State v. Hunter

68 A.2d 274, 4 N.J. Super. 531
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedSeptember 1, 1949
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 68 A.2d 274 (State v. Hunter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Hunter, 68 A.2d 274, 4 N.J. Super. 531 (N.J. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 533 Defendant appeals his conviction for drunken driving and the ninety-day jail sentence and permanent revocation of his driver's license imposed as penalties under the mandate of R.S. 39:4-50,N.J.S.A., because this was his second conviction for violation of that statute. He also appeals from an order denying *Page 534 him a new trial for which he had applied on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

We find it unnecessary to consider the appeal from the judgment of conviction as we think the trial court erred in denying defendant a new trial.

It appears from the statement of the case that the trial court would have acquitted the defendant except for the evidence produced by a device known as the Harger Breath Test or Drunkometer, upon which evidence the city physician predicated his testimony as to defendant's blood alcohol concentration.

Settled medical opinion apparently is that any person is unfit to drive when his blood alcohol concentration is at or in excess of fifteen-hundredths of one per cent. When the concentration is less than this, a person may or may not be unfit to drive depending upon individual characteristics and reaction to alcohol. The city physician determined defendant's concentration to be over sixteen-hundredths of one per cent. and solely on this finding, testified that defendant was unfit to drive at the time of his arrest.

The test made by the physician was not a blood analysis but a breath test. The Harger Drunkometer determines the weight of alcohol in one cubic centimeter of breath. Two thousand times this weight represents the alcohol concentration in one cubic centimeter of blood.

The Harger instrument is ingeniously contrived. Its important components are a rubber balloon and two tubes containing certain chemicals. One tube contains alcohol sensitive chemicals and the other, called an ascarite tube, contains a carbon dioxide absorbent.

The breath of the person tested is captured in the balloon by his voluntary inflation of it. The breath is released into the tubes and a color change appears in the tube sensitive to alcohol when one hundred sixty-nine thousandths of a miligram of alcohol has been absorbed by the chemicals in it. A third or control tube contains a liquid for color comparison. Simultaneously the carbon dioxide from the breath passing through the system is absorbed by the ascarite tube. The *Page 535 weight of the absorbed carbon dioxide represents five and one-half per cent. of the weight of the breath from which the stated quantity of alcohol is absorbed. Thus the breath alcohol concentration is arrived at by simple arithmetic when the weight of the absorbed carbon dioxide is known.

The key step in the process is the determination of the weight of the absorbed carbon dioxide. This is done by weighing the ascarite tube before and after it absorbs the carbon dioxide. The difference in weight is so minute as that its detection requires the use of a scale of great sensitivity, "an analytical balance, to a very fine degree, down to a tenth of one milligram," was the testimony of the state's expert witness.

One ounce avoirdupois is the equivalent of 28,350 milligrams. A scale sensitive to one-tenth of a milligram must be capable of resolving a weight change of that part of an ounce expressed by the fraction 1 over 283,500.

The physician testified that he conducted the test in the "approved" manner. He said he used a pharmacist's scale at a local drug store, but did not otherwise describe it. He seems also to have exhibited at the trial a pamphlet of instructions outlining the Harger test and in which was a photograph of an analytical balance. His testimony was completed on May 21, 1948, at which time the trial judge reserved a ruling as to its admissibility pending the production of expert testimony on the Harger device itself. This was received July 29, 1948. The expert several times in the course of his testimony emphasized that the weights of the ascarite tube before and after absorption of the carbon dioxide must be determined "to a very accurate degree" "on an analytical balance;" "to complete this test we must have an analytical balance available," "it is not furnished as part of the (Harger) apparatus."

The defendant's counsel discovered after the judgment of conviction that the druggist's scale used by the physician was not an analytical balance but of torsion balance design. The State conceded at the oral argument on the appeal that a torsion balance was used. Its sensitivity does not appear, but it seems that commercially available pharmaceutical torsion *Page 536 balances are not sensitive below two milligrams. See ModernLaboratory Appliances, Eimer and Amend (1942), pages 39 and 60. Such a scale is capable of resolving a weight change of only that part of an ounce which is expressed by the fraction 1 over 14,175. An analytical balance sensitive to one-tenth of a milligram has twenty times more resolving power.

Defendant promptly moved for a new trial, which was denied by the order on appeal made February 11, 1949.

Motions for new trials for newly discovered evidence are not favored and are properly entertained with caution by trial courts. But when the elements justifying a new trial clearly appear, the application should be granted. Kursheedt v. StandardBleacher Co., 77 N.J.L. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Ellis v. F.L.C.Martin Automobile Co., 77 N.J.L. 339 (Sup. Ct. 1909);Dundee Manufacturing Co. v. Van Riper, 33 N.J.L. 152 (Sup.Ct. 1868); Young v. McPherson, 3 N.J.L. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1811); Spencer v. Erie Railroad Co., 79 N.J.L. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Carr v. Riskin, 8 N.J. Misc. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1930); and while this court will seldom interfere with the exercise by the trial court of its discretion to grant or deny a new trial, that discretion is a judicial discretion controlled by established rules and may be abused by the denial of a new trial for newly discovered evidence when all of the essential requisites for granting a new trial for that reason exist and the injustice of the judgment is apparent. "Judicial discretion is a mere legal discretion — a discretion in discerning the course presented by the law; and what that has discerned it is the duty of the court to follow." McFeely v. Board of Pension Com'rs ofHoboken, 1 N.J. 212, at 215 (1948). Nelson v. Eastern AirLines, Inc., 128 N.J.L. 46 (E. A. 1941), relied on by the State, is not contrary. That case dealt with the scope of review of an order denying a new trial sought because of an allegedly excessive verdict, and held that the trial court should not be reversed unless the denial, on the facts appearing, is a "shock to reason and to justice," as in Martin v. Lehigh ValleyRailroad Co., 114 N.J.L. 243 (E. A. 1934). The trial court's discretion is *Page 537

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68 A.2d 274, 4 N.J. Super. 531, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hunter-njsuperctappdiv-1949.