[Cite as State v. Harrison, 2011-Ohio-3258.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 95666
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LORENZO HARRISON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-513945
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Keough, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 30, 2011 2
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
David L. Doughten The Brownhoist Building 4403 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44103
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: Mary McGrath Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Lorenzo Harrison appeals from the decision of the trial court,
denying his pro se request for new counsel. Harrison argues the trial court
failed to follow the mandates issued by this court in State v. Harrison,
Cuyahoga App. No. 93132, 2010-Ohio-2778. In particular, Harrison argues
the trial court erred in failing to hold a full and fair hearing and in failing to 3
appoint new counsel for the hearing on remand. For the following reasons,
we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 2} On June 17, 2010, this Court announced its opinion in Harrison.
The facts in Harrison are as follows:
“I. Procedural History
In August 2008, Harrison was indicted on ten counts of rape, each with a furthermore clause that he purposely compelled the victim to submit by force or threat of force, a furthermore clause that the victim was under ten years of age, a notice of prior conviction, and a repeat violent offender specification. Harrison was also indicted on ten counts of kidnapping, each with a sexual motivation specification, notice of prior conviction, and repeat violent offender specification.
Two of the rapes (Counts 1 and 2) and kidnappings (Counts 3 and 4) were alleged to have occurred between August 1, 2005 and January 15, 2006. Four of the rapes (Counts 5-8) and kidnappings (Counts 9-12) were alleged to have occurred between February 1, 2006 and August 1, 2006. The remaining rapes (Counts 13-16) and kidnappings (Counts 17-20) were alleged to have occurred between August 2, 2006 and June 1, 2007. The sole alleged victim was R.A.
A bill of particulars delineated that the charges set forth in Counts 1-4 occurred at a Columbia Avenue, Cleveland home; the charges set forth in Counts 5-12 occurred at an East 106th Street, Cleveland apartment; and the remaining charges set forth in Counts 13-20 occurred at a Woodside Avenue, Cleveland apartment.
After a psychiatric evaluation was performed on Harrison, the case was placed on the common pleas court’s mental health court docket.
The repeat violent offender specifications and notices of prior conviction were bifurcated from the underlying charges and tried to the court. On the day of trial, Harrison made an oral motion to excuse his assistant public defender, but the court summarily denied his request. Counts 13-20 were dismissed at the close of the state’s case 4
pursuant to the defense’s Crim.R. 29 motion. The defense did not present any evidence.
The jury found Harrison guilty of the following: Count 1, rape, and Count 3, kidnapping (at the Columbia Avenue address); Count 5, rape, Count 8, rape, Count 9, kidnapping, and Count 12, kidnapping (at the East 106th address). Harrison was also found guilty of the notices and specifications attendant to Counts 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, and 12. He was acquitted of the remaining charges.
The trial court sentenced him to a life term for the rape counts, to be served concurrently to ten-year sentences for the kidnapping convictions.
II. Trial Testimony
The victim, R.A., testified that she and her mother lived in Cleveland with Harrison at three different residences; she had previously lived with her Aunt Evelyn in Detroit. She stated that Harrison anally raped her on seven different occasions during the time she lived with him. R.A. testified that the incidents occurred while her mother was at work and R.A. was at home with Harrison. After the last time that Harrison raped R.A., he told her that what he had done was wrong and he was going to stop.
R.A. testified that she once told her mother about the rapes, but her mother did not do anything. Her mother admitted that R.A. had told her about Harrison’s conduct and that she did not do anything because she loved Harrison, did not want to see him get in trouble, and did not believe R.A. She continued to leave R.A. alone with Harrison after R.A.’s disclosure.
The trial testimony also revealed that R.A.’s mother and Harrison had a tumultuous relationship that involved drinking and physical violence. R.A.’s mother eventually tired of the relationship, and she and R.A. moved to their hometown of Detroit. Shortly after the move, R.A. told her Aunt Evelyn of the rapes; Evelyn immediately contacted the Cleveland police.
A medical exam was conducted on R.A. two months after the last rape; no evidence of sexual conduct was noted.” 5
Id. {¶ 3} In its opinion, this court overruled Harrison’s objections to the
jury panel, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, his challenge to the
weight of evidence supporting his convictions, and Harrison’s argument that
his waiver of the right to testify was not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily given. Id. However, this court found merit to Harrison’s fourth
assignment of error, in which he argued that the trial court erred in denying
his request to dismiss his counsel without investigation into the grounds for
the request.
“Just prior to voir dire, Harrison asked for replacement counsel, to which the court responded, ‘[t]hat request is denied.’ Trial then commenced.
At sentencing, Harrison raised the issue of his request for replacement counsel and stated that he felt as if he had been ‘railroaded’ by the court and counsel. Defense counsel stated, ‘I don’t want to get into a discussion with Mr. Harrison about the issues he raised. We do have a – I just don’t want to do that on the record.’ The assistant prosecutor responded, ‘Your Honor, if I may for the record just point out that at no point during the four days of trial did the defendant state he was not being properly represented, he never brought anything forward to the court, so I would just like to state that for the record.’”
Id.
{¶ 4} In Harrison, this court found error with the trial court’s
summary dismissal of Harrison’s request for replacement counsel without
permitting him to explain his reasons for the request. Based on the 6
authority from Ohio case law, this Court remanded the case to the trial court
“for the limited purpose of inquiring into Harrison’s allegations, with
instructions to re-enter the judgment of conviction if the allegations are
unfounded.” Id.
{¶ 5} On August 20, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing
pursuant to this court’s order of remand. The trial court provided Harrison
with the opportunity to explain why he wanted another lawyer. Harrison
stated that counsel told his family that he thought Harrison was guilty and
that it was only his job to get the best plea bargain for him, and that counsel
would not call or speak to any of Harrison’s witnesses. Harrison further
stated that counsel refused to acquire police reports that would show that he
was evicting R.A. and her mother from his residence and that they did not
leave on their own.
{¶ 6} In response, defense counsel explained that Harrison did claim
that a lot of people lived in the house when these alleged incidents occurred
and that any number of those individuals could have been an alibi witness.
Defense counsel stated that he did attempt to locate an alibi witness,
however, because the allegations happened over multiple years and at least
three separate locations, counsel was unable to pinpoint the days when other
people were present. Counsel also stated that he did not recall anything 7
about the police reports Harrison mentioned.
{¶ 7} In response to the court’s questions, trial counsel stated that he
did speak with Harrison’s family and that he always leaves the decision to go
to trial to the client. Counsel stated that he believed the plea bargain offer
was a good offer, but he never said Harrison had to take the deal. In fact,
Harrison elected to proceed to a jury trial.
{¶ 8} Harrison next complained that the trial court never asked him or
let him proceed with his own counsel; rather the court subjected him to the
public defender. Harrison admitted that the first time he told the court he
was bringing in paid counsel was on the date of trial, with a jury waiting to
proceed. Additionally, Harrison admitted to filing numerous pro se motions
with the court, but that he never told the court of his new counsel because he
did not have the opportunity. The trial court fund Harrison’s claim
unbelievable given all of the motions Harrison filed during the course of his
case.
{¶ 9} Harrison next told the court that he hired Attorney David
Doughten. Harrison stated that he had not paid Mr. Doughten but that he
was in the process of getting his retainer fee. Harrison reported that Mr.
Doughten would make an appearance as soon as he got the money and all
court papers. Although Mr. Doughten never made an appearance during 8
Harrison’s trial, he did represent Harrison on appeal because, according to
Harrison, “that was the stage that [they were] at.” Tr. 11. Further,
Harrison stated that Mr. Doughten did not make an appearance at trial
because he was not yet on the team. Harrison then stated that there was no
way he wanted to go to trial with the public defender because he used to be a
prosecutor, and still had friends in the prosecutor’s office.
{¶ 10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that
the reasons Harrison asserted for replacing counsel were insufficient. The
trial court found that had Harrison hired an attorney, the attorney could
have made an appearance. The trial court then denied Harrison’s request
for new counsel.
{¶ 11} Harrison appeals, raising the two assignments of error contained
in the appendix to this opinion.
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Harrison argues the trial court
failed to provide a full and fair hearing on the remand from this court. This
assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶ 13} In State v. Deal (1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 244 N.E.2d 742, the
Ohio Supreme Court stated the following at its syllabus: “Where, during the
course of his trial for a serious crime, an indigent accused questions the
effectiveness and adequacy of assigned counsel, by stating that such counsel 9
failed to file seasonably a notice of alibi or to subpoena witnesses in support
thereof even though requested to do so by accused, it is the duty of the trial
judge to inquire into the complaint and make such inquiry a part of the
record. The trial judge may then require the trial to proceed with assigned
counsel participating if the complaint is not substantiated or is
unreasonable.”
{¶ 14} In State v. Prater (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 78, 83, 593 N.E.2d 44,
the Tenth Appellate District found a judge’s concerns about the timeliness of
a motion for new counsel unpersuasive in ruling that the judge should have
inquired about the defendant’s complaint. The Ohio Supreme Court cited
Prater with approval in State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 524, 684
N.E.2d 47. In State v. Beranek (Dec. 14, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76260,
this court noted that, “[i]n both Deal and Prater, the case was remanded to
the judge for the limited purpose of inquiring into the defendant’s
allegations, with instructions to re-enter the judgment of conviction if the
allegations were unfounded. Deal, 17 Ohio St.2d at 20, 244 N.E.2d at
743-44; Prater, 71 Ohio App.3d at 85-86, 593 N.E.2d at 48.”
{¶ 15} This court explained the purpose of the limited remand: “[t]he
purpose of the inquiry and investigation are to allow a defendant the
opportunity to place his allegations on the record, and to show sufficient 10
investigation into their merit to allow appellate review. Thus the
complaining defendant is allowed the opportunity to place allegations and
evidence of at least some issues of ineffective assistance of counsel on the
record for review on direct appeal, rather than having those issues postponed
for postconviction relief petitions, because they rely on evidence outside the
record.” Beranek. This court noted that if the defendant’s allegations are
specific enough to justify further investigation, the court must investigate,
but no further investigation is required for vague or general reasons for
wanting to discharge counsel. Beranek. This court also stated, quoting
Prater, that the investigation may be “‘brief and minimal.’” Beranek.
{¶ 16} This court held that the judge on remand should attempt to
determine those issues for which the defendant sought to discharge his
attorney initially, and acknowledged that “in the aftermath of trial,” a
defendant “might assert numerous errors of his trial counsel,” but cautioned
that “it is unlikely that he would foresee each error prior to trial.” Beranek.
{¶ 17} It was on the above authority that this court in Harrison
remanded this case for a hearing. On remand, the trial court properly
conducted a hearing and allowed Harrison to place on the record, his reasons
for the request for new counsel. After reviewing the record and all evidence
adduced at the hearing, we find that the trial court made sufficient inquiry 11
into the allegation to provide this court with meaningful review. We also
agree with the trial court that Harrison’s reasons supporting his request for
new counsel were insufficient.
{¶ 18} Primarily, during the hearing, Harrison made general, broad
statements about his dislike for the manner in which trial counsel conducted
the investigation into his case. Harrison claimed that he had alibi
witnesses and police reports that would provide a motive for R.A. and her
mother to falsely accuse him. However, Harrison never provided the name
of any alleged alibi witness or any police report showing that he evicted R.A.
or her mother. Moreover, defense counsel provided a reasonable
explanation for the lack of an alibi witness: given the length of time over
which these allegations occurred and the number of residences at which they
were to have occurred, defense counsel found it impossible to pinpoint any
alibi witnesses. Lastly, this court rejected Harrison’s suggestion that the
victim made up the crimes. Harrison, supra.
{¶ 19} Next, Harrison claims the trial court erred when it failed to
inquire into the attorney-client relationship during the hearing. Initially,
we note that Harrison never alleged that a breakdown between himself and
trial counsel ever occurred. Nonetheless, we find that the trial court was
not required to do so. The purpose of the hearing was to allow Harrison to 12
state the reason why he wanted replacement counsel. If the reasons were
vague and general, as the trial court found in this case, no further
investigation was required. Prater, Beranek. Accordingly, the trial court
did not have to determine whether a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship occurred.
{¶ 20} Harrison also claims that the trial court erred by allowing his
trial counsel to represent him on the remand hearing and further erred when
it failed to place himself and his trial counsel under oath. Again, however,
Harrison misses the point of the limited remand in his case. A court is
required to conduct an investigation only if it determines that a defendant’s
allegations are specific enough. Prater, Beranek. The remand hearing was
an informal procedure designed to flush out meritorious claims for new
counsel. Had Harrison presented such a claim, the trial court would have
been bound to conduct a further investigation, which would have presumably
involved the swearing in of witnesses and assigning of counsel.
{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, we agree with the court’s conclusion that
Harrison’s allegations for replacement counsel were insufficient.
{¶ 22} Harrison’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} In his second assignment of error, Harrison argues that the trial
court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel for the remand hearing. 13
We disagree.
{¶ 24} Primarily, we note that in making this argument, Harrison fails
to cite to any authority requiring a trial court to appoint counsel on a remand
hearing on a motion for replacement counsel. Moreover, similar case law
and this court’s decision in Harrison do not require new counsel to be
appointed on remand.
{¶ 25} Nonetheless, Harrison argues that had new counsel been
appointed, counsel would have argued that Harrison did not know he had an
absolute right to testify and that trial counsel’s failure to acquire a medical
expert was an error. Additionally, Harrison claims that appointment of
counsel would have permitted cross-examination of witnesses and the
procurement of records that would have allowed the court to determine
whether Harrison’s charges were justified.
{¶ 26} Again, as stated above, on remand, the trial court was merely
required to allow Harrison to state his reasons for wanting to discharge
counsel. Prater, Beranek, Harrison. If Harrison’s allegations were found to
be vague and general, as in the instant case, no further investigation was
warranted. Moreover, this Court specifically rejected Harrison’s arguments
concerning his right to testify and the lack of a medical expert. See,
Harrison. 14
{¶ 27} Accordingly, Harrison’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 28} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been
affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
Appendix
Assignments of Error:
“I. The trial court failed to provide the appellant a full and fair hearing on the remand from this court.” 15
“II. The trial court deprived the appellant his right to assistance of counsel by failing to appoint counsel for the remand procedure.”