STEWART, Justice:
Defendant, a candidate for the office of Salt Lake County Commissioner, was charged with having violated § 1-10-4, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, which requires the filing of campaign statements and the disclosure of campaign contributions. That section provides: Campaign Statements.
1. Every candidate for election or his designated committee secretary shall file with the county clerk on forms furnished by the clerk, full, correct and itemized statements of all monies and things of monetary value received and expended in the furtherance of said candidacy in accordance with the schedule set forth in this section.
* * * * * *
5. All statements shall be dated and signed by the candidate and the committee secretary.
Failure to comply with those provisions is a misdemeanor.
A complaint charged defendant in two counts: (1) failure to report the name and address of a $6,000 contributor to his election campaign, and (2) failure to file supplemental campaign disclosures of the discharge of campaign debts and obligations.
Defendant filed a motion in a city court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the ordinance was in violation of the Utah Constitution. The court granted the motion and held that Salt Lake County was without constitutional or statutory authority to enact the ordinance under which defendant was charged and dismissed the complaint.
An appeal was taken to a district court which affirmed the dismissal. That court wrote a memorandum decision observing that “... it may be true that our Utah Supreme Court has not been completely consistent in every case on this issue, [but] the majority of the [Utah Supreme Court] cases have indicated that grants of powers [1118]*1118to cities or counties are to be strictly construed to the exclusion of implied powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out the purposes of the expressed powers granted.” The court noted that, on the other hand, Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938), and Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968), “suggest that a county has fairly broad power to enact ordinances ... under the general welfare clause of § 17-5-77 [Utah Code Annotated.]” Nevertheless, the court held that there is no express authority in state statutes authorizing the enactment of § 1-10-4 and that there was nothing that could be “implied from any express power that would justify the enactment of these ordinances.” Accordingly, the court held the ordinance unconstitutional, and the State appeals.1
Defendant contends that because the Legislature has not specifically authorized counties to enact ordinances requiring disclosure of campaign contributions in county elections, Salt Lake County had no power to enact the ordinance in question. Alternatively, defendant contends that the ordinance is invalid because state statutes have preempted the field of regulation.
Concededly, the district court was correct in holding that the Legislature has not expressly authorized enactment of an ordinance requiring disclosure of campaign contributions in county elections. However, the Legislature has conferred upon cities and counties the authority to enact all necessary measures to promote the general health, safety, morals, and welfare of their citizens. Section 17-5-77, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides:
The board of county commissioners may pass all ordinances ... not repugnant to law ... necessary and proper to provide for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof, ... and may enforce obedience to such ordinances ... by fine in any sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment .... [Emphasis added.]
The Legislature has made a similar grant of power to the cities.2
The specific issue in this case is whether § 17-5-77 by itself provides Salt Lake County legal authority to enact the ordinance for disclosure of campaign contributions, or whether there must be a specific grant of authority for counties to enact measures dealing with disclosures of campaign financing to sustain the ordinance in question. Defendant claims that the powers of municipalities must be strictly construed and that because Salt Lake County did not have specific, delegated authority to enact the ordinance in issue, the ordinance is invalid.
The rule requiring strict construction of the powers delegated by the Legislature to counties and municipalities is a rule which is archaic, unrealistic, and unresponsive to the current needs of both state and local governments and effectively nullifies the legislative grant of general police power to the counties. Furthermore, although the rule of strict construction is supported by some cases in this State, it is inconsistent with other cases decided by this Court — a situation that permits choosing between conflicting precedents to support a particular result.
Dillon’s Rule, which requires strict construction of delegated powers to local [1119]*1119governments, was first enunciated in 1868.3 The rule was widely adopted during a period of great mistrust of municipal governments4 and has been viewed as “the only possible alternative by which extensive governmental powers may be conferred upon our municipalities, with a measurable limit upon their abuse.”5
The courts, in applying the Dillon Rule to general welfare clauses, have not viewed the latter as an independent source of power, but rather as limited by specific, enumerated grants of authority. See, e. g., American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923). More recently, however, reasoned opinion regarding the validity of the rule has changed. One authority has noted the harmful effects that the rule of strict construction has had upon the effective exercise of appropriate municipal authority:
Any vestige of inherent powers or liberality in construing delegated powers was soon swept away by the Dillon Rule. This rule was formulated in an era when farm-dominated legislatures were jealous of their power and when city scandals were notorious. It has been the authority, without critical analysis of it, for literally hundreds of subsequent cases.
As it arose, the strict construction doctrine applied to municipal corporations but it has been extended to local government generally and it must be faced in any approach to liberalizing local powers. This rule sends local government to State legislatures seeking grants of additional powers; it causes local officials to doubt their power, and it stops local governmental programs from developing fully. The strict construction rule stimulated home rule efforts and is largely responsible for the erosion of home rule. Because of its importance the rule should be examined critically from time to time. [Footnotes omitted.]6
[1120]*1120As pointed out in Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 Harvard L.Rev. 1059, 1111 (1980):
Most troubling of all to Dillon, cities were not managed by those “best fitted by their intelligence, business experience, capacity and moral character.” Their management was “too often both unwise and extravagant.” A major change in city government was therefore needed to achieve a fully public city government dedicated to the common good. [Footnotes omitted.] [Emphasis in original.]
If there were once valid policy reasons supporting the rule, we think they have largely lost their force and that effective local self-government, as an important constituent part of our system of government, must have sufficient power to deal effectively with the problems with which it must deal. In a time of almost universal education and of substantial, and sometimes intense, citizen interest in the proper functioning of local government, we do not share the belief that local officials are generally unworthy of the trust of those governed. Indeed, if democratic processes at the grassroots level do not function well, then it is not likely that our state government will operate much better. Frug further states:
The most extensive rebuttal to Dillon was published in 1911 by Eugene McQuil-lin in his multivolume treatise, The Law of Municipal Corporations. In an exhaustive survey, McQuillin traced the historical development of municipal corporations and found the essential theme to be a right to local self-government. He rejected the suggestion that cities were created by the state, arguing that “[s]uch [a] position ignores well-established, historical facts easily ascertainable.” McQuillin strongly criticized courts that failed to uphold the right of local self-government:
The judicial decisions denying the right of local self-government without express constitutional guaranty, reject the rule of construction that all grants of power are to be interpreted in the light of the maxims of Magna Carta, or rather the development of English rights and governmental powers prior to that time; that is, the common law transmuted into our constitutions and laws. They ignore in toto the fact that local self-government does not owe its origin to constitutions and laws.... They disregard the fact that it is a part of the liberty of a community, an expression of community freedom, the heart of our political institutions. They refuse to concede, therefore, that it is a right in any just sense beyond unlimited state control, but rather it is nothing more than a privilege, to be refused or granted in such measure as the legislative agents of the people for the time being determine. [Footnotes omitted.] [Id. at 1113-14.]
The Utah territorial court referred to the Dillon Rule as early as 1881 in Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 63, 1 P. 160 (1881). It has been applied in numerous cases since that time, e. g., Layton City v. Speth, Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978); Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1 (1936); American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923). In Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944), the Court stated:
To determine whether or not a city has the power to enact any particular ordinance the court must look to the legislative grant of power and to the Constitution of the State of Utah. If there is a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a particular power, that doubt should be resolved against the city, and the power should be denied. [Emphasis added.] [106 Utah at 520; 150 P.2d at 774.]
See also Parker v. Provo City Corporation, Utah, 543 P.2d 769 (1975).
But the Court has also ignored the rule on occasion without attempting to distinguish it or overrule it. For instance, in Salt Lake City v. Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 P. 636 (1913), and City of Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 Utah 66, 53 P. 985 (1898), specific grants of power were given broad interpretation [1121]*1121by the court; and in Hargraves v. Young, 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P.2d 974 (1955), the upholding of a municipal ordinance required both a broad interpretation of a specific grant of power, as well as reliance on the general welfare clause. See also Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 P. 705 (1910), and Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338 (1980), in which the court relied on the general welfare clause for upholding a city ordinance and, without discussing the issue, broadly construed that clause.
The fear of local governments abusing their delegated powers as a justification for strict construction of those powers is a slur on the right and the ability of people to govern themselves. Adequate protection against abuse of power or interference with legitimate statewide interests is provided by the electorate, state supervisory control, and judicial review. Strict construction, particularly in the face of a general welfare grant of power to local governments, simply eviscerates the plain language of the statute, nullifies the intent of the Legislature, and seriously cripples effective local government.
There are ample safeguards against any abuse of power at the local level. Local governments, as subdivisions of the State, exercise those powers granted to them by the State Legislature, Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955), and the exercise of a delegated power is subject to the limitations imposed by state statutes and state and federal constitutions. A state cannot empower local governments to do that which the state itself does not have authority to do. In addition, local governments are without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict with, state statutory law. Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968). Also, an ordinance is invalid if it intrudes into an area which the Legislature has preempted by comprehensive legislation intended to blanket a particular field.
In view of all these restraints and corrective measures, it is not appropriate for this Court to enfeeble local governments on the unjustified assumption that strict construction of delegated powers is necessary to prevent abuse. The enactment of a broad general welfare clause conferring police powers directly on the counties was to enable them to act in every reasonable, necessary, and appropriate way to further the public welfare of their citizens.
The ultimate limitation upon potential abuses by local governments is the people themselves. It is their vigilance and sound judgment by which all democratic governments in the end, are restricted and directed. Officials who abuse the powers with which they have been entrusted ought not to be, and usually are not, long tolerated.
In short, we simply do not accept the proposition that local governments are not to be trusted with the full scope of legislatively granted powers to meet the needs of their local constituents. On the contrary, the history of our political institutions is founded in large measure on the concept— at least in theory if not in practice — that the more local the unit of government is that can deal with a political problem, the more effective and efficient the exercise of power is likely to be.
This view is shared by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which has urged that local governments be given broad powers, Advisory Commission, supra, n. 6, at 72. The Commission’s Report states:
The Commission believes that legislatures should delegate local powers in broad terms. The abuse by local government of broad powers troubles the Commission minimally. It is not currently widespread in any serious way. The fact that abuse conceivably might occur is no more reason to deny broad delegations of power than it is to deny a Boy Scout a knife because he might cut himself. Additionally, we are of the opinion that if a broad functional delegation of power is a part of the total power residing in the local governing body it will be more responsive to popular control. [Id]
[1122]*1122The wide diversity of problems encountered by county and municipal governments are not all, and cannot realistically be, effectively dealt with by a state legislature which sits for sixty days every two years to deal with matters of general importance. Thus the manner in which the Legislature operates militates in favor of a rule of judicial construction which permits localities to deal with their problems by local legislative action.
The general welfare provision, § 17-5-77, grants county commissioners of each county two distinct types of authority. In the first instance, power is given to implement specific grants of authority. Second, the counties, are granted an independent source of power to act for the general welfare of its citizens. Thus § 17-5-77 provides authority to “pass all ordinances and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this title .... ” The second part of that section empowers counties to pass ordinances that are “necessary and proper to provide for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
Nothing in § 17-5-77 or in Title 17 suggests that the general welfare clause should be narrowly or strictly construed. Its breadth of language demands the opposite conclusion. Moreover, the Constitution does not allow the Legislature unlimited discretion to deal with local government. The broad delegation of power by the Legislature to the counties is consistent with constitutional provisions which establish counties as governmental entities and place certain aspects of county government beyond the power of the Legislature. Article XI, § 1 gives constitutional status to the counties as they existed at the time of adoption of the Constitution, and they are “recognized as legal subdivisions of this State .... ” Sections 2 and 3 of that article restrict the Legislature with respect to the changing of county seats and county lines. In addition, it should be noted that charter cities have been endowed with even more wide-ranging powers by Article XI, § 5 of the Constitution.7 See also Article I, § 25 which provides that those rights enumerated in the Constitution “shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”
The grant of general welfare power to counties is duplicated by a similar grant to the cities, and this Court has on several occasions squarely sustained city ordinances solely on the basis of the general welfare clause. Layton City v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (1980); Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968); Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). Compare Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338 (1980). But see Layton City v. Speth, Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978), in which the Court struck down an ordinance on a narrow construction of the general welfare clause and a specific legislative grant of power.
In Allred the defendant was convicted of violating a Salt Lake City ordinance by directing a police officer to a location where he could obtain sexual intercourse for hire. This Court did not deem it necessary to address the issue of whether express statutory grants of authority were sufficient to empower municipal governments to pass the ordinance in question. Rather, in upholding the conviction, the court stated: “We are of the opinion that the general police power is a sufficient grant of authority to authorize the city ordinance involved [1123]*1123in this case . ... ” 20 Utah 2d at 300, 437 P.2d at 436.8
In Kusse, supra, the defendant was convicted under a Salt Lake City ordinance which prohibited driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In responding to the defendant’s claim that the City did not have authority to pass the ordinance, the City argued that the authority had been granted under two statutory provisions: first, a statute providing that a municipality could “regulate the movement of traffic on the streets, sidewalks and public places, including the movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles,” R.S.U. § 15-8-30 (1933); and second, a grant to enact ordinances in furtherance of the general welfare, R.S.U. § 15-8-84 (1933). This Court held that the City had authority under the general welfare provision to pass the ordinance. The Court stated:
There may be some question whether See. 15-8-30 [the power to regulate the movement of traffic] does not pertain only to the regulation of the actual movement of traffic and the actual prevention of racing and immoderate driving; that is, whether the section permits only the operation on these acts as they occur without giving power to prevent an act or a condition which itself, if permitted, might affect the movement of traffic or be likely to result in racing or immoderate driving. While this seems a narrow construction, it need not now be decided because we think Section 15-8-84, R.S.U. 1933, [the general welfare power provision] definitely permits the city to pass an ordinance to prevent driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. [97 Utah at 116, 93 P.2d at 672.]
Particularly relevant here are those decisions by this Court upholding county ordinances which, in the absence of specific legislative grants of power, derived their authority solely from a grant of general welfare power. Peck v. Dunn, Utah, 574 P.2d 367 (1978), cert. denied 436 U.S. 927, 98 S.Ct. 2822, 56 L.Ed.2d 770 (1978); Buhler v. Stone, Utah, 533 P.2d 292 (1975).
A recent case decided by this Court, Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979),9 also ignored the rule of narrow construction of city powers. The issue at stake was whether the City of West Jordan had the power to require subdividers to dedicate seven percent of the land area of a prospective subdivision to the public for the use and benefit of the citizens of the City of West Jordan, or in the alternative, the equivalent value of land in cash. This provision was sustained under power delegated to cities by § 10-8-84, a grant of general welfare power, as well as other statutory provisions dealing with the general subject of planning and zoning, but none of which conferred any authority upon a municipality to require a payment in kind or cash for the “benefit and use of the citizens” of a city. City of West Jordan did not discuss or attempt to reconcile conflicting cases dealing with Dillon’s Rule, but that case is in harmony with the results reached in Allred and Kusse, supra.
These decisions are consistent with our basic framework of government. This Court in State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061 (1901), stated:
[T]he Constitution implies a right of local self-government to each county, and a right to establish a system of county government is expressly recognized and enjoined. The power is given to create the county government, not to administer to such a system when created. The right of the Legislature was to provide for and put in action, not to run and operate, the machinery of the local government to the disfranchisement of the people. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am.Rep. 103. When the county government is established separate from [1124]*1124the state, each is compelled to bear its own burdens, and not assume those of the other. [24 Utah at 158-59, 66 P. at 1062.]
The reason for providing appropriate protection for local government was stated in State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904):10
The fact is that every provision of the Constitution relating to this important subject appears to manifest an intention to bring those through whom power is to be exercised as close as possible to the subjects upon whom the power is to operate — to preserve the right of local self-government to the people, and to restrict every encroachment upon such right. And, as has been seen, this is in harmony with history, with our American constitutional law, with our notions of decentralization of power, and with the spirit and genius of our institutions. [27 Utah at 485, 76 P. at 340.]
More recently, this Court, in accord with that philosophy, has expressly held a reasonable latitude of judgment and discretion is essential for a county commission to exercise its express and implied powers. Gardner v. Davis County, Utah, 523 P.2d 865 (1974); Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Comm’rs, 28 Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972).
The courts of other states have also held that a general welfare clause confers power in addition to and beyond that granted by specific statutory grants. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal.3d 129, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001 (1976); Leavenworth Club Owners Assoc. v. Atchison, 208 Kan. 318, 492 P.2d 183 (1971); City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944); Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 N.J.Super. 250, 356 A.2d 35 (1976); City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917 (1970); Krolick v. Lowery, 32 A.D.2d 317, 302 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1969); Adams v. City of New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947); City of Pasco v. Dixson, 81 Wash.2d 510, 503 P.2d 76 (1972).
A leading authority in local government law asserts that this is the majority rule. McQuillin in Municipal Corporations states:
Municipal corporations ordinarily are empowered by charter or statute, after enumeration of their specific powers, to do any act, exercise any power and render any service which contributes to their general welfare, good government, good order, or the like. A provision of this character usually is called a general wel[1125]*1125fare or general grant of power clause. Under it ordinances may be passed which are necessary and beneficial, and they will be adjudged valid by the courts, provided they are reasonable and consonant with the general powers and purposes of the local corporation, and not inconsistent with the United States Constitution, treaties, and statutes, and the laws and policy of the state.
The exercise of power conferred by a general welfare or general grant of power clause must be exercised by a municipal corporation, as a general rule, through an ordinance or other form of legislative enactment.
* * * * * *
A general welfare or similar clause, granting extremely broad power to a municipal corporation, is liberally construed to accord to a municipality wide discretion in the exercise of the police power. The cases, indeed, reveal an increasing judicial inclination under such a clause to accord to municipal authorities wider discretion in the reasonable and nondiscriminatory exercise, in good faith, of the police power in the public interest. While under the clause, or under the guise of it, personal and property rights recognized by general law and guaranteed by organic provisions cannot unreasonably be restrained, courts uniformly regard the clause as ample authority for a reasonable exercise, in good faith, of broad and varied municipal activity to protect the health, morals, peace and good order of the community, to promote its welfare in trade, commerce, industry, and manufacture, and to carry out every appropriate object contemplated in the creation of the municipal corporation. [Footnotes omitted.] 11
This power is not to be construed necessarily in light of specifically delegated powers. In City of Hobbs v. Biswell, supra, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico upheld a city ordinance regulating pawnbrokers under a general welfare provision similar to Utah’s. Compare N.M.Stat.Ann. § 14-16-1 (1953) with Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1953). In referring to the authority of a municipality under the general welfare provision, the court stated: “The ordinance adopting authority of subsection B, often referred to as a general welfare clause, is independent of and in addition to ordinance adopting authority conferred by specific statutes.” [473 P.2d at 919.]
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted a similar position in Adams v. City of New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947). In that case, the plaintiff brought an action to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance which required the licensing of music boxes, juke boxes, and mechanical vending machines on the ground that the city did not have the authority to pass the ordinance.12 In upholding the ordinance, the court stated: “It is at once obvious that this provision constitutes a grant of extremely broad powers, and such ‘gen[1126]*1126eral welfare clauses’ have always been liberally construed to accord to municipalities a wide discretion in the exercise of the police power.” [Id., 55 A.2d at 395.]
Closely in point with the facts of the instant case is Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 N.J Super. 250, 356 A.2d 35 (1976), which dealt with the validity of a financial disclosure ordinance adopted by a township without express authority for such action. The court stated: “[Although there is no specific statutory authorization for municipal enactment of official financial disclosure ordinances, general power to adopt such local legislation is inherent in the broad delegation of police power .... ”
These cases state the rule which we adopt in this case. When the State has granted general welfare power to local governments, those governments have independent authority apart from, and in addition to, specific grants of authority to pass ordinances which are reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives of that power, i. e., providing for the public safety, health, morals, and welfare. Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968). And the courts will not interfere with the legislative choice of the means selected unless it is arbitrary, or is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the policy of, the state or federal laws or the constitution of this State or of the United States. Specific grants of authority may serve to limit the means available under the general welfare clause, for some limitation may be imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use of power in a particular manner. But specific grants should generally be construed with reasonable latitude in light of the broad language of the general welfare clause which may supplement the power found in a specific delegation.
Broad construction of the powers of counties and cities is consistent with the current needs of local governments. The Dillon Rule of strict construction is antithetical to effective and efficient local and state government. The complexities confronting local governments, and the degree to which the nature of those problems varies from county to county and city to city, has changed since the Dillon Rule was formulated. Several counties in this State, for example, currently confront large and serious problems caused by accelerated urban growth. The same problems however, are not so acute in many other counties. Some counties are experiencing, and others may soon be experiencing, explosive economic growth as the result of the development of natural resources. The problems that must be solved by these counties are to some extent unique to them. According a plain meaning to the legislative grant of general welfare power to local governmental units allows each local government to be responsive to the particular problems facing it.
Local power should not be paralyzed and critical problems should not remain unsolved while officials await a biennial session of the Legislature in the hope of obtaining passage of a special grant of authority. Furthermore, passage of legislation needed or appropriate for some counties may fail because of the press of other legislative business or the disinterest of legislators from other parts of the State whose constituencies experience other, and to them more pressing, problems. In granting cities and counties the power to enact ordinances to further the general welfare, the Legislature no doubt took such political realities into consideration.
We therefore hold that a county has the power to preserve the purity of its electoral process. The county was entitled to conclude that financial disclosure by candidates would directly serve the legitimate purpose of achieving the goal that special interests should not be able to exercise undue influence in local elections without their influence being brought to light.
It is further argued as support for the unconstitutionality of the statute that the State of Utah has preempted the entire matter of regulating elections. We do not agree. The argument is not based on any direct conflict between the ordinance and a [1127]*1127statute, for there is none. Rather, the argument rests upon the existence of state legislation requiring campaign disclosures by candidates running for certain state offices. But that legislation does not evidence an intention on the part of the Legislature to preempt local ordinances dealing with local candidates.13 See Thorpe v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 Utah 265, 153 P.2d 541 (1944); Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); Battey v. Ritchie, 73 Utah 320, 273 P. 969 (1928); Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 P. 705 (1910).
The state restrictions pertain only to contribution disclosure requirements for state candidates for the offices of governor, secretary of state, and attorney general, § 20-14-7. The State Corrupt Practices in Elections Act leaves county governments to determine for themselves whether the circumstances necessitate the imposition of campaign contribution disclosure requirements for city or county offices.
The subject of campaign disclosure requirements is not one that reflects a need for uniformity. With the differences in the nature of the counties in the State of Utah with respect to population, wealth, and other factors which have a relationship to the integrity of the electoral processes, it is reasonable, in the absence of state legislation, that each county should deal with the problem of the integrity of its electoral processes as it deems appropriate. The ordinances in this case do not conflict, directly or impliedly, with any state statute and are not for that reason unconstitutional.
In sum, the Dillon Rule of strict construction is not to be used to restrict the power of a county under a grant by the Legislature of general welfare power or prevent counties from using reasonable means to implement specific grants of authority. County ordinances are valid unless they conflict with superior law; do not rationally promote the public health, safety, morals and welfare; or are preempted by state policy or otherwise attempt to regulate an area which by the nature of the subject matter itself requires uniform state regulation. Of course a specific power delegated to municipalities may imply a restriction upon the manner of exercise of that power, but the restriction on the exercise of such power is to be construed to permit a reasonable discretion and latitude in attaining the purpose to be achieved.
Finally, contrary to defendant’s contentions, a grant of general welfare authority to counties does not violate Article I, § 24, or Article XI, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. Article I, § 24 requires the uniform operation of general laws. The general welfare clause, § 17-5-77, applies uniformly to all counties. The fact that each county may exercise that power differently is of no constitutional moment. Indeed it would be impracticable, if not impossible, and a mockery of the concept of local self-government to require all counties to have the same ordinances as all others. Generally Article I, § 24 only requires uniformity of laws, within the jurisdiction in which they are operative. Finally, the constitutional mandate of Article XI, § 4, that the Legislature provide for a uniform system of county government, is not applicable because that provision was amended in 1973 to allow the Legislature to provide for optional forms of county government to be approved by referendum. That provision is not relevant to the instant problem. In any event, it is clear beyond peradventure that a uniform system of government does not require uniform laws within all the various systems of government.
We do not judge the wisdom, effectiveness, or practicality of the ordinance in question, or concern ourselves with the factual issues which underlie the allegations against defendant in this case. We rule [1128]*1128only that the ordinance under which this action is brought is constitutional.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a trial on the merits.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL, J., concur.