[Cite as State v. Hake, 2026-Ohio-1393.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30643 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 02724 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas NATHAN HAKE : Court) : Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 17, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30643
ANTHONY COOPER and KENNETH EGBERT, JR., Attorneys for Appellant JACOB S. SEIDL, Attorney for Appellee
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} The State of Ohio appeals from the judgment entry of the Montgomery County
Common Pleas Court dismissing a misdemeanor charge against appellee Nathan Hake for
illegal disposal of construction and demolition debris.
{¶ 2} The trial court found the charge void for vagueness because key terms were
subjective in nature, resulting in potentially arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory
enforcement. The State argues that the trial court erred in finding the charge
unconstitutionally vague.
{¶ 3} We agree that the charge is not void for vagueness as applied to Hake.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
I. Background
{¶ 4} A grand jury indicted Hake on charges of unlawfully disposing of solid waste by
open burning or open dumping, operating a solid waste facility without a license, and
violating an environmental rule by illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris.
The first two charges were unclassified felonies, and the third charge was a second-degree
misdemeanor.
{¶ 5} The three charges stemmed from Hake allegedly using an excavator to dig a
large pit and then filling the pit with solid waste as well as construction and demolition debris.
The State’s May 28, 2025 amended bill of particulars provided these details:
2 The specific conduct of the Defendant which is alleged to constitute the
offenses charged in Count 1, Count 2, and Count 3 of the indictment is as
follows: in February 2023 Nathan Hake, through his house-flipping commercial
business Prodigy Tools, Inc, purchased a property located at 15019 Dayton-
Eaton Pike in Perry Township, Montgomery County, Ohio. The 2 plus acre
tract of land consisted of a house, a detached garage, and an old shed. As
part of his commercial house-flipping operations, the Defendant completely
gutted the abandoned house and placed solid waste materials, along with
construction & demolition debris, on the ground at the property. The solid
waste placed on the ground at the property included appliances, plastics, PVC
piping, oil jugs, a few scrap tires, and household garbage. The construction &
demolition debris the Defendant placed on the ground at the property included
drywall, wood boards, and the old woodshed.
During the week of August 14, 2023, through August 21, 2023, the
Defendant rented a John Deere “225” excavator. The Defendant used the
excavator and other heavy equipment to dig a large hole at the property and
illegally dispose of the solid waste, along with the construction & demolition
debris that was on the ground at the property, by burying these materials in
the large hole. During this time, the gutted house was boarded up and no
longer was a residence. The Defendant was aware that no people resided
within the gutted house, so there was not solid waste being generated within
the house to exempt the illegal disposal activity under R.C. 3734.02(D) and
Ohio Administrative Code Rule 3745-27-03. The Defendant lived at his own
residence [in] . . . Eaton, Ohio.
3 Instead of using dumpsters, roll-off containers, or dump trailers as part
of his commercial house-flipping operation to collect the waste and debris on
the ground at 15019 Dayton-Eaton Pike and paying disposal fees to legally
dispose of the solid waste and demolition debris at a licensed disposal facility,
the Defendant blatantly disregarded Ohio’s solid waste laws and buried the
solid waste that had been on the ground at 15019 Dayton-Eaton Pike in the
huge hole the Defendant had dug on the property, which was maintained as
an unlicensed solid waste facility. The Defendant continued to maintain the
unlicensed facility, which was not on the approved list of licensed solid waste
facilities at Montgomery County Public Health, for 10 continuous months until
June 12, 2024, when Ohio EPA uncovered the buried solid waste, along with
the construction & demolition debris, and legally disposed of the waste and
debris at a licensed facility.
Moreover, the Defendant was aware he had illegally disposed of
construction & demolition debris that had been on the ground at 15019 Dayton-
Eaton Pike by burying the old shed and other construction & demolition debris
at an unlicensed site, a prohibited method of disposal which violated Rule
3745-400-04 of the Ohio Administrative Code, a rule authorized by
R.C. 3714.02 of Chapter 3714 of the Revised Code. The Defendant admitted
to law enforcement on April 11, 2024, in an interview conducted outside his
own residence in Eaton, Ohio, that he illegally disposed of demolition debris
when he stated that he had pushed the old shed and a window that was part
of the shed in the hole at the property located at 15019 Dayton-Eaton Pike.
4 {¶ 6} As part of its investigation, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation excavated
part of the hole and allegedly found solid waste, including “plastic tarps, plastic kids’ toys,
plastic bottles, plastic cooler, plastic buckets, plastic sheeting, plastic totes, plastic 55-gal
drum, black garbage bags containing household trash, unidentifiable plastic materials,
automotive gas tank, furniture, appliance parts, rugs, insulation, exercise equipment, coated
wiring, air tank, propane tank, Stryofoam, and scrap tires.” The excavation also allegedly
uncovered construction and demolition debris, including “shingles, concrete, metal gutters,
and what appeared to be wooden building materials and 2x4s from the old shed or garage
that was on the property.”
{¶ 7} Hake moved to dismiss the three charges on the basis that they were void for
vagueness. The trial court overruled Hake’s motion as to the two felony counts charging
unlawful disposal of solid waste by open burning or open dumping and operating a solid-
waste facility without a license. The trial court sustained the motion, however, as to the
misdemeanor charge of violating an environmental rule by illegally disposing of construction
and demolition debris. After reviewing the charge, the trial court found the words “disposal,”
“facility,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged” were ambiguous, subjective,
and void for vagueness because they allowed arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory
enforcement. This appeal by the State followed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} The State presents the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the charge because the
statute governing the disposal of construction and demolition debris,
R.C. 3714.13(B), is not unconstitutionally vague.
5 {¶ 9} Hake was charged with violating R.C. 3714.13(B), which provides that “[n]o
person shall violate a rule adopted under this chapter.” The rule Hake allegedly violated was
part of the Ohio Administrative Code, former Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B). At the time of his
actions, it provided: “No person shall conduct or allow illegal disposal of construction and
demolition debris.”
{¶ 10} The key words in the rule are “illegal disposal” and “construction and
demolition debris.” Both phrases are defined by rule and statute. The trial court found no
ambiguity in the phrase “construction and demolition debris,” which R.C. 3714.01 defines as
“those materials resulting from the alteration, construction, destruction, rehabilitation, or
repair of any physical structure that is built by humans, including, without limitation, houses,
buildings, industrial or commercial facilities, or roadways.” Under Adm.Code 3745-400-01,
“construction and demolition debris” includes “those structural and functional materials
comprising the structure and surrounding site improvements, such as brick, concrete and
other masonry materials, stone, glass, wall coverings, plaster, drywall, framing and finishing
lumber, roofing materials, plumbing fixtures, heating equipment, electrical wiring and
components containing no hazardous fluids or refrigerants, insulation, wall-to-wall carpeting,
asphaltic substances, metals incidental to any of the above, and weathered railroad ties and
utility poles.”
{¶ 11} The other key words, “illegal disposal,” are defined under Adm.Code 3745-
400-01 to include “the disposal of construction and demolition debris at any place other than
a construction and demolition debris facility operated in accordance with Chapter 3714. of
the Revised Code, this chapter, and Chapter 3745-501 of the Administrative Code; a solid
waste disposal facility operated in accordance with Chapter 3745-27 of the Administrative
Code and licensed in accordance with Chapter 3745-501 of the Administrative Code; or as
6 otherwise authorized by this chapter.” In essence, “‘[i]llegal disposal’ occurs when
construction and demolition debris is placed anywhere other than a licensed landfill.” State
ex rel. DeWine v. ARCO Recycling, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1758, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 12} Although the foregoing definitions seem straightforward, the trial court
observed that R.C. 3714.01 defines the term “disposal” as “the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, emitting, or placing of any construction and demolition debris into
or on any land or ground or surface water or into the air, except if the disposition or
placement constitutes storage.” (Emphasis added.) In contrast to “disposal,” the trial court
noted that R.C. 3714.01 defines “storage” as “the holding of construction and demolition
debris for a temporary period in such a manner that it remains retrievable and substantially
unchanged and, at the end of the period, is disposed of or reused or recycled in a beneficial
manner.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 13} The trial court reasoned that the words “temporary period” and “substantially
unchanged” in the definition of “storage” are vague and “subjective values which may vary
from ordinary person to ordinary person.” Therefore, it found the word “disposal” in the
charge against Hake void for vagueness because “disposal” explicitly excludes “storage,”
which in turn uses the undefined words “temporary period” and “substantially unchanged.”
{¶ 14} Finally, the trial court found the word “facility” impermissibly vague as to the
misdemeanor charge against Hake. It noted that R.C. 3714.01 defines “facility” as “any site,
location, tract of land, installation, or building used for the disposal of construction and
demolition debris.” Because this definition contains the word “disposal,” and the definition of
“disposal” excludes “storage,” which is defined using the words “temporary period” and
“substantially unchanged,” the trial court deemed the word “facility” void for vagueness as
well.
7 {¶ 15} The trial court held that the misdemeanor charge against Hake was
impermissibly vague because it contained subjective terms capable of being applied
arbitrarily and capriciously. It cited Tipp City v. Peachey, 2000 WL 966398, *3 (2d Dist.
July 14, 2000), for the proposition that an ordinance cannot “delegate basic policy matters
to enforcement officials for resolution on a subjective basis.” Based on its analysis, the trial
court dismissed the misdemeanor charge against Hake for violating R.C. 3714.13(B) by
violating Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B).
{¶ 16} “The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a component of the right to due process
and is rooted in concerns that laws provide fair notice and prevent arbitrary enforcement.”
In re Columbus S. Power Co., 2012-Ohio-5690, ¶ 20, citing Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010). To establish impermissible vagueness, a challenger must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a statute is vague “‘not in the sense that it requires a person
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’” State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio
St.3d 168, 171 (1991), quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). “In other
words, the challenger must show that upon examining the statute, an individual of ordinary
intelligence would not understand what he is required to do under the law.” Id. “[T]o pass
constitutional muster, the challenged statute or ordinance must: (1) provide fair warning
about what conduct is proscribed, (2) preclude arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory
enforcement, and (3) not unreasonably impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” Huron
v. Kisil, 2025-Ohio-2921, ¶ 11, citing State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269-270 (1991),
citing State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984).
{¶ 17} “[S]tatutes or ordinances imposing criminal sanctions require a more stringent
review for vagueness than statutes or ordinances imposing civil penalties because ‘the
8 consequences of imprecision are qualitatively’ more severe for statutes or ordinances
imposing criminal liability.” Kisil at ¶ 11, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-499 (1982). “Nevertheless, ‘all statutes designed
to promote the public health, safety, and welfare . . . enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality.’” Id., quoting Anderson at 171, citing State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.2d 159 (1967).
{¶ 18} To establish impermissible vagueness, a challenger must prove that a statute
is “vague in its application to the party at issue in the case.” Kisil at ¶ 13. “‘A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant’s
conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.’” Id., quoting Hoffman
Estates at 495 (Footnote omitted.); see also United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975)
(recognizing that vagueness challenges not involving the First Amendment must be
reviewed based on the facts of the case).
{¶ 19} Hake acknowledges on appeal that he is challenging R.C. 3714.13(B) and
Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B) as applied to him. See Appellee’s Brief, p. 3. Because the trial
court resolved his motion before trial, he agrees that the proper approach is to accept the
State’s factual allegations as true for purposes of his motion and to resolve the void-for-
vagueness issue based on those allegations. Id. at p. 15. We find this approach to be
appropriate. We note that whether the misdemeanor charge at issue is impermissibly vague
is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Elton, 2024-Ohio-1494, ¶ 17
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 20} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that the administrative rule
Hake allegedly violated, Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B), is not void for vagueness. The rule
9 prohibited him from conducting the illegal disposal of construction and demolition debris.
Given the trial court’s finding that “construction and demolition debris” is not ambiguous, the
only real question is whether the word “disposal” is impermissibly vague. If the word
“disposal” is understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence, it follows that the words
“illegal disposal” and “facility” are not ambiguous. Once again, under Adm.Code 3745-400-
01, “illegal disposal” simply means the disposal of construction and demolition debris
anywhere other than a licensed facility. Under R.C. 3714.01, a “facility” is “any site, location,
tract of land, installation, or building used for the disposal of construction and demolition
debris.”
{¶ 21} We believe a person of ordinary intelligence could distinguish between
“disposal” and “storage” of construction and demolition debris as those words are used here.
R.C. 3714.01 defines “disposal” as “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, emitting, or placing of any construction and demolition debris into or on any land or
ground or surface water or into the air, except if the disposition or placement constitutes
storage.” Setting aside the “storage” exception for a moment, we see nothing ambiguous
about this definition, which plainly would prohibit abandoning or discarding construction and
demolition debris by burying it in the ground.
{¶ 22} The “storage” exception in R.C. 3714.01 also is not impermissibly vague. The
statute defines “storage” as “the holding of construction and demolition debris for a
temporary period in such a manner that it remains retrievable and substantially unchanged
and, at the end of the period, is disposed of or reused or recycled in a beneficial manner.”
Although “temporary period” is undefined, the word “temporary” is commonly understood as
not permanent or for a limited time. As for “substantially unchanged,” the term “substantially”
is a word “that permeates the law.” United States v. Collins, 603 F. Supp. 301, 305 (S.D.Fla.
10 1985). “Courts must make determinations based on a substantiality standard on a daily
basis.” Id. Indeed, we note with perhaps some irony that one test for determining whether
certain statutes are void for vagueness is whether they are “substantially incomprehensible.”
Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-511, ¶ 46 (applying this standard to a civil
statute). In common usage, the word “substantially” is understood to mean considerably,
largely, or to a great degree. Although the terms “temporary period” and “substantially
unchanged” are not precisely defined in R.C. 3714.01, they also are not impermissibly vague
when used in context to distinguish “storage” from “disposal.” “A statute will not be declared
void . . . merely because it could have been worded more precisely.” State v. Rober, 2015-
Ohio-5501, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 23} In our view, R.C. 3714.01 plainly prohibits permanently discarding construction
and demolition debris by burying it somewhere other than a licensed facility. This prohibition
does not apply if debris is being held temporarily in a largely unchanged condition so that it
can be retrieved for later recycling or other beneficial use. In the present case, it is
unnecessary to explore the outer limits of what qualifies as “temporary” or to identify
precisely how “unchanged” construction and demolition debris must be to qualify for storage.
The State alleges that Hake excavated a large pit, dumped an assortment of construction
and demolition debris into the hole, and abandoned the debris by covering it with dirt. A
person of ordinary intelligence would understand that this conduct is prohibited by
Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B) unless Hake only temporarily buried the construction and
demolition debris in a largely unchanged condition so that it could be retrieved for later
recycling or other beneficial use.
{¶ 24} Having found no impermissible ambiguity or vagueness, we see no basis for
concluding that R.C. 3714.01 enables arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory enforcement of
11 Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B). In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Eighth District
Court of Appeals rejected Hake’s argument in ARCO Recycling, 2022-Ohio-1758 (8th Dist.).
Although that case was a civil enforcement action rather than a criminal prosecution, the
Eighth District determined that R.C. 3714.01 adequately defined “storage.” Consistent with
our analysis here, the Eighth District reasoned:
Riley contends that the Ohio EPA’s definition of “storage” does not further
define “temporary,” “retrievable,” and “substantially unchanged” and,
therefore, subjected him to arbitrary enforcement. The Ohio EPA’s rules mirror
the Ohio Revised Code. R.C. 3714.01 defines “storage” as “the holding of
construction and demolition debris for a temporary period in such a manner
that it remains retrievable and substantially unchanged and, at the end of the
period, is disposed of or reused or recycled in a beneficial manner.” The plain
language of the rules put Riley on notice of what constituted storage. See State
ex rel. Pennington v. Gundler, 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 661 N.E.2d 1049 (1996)
(words used in a statute are to be given their usual, normal, and customary
meaning.).
Id. at ¶ 71.
{¶ 25} We also find our decision in Peachey, 2000 WL 966398, to be distinguishable.
The trial court relied on Peachey for the proposition that “[a] vague ordinance impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to enforcement officials for resolution on a subjective basis.”
Id. at *3. Peachey involved a zoning regulation prohibiting any exterior “alteration” to property
without a certificate of appropriateness. An “alteration” was defined as a “material change”
to an external architectural feature. The phrase “material change” was undefined. The
zoning regulation in Peachey directed a board to adopt guidelines establishing standards for
12 the review of proposed exterior changes. Despite this directive, the board never adopted
any guidelines. Upon review, we noted evidence of board members’ inconsistency in
defining and applying the “material change” standard. We found the zoning regulation void
for vagueness, reasoning:
Because the Restoration Board failed to adopt guidelines, the
ordinance does not set forth explicit standards for those board members who
apply it. Consequently, each board member is left to call upon his own idea of
what “material change” means, as is shown by Dando’s testimony. We do not
believe that allowing board members to use their own subjective definitions of
“material change” will prevent arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance.
More importantly, Dando stated that the board members considered
“material change” to mean a “change of materials.” Clearly, it would seem to
us that a “material change” would not encompass just any change of materials
at all. The ordinance explicitly defines “alternation” as any material change in
the external architectural features of the property, not as any change at all in
such features.
As we stated, supra, we can never expect exact certainty from the
language in an ordinance. The language must, however, be clear enough to
provide explicit standards for those who apply the ordinance to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In this case, the Restoration Board
has failed to adopt guidelines, as required by the ordinance, and thus there
are no explicit standards that the board members can follow. Thus, we
conclude that Section 154.052, as applied, is unconstitutional because it is
void for vagueness.
13 (Emphasis in original.) Id. at *4-5.
{¶ 26} Unlike Peachey, the record before us reveals no history of inconsistent or
impermissibly subjective decision-making regarding what constitutes “disposal” or “storage.”
As explained above, we see no reasonable basis for confusion about the meaning of those
terms and no real danger of arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory enforcement of
Adm.Code 3745-400-04(B). Unlike Peachey, Hake’s case also does not involve the absence
of mandated guidelines providing explicit standards governing the application of Adm.Code
3745-400-04(B). In short, the specific concerns underlying Peachey are absent here.
{¶ 27} Finally, having found that the misdemeanor charge against Hake is not void
for vagueness, we need not address the State’s alternative arguments (1) that he cannot
simultaneously assert an affirmative defense and rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
(2) that the misdemeanor charge cannot be unconstitutionally vague because enforcement
officials told Hake his actions were prohibited, or (3) that the trial court improperly developed
a vagueness argument for him. These issues have been rendered moot by our finding that
the misdemeanor charge is not void for vagueness.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 28} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. The trial court’s judgment is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
.............
LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.