State v. Hagan

65 S.W. 249, 164 Mo. 654, 1901 Mo. LEXIS 248
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedNovember 12, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 65 S.W. 249 (State v. Hagan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Hagan, 65 S.W. 249, 164 Mo. 654, 1901 Mo. LEXIS 248 (Mo. 1901).

Opinion

SHERWOOD, P. J.

— The defendant was indicted, for the murder of one Edward Harr, by shooting him to death with a revolver. Florence Harr, the widow of deceased, was joined in the indictment with, defendant, but on a trial previous to his, was acquitted. The jury found defendant guilty ■of murder in the second degree and assessed his punishment at thirty years in the penitentiary and he appeals.

The indictment in question was, in the charging part, as follows: “Do present and charge that Augustin Hagan and Florence Harr, late of the county aforesaid, on the twenty-eighth day of April, 1899, at and in the county of Perry, State of Missouri aforesaid, then and there in and upon one Edward Harr, there being, feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of their malice aforethought, did make an assault, and a certain revolving pistol, a deadly weapon, which was then and there loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls, and which they, the said Augustin Hagan and Florence Harr, in their hands then and there had and held, at and against the breast of him, the said Edward Harr, did then and there, feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of their malice aforethought, shoot off and discharge at and upon him, the said Edward Harr, and with the revolving pistol aforesaid, loaded as aforesaid, and with the leaden balls aforesaid, then and there, feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of their malice aforethought, did shoot and strike him, the said Edward Harr, in and upon the breast of him, the said Edward Harr, thereby, then and there feloniously, willfully, deliberately, [658]*658premeditatedly and of their malice aforethought, giving to him, the said Edward Harr, in and upon the breast of him, the said Edward Harr, two mortal wounds, each of said mortal wounds being of the diameter of half an inch and of the depth of six inches, of which mortal wounds aforesaid the said Edward Harr then and there immediately and instantly die. And so the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do charge and say that they, the said Augustin Hagan and Florence Harr, him, the said Edward Harr, at the time and place aforesaid, in the manner and by the means aforesaid, feloniously, willfully, deliberately,' premeditatedly and of their malice aforethought, did kill and murder, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made .and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State. “Samuel Bond, Prosecuting Attorney.”

A motion in arrest challenges the sufficiency of this indictment; the challenge is well grounded. The indictment contains no allegation that Edward Harr is dead. Touching this point, Hawkins says (Book 2, chap. 25, sec. 60) : “Also' it seems to be generally agreed, that no indictment of death can be good without an express allegation, that the deceased both received the hurt which is laid as the cause of his death, and also that he died of the hurt so received; and that the want thereof can not be made good by any implication whatsoever; as hath been more fully shown (chap. 23, secs. 82, 83). Also it hath been adjudged that an indictment against J. S. for feloniously breaking such a prison, and commanding J. N. who was therein imprisoned for felony to escape, is not a good indictment for a felonious breaking, without expressly showing that J. S. did escape, and yet the breaking is expressly laid to be felonious, and it is impossible that it could be so, unless the party did escape. But it will be needless to enumerate any more instances of this kind, which are so very frequent that there is scarce any [659]*659case which mentions exceptions taken to indictments, without having some ox other grounded on this rule, that in an indictment nothing mateñal shall' be taken by intendment or vmplication

In another place, above referred to, the learned author says: “Eor it being the strict rule of law in these cases to have the substance of the fact expressed with precise certainty, the judges will suffer no argumentative certainty whatsoever to induce them to dispense with it. Eor if they should once be prevailed with to do it in one case, the like indulgence would be expected from them in others nearly resembling it, and then in others resembling those, and no one could say where this might end; which could not but endanger the subverting of one of the most fundamental principles of the law, by giving room to judges by arguments from what the jury have found, to convict a man of a fact which they have not found.”

Other authorities pursue the same line of thought and theory.

If any fact, word or circumstance which forms a necessary ingredient in, or a material description of, the offense be omitted in the indictment, such omission vitiates the indictment and of such vitiation defendant may advantage himself by demurrer, motion in arrest or by writ of error. [Rex v. Osmer, 5 East 304; Rex v. Everett, 8 B. & C. 114; Rex v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 196; Rex v. Jackson, 1 Leach 303].

The substantial description and outline of the charge in an indictment for murder done by violence are first, the felonious and mortal stroke given by defendant; second, the death of the person struck within a year and a day after receiving such stroke and in consequence thereof. So that, in the Latin forms, although the indictment charged "dedit mortalem ylagam,” without saying yercussit, the indictment was bad. [2 Hale, 184, 186; Wharton Crim. Plead, and Prac., sec. 259.]

[660]*660So with the omission or dropping of any other essentially descriptive word. Thus of dropping or omission of the word “did” where that word is essential to describe the criminal act done or the transpiring of some event necessary to the completion of the crime charged. [Whart. Crim. Plead. and Prac., sec. 275.]

Thus, in State v. Halder, 2 McCord 377, the indictment, which was for passing counterfeit money, charged that the defendant “feloniously utter and publish, dispose and pass,” etc., etc.; but omitted the word “did” before utter, etc., the court arrested the judgment because no charge was made that the prisoner did the act To like effect is State v. Perry, 2 Bailey, L. 17.

In a number of instances in the State of Texas, the omission of the word “did,” where necessary to describe the charge attempted to be made, has been held to make the indictment incurably defective (Moore v. State, 7 Tex. App. 42), and the omission was held a substantial defect in the indictment; one which necessarily went to the foundation of the prosecution.

Similar adjudications have occurred as to the effect of the omission of the same word. [Ewing v. State, 1 Tex. App. 362; State v. Hutchinson, 26 T. 111; State v. Daugherty, 30 Tex. 360; Edmundson v. State, 41 Tex. 496.]

This court has also held that the omission of the word “with” before the words “some heavy weapon or instrument” was fatal to the sufficiency of the indictment. [State v. Rector, 126 Mo. 328; State v. Furgerson, 152 Mo. 92; Same v. Same, 63 S. W. 101.]

Holding, then, the present indictment fatally defective because of the omission of the word “did” or because of the omission of the word “died,” we reverse the judgment on that account.

But the judgment should be reversed for a still weightier [661]*661ground and reason: The evidence shows a very.clear and indubitable case of self-defense; and this, defendant chiefly relied on.

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Bluebook (online)
65 S.W. 249, 164 Mo. 654, 1901 Mo. LEXIS 248, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hagan-mo-1901.