State v. Guy

Supreme Court of Minnesota

State v. Guy

298 N.W.2d 45, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1558

CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota

DecidedAugust 12, 1980

Docket51407

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 298 N.W.2d 45 (State v. Guy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Guy, 298 N.W.2d 45, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1558 (Mich. 1980).

Pincite

Opinion

SHERAN, Chief Justice.

The trial court, after a suppression hearing, certified as important and doubtful issues of standing of defendants who relied on doctrine of automatic standing for pos-sessory offenses. The doubt was over whether Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), which abolished automatic standing as a matter of federal constitutional law for nonpossessory offenses, also applied to possessory offenses. While this appeal was pending the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) and Rawlings v. Kentucky - U.S. - 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), decided this issue, rejecting the doctrine of automatic standing as a matter of federal constitutional law in the context of possessory offenses. Accordingly, the justification for certification in this case no longer exists. As in Salvucci, we remand to the trial court so that defendants may have the opportunity to demonstrate, if they can, that their-own Fourth Amendment rights were violated. We leave for post-trial appeal, if any, the issue whether as a matter of state constitutional law the doctrine of automatic standing should have continued vitality in this context.

Remanded.

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SHERAN, Chief Justice.

The trial court, after a suppression hearing, certified as important and doubtful issues of standing of defendants who relied on doctrine of automatic standing for pos-sessory offenses. The doubt was over whether Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), which abolished automatic standing as a matter of federal constitutional law for nonpossessory offenses, also applied to possessory offenses. While this appeal was pending the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) and Rawlings v. Kentucky - U.S. - 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), decided this issue, rejecting the doctrine of automatic standing as a matter of federal constitutional law in the context of possessory offenses. Accordingly, the justification for certification in this case no longer exists. As in Salvucci, we remand to the trial court so that defendants may have the opportunity to demonstrate, if they can, that their-own Fourth Amendment rights were violated. We leave for post-trial appeal, if any, the issue whether as a matter of state constitutional law the doctrine of automatic standing should have continued vitality in this context.

Remanded.

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Bluebook (online)

298 N.W.2d 45, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1558, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-guy-minn-1980.

Opinion

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