State v. Haworth

679 P.2d 1123, 106 Idaho 405, 1984 Ida. LEXIS 454

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: March 19, 1984
• Docket: 13989
• Status: Published

Opinions

HUNTLEY, Justice.

An Idaho State Police officer observed an automobile traveling slowly, at 10:00 o’clock at night, coming from Eagle, Idaho, a small town unprotected by law enforcement. The trunk lid was up, and the officer observed a large object in the trunk which weighted the rear end down. The officer stopped the vehicle, in which both defendants were occupants.¹ As a result of the stop, evidence was obtained upon which basis the defendants were charged with six robberies in Ada County. The district court ruled that the stop of the automobile was an “improper investigative stop,” and therefore granted defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence. The state has appealed.

At issue is whether the stop of the automobile violates the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.

A threshold issue is whether defendants have standing to challenge the investigatory stop of the vehicle. The officer testified that the defendants were not free to leave, and it seems obvious that a stop of a vehicle on an open highway at night is necessarily a stop of the occupants inside the vehicle. “[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the fourth amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (emphasis added). The personal rights of both Cowan as passenger and Haworth as driver “to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint-or interference from others,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were infringed upon by the investigatory stop. Therefore, both have standing to contest the reasonableness of the stop.

The district court correctly noted that-this was a “seizure” within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and the state has the burden of proving the proper justification for such a seizure. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Allgood, 98 Idaho 525, 567 P.2d 1276 (1977). The standard which the state must satisfy in order to justify an investigatory stop was recently reviewed and clarified in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). See also State v. DeMasi, 419 A.2d 285 (R.I.1980) (illegal stop of vehicle with heavily laden trunk), 452 U.S. 934, 101 S.Ct. 3072, 69 L.Ed.2d 948 (1981) (reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of Cortez), 448 A.2d 1210 (R.I.1982) (decision after remand). The Supreme Court in Cortez conceded that the standard is an “elu; sive concept” and went on to state that “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.” Supra 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695. The court clarified the “totality of the circumstances” or the “whole picture” standard as follows:

“The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions — inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. “The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior, jurors as fact-finders are permitted to do the same— and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.

“The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct.' at 695.

Since the district court in the present case did not have the benefit of the decision in Cortez, and since we are uncertain whether the district court would consider its one-paragraph memorandum decision to be its evaluation of the “totality of the circumstances — the whole picture,” we reverse and remand this case to the district court for reconsideration under the standards set out in Cortez. The facts as stated in this opinion are merely narrative and are in no way intended as binding upon the district court as the ultimate factfinder on the issue presented.

If the district court should find the vehicle stop to be non-violative of the fourth amendment, it would then be required to make additional findings of fact relevant to whether defendants have standing² to contest the subsequent searches of the vehicle and relevant to the proper justification for such searches.

Reversed and remanded.

DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur. SHEPARD, J., concurs in the result.

1 . We have previously considered this incident, although based upon a different record, a different issue, and different charges. See State v. Cowan, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983).

2 . Distinguish standing to contest a stop of a vehicle from the standing required to contest a search of a vehicle. The latter requires that the defendant "must demonstrate some proprietary interest in the premises searched or some other interest giving [the defendant] a reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Cowan, 104 Idaho 649, 651, 662 P.2d 230, 232 (1983). Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981).