Santaniello, J.
The defendant was found guilty of the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § SSa-lll.1 Upon conviction, he was sentenced to a definite term in prison and transferred to the Whiting Forensic Institute, the trial court having found that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others. After commitment and confinement from January 9, 1985, to January 7,1986, the defendant was presented in court, in accordance with General Statutes § 17-251 (b),2 to determine [521]*521whether he was eligible for discharge from Whiting and to determine his disposition if discharged. As a consequence, he was returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction to serve the balance of his sentence.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, Kelly, J., erred in determining that it had no discretion to release the defendant from incarceration pursuant to § 17-251. The Appellate Court concluded, however, that the trial court had no discretion to release the defendant because he was not otherwise eligible for release under the penal code. State v. Hanson, 12 Conn. App. 32, 45, 529 A.2d 720 (1987). This court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to determine whether the Appellate Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and remand the case with direction.
Although the facts that the trial court could reasonably have found are set forth in State v. Hanson, supra, we summarize those facts pertinent to the issues in this appeal. The defendant was charged with two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-49 and one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-lll. He was tried to the court, Hale, J., and acquitted of the two counts of attempted murder, but found guilty of the count of arson in the first degree. During the [522]*522course of the trial, the court heard psychiatric testimony from two physicians regarding the defendant’s mental state. On January 9,1985, after considering a report from the Whiting Forensic Institute, the testimony presented and the arguments of both counsel, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a term of fifteen years. Because the court also found that Hanson was dangerous to himself and to others, it ordered him confined to the Whiting Forensic Institute for custody, care and treatment in accordance with General Statutes § 17-245.3 The court stated: “If the Director should find that the defendant is sufficiently improved to be discharged from the institute, it is the strong recommendation to the Court hearing the matter under [General Statutes § 17-251] that the defendant serve at least a portion of this sentence.”
On January 7,1986, the defendant appeared before the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 17-251 and asked the court to enter an order transferring him to another institution, such as Connecticut Valley Hospital, or in the alternative to heed Judge Hale’s recommendation at sentencing and require him to serve some lesser portion of his fifteen year sentence. Judge Kelly, however, discharged the defendant from Whit[523]*523ing and transferred him to the commissioner of correction to serve the remainder of his fifteen year sentence, stating that he could not resentence the defendant because “[h]e has already been sentenced.” The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked the authority to release the defendant before he was eligible for release under his original fifteen year sentence. The Appellate Court sustained the trial court ruling and concluded that the trial court had no discretion to release the defendant because he was not otherwise eligible for release under the penal code. State v. Hanson, supra, 45.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that in a proceeding pursuant to § 17-251, the court may not modify the sentence previously imposed if modification is otherwise prohibited under the penal code.
Under § 17-251 (b), a hearing is held to determine whether a defendant who is confined to Whiting for psychiatric care under General Statutes §§ 17-2444 and 17-245 should be discharged from the institute. If the court determines that the patient should be discharged, it must then determine whether the patient should be [524]*524released, granted parole or returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction. The Appellate Court concluded that the word “release” in § 17-251 (b) was to be read in conjunction with its use in the penal code, and therefore “to vest the court with discretion, upon its determination that the defendant should be discharged from the institute, to modify the original sentence of the defendant if he would otherwise be eligible for release under the penal code.” State v. Hanson, supra, 45. The Appellate Court upheld the denial of relief to the defendant under § 17-251 (b) by concluding that the defendant was ineligible for release under the penal code for two reasons. We find error in both reasons offered by the Appellate Court and disagree in its reading of the word “release” in § 17-251 (b).
The first ground relied upon by the Appellate Court was that the defendant’s conviction of a class A felony made him ineligible for conditional or unconditional release under General Statutes §§ 53a-285 and 53a-29.6 [525]*525The Appellate Court did not consider the possibility of a suspended sentence and probation, apparently assuming that such a sentence would be contrary to General Statutes §§ 53a-35a7 and 53a-29 (a). This court, however, in State v. O’Neill, 200 Conn. 268, 511 A.2d 321 (1986), held that a sentencing court has discretion to enter a suspended sentence for a first degree arson conviction. In O’Neill, we found that the trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion to consider any suspension [526]*526of a sentence for first degree arson was a violation of the defendant’s equal protection rights.8 Because the defendant was convicted for first degree arson, he could have received a suspended sentence. Therefore, the Appellate Court erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 53a-28 and 53a-29 prohibited the defendant’s release under § 17-251 (b).
The second ground relied upon by the Appellate Court was that General Statutes § 53a-399 prohibits the early release of a defendant who has been sentenced to a definite term exceeding three years. Noting that the defendant had been convicted and sentenced under the penal code to a definite sentence of fifteen years, the Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was therefore ineligible for discharge or intensive probation under § 53a-39. While the Appellate Court [527]
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Santaniello, J.
The defendant was found guilty of the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § SSa-lll.1 Upon conviction, he was sentenced to a definite term in prison and transferred to the Whiting Forensic Institute, the trial court having found that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others. After commitment and confinement from January 9, 1985, to January 7,1986, the defendant was presented in court, in accordance with General Statutes § 17-251 (b),2 to determine [521]*521whether he was eligible for discharge from Whiting and to determine his disposition if discharged. As a consequence, he was returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction to serve the balance of his sentence.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, Kelly, J., erred in determining that it had no discretion to release the defendant from incarceration pursuant to § 17-251. The Appellate Court concluded, however, that the trial court had no discretion to release the defendant because he was not otherwise eligible for release under the penal code. State v. Hanson, 12 Conn. App. 32, 45, 529 A.2d 720 (1987). This court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to determine whether the Appellate Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and remand the case with direction.
Although the facts that the trial court could reasonably have found are set forth in State v. Hanson, supra, we summarize those facts pertinent to the issues in this appeal. The defendant was charged with two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-49 and one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-lll. He was tried to the court, Hale, J., and acquitted of the two counts of attempted murder, but found guilty of the count of arson in the first degree. During the [522]*522course of the trial, the court heard psychiatric testimony from two physicians regarding the defendant’s mental state. On January 9,1985, after considering a report from the Whiting Forensic Institute, the testimony presented and the arguments of both counsel, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a term of fifteen years. Because the court also found that Hanson was dangerous to himself and to others, it ordered him confined to the Whiting Forensic Institute for custody, care and treatment in accordance with General Statutes § 17-245.3 The court stated: “If the Director should find that the defendant is sufficiently improved to be discharged from the institute, it is the strong recommendation to the Court hearing the matter under [General Statutes § 17-251] that the defendant serve at least a portion of this sentence.”
On January 7,1986, the defendant appeared before the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 17-251 and asked the court to enter an order transferring him to another institution, such as Connecticut Valley Hospital, or in the alternative to heed Judge Hale’s recommendation at sentencing and require him to serve some lesser portion of his fifteen year sentence. Judge Kelly, however, discharged the defendant from Whit[523]*523ing and transferred him to the commissioner of correction to serve the remainder of his fifteen year sentence, stating that he could not resentence the defendant because “[h]e has already been sentenced.” The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked the authority to release the defendant before he was eligible for release under his original fifteen year sentence. The Appellate Court sustained the trial court ruling and concluded that the trial court had no discretion to release the defendant because he was not otherwise eligible for release under the penal code. State v. Hanson, supra, 45.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that in a proceeding pursuant to § 17-251, the court may not modify the sentence previously imposed if modification is otherwise prohibited under the penal code.
Under § 17-251 (b), a hearing is held to determine whether a defendant who is confined to Whiting for psychiatric care under General Statutes §§ 17-2444 and 17-245 should be discharged from the institute. If the court determines that the patient should be discharged, it must then determine whether the patient should be [524]*524released, granted parole or returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction. The Appellate Court concluded that the word “release” in § 17-251 (b) was to be read in conjunction with its use in the penal code, and therefore “to vest the court with discretion, upon its determination that the defendant should be discharged from the institute, to modify the original sentence of the defendant if he would otherwise be eligible for release under the penal code.” State v. Hanson, supra, 45. The Appellate Court upheld the denial of relief to the defendant under § 17-251 (b) by concluding that the defendant was ineligible for release under the penal code for two reasons. We find error in both reasons offered by the Appellate Court and disagree in its reading of the word “release” in § 17-251 (b).
The first ground relied upon by the Appellate Court was that the defendant’s conviction of a class A felony made him ineligible for conditional or unconditional release under General Statutes §§ 53a-285 and 53a-29.6 [525]*525The Appellate Court did not consider the possibility of a suspended sentence and probation, apparently assuming that such a sentence would be contrary to General Statutes §§ 53a-35a7 and 53a-29 (a). This court, however, in State v. O’Neill, 200 Conn. 268, 511 A.2d 321 (1986), held that a sentencing court has discretion to enter a suspended sentence for a first degree arson conviction. In O’Neill, we found that the trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion to consider any suspension [526]*526of a sentence for first degree arson was a violation of the defendant’s equal protection rights.8 Because the defendant was convicted for first degree arson, he could have received a suspended sentence. Therefore, the Appellate Court erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 53a-28 and 53a-29 prohibited the defendant’s release under § 17-251 (b).
The second ground relied upon by the Appellate Court was that General Statutes § 53a-399 prohibits the early release of a defendant who has been sentenced to a definite term exceeding three years. Noting that the defendant had been convicted and sentenced under the penal code to a definite sentence of fifteen years, the Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was therefore ineligible for discharge or intensive probation under § 53a-39. While the Appellate Court [527]*527accepted that the court could grant parole to an eligible defendant, or order him to be returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction pursuant to § 17-251 (b), it concluded that the word “release” in the statute must be construed in accordance with the statutes regarding sentencing and punishment, for “[t]o hold otherwise would lead to the bizarre and irrational result that persons who are criminally responsible for their actions, who have been convicted and sentenced and who would not be otherwise eligible for discharge from the custody of the commissioner of correction, might serve only six months in a psychiatric institute, and then upon reexamination and a hearing, be released from any further confinement.” State v. Hanson, supra, 46. The Appellate Court concluded, therefore, that § 53a-39 served to limit the discretion of the trial court to order release under § 17-251 (b).
We find our decision in Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987), dispositive on the issue of the correct interpretation of the word “release” in § 17-251 (b). While Murray v. Lopes dealt with the application of statutory sentence reduction credit to individuals sentenced and confined at Whiting for custody, care and treatment pursuant to General Statutes § 17-245 (c), we noted that “the benefit of early release under § 17-251 is in addition to, not in lieu of, the statutory sentence reduction credit that automatically accrues to all prisoners,” and “the fact that there are two different statutory release systems does not compel the conclusion that they are inconsistent or conflict with each other.” (Emphasis added.) Murray v. Lopes, supra, 35-36. The possibility of release through sentence modification under § 53a-39 is distinct from the possibility of release under § 17-251 (b). Although both statutes operate similarly by giving the court discretion to order release, they are different mechanisms for release.
[528]*528The word “release” as used in § 17-251 (b) is clear and unambiguous. To find support for the Appellate Court’s position, this court would have to ignore its previous decisions that have held that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions that are not clearly stated. See State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 363, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 314, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1986); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981).
We acknowledge the Appellate Court’s concern that reading “release” under § 17-251 (b) independent of the penal code could result in the release of a defendant convicted and sentenced under the penal code from any further confinement after six months at Whiting. If, for instance, an individual were convicted and sentenced to a nonsuspendible sentence of ten years in the Connecticut correctional institution at Somers, that individual would not be eligible for sentence reduction and would serve the full ten year term. If that same individual had been found to be in need of custody, care and treatment under General Statutes §§ 17-244 and 17-245, early release from his previously imposed sentence of ten years would be possible upon his discharge from Whiting pursuant to § 17-251 (b). Furthermore, an individual found to be in need of observation and treatment in a mental hospital following sentencing and transferred to such a facility pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17-194d or 17-194e must be returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction to complete his sentence upon recovery and discharge from the mental hospital. General Statutes § 17-194f.10
[529]*529Although we might disfavor the inconsistent results outlined above, “[i]t is not the function of this court to alter the will of the legislature merely because the results are unfair.” McDonald v. Haynes Medical Laboratory, Inc., 192 Conn. 327, 334, 471 A.2d 646 (1984). “Where statutory language is clearly expressed . . . courts must apply the legislative enactment according to the plain terms and ‘cannot read into the terms of a statute something which manifestly is not there in order to reach what the court thinks would be a just result.’ ” Johnson v. Manson, supra, 315. “ ‘It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is the function of the legislature.’ ” State v. Perrucio, 192 Conn. 154, 163 n.4, 471 A.2d 632, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801, 105 S. Ct. 55, 83 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1984), quoting Duart v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 188, 190, 110 A.2d 647 (1954).
We go no further than to point out that revision and clarification of General Statutes § 17-251 by the legislature is necessary. As it stands, the statute appears to authorize the director of Whiting and the trial court to grant “parole” to a patient sentenced and committed by the court. If that option was ever truly available to the director or the trial court under the statutes relating to parole,11 it is no longer a viable option with the [530]*530advent of definite sentencing in Connecticut in 1980.12 As has already been pointed out, that portion of § 17-251 (b) that authorizes the trial court to release a sentenced patient upon discharge from Whiting produces questionable results.
Cognizant of our responsibility to afford the defendant his right to equal protection, we believe a remand [531]*531to the original sentencing court is in order with the direction that it resentence the defendant with the knowledge that a suspended sentence is now available, though not mandatory, for first degree arson. As we stated earlier, State v. O’Neill, supra, held that the trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion to consider any suspension of the defendant’s sentence for first degree arson. Because our decision in O’Neill followed the defendant’s sentencing in the present case,13 the trial court was unaware that it had discretion to give the defendant a suspended sentence.
There is error, the judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction that it be returned to the original sentencing court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.