did not. Counsel was not made available,
and police continued the interrogation until defendant inculpated himself.
14 Those statements were obtained in violation of Miranda and were subject to
suppression. Although defendant did not raise this objection at trial, both
parties now acknowledge the error in admitting his statements.
The State argues, however, that the error was harmless -- that it was not
“of such a nature to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result .”
State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 543 (2015) (quoting R. 2:10-2). See State v.
Jackson, 243 N.J. 52, 73 (2020) (harmless error requires courts to determine
whether the “error [was] ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether
[it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached’” (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 581 (2018))).
We thus consider whether it was harmless error to admit defendant’s
statements, keeping in mind that we rarely find an error to be harmless when
the State violates a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. McCloskey,
90 N.J. at 31. That is not only because the right to counsel is so precious, but
also because self-inculpatory statements are powerful evidence of guilt that is
not easily overcome. See State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 285 (2021)
(“[I]nculpatory remarks by a defendant have a tendency to resolve jurors’
doubts about a defendant’s guilt to his detriment.” (quoting McCloskey, 90
N.J. at 31)). This case is no exception to that general principle.
15 The State argues that this case is analogous to our decision in State v.
Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019). In Tillery, we found harmless any error in the
admission of the defendant’s statement to police, emphasizing that the
evidence of the defendant’s guilt “was overwhelming.” Id. at 310-20. In that
case, the defendant was convicted of selling a handgun to a cooperating
informant. Id. at 310. That informant wore a wire and recorded the defendant
during the transaction; police also witnessed the defendant conduct the sale,
and they recovered the handgun from the informant’s vehicle. Id. at 320-21.
The statements that the defendant sought to exclude, moreover, contained
“little -- if any -- incriminating evidence relevant to [the crime of conviction].”
Id. at 321-22. Instead, the inculpatory statements primarily concerned the
defendant’s ability to pay his weapon supplier, but he was convicted of selling
a weapon. Id. at 321. In that context, admission of the statement was not
capable of changing the outcome of the defendant’s trial.
This case is not like Tillery -- this is not an instance of overwhelming,
direct evidence. Defendant’s statements identifying himself in the liquor store
footage strengthened the State’s theory of the case and the circumstantial
evidence supporting it. Through a series of video clips, connected through
16 inferences,2 the State attempted to place defendant at the scene of the murder
and associate him with the Audi used in its commission. From there, the State
invited the jury to conclude that defendant was the driver. Any doubt about
whether defendant was the man on the surveillance tape was eliminated by the
introduction of his statements.
Further, defendant’s statement -- made after police failed to honor his
invocation of the right to counsel -- that he had been at the liquor store at the
time of the murder was shown to be false by the surveillance footage. This
undoubtedly tarnished defendant’s credibility in the eyes of the jury, and his
recitation of events on the night of Gee’s murder was disproven by his own
words.
In a case such as this -- where the State’s theory hinges on circumstantial
evidence of a defendant’s location at a particular time -- a self-identifying,
self-inculpatory statement that colors the defendant as a liar is not harmless
2 The Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office obtained a warrant for defendant’s cell phone data, which was sent to defendant’s cell phone carrier. The carrier provided a call log and cell cite data, detailing which towers defendant’s cell phone had communicated through on the night in question. That information was sent to the FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team (CAST), which determined that the cell dominant phone coverage was consistent with defendant’s cell phone being present at the GPS-derived locations of the Audi. CAST also determined that the coverage of the cell site could include at least some points along the Audi’s path as established by GPS data.
17 beyond a reasonable doubt. While police may extract such statements through
interrogation, they must do so within the confines of the law. We are satisfied
that did not happen in this case. We conclude therefore that only a new trial,
one untainted by defendant’s unlawfully obtained admissions, can rectify the
detectives’ failure to honor defendant’s Miranda rights.
In light of our disposition of the above issues, we decline to address
whether the police coerced defendant’s statement or whether their
misstatements rendered his Miranda waiver per se invalid.
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the matter is
remanded for a new trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE- LOUIS, and FASCIALE; and JUDGES FISHER and SABATINO (both temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.