Amended Opinion of the Court by
ACOBA, J.
We hold that under the circumstances here, the circuit court of the first circuit (the court) plainly erred when during jury selection it removed two jurors for cause on the motion of RespondenVPlaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i (Respondent) after the jury panel already had been passed for cause and Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Patrick K.K. Ho (Petitioner) and Respondent had already exhausted their peremptory challenges. This procedure violated Rule 241 of the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP), which provides that “[cjhallenges for cause may be made at any time prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges!,]” (emphasis added), and in effect abrogated the parity in the number of peremptories each side is guaranteed pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 635-30.2 As a result, we vacate Petitioner’s April 24, 2008 judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the court and the December 1, 2011 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) and remand this case for a new trial.
I.
On May 3, 2004, Petitioner was indicted for three counts of First Degree Sexual Assault, HRS § 707-730(l)(b) and (l)(c),3 and nine counts of Third Degree Sexual Assault, HRS § 707-732(l)(b) and (l)(c).4 According to [417] Respondent, Petitioner, who was 64 years old at the time, sexually assaulted his granddaughter (GW), the complaining witness, during a twelve-month period before and after her fourteenth birthday. Petitioner was tried, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on two counts of First Degree Sexual Assault and three counts of Third Degree Sexual Assault. Petitioner was acquitted of the remaining counts.
A.
Petitioner appealed and raised two points before the ICA that are relevant to his Application for Writ of Certiorari (Application). As to the first point, Petitioner argued that the court’s refusal to disqualify two jurors who were sexually assaulted as teenagers compelled Petitioner to use two of his three peremptories to remove the jurors from the jury panel. In his Application, Petitioner relates that Juror 19 told the court that she had been sexually assaulted as a child “between the age [sic] of 11 to 14,” “but nevertheless felt she could be fair.” According to Petitioner, when “[a]sked by defense counsel if she understood the presumption of innocence, [Juror 19] said, ‘there’s a possibility that he is guilty because we’re here.’ ” The court refused Petitioner’s request to excuse Juror 19 for cause.
Petitioner also claims that the court erroneously failed to strike Juror 23a for cause. Like Juror 19, Juror 23a stated that she had been a victim of sexual assault, but claimed she could nevertheless be fair. She also reported having a friend in law enforcement. According to Petitioner, the court cut off defense counsel’s attempt to question Juror 23a, and refused Petitioner’s request to strike Juror 23a for cause.
Petitioner maintains that he “was forced [to] use two of his three peremptories to remove [Juror 19] and [Juror 23a] from the panel[,]” and that Respondent made no attempt to remove these jurors from the panel. Petitioner also claims “[h]e used the third [peremptory challenge] to remove [another] Juror [ ], who had found someone guilty in a prior criminal ease and testified she would find [Petitioner] guilty too if she only suspected his guilt.”
As to his second point, Petitioner argued to the ICA that the court erred in removing two other jurors for cause at Respondent’s request after Petitioner exercised all of his peremptories, based on identical grounds urged by Respondent before the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. Petitioner recounts in his Application that Respondent asked the court to disqualify Juror 43a and Juror 8a for cause because they allegedly had problems speaking or understanding English. The court initially refused to excuse the jurors for cause. After all the jurors were passed for cause, the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. Respondent did not use its peremptory challenges to excuse Juror 43a or Juror 8a, despite having challenged them for cause.
Petitioner relates that “[Respondent] waited until after [the panel had been passed for cause and] all peremptories had been exercised, and then ‘renewed’ [its] request to disqualify [Juror 43a and Juror 8a] based on the same grounds [given previously]”:
[Respondent:] I’m going to again renew my motion to excuse for cause jurors in chairs number 2 and 5, [8a] and [43a] ... on the grounds that they cannot communicate effectively in the English language.
(Emphasis in original.)
This time, the court conducted additional voir dire and then granted Respondent’s motion to disqualify Juror 43a and Juror 8a, for the same reasons Respondent had urged before the parties had exhausted their peremptory challenges. Petitioner states that “the court did not ask [Petitioner’s] position on the renewed motion, presumably because defense counsel had already passed both jurors [418] for cause, and opposed the State’s motion for disqualification when it was lodged before the peremptories were exercised.” (Emphasis in original.) Juror 43a and Juror 8a were replaced by Juror 7 and Juror 9, who were passed for cause. The court did not give the parties additional peremptory challenges with respect to the replacement jurors. Juror 7 and Juror 9 sat on the jury and participated in rendering the verdict.
B.
On November 14, 2011, the ICA upheld Petitioner’s conviction in a split decision. State v. Ho, No. 29131, 125 Hawai'i 475, 2011 WL 5518045 (Haw.App. Nov. 14, 2011) (SDO). According to the ICA, on appeal, Petitioner contended that “his peremptory challenges were impaired because the Family Court (a) erred in refusing to dismiss Jurors 19 and 23a for cause because both jurors stated during voir dire that they were sexually assaulted in the past and (b) ‘lacked jurisdiction’ to dismiss jurors 43a and 8a for cause, and to replace them with jurors 7 and 9, after peremptory challenges had been made.” Id. at *1. The ICA majority concluded as to the first alleged error that the court did err in not striking Juror 19 and Juror 23a for cause. Id. However, the majority concluded that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing that his right to exercise peremptory challenges was denied or impaired. Id. (citing State v. Iuli, 101 Hawai'i 196, 205-06, 65 P.3d 143, 152-53 (2003)).
As to the second error alleged (regarding Juror 43a and Juror 8a), the majority concluded that “the fact that [Petitioner] did not object to jurors 7 or 9 for cause means that [Petitioner’s] right of peremptory challenge was not denied or impaired.” Id. (citing
State v. Graham, 70 Haw. 627, 634, 780 P.2d 1103, 1107-08 (1989)) (emphasis added). The majority quoted the following language from Graham:
A defendant ... cannot sit in silence and accept a juror as unprejudiced and fair and then subsequently allege error in the retention of the same juror.
The result can be no different where a member of the jury panel is not challenged for cause and is later excused on a peremptory challenge. No error can be predicated on the trial court’s failure to excuse the proposed juror for cause since the court was not asked to rule on the matter and did not rule.
Id. (quoting Graham, 70 Haw. at 634, 780 P.2d at 1107-08) (ellipsis in original).
The majority did acknowledge that the ICA had twice “found plain error in trial courts’ mishandling of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges” under HRPP Rule 24(d)5 in State v. Timas, 82 Hawai'i 499, 923 P.2d 916 (App.1996) and State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994). Ho, 2011 WL 5518045, at *1 n. 3. But it maintained,
The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, has never itself extended plain error to the issue of the ordering of peremptory and for cause challenges. Rather, the supreme court has, to this point, required first that defendants establish that peremptory rights have to be denied or impaired before a showing of prejudice will be excused. Iuli, 101 Hawai'i at 204, 65 P.3d at 151. Such an ordering of the analysis is particularly appropriate where, as here, the trial court could have-even at any time during [419] trial under HRPP Rule 24(c) [6]-replaced jurors 4.3a and 8a if they were found “unable or disqualified to perform their duties,” and where the alleged error could have been rectified by allowing additional peremptory challenges, if it had first been brought to the trial court’s attention. Under the circumstances, we believe that the application of plain error is unwarranted. Id. (emphases added).
The ICA dissent was silent as to Petitioner’s contention that the court erred in failing to excuse Juror 19 and Juror 23a for cause. However, as to Juror 43a and Juror 8a, the dissent would have held that Petitioner’s “right to exercise his peremptory challenges was impaired.” Id. at *3 (Ginoza, J., dissenting) (citing Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 499, 923 P.2d at 916, Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 165, 880 P.2d at 217, and HRPP Rule 24(d)). According to the dissent, the ICA “has held as to alternate jurors that ‘the defendant shall not be called upon to exercise [peremptory] challenge[s] until all potential alternate jurors have been examined and passed on challenges for cause[.]’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926 (quoting Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224)).
The dissent reasoned that (1) Respondent “challenged jurors 43a and 8a for cause, but they were not initially dismissed”; (2) after Petitioner “used his last peremptory challenge, [Respondent] renewed its ‘for cause’ challenge to jurors 43a and 8a, who were then dismissed for cause”; and (3) “jurors 7 and 9 were then added to replace jurors 43a and 8a.” Id. The dissent concluded that “[e]ven though [Petitioner] did not challenge jurors 7 or 9 for cause or challenge the [court’s] procedure, under Timas and Car-valho it was plain error to dismiss jurors 43a and 8a for cause and replace them with jurors 7 and 9 after [all of Petitioner’s] peremptory challenges had been used.” Id.
According to the dissent, there was no need for Petitioner to show prejudice because “ ‘the denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.’” Id. (quoting Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926 (quoting Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 174, 880 P.2d at 226)). The dissent distinguished Iuli and State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 948 P.2d 1036 (1997), where trial courts allegedly abused their discretion in refusing to excuse a juror for cause and the defendant then utilized a peremptory challenge to remove that juror, from Carvalho and Timas, where “the right to exercise peremptory challenges is denied or impaired when a defendant is called on to exercise the challenges before prospective jurors are passed for cause. ” Id. (emphasis added).
[420] II.
Petitioner lists the following questions in his Application:
A Did the ICA commit grave error, and render a decision inconsistent with supreme court and ICA precedent, when it acknowledged major errors during jury selection, but found no impairment of [Petitioner’s] statury [sic] right to peremptory challenges?
B. Did the trial court commit plain error, and impair “one of the most important rights secured to the accused in a criminal case,” when it forced [Petitioner] to use two-out-of-three peremptories to remove patently biased jurors that should have been disqualified for cause?
C. Did the trial court commit plain error, and impair “once of the most important rights secured to the accused in a criminal ease,” when it granted the state’s “renewed” motion to disqualify two jurors after the exercise of peremptory challenges, based on identical grounds urged before?
(Capitalization omitted and emphases added.)
Respondent filed a Response to the Application (Response). Respondent contends that Petitioner’s use of his peremptory challenges as to the sexually abused jurors (Juror 19 and Juror 23a) was not impaired because Petitioner did not ask for additional peremptory challenges, did not tell the court that his use of peremptory challenges was impaired, and did not challenge the impartiality of the final jury. Respondent cites Iuli, 101 Hawai'i at 200-02, 65 P.3d at 147-49, Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 83, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), and United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), in support of this contention. As to Juror 8a and Juror 43a, Respondent argues that by striking these jurors the court ensured that Petitioner’s trial would be fair; that HRPP Rule 24(c) “seems to acknowledge” a court’s authority to excuse jurors just prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict; and (apparently) that Petitioner should have requested additional peremptory challenges and should have objected.
Petitioner filed a Reply to Response to Application for Certiorari (Reply). In his Reply, Petitioner argues, as to Juror 19 and Juror 23a, that peremptory challenges are a necessary part of trial by jury. Petitioner further argues that he had to use two of his three peremptories to cure trial errors, and therefore the degree of impairment of his peremptories “far exceeds” the single peremptory lost to the defendants in Iuli, Ross, and Martinez-Salazar. As to Juror 8a and Juror 43a, Petitioner states that Respondent did not address the argument that the right to exercise peremptory challenges is denied or impaired when a defendant is called to exercise peremptory challenges before prospective jurors are passed for cause.
III.
The jury selection process is governed by HRS § 635-30 and HRPP Rule 24.7 In cases like this one, that do not involve an offense punishable by life in prison, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges to [421] strike the jurors on the panel who have been passed for cause. HRS § 635-30; HRPP Rule 24(b). In addition, HRPP Rule 24(c) allows up to four “alternate” jurors to be impaneled, in case one of the “regular juror[s]” becomes unqualified. The parties are given one peremptory challenge to strike alternate jurors. HRPP Rule 24(c).
Challenges for cause are permitted only before the exercise of peremptory challenges for both regular and alternate jurors. HRPP Rule 24(d). This means that when the parties exercise their peremptories they know who the potential regular jurors and the potential alternates are. See id. Once the jurors have been passed for cause, the prosecution and the defendant alternately state their peremptory challenges. HRPP Rule 24(d). In all cases, the prosecution is allowed only as many challenges as are allowed to the defendant. HRS § 635-30; HRPP Rule 24(b).
IV.
We beliéve that Question C in the Application must be answered in the affirmative and is dispositive. Accordingly, we do not reach Questions A and B. For the reasons stated herein, the case is remanded for a new trial.
A.
We begin by reviewing Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 880 P.2d 217, which is instructive. Carvalho involved HRPP Rule 24(c), under which a defendant is entitled to “[one] peremptory challenge which may be used to challenge the alternate jurors only.” Pursuant to HRS § 635-30 and HRPP Rule 24(b), the prosecution “shall be allowed as many” peremptory challenges “as are allowed to all defendants.” In Carvalho, the circuit court passed one alternate for cause and gave each party an opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge. 79 Hawai'i at 171, 880 P.2d at 223. The prosecution indicated that it would “waive” its peremptory challenge and the defense exercised its peremptory challenge to strike the juror. Id. The circuit court then called another alternate juror. Id. At that point, the defendant could no longer exercise a peremptory challenge, having exhausted his one peremptory to strike the first juror. Id. However, the prosecution was given the opportunity to exercise another peremptory challenge. Id. The ICA held that the circuit court plainly erred because the defendant had been compelled to exhaust his peremptory challenge before all the alternates had been passed for cause, in violation of HRPP Rule 24(d), and the prosecution, in effect, was afforded a “second” peremptory challenge, in violation of HRS § 635-30 and HRPP Rule 24(b), which guarantee the parties an equal number of peremptory challenges. See id.
Similarly, in Timas, as in Carvalho, the ICA concluded that the circuit court plainly erred in calling and passing for cause an alternate juror after the defendant had exercised his one peremptory challenge. Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926. In Timas, which was a multi-defendant ease, the circuit court called the first alternate juror and announced that each defendant would be entitled to one peremptory challenge. See id. at 507, 923 P.2d at 924. One of the defendants exercised his peremptory challenge. Id. The circuit court then called additional alternate jurors. Id. The same defendant was not able to exercise a peremptory challenge with respect to the additional alternate jurors, because he had exhausted his one peremptory challenge in striking the first alternate juror. Id.
The ICA held that the defendant’s right to one peremptory challenge pertained to all of the alternate jurors and that the procedure used by the circuit court did not eonfonn to that announced in Carvalho. Id. at 509, 923 P.2d at 926. The ICA also held that the defendant was not required to show prejudice, and that although the defendant had not raised the point on appeal, the defendant’s statutory right to exercise a peremptory challenge had been impaired, resulting in a denial of his substantial rights. Id. The ICA therefore concluded that the plain error doctrine applied. Id.
V.
These cases illustrate the distinct nature of errors involving a court’s failure to strike jurors for cause before the parties have exer-[422] eised their peremptories, and errors that occur after the parties have exercised their peremptories. Carvalho and Timas involved an error that occurred after the parties had exercised their peremptories. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 171-72, 880 P.2d at 223-24; Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926. Because the Carvalho court called additional alternate jurors after the defendants exercised their peremptory challenges, the defendants were not aware of the composition of the entire jury panel before exhausting their peremptory challenge. Therefore, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to exercise their peremptory challenge with respect to all of the alternate jurors. Id. In Carvalho, the ICA explained that the court’s error was compounded because it allowed the prosecution an additional peremptory challenge after the defendant had exercised his single peremptory challenge. 79 Hawai'i at 171-72, 880 P.2d at 223-24. Under those circumstances, in Carvalho and in Timas, the ICA concluded that the defendants’ right to exercise peremptory challenges had been denied or impaired. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 171-72, 880 P.2d at 223-24; Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926.
VI.
Under Question C in the Application, the issue is whether Petitioner’s right to exercise peremptory challenges was impaired when the court entertained Respondent’s challenges for cause after the parties had exei’-eised their peremptory challenges.
A.
As mentioned, Petitioner contends that the court erred in striking Juror 43a and Juror 8a for cause upon Respondent’s motion after all the jurors in the jury box had already been passed for cause. According to Petitioner, the practice of allowing Respondent two challenges for cause after peremptory challenges had been exercised is prohibited by HRPP Rule 24(d) and by case law, and resulted in Respondent effectively having two additional peremptory challenges. Petitioner states that:
After exercising three peremptory challenges against other jurors, the State was allowed to renew its challenge for cause against [Juror 43a] and [Juror 8a], ostensibly giving it five peremptories to [Petitioner’s] one. Moreover, [Petitioner’s] sole peremptory was exercised before [Jurors 43a and 8a] were replaced. Two court rules require that challenges for cause be made ‘prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges’.... Otherwise, litigants cannot compare the relative qualifications and attitudes of all 12 jurors examined and passed for cause....
(Internal citations omitted and emphasis added.)
As noted before, the ICA majority concluded that Petitioner’s right to exercise his peremptory challenges was not impaired because (1) Petitioner did not object to Juror 7 or Juror 9 for cause (citing Graham, 70 Haw. at 634, 780 P.2d at 1107-08); (2) under HRPP Rule 24(e) the court could have replaced Juror 43a and Juror 8a if these were found unable or disqualified to perform their duties at any time before trial; (3) under lull, Petitioner should have objected and asked for additional peremptory challenges; and (4) there was no plain error in the absence of an objection by Petitioner. Ho, 2011 WL 5518045, at *1. Respondent argues that (1) the court performed its duty to ensure Petitioner’s trial would be had before a fair and impartial jury; (2) HRPP Rule 24(c) seems to acknowledge the circuit court’s authority to excuse jurors until just prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict; and (3) Petitioner should have objected and requested additional peremptory challenges.8
VII.
To reiterate, HRPP Rule 24(d) allows challenges for cause only before the parties have exercised their peremptory challenges. HRPP Rule 24(d) (“Challenges for cause may be made at any time prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges.”). In Carvalho, in the context of alternate jurors, the ICA explained that the right to exercise peremptory challenges is a right that applies with respect [423] to all potential alternate jurors, and that the courts were not allowed to give one party more peremptories than the other:
Only after all potential alternates were passed for cause could Defendant properly exercise his one peremptory challenge as contemplated by HRPP Rule 24(c). The procedure [whereby the court asked the parties to exercise them peremptories after the first alternate was passed for cause and then passed another alternate for cause] ‘prejudiced Defendant because he was compelled to exhaust his peremptory challenge before all the prospective alternate jurors were passed for cause.
Moreover, once the State waived its challenge it was foreclosed from exercising any more peremptory challenges because the State is only “allowed as many peremptory challenges as are allowed to [the] defendant ].” HRS § 635-30; HRPP Rule 24(b). The court’s procedure, as a matter of fact, resulted in the State gaining an extra challenge not afforded the defendant, giving it an unfair advantage in selecting the jurors who ultimately decided the case. We hold, therefore, that the defendant’s right to one peremptory challenge to alternate jurors under HRPP Rule 24(c) is a right pertaining to all the alternate jurors and therefore the defendant shall not be called upon to exercise the challenge until all potential alternate jurors have been examined and passed on challenges for cause.
79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224 (emphases added).
In light of HRS § 635-30, HRPP Rule 24, Carvalho, and Timas, it is evident that the procedure the court followed during jury selection was improper. Respondent only “renewed” its motion to have Juror 43a and Juror 8a stack for cause after the parties exhausted their peremptory challenges. As Petitioner contends, by striking jurors for cause after Petitioner exercised his peremptory challenges, (1) the court deprived Petitioner of the opportunity to compare and contrast the relative qualifications of the twelve jurors passed for cause before exercising his peremptory challenges; and (2) Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to exercise any peremptory challenges with respect to the two jurors (Juror 7 and Juror 9) who replaced Juror 43a and 8a. See Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224 (holding, with respect to alternate jurors, that the right to exercise a peremptory challenge is a right pertaining to all the alternate jurors).
Further, by allowing Respondent to challenge two jurors for cause after both parties exhausted their peremptory challenges, the court for all practical purposes gave Respondent two additional peremptory challenges. Indeed, this ease and Carvalho are essentially indistinguishable. See 79 Hawai'i 165, 880 P.2d 217. Here, as in Carval-ho, when that court stack Respondent’s jurors for cause after peremptories had been exercised, that court gave Respondent two additional opportunities to shape the jury. As discussed, for-cause challenges under HRPP Rule 24 should occur before peremp-tories to ensure the parties have the opportunity to exercise their peremptories as to all prospective jurors. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224. By granting Respondent’s motion to strike the jurors for cause after the parties had fully exhausted their peremptory challenges, the court in effect gave the prosecution additional peremptory challenges. This violated HRS § 635-30 and HRPP Rule 24(b) because the prosecution is only allowed “as many challenges as are allowed to [the] defendant [ ].”9
VIII.
The ICA majority, however, did not believe that Petitioner’s right to exercise his peremptory challenges was impaired because Petitioner “did not object to Jurors 7 or 9 for [424] cause.”10 Ho, 2011 WL 5518045, at *1. The majority reasoned that a defendant cannot accept a juror as unprejudiced and unfair and then subsequently allege error in the retention of the same juror. Id. (citing Graham, 70 Haw. at 634, 780 P.2d at 1107-08). However, Petitioner’s complaint as to the replacement of Juror 8a and Juror 43a with Juror 7 and Juror 9 was not that the latter were biased, but rather that, in effect, the prosecution was given additional peremptory challenges and therefore had an unfair advantage in shaping the jury.11 Respectfully, it would have been disingenuous for Petitioner to request that Juror 7 and Juror 9 be removed for cause because Petitioner apparently did not have reason to challenge those jurors for cause.
In a similar vein, Respondent contends that by removing Juror 8a and Juror 43a the court ensured that Petitioner’s trial was fair. This claim is debatable because, although Respondent claims that these jurors had trouble communicating in English, Petitioner objected to the removal of those two jurors, and the court initially agreed they should be passed for cause. Cause aside, a party may prefer to keep the twelve jurors that have been passed for cause, sensing that those that remain in the jury pool may be less accepting of the party’s position than others already seated. In any event, as explained supra, it was violative of HRS § 635-30 and HRPP Rule 24(b) for the court, in effect, to give Respondent more peremptory challenges, and thus more opportunities to shape the final jury membership, than were given to Petitioner.
IX.
The ICA majority and Respondent, however, also cite the portion of HRPP Rule 24(c) that states that the court has authority to excuse jurors until just “prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, [who] become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties,” implying that it was not error for the court to strike Juror 8a and Juror 43a for cause after the parties had exhausted their peremptories.12 The language cited by the ICA majority and the Respondent have been taken out of context. The quoted phrase is part of a sentence in HRPP Rule 24(c) that indicates that if a regular juror is found unable to perform his or her duties, the court may replace the regular juror with one of the alternate jurors who has already been impaneled. Specifically, and to reiterate, HRPP Rule 24(c) states:
The court may direct that not more than 4 jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors who shall, in the order in which they are called, replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict. When the court directs that one or more alternate jurors be impaneled, each defendant shall be entitled to 1 additional peremptory challenge which may be used to challenge the alternate jurors only; and other peremptory challenges allowed to challenge the regular jurors shall not be used to challenge alternate jurors.
(Emphasis added.)
In other words, alternate jurors who have already been passed for cause and sur[425] vived peremptory challenges and thus have been ultimately chosen as alternate jurors for the case may be used to replace “regular” jurors during trial when regular jurors, for some reason or another, become disqualified. Id. Thus, by no means does HRPP Rule 24(e) change the procedure the court must follow during jury selection and allow the court to entertain motions to strike jurors for cause after the parties have already exhausted their peremptory strikes. This reading of HRPP Rule 24(c) is foreclosed by HRPP Rule 24(d), which allows challenges for cause prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges.13
X.
The ICA majority and Respondent also believe that luli forecloses Petitioner’s challenge to the court’s grant of Respondent’s renewed motion for cause, because Petitioner did not request additional peremptory challenges and, seemingly, because he did not point to any other jurors that he would have excused.14 However, luli was not concerned with the circumstances here and thus is distinguishable. luli involved a challenge for cause made before the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. 101 Hawai'i at 200-05, 65 P.3d at 147-152. This court declined to decide whether the circuit court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause, but held that the defendant had not shown that his rights were impaired because the defendant had not identified other jurors he would have struck and did not ask for additional peremptory challenges. Id. There was no allegation in luli that the court had done anything improper after the jurors were passed for cause and the peremptory challenges ended. See id. The parties in luli exercised their peremptories with full knowledge of the twelve jurors who had been passed for cause. See id.
Here, in contrast, the court struck two jurors for cause at Respondent’s behest after the court had already passed the jurors for cause and after the parties had exercised their peremptories. As noted before, this meant that Petitioner did not have the opportunity to exercise his peremptories after comparing the relative qualifications of the twelve jurors passed for cause, that Petitioner was not able to exercise peremptories with respect to Juror 7 and Juror 9, and that Respondent for all practical purposes exercised two additional peremptory challenges. luli simply did not address a situation where the court allowed additional challenges to jurors after the parties have exercised their peremptories.
Instead, the court’s error in this case is much more like that in Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224, where that court granted an additional peremptory challenge to the prosecution after the defendant had exercised his peremptory challenge. luli did not overrule Carvalho, and in fact cited that decision approvingly. Iuli, 101 Hawai'i at 204, 65 P.3d at 151. Carvalho was also cited approvingly in Kauhi.15 See Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i at 198, 948 P.2d 1036 (explaining that because the right to exercise peremptory challenges is one of the most important secured to defendants, the denial or impairment of that right is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice) (quoting Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224).
[426] Accordingly, respectfully, the ICA was also wrong when it said, “The Hawai'i Supreme Court [has] never itself extended plain error to the issue of the ordering of peremptory and for cause challenges.” Ho, 2011 WL 5518045, at *1. lull and Kauhi both cited Carvalho, in which the court applied the plain error doctrine, approvingly. Moreover, in lull and Kauhi there was no need to apply the plain error doctrine because in both instances the defendants objected and asked the court to strike the contested jurors for cause. See Iuli, 101 Hawai'i at 205-06, 65 P.3d at 152-53; Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i at 197-200, 948 P.2d at 1038-1041.
Because Respondent was allowed to challenge jurors after the parties had exercised their peremptories, Respondent had an unfair advantage in selecting the jurors who ultimately decided the case. See id. Petitioner was therefore not able to exercise his rights to the same extent as Respondent. See HRS § 635-30 and HRPP Rule 24(b). Petitioner was unable to exercise his peremp-tories with respect to all of the twelve regular jurors because he had already exhausted his peremptories by the time the court, upon Respondent’s motion, substituted Juror 43a and Juror 8a with Juror 7 and Juror 9. Petitioner can therefore establish that his statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges was impaired.
Further, as explained, supra, Petitioner need not establish prejudice in order to succeed. “[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal ease is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.” Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Since the right to exercise a peremptory challenge is “one of the most important of the rights secured to an accused in a criminal ease, the denial or impairment of that right is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.” Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i at 198, 948 P.2d at 1039 (quoting Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224); see also Iuli, 101 Hawai'i at 204, 65 P.3d at 151 (“[T]he denial or impairment of [the right to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”) (quoting Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i at 198, 948 P.2d at 1039 (quoting Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 172, 880 P.2d at 224)) (ellipsis omitted).
Thus, “in this jurisdiction a defendant has a right to exercise his peremptory challenges as the statute provides and no court would uphold, as being nonprejudicial, the deprivation of the statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges, even though that right is solely dependent on statute, and not on a constitutional right.” Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 174, 880 P.2d at 226 (quoting State v. Echineque, 73 Haw. 100, 107, 828 P.2d 276, 279 (1992)) (internal quotations and ellipsis omitted). As stated in Carvalho, “the denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.” Thus, “the historical underpinning of peremptory challenges and substantial authority support the adoption of this rule.” Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 174, 880 P.2d at 226.
XI.
Finally, the ICA would not have applied the doctrine of plain error because the court could have granted additional peremptory challenges had Petitioner objected.16 Ho, 2011 WL 5518045, at *1 n. 3. However, the ICA’s approach would contradict both Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 174, 880 P.2d at 226, and Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926, in which plain error was taken from errors that are essentially indistinguishable from the one alleged here. If the defendants’ substantial rights were affected in those eases, as the ICA held, Petitioner’s substantial rights were affected in this case.
Furthermore, as discussed, supra, in Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 174, 880 P.2d at 226, and Timas, 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926, as in this case, the defendant did not object to the court’s improper procedure. However, “appellate courts, in the public interest, may on their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken if [427] the eiTors are obvious, and if the errors otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i at 174, 880 P.2d at 226 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, in Carvalho, the ICA concluded that the court’s error was “obvious, and it affected the fairness and integrity of the jury selection process ... [and therefore] required reversal.” Id. Similarly, in Timas, where an alternate juror was improperly impaneled and the defendant did not raise the error on appeal, the ICA noticed the error and held that it was plain. 82 Hawai'i at 509, 923 P.2d at 926. Likewise, in Kauhi, although the contested juror did not participate in rendering the verdict, this court nevertheless reversed the defendant’s conviction when the circuit court erroneously failed to strike the juror for cause. 86 Hawai'i at 200, 948 P.2d at 1041. In line with these eases, here the error was obvious and affected the fairness and the integrity of the selection process.
XII.
Based on the foregoing, the ICA’s December 1, 2011 judgment and the court’s April 24, 2008 judgment are vacated and the ease remanded for a new trial.