State v. Havas

601 P.2d 1197, 95 Nev. 706, 1979 Nev. LEXIS 645

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Decided: October 29, 1979
• Docket: 10357
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

By the Court,

Breen, D. J.:¹

The trial court dismissed charges of forcible rape against Havas upon the ground that the prosecution had failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. This case has been before this court -twice on other matters. See State v. Havas, 91 Nev. 611, 540 P.2d 1060 (1975) and State v. Havas, No. 9321, Order Dismissing Appeal, filed December 30, 1976.

The record discloses that the pants and undergarments of the alleged victim were not produced by the prosecution for inspection when requested by the defense. No explanation was made for the unavailability of the garments nor was there a contention made that they were intentionally destroyed by the prosecutor. The garments were either lost, destroyed or simply not taken into possession during the investigation of this case.

The issue presented to us is whether the evidence not preserved was material and exculpatory. If so, the failure to preserve the evidence violates due process without the necessity of showing the reasons for its unavailability. The burden of showing materiality and exculpatory nature of the evidence rests on the defense. Hale v. State, 230 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1967); State v. Hornbeak, 559 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1977); State v. Craig, 545 P.2d 649 (Mont. 1976).

In Wallace v. State, 88 Nev. 549, 501 P.2d 1036 (1972), we reversed a conviction when the prosecution intentionally failed to disclose a psychiatrist’s report. There we followed Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), in holding that when the prosecution withholds exculpatory evidence, due process is violated regardless of the motive of the prosecutor.

Respondent contends that he would have used the garments to show lack of force. The garments, says respondent, must have been torn to have been removed in the manner claimed by the victim. The position of the prosecution is that since a showing of physical force is not necessary to complete the act of forcible rape (Dinkens v. State, 92 Nev. 74, 77, 546 P.2d 228, 230 (1976)), but only that the act was committed against the victim’s will, the garments are not material. Furthermore, claims the prosecutor, the victim has already testified that the clothing was not torn and, therefore, its presence would' be cumulative.

The crime of rape is rarely perpetrated in the presence of witnesses other than the defendant and the victim and great reliance must be placed on the testimony of the victim, and, if given, the defendant. Thus, the presence or absence of other evidence which would support or refute the testimony of the involved parties has the potential for great significance.

See for example, Davis v. Pitchess, 388 F.Supp. 105 (C.D.Cal. 1974), where the court held the presence of vaginal smears on the victim’s underpants to be highly relevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. And see State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1976), which determined that the preservation of clothing of a murder victim was immediately related to the very existence of the alleged homicide. The court therein reversed a conviction on the ground that there was a reasonable possibility that the destroyed evidence was material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

On these facts, we believe a rape victim’s underpants are so related to the commission of the crime and that their preservation has such potential relevance to the guilt or innocence of an accused that a further showing is unnecessary. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir. 1971). The prosecution should have acquired and preserved the underpants in question.

This does not place an undue burden on the prosecution for preservation of this type of evidence. In an appropriate case, where the prosecutor seeks to dispose of such evidence, the trial court can be petitioned, with notice to the defense, to determine a course of action consistent with the interests of the parties.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Thompson and Manoukian, JJ., concur.

1 Mr. Chief Justice John Mowbray voluntarily disqualified himself and took no part in this decision. The Governor, pursuant to Art. VI, § 4 of the Constitution, designated Judge Peter I. Breen of the Second Judicial District to sit in his stead.