[133]*133The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ekancis, J.
Defendant Hawthorne was indicted for atrocious assault and battery allegedly committed on January 31, 1965. Prior to trial he moved for an order barring the prosecutor from using, on cross-examination at the trial for purposes of attacking his credibility, three previous convictions of crime. The convictions sought to be excluded were: (1) February 1945, larceny of an automobile in Baltimore, Maryland, for which he received a one-year sentence, (2) November 1945, armed robbery in Essex County, New Jersey, for which the sentence was four to seven years in State Prison, (3) 1956, robbery in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where the sentence was four to ten years. (If the last sentence had been served fully, Hawthorne would not have been out of jail when the present offense was committed. How long he had been on the street in January 1965 does not appear. It seems likely, however, that he was on parole at the time. It may be noted also that had he not been released before the end of his term in Maryland, he would not have been in New Jersey to engage in the armed robbery here.) The trial court granted the motion and executed an order suppressing the evidence of the convictions. The reason assigned was that the convictions were too remote to permit their use by the State in cross-examining the defendant at the trial for impeachment purposes. State v. Hawthorne, 90 N. J. Super. 545 (Cty. Ct. 1966). The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, but before argument there we certified the matter on our own motion.
I
In 1799 the Legislature adopted a statute providing that no person convicted of any one of certain enumerated crimes “shall, in any case, be admitted as a witness, unless he or she be first pardoned * * *” June 7, 1799, Pat. L. p. 401, Revised Laws of New Jersey 1820, p. 462. In 1871 this over-all disqualification was ameliorated. By Chapter 40 of [134]*134the Laws of 1871 it was directed that whenever such a previously convicted person was being tried upon an indictment, accusation or allegation of crime, he should be admitted as a witness, “if he shall offer himself as a witness” in his own behalf. A further revision applicable to civil and criminal actions took place in 1874 (Revision 1709-1877 p. 378; Gen. Stats. N. J. 1895, p. 1397). In substance that revision continues to exist as N. J. S. 2A:81-12, which controls the controversy now before us. It says:
“For the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness * * * his conviction of any crime may be shown by examination or otherwise, and his answers may be contradicted by other evidence. * * *”
When defendant’s motion was made to suppress the evidence of his previous convictions of crime, the trial judge felt that the word “may” in the above-quoted portion of the statute (i. e., the defendant’s previous conviction of any crime “may be shown to affect his credibility”) conferred on the courts discretionary power to admit or exclude such evidence. He then pointed ,out that under common law rules of evidence trial judges have authority to exclude proof if they find its probative value is substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice it will inflict upon the party against whom it is directed. (See Rule 4 of proposed rules of evidence, adopted by the Supreme Court on September 14, 1964, and awaiting action by the Legislature). Reasoning from these premises he concluded that the criminal convictions, the last one being about nine years prior to the criminal act pending trial, were too remote and therefore ought to be excluded at the trial because of their great potentiality for visiting a prejudice upon Hawthorne which would he greatly disproportionate to their probative value as an attack upon his credibility.
We cannot agree. In our judgment both the history of the statute and the context in which the word “may” appears refute the idea that the Legislature intended to invest the courts with discretion to admit or exclude evi[135]*135deuce of a defendant’s previous convictions of crime. It must be remembered that in earlier days Hawthorne’s’ convictions would have disqualified him as a witness. Then the Legislature decided total disqualification was too harsh a sanction to add to the punishment prescribed and imposed upon the convict for his crime. In furtherance of that decision it directed that the convicted person should be admitted as a witness, if he chose to testify. But it added that if he did take the witness stand his previous conviction of crime “may” be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility. In the context “may” connotes an authorization, a grant of permission to the parties to civil or criminal actions to show the witness’s previous criminal conviction by testimonial examination or by production of the record. Plainly the option was intended to be given to the State and the defendant in a criminal case, and the plaintiff and defendant in a civil case. No time limit was imposed upon admissibility. There is simply the flat and unrestricted statement that the conviction of crime may be shown to affect credibility. The authorization represented a policy decision by the Legislature, and established, as a matter of law, the admissibility of a conviction without regard to time interval between the conviction and the person’s appearance as a witness. Thus, the “may” in the statute does not bespeak a grant of permission or discretion to the trial judge to receive or reject the proof. On the contrary, the parties are invested with the option and if it is exercised the examination must be allowed or the record of conviction received when offered.
The trial judge cited Luck v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 151, 348 F. 2d 763 (D. C. Cir. 1965), in support of his view as to the import of the New Jersey statute. The District of Columbia code is substantially the same as ours, saying that the fact of a witness’s conviction of crime “may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness.” The Court of Appeals declared that the word “may” leaves room for the exercise of judicial discretion respecting the admis[136]*136sibility of a prior conviction of a defendant. We consider that construction strained and not justified by the context of the statute.
Reference has been made to cases in Texas, Maryland and Illinois as supporting the contention that a person’s previous conviction of crime, if considered too remote by the trial judge, may be declared inadmissible to affect credibility. See, Perez v. State, 141 Tex. Cr. R. 575, 150 S. W. 2d 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941), an 11-year old burglary conviction; Dallas County Water Control & Improvement District v. Ingram, 395 S. W. 2d 834 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965), 28-year old manslaughter conviction; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 383 S. W. 2d 197 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964), nine-year old burglary conviction. It is true that the Texas courts exclude evidence of convictions if they are considered too remote. But the Texas statute which permits introduction of a criminal record for impeachment purposes does so in language far less broad than that of our own statute.
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[133]*133The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ekancis, J.
Defendant Hawthorne was indicted for atrocious assault and battery allegedly committed on January 31, 1965. Prior to trial he moved for an order barring the prosecutor from using, on cross-examination at the trial for purposes of attacking his credibility, three previous convictions of crime. The convictions sought to be excluded were: (1) February 1945, larceny of an automobile in Baltimore, Maryland, for which he received a one-year sentence, (2) November 1945, armed robbery in Essex County, New Jersey, for which the sentence was four to seven years in State Prison, (3) 1956, robbery in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where the sentence was four to ten years. (If the last sentence had been served fully, Hawthorne would not have been out of jail when the present offense was committed. How long he had been on the street in January 1965 does not appear. It seems likely, however, that he was on parole at the time. It may be noted also that had he not been released before the end of his term in Maryland, he would not have been in New Jersey to engage in the armed robbery here.) The trial court granted the motion and executed an order suppressing the evidence of the convictions. The reason assigned was that the convictions were too remote to permit their use by the State in cross-examining the defendant at the trial for impeachment purposes. State v. Hawthorne, 90 N. J. Super. 545 (Cty. Ct. 1966). The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, but before argument there we certified the matter on our own motion.
I
In 1799 the Legislature adopted a statute providing that no person convicted of any one of certain enumerated crimes “shall, in any case, be admitted as a witness, unless he or she be first pardoned * * *” June 7, 1799, Pat. L. p. 401, Revised Laws of New Jersey 1820, p. 462. In 1871 this over-all disqualification was ameliorated. By Chapter 40 of [134]*134the Laws of 1871 it was directed that whenever such a previously convicted person was being tried upon an indictment, accusation or allegation of crime, he should be admitted as a witness, “if he shall offer himself as a witness” in his own behalf. A further revision applicable to civil and criminal actions took place in 1874 (Revision 1709-1877 p. 378; Gen. Stats. N. J. 1895, p. 1397). In substance that revision continues to exist as N. J. S. 2A:81-12, which controls the controversy now before us. It says:
“For the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness * * * his conviction of any crime may be shown by examination or otherwise, and his answers may be contradicted by other evidence. * * *”
When defendant’s motion was made to suppress the evidence of his previous convictions of crime, the trial judge felt that the word “may” in the above-quoted portion of the statute (i. e., the defendant’s previous conviction of any crime “may be shown to affect his credibility”) conferred on the courts discretionary power to admit or exclude such evidence. He then pointed ,out that under common law rules of evidence trial judges have authority to exclude proof if they find its probative value is substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice it will inflict upon the party against whom it is directed. (See Rule 4 of proposed rules of evidence, adopted by the Supreme Court on September 14, 1964, and awaiting action by the Legislature). Reasoning from these premises he concluded that the criminal convictions, the last one being about nine years prior to the criminal act pending trial, were too remote and therefore ought to be excluded at the trial because of their great potentiality for visiting a prejudice upon Hawthorne which would he greatly disproportionate to their probative value as an attack upon his credibility.
We cannot agree. In our judgment both the history of the statute and the context in which the word “may” appears refute the idea that the Legislature intended to invest the courts with discretion to admit or exclude evi[135]*135deuce of a defendant’s previous convictions of crime. It must be remembered that in earlier days Hawthorne’s’ convictions would have disqualified him as a witness. Then the Legislature decided total disqualification was too harsh a sanction to add to the punishment prescribed and imposed upon the convict for his crime. In furtherance of that decision it directed that the convicted person should be admitted as a witness, if he chose to testify. But it added that if he did take the witness stand his previous conviction of crime “may” be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility. In the context “may” connotes an authorization, a grant of permission to the parties to civil or criminal actions to show the witness’s previous criminal conviction by testimonial examination or by production of the record. Plainly the option was intended to be given to the State and the defendant in a criminal case, and the plaintiff and defendant in a civil case. No time limit was imposed upon admissibility. There is simply the flat and unrestricted statement that the conviction of crime may be shown to affect credibility. The authorization represented a policy decision by the Legislature, and established, as a matter of law, the admissibility of a conviction without regard to time interval between the conviction and the person’s appearance as a witness. Thus, the “may” in the statute does not bespeak a grant of permission or discretion to the trial judge to receive or reject the proof. On the contrary, the parties are invested with the option and if it is exercised the examination must be allowed or the record of conviction received when offered.
The trial judge cited Luck v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 151, 348 F. 2d 763 (D. C. Cir. 1965), in support of his view as to the import of the New Jersey statute. The District of Columbia code is substantially the same as ours, saying that the fact of a witness’s conviction of crime “may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness.” The Court of Appeals declared that the word “may” leaves room for the exercise of judicial discretion respecting the admis[136]*136sibility of a prior conviction of a defendant. We consider that construction strained and not justified by the context of the statute.
Reference has been made to cases in Texas, Maryland and Illinois as supporting the contention that a person’s previous conviction of crime, if considered too remote by the trial judge, may be declared inadmissible to affect credibility. See, Perez v. State, 141 Tex. Cr. R. 575, 150 S. W. 2d 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941), an 11-year old burglary conviction; Dallas County Water Control & Improvement District v. Ingram, 395 S. W. 2d 834 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965), 28-year old manslaughter conviction; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 383 S. W. 2d 197 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964), nine-year old burglary conviction. It is true that the Texas courts exclude evidence of convictions if they are considered too remote. But the Texas statute which permits introduction of a criminal record for impeachment purposes does so in language far less broad than that of our own statute. For example, the Texas law provides that where a suspended sentence is set aside, or where the convicted criminal was placed on probation and the period of probation has expired, the underlying conviction is not admissible. Vernon’s Ann. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.29. These limitations bespeak a legislative policy qualitatively different from that expressed by the Few Jersey lawmakers. The Maryland cases are not particularly significant. In Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153, 75 A. L. R. 1471 (Ct. App. 1931), a five-year old simple assault conviction was excluded as not involving an infamous crime. Likewise in Simond v. State, 127 Md. 29, 95 A. 1073 (Ct. App. 1915), proof of a 10-year old drunkenness conviction was rejected. But not cited by Hawthorne is Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 185 A. 2d 488 (1962), where previous convictions of murder and robbery, 39 years earlier, and larceny, 26 years earlier, were declared admissible to affect credibility. The Maryland Court of Appeals, after pointing out that the statute (like ours) fixed no time limit on admissibility, said the convictions [137]*137were admissible “without reference to the time of [their] commission, for such bearing and weight on credibility as the trier of fact may give [them] under the circumstances.” 185 A. 2d, at p. 489. The Illinois case cited by defendant, People v. Henneman, 323 Ill. App. 124, 54 N. E. 2d 745 (App. Ct. 1944), is of little weight at present on the issue now before us. Three years after Henneman the question was presented in People v. Buford, 396 Ill. 158, 71 N. E. 2d 340 (1947). In that case error was charged in the introduction, over defendant’s objection, of his previous conviction of crime on the ground that it was too remote. In upholding the admissibility of the conviction the Supreme Court said:
“The introduction of such record of conviction for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness, or the defendant who has voluntarily testified, is provided for by statute. That statute fixes no limitation as to the time of such previous conviction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, chap. 38, par. 734, p. 1271.) This contention cannot be sustained.”
It should be noted that the Illinois statute is substantially the same as ours. See also, People v. Brown, 69 Ill. App. 2d 212, 215 N. E. 2d 812 (App. Ct. 1966).
Despite the many cases in our reports sustaining the cross-examination of a witness or a defendant in a criminal case about his previous conviction of crime, no case has been cited to us, and we are unaware of any, where the question of remoteness of the conviction has been raised or ruled upon. Eecognition of the long-standing and unqualified language of the statute—not any lack of ingenuity on the part of our bar—undoubtedly presents the reason for this. In fact, the opinions of the appellate courts in discussing such proof in the context of a particular case rarely refer, except perhaps in passing, to the date of the earlier conviction of the witness. For example, see State v. Rodia, 132 N. J. L. 199 (E. & A. 1944), defendant’s 15-year old conviction; State v. Arnwine, 67 N. J. Super. 483, 485 (App. Div. 1961), convictions going back at least 20 years. More[138]*138over, in State v. Tansimore, 3 N. J. 516, 532 (1950), defendant’s conviction of murder 27 years earlier than the homicide for which he was being tried was admitted, even though he had received a pardon 14 years before the second killing. This Court held that the first conviction was properly received for impeachment purposes, under the statute, saying:
“There are no exceptions recited here and it cannot reasonably be asserted the Legislature intended the statute should become inoperative where a pardon was granted as no such provision is contained therein.”
That a pardon does not render proof of the conviction inadmissible to affect credibility seems to be the generally accepted rule. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 980 p. 543, Supp. 1964 p. 201; and see, State v. Henson, 66 N. J. L. 601, 610 (E. & A. 1901), dissenting opinion. At this point one might well ask: If a pardon does not stand in the way of the statutory direction that conviction of crime may be shown for purposes of impeachment, how can it be said that mere passage of time will nullify the legislative will? (If the pardon were granted because the executive was satisfied of the innocence of the person convicted, justice would seem to render the statute inapplicable. In fact, there has been considerable agitation for change of the Tansimore rule. But those problems are not before us now.)
Purther support for the view that the Legislature did not intend to impose a time limitation, or to authorize a court in its discretion to impose such a limitation, on the right granted to prove a witness’s previous conviction of crime is disclosed by N. J. S. 2A:164-28. This statute had its origin in Chapter 345 of the Laws of 1931. Under that act a person who received a suspended sentence after conviction of any crime, and who had no further conviction of crime for 20 years thereafter, was given permission to file a petition in the court where the conviction had been entered, praying that the record thereof be expunged and that he [139]*139be relieved “from such disabilities as may have * * * existed by reason thereof.” If the court upon hearing, after notice to the prosecutor, found no reason to the contrary it was authorized to enter an order directing expungement of all evidence of conviction, and reciting that the petitioner be “forthwith thereafter relieved from such disabilities as may have heretofore existed by reason thereof.” The broad sweep of the statute undoubtedly was called to the attention of the Legislature, because an amendment was adopted in 1936. It continued the provision for suspended sentence and added cases where a fine of no more than $500 was imposed (subsequently increased to $1000. See N. J. S. 2A:164-28). The interval between conviction and filing of the petition for expungement was reduced to 10 years and notice was required to be given to the chief of police or executive head of the police department in the municipality where the crime was committed. Then if no reason appeared to the contrary, the court was empowered to grant the order. An important qualification was added, however. Authority was withdrawn to expunge the record of the following crimes, even where sentence was suspended or the $500 (now $1000) fine was not exceeded: “treason, misprison of treason, anarchy, hostility to government [later excluded], all capital eases, perjury, carrying concealed weapons or weapons of any deadly nature or type, rape, seduction, aiding, assisting or concealing persons accused of high misdemeanors, or aiding the escape of inmates of prisons, embracery, arson, robbery or burglary.” Chapter 174, L. 1936, §§ 1, 2. Although the statute in its present form is not applicable here, it does have some relevance to our problem. It shows that the Legislature is aware of the disabilities that follow in the wake of conviction of crime. It indicates a willingness to relieve a person convicted of crimes not enumerated in the exception of the disabilities consequent upon the conviction, providing he had received no more than the specified sentence and for the ensuing 10 years had led a life of rectitude. (Although the question is not before us, [140]*140it is reasonable to suppose that an order expunging the record in a case within the statute would relieve the convicted person from being subject to proof of the conviction to affect his credibility whenever he appeared as a witness). But the original and, particularly, the amended statutes reveal a purpose to continue the disabilities consequent upon conviction of the listed crimes and all others as well unless, as to the others, the sentence thereon was suspended or the specified fine not exceeded.
We are satisfied that the Legislature in enacting the 1874 statute, which is critically involved in this case, and continuing it through the various revisions down to the present time, did not intend to impose a time limitation on the admissibility of previous convictions of crime when offered for impeachment purposes. In light of the history, the intention was to admit the proof regardless of the age of the conviction. The 1874 act was drawn by Chief Justice Beasley and Justice Depue (who were members of the Supreme Court at the time) and Mr. Cortlandt Parker, an eminent member of the bar. State v. Henson, supra, 66 N. J. L., at p. 605. If lapse of time between previous criminal conviction and the trial at which the convicted person appeared as a witness was to be a barrier against admissibility, certainly these legal scholars would have so provided. Absence of any such limitation reveals a desire to permit the whole matter to be submitted to the common sense of a jury for evaluation of the effect, if any, on the person’s credibility. In Henson, speaking of the statute, Justice Yan Syckel said:
“The act of 1874 does not submit to the court, as a question of law, whether the crimes charged should affect credibility; it is a question for the jury, whose province alone it is to say to what extent, if any, credibility shall be affected.” 66 N. J. L., at p. 606
Under all the circumstances we hold the view that previous conviction of crime of a witness, whatever its age, may be shown to affect credibility. That we deem to be the [141]*141legislative will, and if we overstate it, we assume the matter will be given appropriate consideration by the Legislature. In the present state of the law the effect on credibility of a “remote” conviction must be left to the judgment of the 12 jurors. The line of demarcation between remoteness and sufficient proximity depends upon many factors, only one of which is time. Prom a practical standpoint, where considerable time has elapsed between the conviction and the witness’s appearance, a party may hesitate to offer the proof for fear of an adverse reaction by the jury. But in the present state of the law the gamble is his to take, under adequate instructions by the court to the jury. In proper cases where the element of remoteness is involved, the trial judge in his charge should in fairness call attention to the fact, and caution the jurors against giving the conviction any more weight in passing upon the witness’s veracity than reasonable and sensible people ought to give to it.
Prom all the above, we conclude that the trial judge erred in holding he was vested with discretion to deprive the State of the opportunity, in advance of trial or otherwise, of showing defendant’s three previous criminal convictions. We add also that, even if such discretion existed, defendant’s recidivistic record should not have been excluded. His second offense was committed before the full term of the first sentence had expired. The next two crimes were more heinous than the first, and the full term of the third sentence had not run before the present alleged crime was committed. If one objective of sentence and parole is rehabilitation, it cannot be said that Hawthorne’s record shows satisfactory achievement thereof.
II
The practice engaged in here requires comment. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence of a witness’s, particularly a defendant’s, previous conviction of crime is not the type of “objection” which may be determined in advance of trial, within the contemplation of R. R. 3:5-5 (b)(1). Uor [142]*142is it within R. R. 3:2A-6(a), dealing with suppression in advance of trial of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. Credibility of a defendant is a matter which can best, and perhaps only, be evaluated in the framework of the trial as the evidence has constructed it when the defendant or the witness takes the witness stand. Only then, in the great mass of cases, can the party having the option under the statute exercise an informed judgment whether to cross-examine or otherwise prove the previous criminal record.1
This is not to say that under no circumstances can pretrial motions to exclude evidence be made, or that in some situations evidence problems cannot be settled at the pretrial conference. Obviously there is an area in which the judge’s discretion may operate. See, R. R. 4:29-1(b)(7); R. R. 3:5-3; State v. Flett, 234 Or. 124, 380 P. 2d 634, 94 A. L. R. 2d 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Annotation, “Prejudicial [143]*143Evidence—Pretrial Motion” 94 A. L. R. 2d 1087 (1964). An effort to categorize instances which might justify pretrial rulings on matters of evidence is not called for by this case. It is sufficient to say now that great caution should be exercised to avoid fractionizing trials and risking interlocutory appeals. It should be remembered also that most evidence problems are best and most expeditiously settled, in the atmosphere and context of the trial. To illustrate: Either just before the defendant is called to testify or after his direct examination, defense counsel at side bar may suggest to the court that he would like to inquire of the prosecutor if the defendant is to be cross-examined about a particular matter considered incompetent or irrelevant and probably prejudicial if questions are put about it in the presence of the jury—even if the objections then made are sustained; if so, he may request that the jury be excused while the issue is argued and decided. This is not uncommon practice in our courts; experienced trial counsel have been engaging in it for years. Such procedure does not interfere with the cohesiveness of the trial, and in our judgment, represents the ordinary and desirable practice.
Reversed and remanded for trial.