State v. Jackson, 2007ca00342 (10-20-2008)

2008 Ohio 5456
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 20, 2008
DocketNo. 2007CA00342.
StatusPublished

This text of 2008 Ohio 5456 (State v. Jackson, 2007ca00342 (10-20-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Jackson, 2007ca00342 (10-20-2008), 2008 Ohio 5456 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION *Page 2
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jakei Jackson appeals his conviction entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas on three counts of violating a protection order, in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1). Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶ 2} In August, 2006, Laura Ganser obtained a civil protection order effective for five years against Appellant, her ex-boyfriend. In September, 2005, Appellant violated the order, and was convicted of menacing by stalking.

{¶ 3} In November, 2006, Appellant contacted Ganser by telephone stating he wanted to see her and take her out. Later in the same day, Appellant sent a text message to Ganser. Ganser called the Stark County Sheriffs Department to report the communication. Ganser asserts Appellant continued to visit her place of employment, park his car in front of her home and drive up onto her front lawn. The events continued from November of 2006, to July of 2007.

{¶ 4} On July 25, 2007, Stark County Deputy Sheriff Cliff Hall observed Appellant's vehicle on St. Elmo Avenue near Ganser's residence, after Ganser reported by telephone to the Stark County Sheriffs Department Appellant had pulled up on her front lawn.

{¶ 5} The Stark County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one count of menacing by stalking, a violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)(B)(2) and three counts of violating a protection order, in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1). *Page 3

{¶ 6} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 17, 2007. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all the charges. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to consecutive and maximum sentences totaling fifty-four months in prison.

{¶ 7} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:

{¶ 8} "I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR THREE COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF PROTECTION ORDER WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."

{¶ 9} Initially, we note Appellant does not challenge his conviction for menacing by stalking, for which he received an eighteen-month prison sentence. Rather, Appellant maintains his convictions for violating the protection order were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 10} On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed. The discretionary power to grant a new hearing should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the judgment." State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N .E.2d 541 super ceded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith,80 Ohio St.3d 89, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N .E.2d 668, citing State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Because the trier of fact is in a better position to observe the witnesses' demeanor and weigh their credibility, the weight of the evidence *Page 4 and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212, syllabus 1.

{¶ 11} Appellant was convicted of three counts of violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), which reads:

{¶ 12} "(A) No person shall recklessly violate the terms of any of the following:

{¶ 13} "(1) A protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code;"

{¶ 14} Upon review of the record, the civil protection order at issue indisputably prohibited Appellant from contacting Ganser via telephone, at her residence or place of employment. Appellant was aware of the order as he had been previously convicted of violating the same in September of 2005.

{¶ 15} At trial, Ganser testified:

{¶ 16} "Q. Now, Laura, I'm going to bring you to the time period from 11/15 — November 15, 2006 to July 26, 2007. Did you continue to have problems with the Defendant?

{¶ 17} "* * *

{¶ 18} "Q. I'm going to call your attention specifically to November 15 —

{¶ 19} "A. Okay.

{¶ 20} "Q. — 2006. Did the Defendant contact you on that date?

{¶ 21} "A. Yes. I received a private call on my cell phone and I'm the emergency contact at work. And I answered the phone and no one answered. And I didn't know if it was a wrong number. So about an hour later, private call came up again and I answered it, and it was the Defendant. *Page 5

{¶ 22} "Q. And what did he say?

{¶ 23} "A. He said he wanted to ask me some questions and he's never had a thing for someone like me before, and he just wanted to see me and he wanted to take me out. And I told him that I was calling the police and that he was throwing his life away and to leave me alone.

{¶ 24} "Q. Did he contact you further that day?

{¶ 25} "A. Yes, he text messaged me then later on that day saying that it's — he had a good time talking to me in our conversation that day.

{¶ 26} "Q. Let me ask you this, you indicated you have a cell phone?

{¶ 27} "A. Uh-huh. Yes.

{¶ 28} "Q. And you have a specific cell phone number?

{¶ 29} "A. Yes.

{¶ 30} "Q. How long have you had that number for?

{¶ 31} "A. Oh, gosh. I could guesstimate maybe a year, year and a half, something like that.

{¶ 32} "Q. Was the Defendant aware of that number at that time period?

{¶ 33} "A. The only — I didn't believe so. But, again, I'm the emergency when you call the office.

{¶ 34} "Q. Well, let's — let's go into that. What type of work do you do?

{¶ 35} "A. I work for a dental office. I'm an RN, but I work for a dental office.

{¶ 36} "Q. And how long have you worked at that dental office?

{¶ 37} "A. Almost nine years.

{¶ 38} "Q. What are your duties there? *Page 6

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Related

State v. Martin
485 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1983)
State v. Dehass
227 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
State v. Smith
1997 Ohio 355 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State v. Thompkins
1997 Ohio 52 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 5456, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-jackson-2007ca00342-10-20-2008-ohioctapp-2008.