[Cite as State v. Hartley, 2026-Ohio-642.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 31329
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE RAYMOND HARTLEY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. CR-2024-03-0874
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 25, 2026
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Raymond Hartley, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On the evening of February 27, 2024, T.C. drove to the house of his friend, Amber
Weaver, who lives in Tallmadge. Weaver was working the night shift that evening and she had
arranged for T.C. to spend the night and care for her children. During the middle of the night, a
man walked into the bedroom where T.C. was sleeping and struck him in the head. When Weaver
returned home, she found Hartley sleeping on the couch while a badly injured T.C. remained in
the bedroom.
{¶3} Following an investigation by Tallmadge police, the Summit County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging Hartley with one count of felonious assault and one count of
aggravated burglary. Hartley pleaded not guilty to the charge at arraignment, and the matter 2
proceeded to a jury trial. The trial court gave jury instructions on felonious assault and aggravated
burglary, as well as the lesser included offenses of assault and criminal trespass. The jury found
Hartley guilty of felonious assault, but not guilty of aggravated burglary and the lesser included
offense of criminal trespass. The trial court imposed a sentence of two to three years
imprisonment.
{¶4} On appeal, Hartley raises four assignments of error. This Court consolidates certain
assignments of error to facilitate review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. HARTLEY’S [CRIM.R.] 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Hartley contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the felonious assault charge. In his second assignment
of error, Hartley argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction
for felonious assault.1 This Court disagrees with both assertions.
{¶6} Crim.R. 29(A) provides, in relevant part:
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state’s case.
1 As Hartley combined his first and second assignments of error in his merit brief, this Court also joins those assignments of error. 3
{¶7} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the
trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶8} Hartley was convicted of one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), which states, “[n]o person shall knowingly . . . [c]ause serious physical harm to
another[.]” R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a) further provides that “[w]hoever violates this section is guilty
of felonious assault. Except as otherwise provided[,] . . . felonious assault is a felony of the second
degree.” Hartley’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence focuses on whether this case
involved serious physical harm. R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) defines “[s]erious physical harm to persons”
as any of the following:
(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain. 4
Background
{¶9} During its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence in support of the following
narrative. Weaver is a single mother of four children. Weaver works as a manager at a
developmental disability agency that provides home healthcare services. Because Weaver was
working the night shift on the evening of February 27, 2024, she made arrangements for her friend,
T.C., to stay the night at her house and watch her two youngest children, both of whom are boys.
When Weaver returned home after her shift on the morning of February 28, 2024, she was
surprised to find her cousin, Hartley, sleeping on the couch. Weaver testified that while Hartley
had visited the house previously, he was not supposed to be in the house at that time. Weaver
explained that Hartley’s relationship with T.C. was “[n]ot good.” Weaver walked into the bedroom
and found that T.C. was “badly injured[.]” T.C. was in a pool of blood and his face was battered.
When T.C. indicated that Hartley had caused the injuries, Weaver woke up Hartley, who appeared
to be intoxicated. Weaver asked Hartley to get in her car, and she drove him to his mother’s house.
Weaver then returned to her house and called 9-1-1. After making a report to police and then
attempting to find alternate childcare arrangements, Weaver drove T.C. to the hospital.
{¶10} At trial, T.C. explained that Weaver had arranged for him to be at her house to
receive her two boys from another babysitter early in the morning on February 28, 2024. With
Weaver’s permission, T.C. arrived the night before to ensure that there would not be any traffic
issues the following morning. After texting Weaver around 10:00 p.m. to let her know that he had
arrived, T.C. fell asleep in Weaver’s bedroom. T.C. testified that he was suddenly awoken in the
middle of the night when Hartley punched him in the face. After some initial confusion as to why
Hartley was in the bedroom, T.C. explained that he “faded out pretty quick[ly]” after being
punched. T.C. further testified that there was “a lot of blood” and that he had “a pretty bad cut to 5
[his] eyebrow[.]” T.C. experienced facial numbness immediately after being punched. Still lying
in bed, T.C. turned away from Hartley before losing consciousness. When Weaver woke up T.C.
the following morning, T.C. was “very fuzzy” and “completely out of it.” T.C.’s eye was nearly
swollen shut and he was in a great deal of pain.
{¶11} Before going to the hospital, Weaver called the police and Officer Collin Hefner
responded to the scene. Officer Hefner testified that it looked like T.C. “had been severely beaten
[] on the left side of his face.” Officer Hefner noted that “the whites of [T.C.’s] eye appeared to
be filled with blood.” In addition to taking the report, Officer Hefner advised T.C. to go to the
hospital, given that his injuries were significant. T.C. underwent a CT scan upon arriving at the
hospital. T.C. was diagnosed with a concussion. T.C. also suffered a chipped tooth. At trial, the
State introduced photographs depicting the extent of T.C.’s injuries. The photographs showed
deep cuts to T.C.’s eyebrow, significant swelling on the left side T.C.’s face, as well as severe
redness in T.C.’s left eye. T.C. testified that he experienced blurred vision for a period after the
incident and that it “took [] a good two to three months for everything to get back to half normal[.]”
Discussion
{¶12} In support of his first and second assignments of error, Hartley asserts that “[w]hile
[he] does not dispute that he caused physical harm to T.C., he submits that the testimony and
evidence presented clearly demonstrated that the injuries inflicted did not result in ‘serious
physical harm’ to T.C.” Hartley stresses that T.C.’s concussion diagnosis was a clinical diagnosis
and that the emergency room physician did not feel that it was necessary to refer T.C. to a
neurologist. Hartley further highlights that this case did not involve a weapon and that T.C.
declined treatment in the emergency room for the cuts on his face. 6
{¶13} Under these circumstances, Hartley’s sufficiency challenge is without merit.
“Serious physical harm” is defined under R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(c), (d), and (e) as harm that results
in the victim experiencing “temporary, substantial incapacity[,]” “temporary, serious
disfigurement[,]” or “acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering or that
involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.” “The degree of harm that rises to the level
of ‘serious’ physical harm is not an exact science, particularly when the definition includes such
terms as ‘substantial,’ ‘temporary,’ ‘acute,’ and ‘prolonged.’” (Citations omitted.) State v. Mango,
2016-Ohio-2935, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). To the extent that Hartley downplays the level of treatment that
T.C. received at the emergency room, this Court is mindful that we must construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution in resolving a sufficiency challenge. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d at 279. Hartley punched T.C. while T.C. was defenseless in his sleep, and T.C. awoke only
briefly before quickly losing consciousness. The next morning, Weaver found T.C. in a pool of
his own blood, having suffered severe lacerations and swelling on the left side of his face, as well
as a chipped tooth. T.C. remained dazed at that time and he was subsequently diagnosed with a
concussion. T.C. also experienced blurred vision for several months after the assault. This
evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to establish that
Hartley’s attack resulted in serious physical harm to T.C.
{¶14} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
MR. HARTLEY’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶15} In his third assignment of error, Hartley argues that his felonious assault conviction
was against the weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees. 7
{¶16} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be
against the weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). An appellate court should exercise the
power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional
cases. Id.
{¶17} Focusing largely on the details of T.C.’s emergency room visit, Hartley argues that
the weight of the evidence does not support the conclusion that T.C. suffered serious physical
harm. Hartley stresses that T.C. did not seek medical treatment for roughly 12 to 14 hours after
the attack and that the level of care that T.C. received in the emergency room was not consistent
with suffering serious physical harm.
{¶18} As discussed above, T.C. lost consciousness after being struck by Hartley in the
middle of the night. When Weaver found T.C. the following morning, T.C. was covered in blood
and he remained “very much still out of it.” Weaver took measures to drive Hartley to a separate
location prior to returning to her house and calling the police to report the incident. After making
a police report, Weaver had difficulty making alternate childcare arrangements before she could
drive T.C. to the hospital. By the time Weaver and T.C. arrived at the emergency room at Akron
City Hospital, it was approximately 5:00 pm on February 28, 2024.
{¶19} At trial, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Brigid McCulloch, the attending
physician in the emergency room who treated T.C. Dr. McCulloch testified that the assault on
T.C. resulted in ecchymosis around the left eye, jaw pain, and a subconjunctival hemorrhage, 8
which is the burst of the blood vessels in the eye. T.C. also suffered a chipped tooth and a
laceration above the eyebrow. Based on T.C.’s condition, Dr. McCulloch ordered a CT scan, based
in part out of concern that T.C. had suffered a facial fracture. Dr. McCulloch testified that the
radiologist’s interpretation of the CT scan revealed significant soft tissue swelling but the medical
team was able to rule out intercranial bleeding or a facial fracture. Dr. McCulloch diagnosed T.C.
with a concussion and instructed him to return if his symptoms worsened. Dr. McCulloch testified
that a concussion is a traumatic brain injury and it is typically subject to a clinical diagnosis. Dr.
McColloch further explained that recovery from a concussion can take a period of days or months,
depending on the severity of the injury. While Dr. McCulloch also offered T.C. laceration wash
out and repair, T.C. expressed a preference to treat the wound at home.
{¶20} On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired as to whether Dr. McColloch
directed T.C. to see a neurologist. Dr. McColloch answered in the negative based on her review
of her records. Dr. McColloch explained that she instructed T.C. to seek medical attention if his
concussion symptoms intensified because that could signify the worsening of a traumatic brain
injury. The trial court also permitted the jury to ask several questions. Regarding the timeframe
of events, Dr. McColloch testified that T.C. reported that the injury occurred overnight while he
was sleeping and that the triage process in the emergency room started at 5:53 p.m. on February
28, 2024. T.C. was discharged at 10:16 p.m. With respect to the timeframe for recovery, Dr.
McColloch testified that a subconjunctival hemorrhage typically does not result in permanent
damage to the eye. Dr. McColloch noted, however, that a concussion can result in lingering vision
issues.
{¶21} A careful review of the record reveals that Hartley’s conviction did not result in a
manifest miscarriage of justice. While Hartley attempts to downplay T.C.’s injuries by 9
underscoring that T.C. did not immediately seek medical attention, the State presented evidence
regarding the sequence of events that caused the delay. Namely, T.C. was unconscious for a period
of time following the incident and Weaver first removed Hartley from her home, called the police,
and sought to make childcare arrangements prior to driving T.C. to the hospital. Furthermore, Dr.
McColloch explained that a clinical diagnosis of a concussion is common practice and that, in the
case of a severe concussion, symptoms could last for months. Accordingly, the fact T.C. was not
referred to a neurologist does not negate the other evidence regarding the severity of his injuries.
T.C. testified that he experienced blurred vision for a prolonged period of time following the
incident and that it was two or three months before he began to feel normal. Under the
circumstances presented here, Hartley has not demonstrated that this is the exceptional case where
the jury clearly lost its way. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340.
{¶22} Hartley’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
MR. HARTLEY WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
{¶23} In his fourth assignment of error, Hartley argues that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to request that the trial court give a jury instruction on the offense
of aggravated assault. This Court disagrees.
{¶24} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Hartley must show that
“counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that prejudice arose
from counsel’s performance.” State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 674 (1998), citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Hartley must show that counsel’s performance
was objectively deficient by producing evidence that counsel acted unreasonably. State v. Keith,
79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534 (1997), citing Strickland at 687. Second, he must demonstrate that but for 10
counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been
different. Keith at 534. “This Court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if the
appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), citing
State v. Ray, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.).
{¶25} During a break in the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel raised the prospect of
requesting an alternative jury instruction on aggravated assault. The parties debated the issue, and
the State ultimately presented case law indicating that an aggravated assault instruction would not
be appropriate. Upon reviewing the case law, the trial court agreed with the State and indicated
that an aggravated assault instruction was “off the table.” At that point, defense counsel
acknowledged that the case law presented by the State was “dispositive” and, in the alternative,
lobbied for an instruction on misdemeanor assault. The State indicated that it had no objection to
a misdemeanor assault instruction.
{¶26} On appeal, Hartley maintains that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to renew his request for an aggravated assault jury instruction at the close of the
evidence, in light of the testimony that T.C. tended to “nitpick” Hartley and that the two men did
not have a good relationship. Hartley maintains that if defense counsel had requested the
aggravated assault instruction, Hartley would have been convicted of a fourth-degree offense as
opposed to second-degree felonious assault.
{¶27} Hartley’s ineffective assistance argument is without merit. As discussed above,
trial counsel raised the prospect of an aggravated assault jury instruction and the trial court ruled
that such an instruction was “off the table.” At that time, trial counsel pivoted and requested an
instruction on misdemeanor assault, to which the trial court agreed. While Hartley now contends
that trial counsel should have revisited the possibility of an aggravated assault jury instruction at 11
the close of the evidence, we are unpersuaded given that such an instruction would have been
inappropriate in light of the well-settled precedent that aggravated assault is not a lesser-included
offense of felonious assault. See generally State v. Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 210-211 (1988).
Accordingly, as Hartley has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s performance was objectively
deficient, he cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance claim.
{¶28} Hartley’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶29} Hartley’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 12
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT
FLAGG LANZINGER, J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JAMES K. REED, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.