[Cite as State v. Hamilton, 2020-Ohio-5330.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. -vs- Case No. 2019 CA 0120 RONALD K. HAMILTON
Defendant-Appellant O P I N IO N
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018-CR-0514
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 18, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
GARY BISHOP JACEDA BLAZEF Prosecuting Attorney 409 Park Avenue West Richland County, Ohio Mansfield, Ohio 44906
JOSEPH C. SNYDER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 38 South Park Street Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 2
Hoffman, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Ronald Hamilton appeals the judgment entered by the
Richland County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his guilty plea to gross
sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05(B)), and sentencing him to sixty months incarceration.
Appellee is the state of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} The victim in the instant case is a seven-year-old girl, who lived near
Appellant. Appellant’s girlfriend and the victim’s mother were best friends, and the two
families were close friends as well as neighbors. The victim referred to Appellant as
“Uncle Ronnie.”
{¶3} Between the dates of December 10, 2017, and March 26, 2018, Appellant’s
daughter reported to her school something was going on with the victim in the instant
case. The school and the Shelby Police Department became involved. The victim
reported to law enforcement she did not like Uncle Ronnie because he played the “tickle
monster game” with her, during which he licked her vaginal area.
{¶4} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury with rape (R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b)) and two counts of gross sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), (B)).
On October 21, 2019, Appellant pled guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(B), a felony of the third degree. The remaining counts were
dismissed. Following a presentence investigation and a sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to sixty months incarceration.
{¶5} It is from the November 26, 2019, judgment of the Richland County
Common Pleas Court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error: Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 3
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO MORE THAN THE
MINIMUM SENTENCE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO SIXTY MONTHS PRISON WHEN HIS
MAXIMUM EXPOSURE TO PRISON WAS THIRTY-SIX MONTHS.
I.
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to the maximum term of incarceration of sixty months.
{¶7} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), which provides in pertinent part:
(2)The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this
section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the
sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence
and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The
appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action
authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the
following: Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 4
(a)That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b)That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law (emphasis added).
{¶8} A trial court's imposition of a maximum prison term is not contrary to law as
long as the court sentences the offender within the statutory range for the offense, and in
so doing, considers the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth R.C. 2929.12. State v.
Kinser, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2019-0089, 2020-Ohio-3881, ¶ 10, citing State v.
Santos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103964, 2016-Ohio-5845, ¶ 12. Although a trial court
must consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, there is no requirement the court
state its reasons for imposing a maximum sentence, or for imposing a particular sentence
within the statutory range. Id. R.C. 2929.12 does not require the trial court to state on the
record it has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism.
State v. Hayes, 5th Dist. Knox No. 18CA10, 2019-Ohio-1629, ¶49.
{¶9} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated it had reviewed the
presentence investigation report, as well as letters sent to the court on Appellant’s behalf.
Dr. Bob Stinson, a forensic psychologist, and Appellant’s pastor both spoke on
Appellant’s behalf.
{¶10} The trial court stated at the sentencing hearing it had considered the
purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11. The trial court found the injury Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 5
was exacerbated by the victim’s age, and she was abused by an adult she trusted. Sent.
Tr. 44. The trial court found what happened to the victim would never be erased, and she
would deal with this offense for the rest of her life. Sent. Tr. 45. The court found Appellant
held a position of trust to the victim. Id. Appellant was a trusted neighbor and was
permitted to be around the victim when his own daughter babysat the victim, giving him
access and the opportunity for abuse. Id. The court found none of the less serious factors
set forth in the statute existed in the instant case. Id.
{¶11} The trial court further noted some of the recidivism factors applied to
Appellant. Appellant had a history of criminal convictions, although he had no prior felony
convictions. Sent. Tr. 46. Although Appellant said he was sorry, the trial court stated it
did not “see a lot of remorse other than that.” Id.
{¶12} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing (R.C. 2929.11) as well as the factors that the court must consider
when determining an appropriate sentence. (R.C. 2929.12). Although not required to do
so, the trial court set forth its reasons for the maximum sentence on the record. While
Appellant may disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge,
Appellant's sentence was within the applicable statutory range, and we find no basis for
concluding the sentence is contrary to law.
{¶13} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶14} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
sentencing him to 60 months incarceration because his maximum exposure was a
sentence of 36 months. Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 6
{¶15} Appellant argues his maximum sentence was limited to 36 months
incarceration based on R.C.
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[Cite as State v. Hamilton, 2020-Ohio-5330.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. -vs- Case No. 2019 CA 0120 RONALD K. HAMILTON
Defendant-Appellant O P I N IO N
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018-CR-0514
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 18, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
GARY BISHOP JACEDA BLAZEF Prosecuting Attorney 409 Park Avenue West Richland County, Ohio Mansfield, Ohio 44906
JOSEPH C. SNYDER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 38 South Park Street Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 2
Hoffman, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Ronald Hamilton appeals the judgment entered by the
Richland County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his guilty plea to gross
sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05(B)), and sentencing him to sixty months incarceration.
Appellee is the state of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} The victim in the instant case is a seven-year-old girl, who lived near
Appellant. Appellant’s girlfriend and the victim’s mother were best friends, and the two
families were close friends as well as neighbors. The victim referred to Appellant as
“Uncle Ronnie.”
{¶3} Between the dates of December 10, 2017, and March 26, 2018, Appellant’s
daughter reported to her school something was going on with the victim in the instant
case. The school and the Shelby Police Department became involved. The victim
reported to law enforcement she did not like Uncle Ronnie because he played the “tickle
monster game” with her, during which he licked her vaginal area.
{¶4} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury with rape (R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b)) and two counts of gross sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), (B)).
On October 21, 2019, Appellant pled guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(B), a felony of the third degree. The remaining counts were
dismissed. Following a presentence investigation and a sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to sixty months incarceration.
{¶5} It is from the November 26, 2019, judgment of the Richland County
Common Pleas Court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error: Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 3
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO MORE THAN THE
MINIMUM SENTENCE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO SIXTY MONTHS PRISON WHEN HIS
MAXIMUM EXPOSURE TO PRISON WAS THIRTY-SIX MONTHS.
I.
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to the maximum term of incarceration of sixty months.
{¶7} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), which provides in pertinent part:
(2)The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this
section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the
sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence
and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The
appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action
authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the
following: Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 4
(a)That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b)That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law (emphasis added).
{¶8} A trial court's imposition of a maximum prison term is not contrary to law as
long as the court sentences the offender within the statutory range for the offense, and in
so doing, considers the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth R.C. 2929.12. State v.
Kinser, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2019-0089, 2020-Ohio-3881, ¶ 10, citing State v.
Santos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103964, 2016-Ohio-5845, ¶ 12. Although a trial court
must consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, there is no requirement the court
state its reasons for imposing a maximum sentence, or for imposing a particular sentence
within the statutory range. Id. R.C. 2929.12 does not require the trial court to state on the
record it has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism.
State v. Hayes, 5th Dist. Knox No. 18CA10, 2019-Ohio-1629, ¶49.
{¶9} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated it had reviewed the
presentence investigation report, as well as letters sent to the court on Appellant’s behalf.
Dr. Bob Stinson, a forensic psychologist, and Appellant’s pastor both spoke on
Appellant’s behalf.
{¶10} The trial court stated at the sentencing hearing it had considered the
purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11. The trial court found the injury Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 5
was exacerbated by the victim’s age, and she was abused by an adult she trusted. Sent.
Tr. 44. The trial court found what happened to the victim would never be erased, and she
would deal with this offense for the rest of her life. Sent. Tr. 45. The court found Appellant
held a position of trust to the victim. Id. Appellant was a trusted neighbor and was
permitted to be around the victim when his own daughter babysat the victim, giving him
access and the opportunity for abuse. Id. The court found none of the less serious factors
set forth in the statute existed in the instant case. Id.
{¶11} The trial court further noted some of the recidivism factors applied to
Appellant. Appellant had a history of criminal convictions, although he had no prior felony
convictions. Sent. Tr. 46. Although Appellant said he was sorry, the trial court stated it
did not “see a lot of remorse other than that.” Id.
{¶12} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing (R.C. 2929.11) as well as the factors that the court must consider
when determining an appropriate sentence. (R.C. 2929.12). Although not required to do
so, the trial court set forth its reasons for the maximum sentence on the record. While
Appellant may disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge,
Appellant's sentence was within the applicable statutory range, and we find no basis for
concluding the sentence is contrary to law.
{¶13} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶14} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
sentencing him to 60 months incarceration because his maximum exposure was a
sentence of 36 months. Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 6
{¶15} Appellant argues his maximum sentence was limited to 36 months
incarceration based on R.C. 2907.05(C):
(2) Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4)
or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree. Except as otherwise
provided in this division, for gross sexual imposition committed in violation
of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section there is a presumption that a prison
term shall be imposed for the offense. The court shall impose on an offender
convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of
this section a mandatory prison term, as described in division (C)(3) of this
section, for a felony of the third degree if either of the following applies:
(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in
the case corroborating the violation;
(b) The offender previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
violation of this section, rape, the former offense of felonious sexual
penetration, or sexual battery, and the victim of the previous offense was
less than thirteen years of age.
(3) A mandatory prison term required under division (C)(2) of this
section shall be a definite term from the range of prison terms provided in
division (A)(3)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the
third degree. Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 7
{¶16} Appellant acknowledges R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) provides for a sentence of
up to 60 months for a violation of R.C. 2907.05(B). However, he argues R.C.
2907.05(C)(3) only refers to R.C. 2929.14 if the conditions of a prior conviction and
corroborating evidence is met. Therefore, he argues the maximum sentence is 36
months, which is the maximum sentence for a third degree felony which is not sex-related.
We disagree.
{¶17} In discussing the constitutionality of the corroboration requirement, the Ohio
Supreme Court explained, “Pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a), the court shall impose a
mandatory prison term when “[e]vidence other than the testimony of the victim was
admitted in the case corroborating the violation.” State v. Bevly, 142 Ohio St.3d 41, 2015-
Ohio-475, 27 N.E.3d 516, ¶ 8. By its plain language, R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) distinguishes
when the prison term for violation of R.C. 2907.05 is mandatory, and when there is a mere
presumption in favor of prison. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), a 60 month sentence
is within the statutory range for a violation of R.C. 2907.05, whether a prison sentence is
mandatory or presumptive. We find nothing in R.C. 2907.05(C), which governs when a
prison sentence is mandatory as opposed to merely presumptive, alters the maximum
sentence the trial court could impose in the instant case. Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0120 8
{¶18} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} The judgment of the Richland County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J. Baldwin, J. and Wise, Earle, J. concur