State v. Hartley

2025 Ohio 3048

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 26, 2025
• Docket: 2024CA00117
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hartley, 2025-Ohio-3048.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2024CA00117

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court, Case No. 2024CRB1009 NICHOLAS HARTLEY Judgment: Affirmed in part: Vacated in Defendant – Appellant part; Remanded in part

Date of Judgment Entry: August 26, 2025

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Andrew J. King, Robert G. Montgomery, Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: Jason P. Reese, Canton Law Director, Katie M. Erchick Gilbert, Canton City Prosecutor, Kristina Lockwood, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff- Appellee; D. Coleman Bond, for Defendant-Appellant. OPINION

Hoffman, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nicholas Hartley appeals the judgment entered by the

Canton Municipal Court convicting him following jury trial of criminal damaging (R.C.

2909.06(A)(1)), and sentencing him to ninety days in the Stark County Jail. Plaintiff-

appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On February 1, 2025, Appellant was seated in a courtroom gallery in the

Canton Municipal Court, waiting for his appearance for a traffic citation. Officer David

Wright of the Canton Police Department was working in the courthouse securing inmates

for court appearances. As Officer Wright passed Appellant in the gallery of the courtroom,

Appellant asked to speak to the officer. Appellant said to Officer Wright, “You’re a fucking

pig.” Tr. 49. The officer asked Appellant to step into the lobby, so as not to disturb court.

{¶3} In the lobby Appellant became very loud and vulgar. The officer told

Appellant to be seated, and a bailiff would call him when it was time for Appellant’s court

appearance. Appellant continued cursing loudly. Officer Gary Premier heard the

disturbance from inside the courtroom, and came to the lobby to assist Officer Wright.

{¶4} The officers escorted Appellant outside the building, where Appellant

continued to create a disturbance. Appellant blocked the entrance to the building, forcing

people to enter through the exit. The officers called for backup.

{¶5} Officers attempted to bring Appellant back into the courthouse for his

hearing. However, Appellant refused to put his phone down in order to walk through the metal detector. Appellant was escorted by officers back outside the building, where he

became more agitated. Appellant was arrested by Sergeant Larry Legg.

{¶6} Sgt. Legg escorted Appellant to a holding cell inside the Canton Municipal

Courthouse. Appellant continued to yell at the officers. For approximately forty minutes,

Appellant repeatedly kicked the door of the holding cell. The door shook when Appellant

kicked the door. The officer warned Appellant he was damaging the door, and Appellant

responded he did not care. The door displayed signs of damage, and would no longer

open properly.

{¶7} Appellant was initially charged with vandalism as a felony of the fifth degree,

and disorderly conduct as a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The case was bound

over to the Stark County Grand Jury. The Grand Jury indicted Appellant with criminal

damaging or endangering, a misdemeanor of the second degree, in violation of R.C.

2909.06(A)(1). The case was transferred back to the Canton Municipal Court.

{¶8} The case proceeded to jury trial. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the

trial court convicted Appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict. The trial court

sentenced Appellant to ninety days in the Stark County Jail, with all but seven days

suspended on condition of good behavior for two years. Appellant was ordered to

complete fifty hours of supervised community service in lieu of jail days and placed on

probation for two years. It is from the July 26, 2024 judgment of the trial court Appellant

prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error: I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO

SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST THE APPELLANT FOR THE

OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL DAMAGING OR ENDANGERING IN

VIOLATION OF R. C. 2909.06(A)(1).

II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, AND MUST BE REVERSED.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION

OF TESTIMONIAL AND VIDEO EVIDENCE CONCERNING

ALLEGATIONS OF PRIOR CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS BY

APPELLANT, IN VIOLATION OF OHIO EVID. R. 402, 403, AND 404(B).

THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS EVIDENCE WAS IRRELEVANT,

PREJUDICIAL, AND IMPROPERLY USED TO SUGGEST THAT

APPELLANT ACTED IN CONFORMITY WITH PRIOR ACTS TO PROVE

GUILT REGARDING THE CHARGED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL

DAMAGING OR ENDANGERING.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO AFFORD APPELLANT AN

OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLOCUTION PRIOR TO SENTENCING, AND AS

SUCH THE SENTENCE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

I., II.

{¶9} In his first and second assignments of error, Appellant argues the judgment

convicting him of criminal damaging or endangering is not supported by sufficient

evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. {¶10} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph two of

the syllabus (1991).

{¶11} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App. 3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

{¶12} Appellant was convicted of criminal damaging or endangering in violation of

R.C. 2909.06(A)(1):

(A) No person shall cause, or create a substantial risk of physical

harm to any property of another without the other person's consent:

(1) Knowingly, by any means[.]

{¶13} Appellant argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove he

damaged the door or created a substantial risk of physical harm to the door. He argues

the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence for the same reason, and also argues the jury lost its way because of the erroneous admission of other acts

evidence.1

{¶14} Sgt. Legg testified Appellant kicked and pushed his body against the door

of the holding cell for approximately forty minutes. Sgt. Legg’s body camera video,

admitted into evidence at trial, shows the door shook from the force of Appellant kicking

the door. Appellant continued to kick the door despite warnings from Sgt. Legg about

damaging the door. The photos admitted into evidence show scuff marks and a crease

on the door. While the officer could not affirmatively testify the door was completely free

of damage prior to Appellant being placed inside, the officer testified the door to the cell

opened easily at the time he placed Appellant inside, but did not open properly when he

retrieved Appellant from the cell later. We find the State presented sufficient evidence

from which the jury could find Appellant knowingly created a substantial risk of physical

harm to the door, or caused physical harm to the door. We further find the jury did not

lose its way in finding Appellant either damaged the door or created a substantial risk of

physical harm to the door, and the judgment of conviction is therefore not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶15} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

III.

{¶16} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the testimony and body

camera video admitted into evidence showing his behavior in the courthouse prior to

being placed in the holding cell constituted inadmissible other bad acts evidence in

violation of Evid.R. 404(B). We disagree.

1The issue of the admissibility of other acts evidence is assigned separately in Appellant’s third

assignment of error, and will be addressed separately. {¶17} At the outset, we note Appellant argues the State did not provide written

notice of its intent to rely on other acts evidence, as required by Evid.R. 404(B)(2).

Appellant has failed to separately assign the State’s failure to provide notice as error.

Pursuant to App. R. 12(A)(2), we disregard any argument not separately assigned as

error as required by App. R. 16(A).

{¶18} Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his behavior prior

to his placement in the holding cell on the basis the evidence was not relevant and the

danger of unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value, in violation of Evid.R. 402 and

403. Throughout trial and at the end of trial, Appellant noted his continuing objection to

this evidence on the basis of relevance. However, Appellant did not specifically object in

the trial court to admission of the evidence violated Evid.R. 404(B). Accordingly, we must

find plain error in order to reverse. To establish plain error, Appellant must show an error

occurred, the error was obvious, and there is a reasonable probability the error resulted

in prejudice, meaning the error affected the outcome of the trial. State v. McAlpin, 2022-

Ohio-1567, ¶ 66, citing State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22.

{¶19} “A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the

rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271(1991).

{¶20} Evid.R. 404(B) provides in pertinent part: (B) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not

admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice. This evidence may be admissible for

another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

{¶21} Evid.R. 403(A) provides, “Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of

confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

{¶22} “Evid.R. 404(B) categorically prohibits evidence of a defendant's other acts

when its only value is to show that the defendant has the character or propensity to

commit a crime.” State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4441, ¶ 36. Other acts evidence may,

however, be admissible for another non-character-based purpose, such as “motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.” Evid.R. 404(B)(2). “The key is that the evidence must prove something other

than the defendant's disposition to commit certain acts.” State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-

4440, ¶ 22.

{¶23} In State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5695, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a

three-part analysis for consideration of admissibility of other acts evidence: The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence is

relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Evid.R. 401. The next step is to consider whether evidence of the other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the character of the accused

in order to show activity in conformity therewith or whether the other acts

evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in

Evid.R. 404(B). The third step is to consider whether the probative value of

the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice. See Evid.R. 403.

{¶24} Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶25} Other acts evidence may also be admitted when those acts form part of the

“immediate background of the alleged act,” as part of the res gestae of the charged crime.

State v. David, 2021-Ohio-4004, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). “There are occasions when the other-

acts evidence is so inextricably intertwined with the charged conduct that its admission is

necessary to give the complete picture of what occurred.” State v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio

St.2d 308, 318 (1980).

{¶26} The admissibility of other acts evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) is a

question of law. Hartman at ¶ 22. A trial court is precluded from admitting improper

character evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), but it has discretion to allow other acts evidence

which is admissible for a permissible purpose. Id., citing Williams at ¶ 17. {¶27} Pursuant to Williams, we first consider whether the evidence was relevant.

We find the evidence of Appellant’s behavior immediately prior to being placed in the

holding cell was relevant to demonstrate he knowingly damaged the door or created a

substantial risk of harm to the door by kicking it repeatedly. The evidence demonstrated

his anger and disruptive behavior toward the police officers working at the courthouse

continued despite the officers’ attempts to deescalate Appellant’s behavior, in order to

allow him to complete his business at the courthouse.

{¶28} We next consider whether the evidence was presented to prove the

character of the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith, or whether the

other acts evidence was presented for a legitimate purpose. We find the evidence was

presented for the legitimate purpose of demonstrating the res gestae of the offense of

criminal damaging or endangering. Appellant’s actions in the holding cell were a

continuation of his actions in the courthouse which led to his arrest, and ultimately to his

placement in the holding cell. Without evidence of what happened in the courthouse

earlier, the jury would have no context for Appellant’s placement in the holding cell at the

courthouse. His actions throughout the encounter are inextricably intertwined, and

evidence of what occurred prior to Appellant’s placement in the holding cell was

necessary to provide the jury with a complete picture of the offense. Further, we find the

evidence was admissible to show his motive or intent in kicking the door for forty minutes

while in the holding cell.

{¶29} Finally, we must consider whether the probative value of the evidence was

outweighed by its probative value. We find the trial court’s decision the probative value

of the evidence to demonstrate Appellant’s motive and intent, as well as to establish the res gestae of the charged offense, outweighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence did

not constitute an abuse of discretion.

{¶30} We find the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting other acts

evidence. The third assignment of error is overruled.

IV.

{¶31} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

failing to afford him his right to allocution prior to sentencing as required by Crim. R.

32(A)(1). The State concedes this assignment of error, and agrees the case must be

remanded for resentencing.

{¶32} The fourth assignment of error is sustained.

{¶33} The judgment of the Canton Municipal Court convicting Appellant of criminal

damaging or endangering is affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and this case is

remanded for resentencing. Costs are assessed to Appellant.

By: Hoffman, P.J.

King, J. and

Montgomery, J. concur