State v. Hensley

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: September 20, 1976
• Docket: 13055
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 13055 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTH

STATE OF MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-VS - RILEY HENSLEY,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable P e t e r Meloy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record :

For Appellant :

Ralph Randono a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana E. F. G i a n o t t i a p p e a r e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Robert L. tJoodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana C h a r l e s E. Erdman, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , He1 ena , Montana R o b e r t L. Deschamps, County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana

Submitted: September 1, 1976

Decided : 5EP 2 O 1976 TE$Z 0 13-76 Filed : M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t from a judgment e n t e r e d

f o l l o w i n g h i s c o n v i c t i o n by a j u r y i n Missoula County of t h e

c r i m e of b r i b e r y of a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r .

The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t on October 4 , 1973, Missoula

Deputy County A t t o r n e y Ed McLean m e t w i t h d e f e n d a n t and Floyd

Wright a t a r e s t a u r a n t i n M i s s o u l a , Montana, t o d i s c u s s McLean

d i s p o s i n g of gambling c h a r g e s pending a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t . The

d i s c u s s i o n c e n t e r e d around t h e a v a i l a b l e methods o f d i s p o s i n g

of t h e s e c h a r g e s , i n c l u d i n g a d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e . A t the close

of t h e meeting d e f e n d a n t gave $190 t o Wright who added $60 o f

h i s own and Wright t h e n g a v e $250 t o McLean. The e n t i r e meet-

i n g was o b s e r v e d by a s u r v e i l l a n c e t e a m of t h e Missoula County

s h e r i f f ' s department. T h e r e a f t e r , d e f e n d a n t and Wright w e r e

c h a r g e d j o i n t l y by i n f o r m a t i o n a s committing " * * * the offense of Giving a B r i b e t o a Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a f e l o n y , a s spec-

i f i e d i n S e c t i o n 94-801, R.C.M. 1947 * * *." The c a s e s w e r e

s e v e r e d f o r t r i a l and d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1975.

The f i r s t i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s whether a d e p u t y c o u n t y

a t t o r n e y i s a " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n

94-801, R.C.M. 1947.

W e have n e v e r d e f i n e d t h e term " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " a s it

i s used i n s e c t i o n 94-801, R.C.M. 1947. However, i n P o r t e r v.

D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 124 Mont. 249, 274, 220 P.2d 1035, t h e C o u r t s a i d :

"So i n Montana, a s i n Washington, t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y i s a p u b l i c o f f i c e r , a p a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l system, v e s t e d w i t h power o v e r t h e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s i n h i s c o u n t y and a s s u c h o f f i c e r responsible t o t h e people f o r t h e per- formance o f t h e d u t i e s e n t r u s t e d t o him." (Emphasis added.)

W e f i n d additional support f o r t h i s r u l i n g i n o t h e r j u r i s -

dictions.

The Idaho Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t a d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i s a " j u d i c i a l officer", not an executive o f f i c e r , within t h e

meaning o f a b r i b e r y s t a t u t e c o n c e r n i n g e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r s .

S t a t e v . W h a r f i e l d , 4 1 I d a h o 1 4 , 236 P. 862, 863. The s t a t -

u t e c o n s t r u e d i n W h a r f i e l d i s i d e n t i c a l t o s e c t i o n 94-3903,

R.C.M. 1947, o u r s t a t u t e c o n c e r n i n g b r i b e s g i v e n o r o f f e r e d t o

executive officers. The I d a h o c o u r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n was b a s e d

upon a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r e a t i o n of t h e o f f i c e o f d i s t r i c t a t t o r -

ney u n d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r t i c l e d e v o t e d t o t h e j u d i c i a l

department.

R a t i o n a l e i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t o f t h e I d a h o c o u r t was i n -

c o r p o r a t e d by New Mexico i n d e f i n i n g " j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " w i t h i n

a bribery s t a t u t e t o include a d i s t r i c t attorney. S t a t e v.

C o l l i n s , 28 N.M. 230, 210 P. 569; S t a t e v . Chambers, 86 N.M.

383, 524 P.2d 999.

A r t i c l e V I I I o f t h e 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which i s

e n t i t l e d " J u d i c i a l Departments" c r e a t e s t h e o f f i c e o f c o u n t y

attorney. A r t i c l e V I I I , Sec. 1 9 , 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

Although t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t c l a s s i f y c o u n t y

a t t o r n e y s w i t h i n t h e j u d i c i a l d e p a r t m e n t , it was t h e 1889 Montana

C o n s t i t u t i o n which was i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e

e n a c t e d s e c t i o n 94-801, R.C.M. 1947. In doing so t h e L e g i s l a t u r e

must have been aware o f and w a s bound by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a s s -

i f i c a t i o n s of public o f f i c e r s . Our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a -

t i o n o f a c o u n t y a t t o r n e y b e i n g i d e n t i c a l t o I d a h o and New

Mexico, w e a g r e e w i t h t h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n s and h o l d t h a t a c o u n t y

a t t o r n e y i s a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r w i t h i n t h e meaning o f s e c t i o n 94-

801, R.C.M. 1947.

W e have n o t i g n o r e d t h e C a l i f o r n i a a u t h o r i t y c i t e d by

d e f e n d a n t , b u t under o u r circumstances such a u t h o r i t y i s n o t

applicable. A s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Wharfield, 3 1 I d a h o 1 4 , 236

P. 862, 863: " I n t h i s d e c i s i o n we a r e n o t unmindful of t h e c a s e o f S i n g h v. S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 4 4 Cal.App. 64, 185 P. 985, h o l d i n g t h a t a p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y i s a n e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r of t h e s t a t e ; b u t i n C a l i f o r n i a a d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i s an o f f i c e r of t h e c o u n t y , and i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f C a l i f o r n i a , divided i n t o a r t i c l e s t r e a t i n g of t h e executive, l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l d e p a r t m e n t s , t h e o f f i c e of d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i s n o t mentioned, a s i n o u r s under t h e j u d i c i a l d e p a r t m e n t . * * * "

Defendant f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h e a c t t o which t h e b r i b e

a t t e m p t a p p l i e d was n o t w i t h i n t h e l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y and power

of McLean. The t e s t i m o n y o f f e r e d was t h a t McLean w a s b e i n g

o f f e r e d t h e b r i b e t o have pending gambling c h a r g e s d i s p o s e d o f .

T h i s C o u r t h a s s t a t e d i n H a l l a d a y v . S t a t e Bank of F a i r f i e l d ,

6 6 Mont. 1 1 118, 2 1 2 P. 1 , 861:

" * * * The c o u n t y a t t o r n e y i n t h i s s t a t e , n o t o n l y d i r e c t s under what c o n d i t i o n s a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s h a l l be commenced, b u t from t h e t i m e it b e g i n s u n t i l it ends h i s s u p e r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l i s c o m p l e t e , l i m i t e d o n l y by s u c h r e s t r i c t i o n s a s t h e law imposes. * * * "

I t seems t h e d e f e n d a n t was w e l l aware of t h i s a u t h o r i t y a t t h e

t i m e of t h e b r i b e , b u t now c o n t e n d s o n l y t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o u l d

have d i s m i s s e d t h e c h a r g e s i n v o l v e d . I t would be u n r e a s o n a b l e

f o r t h i s Court t o disregard t h e f a c t t h a t i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y a

c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s d e c i s i o n and r e q u e s t t o d i s m i s s would be f o l l o w e d

by a d i s t r i c t c o u r t .

The remaining i s s u e s d e a l w i t h t h r e e a s p e c t s of McLean's

testimony.

The f i r s t o f t h e s e i s when McLean t e s t i f i e d on r e d i r e c t

e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t it was t h e p o l i c y of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e

t o d e l a y f i l i n g charges u n t i l t h e o f f i c e f e l t they could prove

d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . Defendant c o n t e n d s

such t e s t i m o n y was a n improper and p r e j u d i c i a l comment. W e must

remember t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y f o l l o w e d a n e x t e n s i v e cross-examin-

a t i o n by d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l a s t o t h e l e n g t h of t i m e between t h e

i n i t i a l b r i b e r y o f f e r and t h e c h a r g i n g o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . Since d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of d e l a y i n f i l i n g t h e c h a r g e s ,

and r e p e a t e d l y asked why such d e l a y o c c u r r e d , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

allowed t h e t e s t i m o n y i n q u e s t i o n t o e x p l a i n t h a t d e l a y . The

scope of r e d i r e c t examination i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e

d i s t r i c t court. S t a t e v . Simanton, 1 0 0 Mont. 292, 49 P.2d 981.

W f i n d no a b u s e of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , n o r i s it e

a comment on t h e e v i d e n c e by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n as contended by de-

fendant. A s p h r a s e d by t h e S t a t e i n t h e i r b r i e f , "The d e f e n d a n t

opened t h e d o o r , and c a n n o t now complain b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e d r o v e

a t r u c k through i t . "

Secondly, McLean t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n

wherein t h e b r i b e o c c u r r e d , d e f e n d a n t e x p r e s s e d h i s d i s p l e a s u r e

of u s i n g a d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e on t h e pending c h a r g e s , b e c a u s e de-

f e n d a n t had s u c h a s e n t e n c e imposed on a p r i o r o f f e n s e . The p r i o r

o f f e n s e was n o t s p e c i f i e d and t h i s was t h e o n l y mention of o t h e r

o f f e n s e s a l l e g e d t o have been committed by d e f e n d a n t . The s t a t e -

ment o f d e f e n d a n t w a s a p a r t of t h e res g e s t a e . Res g e s t a e

s t a t e m e n t s are u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e h e a r s a y r u l e , b u t t h e

s t a t u t e and c a s e s e x p l a i n i n g t h e r u l e a p p l y g e n e r a l l y t o any s t a t e -

ments made i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e f a c t i n i s s u e .

S e c t i o n 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s :

" D e c l a r a t i o n s which a r e a p a r t o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . Where, a l s o , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r o m i s s i o n forms p a r t of a t r a n s a c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f t h e f a c t i n d i s p u t e , o r evidence of t h a t f a c t , such d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r o m i s s i o n i s e v i d e n c e as p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . "

I n S t a t e v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 458, 513 P.2d 258,

t h e C o u r t quoted a p p r o v i n g l y t h i s l a n g u a g e from I n re P e t i t i o n

of P e t e r s o n , 155 Mont. 239, 467 P.2d 281:

" ' R e s g e s t a e a r e t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , f a c t s , and d e c l a r a t i o n s which grow o u t of t h e main f a c t , a r e contemporaneous w i t h i t , and s e r v e t o i l l u s t r a t e i t s c h a r a c t e r . ' S t a t e v . Broadwater, 75 Mont. 350, 243 P. 587."

Applying t h e s e r u l e s t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , it i s c l e a r the conversation which immediately preceded the passing of the bribe money was res gestae statements. The Information charged the defendant with giving a bribe to McLean " * * * with the intent to influence his decision on how to handle the prosecution of gambling cases * * *." Certainly the discussion on how he was to handle Hensley's case formed a part of the bribery transaction, was contemporaneous with it, and served to illustrate its charac- ter. Moreover, the discussion constituted an essential part of the State's proof of the crime as charged to show the defendant's intent when he gave McLean the money. As noted, proof of other offenses is admissible in order to show guilty knowledge, motive or intent. Thus, the res gestae discussion of Hensley's deferred sentence in some prior unspecified crime was proper to show his knowledge of what he was talking about; his motive to get the pending gambling charges completely dismissed; and his intent to influence McLean's prosecutorial decisions. The final issue is whether or not the testimony as to the conversation, wherein the bribe occurred, should have been allowed, since the conversation took place after defendant had been charged for gambling operations, he had retained counsel on those charges, and the conversation occurred outside the presence of retained counsel. Defendant relies on Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L Ed 2d 246. His argument, however, is similar to the one struck down in United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1302, cert.den. 397 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 912, 25 L Ed 2d 93, where the court said: "Clearly, Massiah and Beatty are without applica- bility here. In both of those cases, the Govern- ment souqht to use the defendant's self-incrim- inating post-indictment statements to prove the charge in the pendinq indictment. Here, by con- trast, Missler was under indictment for hijackinq, but the trial in which the statements were-used - was not for that offense. The agents' testimony was received in proof of a distinct and separate offense--obstruction of justice--committed after the hijacking indictment. * * * " Defendant's statements, like Missler's, were used against him in proving a distinct and separate offense--bribery--committed

after the gambling charges. Defendant's argument is without merit.

The judgment is m £fir e

Chief Justice

We concur: \