State v. Harrington

440 A.2d 1078

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: March 31, 1982
• Status: Published

Opinions

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

A Superior Court jury in York County found defendant guilty of criminally negligent manslaughter, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A) (Supp.1980), but the presiding justice entered a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict.¹ The State brings this appeal, pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(2) (1980) and M.R.Crim.P. 37B. We reverse the judgment of acquittal and reinstate the jury verdict.

On January 16, 1981, defendant visited the Sanford home of one of his friends in the company of another friend, Thomas Mellon. Defendant and Mellon had been drinking beer before arriving, and continued while at the friend’s home, though there is no evidence that either was drunk. Defendant became intrigued by a shotgun hanging in a gun rack on the living room wall. With Mellon just a few feet away in the kitchen and two other men working overhead in the attic, he removed the weapon and began inspecting it. The gun discharged, fatally wounding Mellon, who had moved in front of the gun while defendant was handling it.

We have recently stated the standard of review on an appeal by the State from a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict as follows:

The test of ... legal sufficiency is whether on the evidence as a whole, assessed most favorably to the State, a jury acting rationally could not avoid having a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.

State v. Howes, Me., 432 A.2d 419, 424 (1981). This appellate court applies the same standard in reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as the presiding justice was obliged to apply in granting it. Generally, no deference is owed the presiding justice’s determination. The requirement that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the State negates the significance of the presiding justice’s opportunity to observe witness demeanor, except in the extraordinary circumstance that the trial court could conclude that a witness’s credibility had been so thoroughly impeached that the jury could not rationally give any weight to his testimony. Conversely, much deference is owed the findings of a properly instructed jury acting on competent evidence without suggestion of misconduct.

Criminally negligent manslaughter exists when one by his conduct causes the death of another and fails to be aware of the risk posed by that conduct. 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 10(4)(A), 203(1)(A) (Supp.1980).² The failure to be aware of the risk, “when viewed in the light of the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation.” Id., § 10(4)(C). Many facts brought out at trial support the jury in finding defendant guilty by that standard. The owner of the gun testified that he believed he had left the gun’s safety in the “on” position, which suggests that defendant must have turned it off to fire the weapon. Defendant claimed not to have pulled the trigger, but he also admitted to knowing that he could open the chamber by depressing the trigger with the safety on. A firearms expert testified that the gun could not be fired except by pulling the trigger. The jury could rationally have concluded that defendant, attempting as he claimed he was to open the chamber and determine whether the gun was loaded, inadvertently turned the safety off, then pulled the trigger, causing the shotgun to fire.

The State also established that defendant was familiar with firearms generally; had never inspected this gun and so should have been very cautious with it; had no reason to believe the gun was unloaded; could easily have turned the gun over to see that the tubular magazine, at least, was loaded; and did not check to be sure there was no one in the potential line of fire before handling the gun. The jury did not have to believe all of this evidence to conclude rationally, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant deviated grossly from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would have observed in the same situation.

The evidence, assessed most favorably to the State, could convince a rational factfinder of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The record does not suggest that the jurors were improperly instructed, or'engaged in any misconduct, or acted in anything less than the sober, thoughtful manner that befits their high function.³ Under these circumstances, it was error for the presiding justice to unseat the jury’s verdict of guilt.

The entry must be:

Judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict reversed; case remanded for entry of judgment of conviction on the jury verdict.

NICHOLS, CARTER, WATHEN, JJ., concurring.

VIOLETTE, J., with whom GODFREY, J., joins, dissenting.

1 . The presiding justice acted in response to defendant’s motion for a new trial. Under M.R.Crim.P. 29(b), “[a] motion for new trial shall be deemed to include a motion for judgment of acquittal as an alternative.”

2 . Section 10(4)(A) has been moved to become 17-A M.R.S.A. § 35(4)(A) (Supp.1981). Section 203(1)(A) has not been changed.

3 . In his opinion ordering the judgment of acquittal n. o. v., the presiding justice expressed concern that some jurors may have found offensive the crude four-letter word frequently used by defendant in a tape-recorded statement to the police that was played at trial'. Defendant did not object to the admission of the statement, and neither below nor before this court has he urged it as grounds for a new trial. The presiding justice did not find the admission to be error, and neither do we. The justice’s concern did not, of course, go to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict.