Williams, J. —
Petitioners Gregory D. Haner and the State of Washington seek review of the Grays Harbor County Superior Court's denial of a motion to file an amended information. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the prosecuting attorney had sought to reduce a charge by amending the original information.
The essentially undisputed facts are as follows: Defendant Haner, who was on probation for the felony offense of possession of amphetamines, and a friend had spent a day drinking beer and whiskey. In the evening they drove to an area outside Aberdeen, Washington, and came upon a group of people. Haner, who was the driver of the vehicle, fired six shots from a .45 caliber pistol. After continuing up the road for a distance, Haner turned back and again approached the group. A heated argument ensued. Someone apparently saw the gun lying on the seat of the car and made a move to seize it. Haner grabbed it first, pointed it toward the victim, and fired. The victim was not seriously injured, though a glancing blow from the bullet caused scalp bleeding and severed some hair from his head.
Haner was charged with assault in the second degree. The information also included an allegation that at the time of the commission of the offense he was armed with a [860]*860deadly weapon under RCW 9.95.040, which was also a firearm under RCW 9.41.025.
Four days before trial, the State moved to file an amended information. This motion was part of a plea bargain agreement which included the following terms: (1) the charge against Haner would be reduced from second degree assault to third degree assault, and (2) the deadly weapon allegations would be stricken. The parties told the court they presumed Haner's probation would be revoked, and in that event the prosecutor agreed to recommend that the sentences resulting from the revocation and from the third degree assault charge would run concurrently. Haner told the court he wished to plead guilty to the amended information as part of the plea bargain arrangement.
It was Haner's contention that the shooting was accidental, and defense counsel told the judge he "had a good chance to defeat the Second Degree Assault" charge. The prosecuting attorney conceded the case for second degree assault was a hard one, which presented some difficulties of proof. He felt, however, that the facts of the case clearly fell within the charge of third degree assault and in view of the difficulties with proof of the original charge, he argued the plea bargain was appropriate and justified. Since a conviction on the second degree assault charge would carry a maximum term of 10 years and a mandatory minimum of IV2 years, Haner and his counsel concluded that it was in Haner's best interest to avoid a risk of conviction on the second degree assault charge and to plead guilty to the reduced charge without the deadly weapon allegation.
Stating that he had a duty to "approve or disapprove plea bargains and to the filing of amended charges", the judge denied the motion to amend the information. Although he did not clearly state his reasons, it appears the judge felt under the facts of the case and Haner's prior record that Haner ought either to be convicted of second degree assault with the accompanying longer sentence or to be acquitted. He also disapproved the proposed striking of the weapons charge, conviction of which in Haner's case [861]*861would carry a 7%-year mandatory minimum sentence. RCW 9A.36.020; 9A.36.030; 9A.20.020(l)(b), (c); 9.95.040(2). The judge explained:
[TJhere are indications in the record, whether they're provable or not, that the defendant was on probation for a felony, and there are indications that he intentionally shot at someone and that he hit someone.
Now, I am fully aware that this puts him in a position of looking at a potential seven year [sic] minimum term. If someone is on probation for a felony and while on probation for a felony shoots somebody on purpose, I'm not so sure but what they shouldn't serve seven years. So that part doesn't really move me too much.
. . . I'm just saying that anyone who pled guilty to a felony committed while he is on probation for a felony is certainly — whoever the judge is, he's got to consider sending that person to prison.
. . . So, on the one hand if I have a person who intentionally shot somebody while he was on probation he ought to be punished, in my opinion, and on the other hand if he didn't mean to shoot anybody and it was all an accident, then he shouldn't go to prison. I don't know about this in between.
Haner moved for discretionary review of the denial of the motion to amend, and the Court of Appeals entered an order (1) granting the motion and (2) certifying the case to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030 and RAP 4.2. Since the State agreed with Haner that the judge had abused his discretion, the parties are designated joint petitioners to this court and the trial court is the respondent.
The only issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the State to file an amended information charging a crime to which Haner had agreed to plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. It is a question of first impression in this state.
Petitioners do not deny that the judge has the clear discretionary authority to refuse to accept a plea bargain under CrR 4.2(e), which provides:
[862]*862(e) Agreements. If a plea of guilty is based upon an agreement between the defendant and the prosecuting attorney, such agreement must be made a part of the record at the time the plea is entered. No agreement shall be made which specifies what action the judge shall take on or pursuant to the plea or which attempts to control the exercise of his discretion, and the court shall so advise the defendant.
(Italics ours.)
CrR 4.2(e) was adopted by this court effective July 1, 1973. Prior to adoption of the Superior Court Criminal Rules on that date, the Judicial Council submitted to this court a report prepared by the Criminal Rules Task Force. See Criminal Rules Task Force, Washington Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure (West Pub. Co. ed. 1971). The comment to CrR 4.2(e) states, in part, at page 49:
This rule is similar to ABA proposals (ABA, Project, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968) ... § 3.3(b)) except that the instant rule envisions no statement of commitment, however tentative, by the judge.
... It was the intent of the Task Force that no plea bargaining agreement should constrict the court's discretion.
Courts in other jurisdictions have likewise upheld trial court refusals to accept plea agreements in circumstances where serious crimes were involved. See, e.g., State v. LeMatty, 263 N.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Iowa App. 1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb.
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Williams, J. —
Petitioners Gregory D. Haner and the State of Washington seek review of the Grays Harbor County Superior Court's denial of a motion to file an amended information. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the prosecuting attorney had sought to reduce a charge by amending the original information.
The essentially undisputed facts are as follows: Defendant Haner, who was on probation for the felony offense of possession of amphetamines, and a friend had spent a day drinking beer and whiskey. In the evening they drove to an area outside Aberdeen, Washington, and came upon a group of people. Haner, who was the driver of the vehicle, fired six shots from a .45 caliber pistol. After continuing up the road for a distance, Haner turned back and again approached the group. A heated argument ensued. Someone apparently saw the gun lying on the seat of the car and made a move to seize it. Haner grabbed it first, pointed it toward the victim, and fired. The victim was not seriously injured, though a glancing blow from the bullet caused scalp bleeding and severed some hair from his head.
Haner was charged with assault in the second degree. The information also included an allegation that at the time of the commission of the offense he was armed with a [860]*860deadly weapon under RCW 9.95.040, which was also a firearm under RCW 9.41.025.
Four days before trial, the State moved to file an amended information. This motion was part of a plea bargain agreement which included the following terms: (1) the charge against Haner would be reduced from second degree assault to third degree assault, and (2) the deadly weapon allegations would be stricken. The parties told the court they presumed Haner's probation would be revoked, and in that event the prosecutor agreed to recommend that the sentences resulting from the revocation and from the third degree assault charge would run concurrently. Haner told the court he wished to plead guilty to the amended information as part of the plea bargain arrangement.
It was Haner's contention that the shooting was accidental, and defense counsel told the judge he "had a good chance to defeat the Second Degree Assault" charge. The prosecuting attorney conceded the case for second degree assault was a hard one, which presented some difficulties of proof. He felt, however, that the facts of the case clearly fell within the charge of third degree assault and in view of the difficulties with proof of the original charge, he argued the plea bargain was appropriate and justified. Since a conviction on the second degree assault charge would carry a maximum term of 10 years and a mandatory minimum of IV2 years, Haner and his counsel concluded that it was in Haner's best interest to avoid a risk of conviction on the second degree assault charge and to plead guilty to the reduced charge without the deadly weapon allegation.
Stating that he had a duty to "approve or disapprove plea bargains and to the filing of amended charges", the judge denied the motion to amend the information. Although he did not clearly state his reasons, it appears the judge felt under the facts of the case and Haner's prior record that Haner ought either to be convicted of second degree assault with the accompanying longer sentence or to be acquitted. He also disapproved the proposed striking of the weapons charge, conviction of which in Haner's case [861]*861would carry a 7%-year mandatory minimum sentence. RCW 9A.36.020; 9A.36.030; 9A.20.020(l)(b), (c); 9.95.040(2). The judge explained:
[TJhere are indications in the record, whether they're provable or not, that the defendant was on probation for a felony, and there are indications that he intentionally shot at someone and that he hit someone.
Now, I am fully aware that this puts him in a position of looking at a potential seven year [sic] minimum term. If someone is on probation for a felony and while on probation for a felony shoots somebody on purpose, I'm not so sure but what they shouldn't serve seven years. So that part doesn't really move me too much.
. . . I'm just saying that anyone who pled guilty to a felony committed while he is on probation for a felony is certainly — whoever the judge is, he's got to consider sending that person to prison.
. . . So, on the one hand if I have a person who intentionally shot somebody while he was on probation he ought to be punished, in my opinion, and on the other hand if he didn't mean to shoot anybody and it was all an accident, then he shouldn't go to prison. I don't know about this in between.
Haner moved for discretionary review of the denial of the motion to amend, and the Court of Appeals entered an order (1) granting the motion and (2) certifying the case to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030 and RAP 4.2. Since the State agreed with Haner that the judge had abused his discretion, the parties are designated joint petitioners to this court and the trial court is the respondent.
The only issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the State to file an amended information charging a crime to which Haner had agreed to plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. It is a question of first impression in this state.
Petitioners do not deny that the judge has the clear discretionary authority to refuse to accept a plea bargain under CrR 4.2(e), which provides:
[862]*862(e) Agreements. If a plea of guilty is based upon an agreement between the defendant and the prosecuting attorney, such agreement must be made a part of the record at the time the plea is entered. No agreement shall be made which specifies what action the judge shall take on or pursuant to the plea or which attempts to control the exercise of his discretion, and the court shall so advise the defendant.
(Italics ours.)
CrR 4.2(e) was adopted by this court effective July 1, 1973. Prior to adoption of the Superior Court Criminal Rules on that date, the Judicial Council submitted to this court a report prepared by the Criminal Rules Task Force. See Criminal Rules Task Force, Washington Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure (West Pub. Co. ed. 1971). The comment to CrR 4.2(e) states, in part, at page 49:
This rule is similar to ABA proposals (ABA, Project, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968) ... § 3.3(b)) except that the instant rule envisions no statement of commitment, however tentative, by the judge.
... It was the intent of the Task Force that no plea bargaining agreement should constrict the court's discretion.
Courts in other jurisdictions have likewise upheld trial court refusals to accept plea agreements in circumstances where serious crimes were involved. See, e.g., State v. LeMatty, 263 N.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Iowa App. 1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); People v. Ferguson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 732, 361 N.E.2d 333 (1977); and Akron v. Ragsdale, 61 Ohio App. 2d 107, 399 N.E.2d 119 (1978).
Petitioners maintain, however, that this is not fundamentally a plea bargain case under CrR 4.2(e). Rather, they claim that the gravamen of the issue is the collision between the parties' desire and the prosecutor's power to amend the information on the one hand, and the trial judge's arbitrary refusal to allow such amendment on the [863]*863other. Broadly stated, it is urged that the charging function is a prosecutorial one, that amendment of the information under CrR 2.1(d) is part of the charging function, and that the court abused its discretion by invading this province. Although they concede that CrR 2.1(d) by its terms gives some role to the trial court in the process of amending an information, they contend that the trial judge may refuse to grant a motion to amend only in two narrow situations: (1) when the rights of the defendant would be prejudiced by the amendment, and (2) when the justification for the amendment does not relate to the prosecutorial function. We disagree.
CrR 2.1(d) provides:
(d) Amendment of Information. The court may permit any information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.
Clearly, the prosecuting attorney is vested with the power to " [pjrosecute all criminal and civil actions in which the state or his county may be a party . . .", RCW 36.27-.020(4). Moreover, there is no role for the court at the time the prosecuting attorney files the original charge:
(a) Use of Indictment or Information. The initial pleading by the state shall be an indictment or an information in all criminal proceedings filed by the prosecuting attorney.
(Italics ours.) CrR 2.1(a).
The amendment of an information is not an initial decision to prosecute, however. See State ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade District Court, 94 Wn.2d 772, 778, 621 P.2d 115 (1980); People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 65, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974). By the time the State has determined to move to amend the information, the plain terms of CrR 2.1(d) have implicated the court in any possible alterations. People v. Superior Court, supra.
When a defendant enters into a plea bargain agreement, it is virtually always for the purpose of reducing the time he potentially may have to serve in confinement or of free[864]*864ing the judge from statutory restraints which prohibit the granting of probation. This is accomplished when the prosecutor moves to either dismiss or reduce some or all of the charges. Thus, the reducing or dismissal of charges is an integral and major element of the bargain. To characterize it solely as a charging function of the prosecutor and not as part of the plea bargain is unrealistic and as a practical matter strips the judge of his authority to approve or disapprove the plea bargain, a role all parties agree he has.
Granting of probation, establishing conditions of probation, ordering that sentences run concurrently, recommendations to the parole board, amount of fine, terms of restitution, etc., fall within the judge's sentencing powers whether they are elements of a plea bargain agreement or not. See, e.g., RCW 9.95.010; 9.95.030; 9.95.200. Thus, to have any meaning beyond its ordinary sentencing powers, the court's authority to approve or deny a plea bargain must include the right to refuse or allow the dismissal or amendment of the charges.
It follows, then, that the only remaining question is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant the State's motion to amend the information.1
In this case, it was admitted that Haner had a prior fel[865]*865ony conviction and that one of the conditions of his probation was that he not carry a gun. By his own admission, he had consumed a large quantity of intoxicating beverages on the day of the incident. Moreover, the parties agree that he did point his gun at the victim and fired it. Fortuitously, the victim suffered only a slight wound. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion in concluding that the public interest would not be served by reduction of the charge and dropping of the deadly weapon allegation.2
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying the State's motion to amend the information.
Rosellini, Stafford, Hicks, and Dore, JJ., concur.