State v. Hinkle

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hinkle, 2026-Ohio-1857.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LICKING COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2026 CA 00006

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2025 CR 00356 BRADLEY J. HINKLE Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: May 21, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges

APPEARANCES: JENNY WELLS, KENNETH W. OSWALT, for Plaintiff-Appellee; STEPHEN T. WOLFE, for Defendant-Appellant.

King, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Bradley J. Hinkle, appeals his January 5, 2026

sentence from the Licking County Common Pleas Court. Plaintiff-Appellee is State of

Ohio. We affirm the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On June 18, 2025, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted Hinkle on one

count of aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11

(second-degree felony), one count of aggravated trafficking (methamphetamine) in

violation of R.C. 2925.03 (second-degree felony), and one count of tampering with

evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12 (third-degree felony). The indictment included

forfeiture specifications for U.S. currency and a vehicle under R.C. 2981.02 and 2941.1417. {¶ 3} On January 5, 2026, Hinkle pled guilty to amended charges; the second-

degree felonies were reduced to third-degree felonies. The drug offenses merged and the

State elected sentencing on the trafficking count. By judgment entry filed on the same

date, the trial court sentenced Hinkle to maximum sentences of thirty-six months each

on the trafficking and tampering counts, to be served consecutively. Further, the trial

court sentenced Hinkle to an additional two years due to Hinkle being on postrelease

control at the time of committing the offenses; the two years were ordered to be served

consecutively to the six years for a total term of eight years in prison. The trial court

ordered the forfeiture of the U.S. currency and the vehicle.

{¶ 4} Hinkle filed an appeal with the following assignments of error:

I

{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM

SENTENCE ON THE HIGHEST DEGREE OFFENSE."

II

{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE

SENTENCES."

I, II

{¶ 7} In his assignments of error, Hinkle challenges the sentence imposed by the

trial court. This court reviews felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in

R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22; State v. Howell, 2015-Ohio-4049,

¶ 31 (5th Dist.). Subsection (G)(2) sets forth this court's standard of review as follows: (2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this

section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the

sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and

remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate

court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of

section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,

whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶ 8} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty

as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 9} Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this court to independently weigh

the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court

"concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 [purposes and

principles of felony sentencing] and 2929.12 [seriousness and recidivism factors]." State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. The Supreme Court of Ohio clarified that the holding in

Jones should not be "construed as prohibiting appellate review of a sentence when the

claim is that the sentence was imposed based on impermissible considerations—i.e.,

considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12."

State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22. "Accordingly, when a trial court imposes a

sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those that are

permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law." Id.

{¶ 10} "A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial

court 'considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed

in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant

within the permissible statutory range.'" State v. Morris, 2021-Ohio-2646, ¶ 90 (5th

Dist.), rev'd on other grounds, 2022-Ohio-4609, quoting State v. Dinka, 2019-Ohio-

4209, ¶ 36 (12th Dist.). "Under established law, a 'trial court has full discretion to impose

any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make

any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum

sentences.'" State v. Sullens, 2022-Ohio-2305, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. King,

2013-Ohio-2021, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). "There is no explicit requirement for a trial court to

memorialize the specific factors it considered in its journal entry." State v. Halasz, 2025-

Ohio-3072, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hodges, 2013-Ohio-5025, ¶ 13-14 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 11} We will address Hinkle's arguments within this framework.

MAXIMUM SENTENCES

{¶ 12} Hinkle argues the imposition of maximum sentences on his third-degree

felonies was contrary to law. We disagree. {¶ 13} Felonies of the third degree are punishable by "a definite term of nine,

twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months." R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b).

Hinkle's sentences are within the statutory range for third-degree felonies.

{¶ 14} The trial court indicated it considered "the principles and purposes of

sentencing under Ohio Revised Code 2929.11, and has balanced the seriousness and

recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code 2929.12." Judgment Entry Filed January 5,

2026.

{¶ 15} "Although a trial court must consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, there is no requirement that the court state its reasons for imposing a maximum

sentence, or for imposing a particular sentence within the statutory range." State v.

Santos, 2016-Ohio-5845, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); accord State v. Webb, 2019-Ohio-4195, ¶ 17.

{¶ 16} The record reflects the trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory

range for a third-degree felony, and one that was not based on impermissible

considerations.

{¶ 17} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in sentencing Hinkle to the

maximum statutory term.

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

{¶ 18} Hinkle argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences

because it "did not engage in any sort of analysis." We disagree.

{¶ 19} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) governs consecutive sentences and states the following:

(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for

convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve

the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness

of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,

and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison

term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of

conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

by the offender.

{¶ 20} As held by the Supreme Court: "In order to impose consecutive terms of

imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing

entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings." State v. Bonnell,

2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus.

{¶ 21} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the requisite findings

for consecutive sentencing under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), stating (T. at 21-22): consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public, to punish you,

that they are not disproportionate to the seriousness of your conduct or the

danger that you pose to the public. And, further, that these occurred while

you were on active supervision from Case No. 21CR198, another conviction

for methamphetamine trafficking for which you were placed on post-release

control for a period of three years on March 10 of 2025. I'll impose two

years of your post-release control time. I'll order they all run consecutively

for an eight year prison term.

{¶ 22} In the sentencing entry, the trial court noted, "consecutive sentences are

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public." Judgment Entry filed

January 5, 2026. The trial court further noted: "[t]he offender committed one or more of

the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a

sanction imposed pursuant to Section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code,

or was under post-release control for a prior offense." Id; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a).

{¶ 23} The record demonstrates the trial court received and thoroughly reviewed

the presentence investigation report, heard statements from the prosecutor, defense

counsel, and Hinkle himself, and considered the purposes and principles of sentencing

under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12.

T. at 16-20. In sentencing Hinkle, the trial court noted the following (T. at 20): Your Ohio Risk Assessment Survey places you in a very high risk category

for recidivism or being arrested for a new felony. You're at a 32 probably

because the best predicter of future behavior is past behavior. Your past

behavior has been terrible. You have been to prison at least for the last 20

years, and, you know, here it is. You got released from prison March 10th

of 2025, and in less than three months, you're picked up again for this.

{¶ 24} The trial court further noted Hinkle has "been on probation plenty of times"

and has parole violations. T. at 21.

{¶ 25} Upon review, we find the trial court made the required findings at the

sentencing hearing for consecutive sentencing and incorporated its findings into its

sentencing entry, meeting the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); the trial court did not

err in imposing consecutive service.

{¶ 26} Assignments of Error I and II are denied. {¶ 27} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Licking County Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.

{¶ 28} Costs to Appellant.

By: King, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Montgomery, J. concur.