State v. Griffin

Supreme Court of South Carolina

State v. Griffin

785 S.E.2d 786, 416 S.C. 266, 2016 WL 2755844, 2016 S.C. LEXIS 102

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedMay 11, 2016

DocketAppellate Case 2015-001839; 27635

StatusPublished

This text of 785 S.E.2d 786 (State v. Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Griffin, 785 S.E.2d 786, 416 S.C. 266, 2016 WL 2755844, 2016 S.C. LEXIS 102 (S.C. 2016).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Griffin, 413 S.C. 258, 776 S.E.2d 87 (Ct.App.2015). We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision as modified.

After the start of trial, Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the deputies involved in his arrest and detainment were not duly qualified pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. §§ 23-13-10 and -20 (2007), because: (1) they were not properly bonded; (2) their oaths of office were not properly *268 evidenced by a certifícate signed by the sheriff until after Petitioner’s arrest; and (3) the certificates acknowledging their appointments and oaths were not properly authenticated in the public record. The motion was denied.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding the deputies could be considered “de facto deputies despite their failure to comply with all of the requirements of sections 23-13-10 and 23-13-20,” because they: (1) were employed with the sheriffs office for a significant amount of time; (2) stated at trial they were bonded and had taken an oath to every sheriff for whom they had worked; (3) performed duties consistent with their appointments as deputies; and (4) were identifiable to Petitioner as deputy sheriffs who had the authority to act.

However, we find such an analysis unnecessary, as it is well established that “the illegality of an initial arrest [does] not bar the accused person’s subsequent prosecution and conviction of the offense charged.” State v. Biehl, 271 S.C. 201, 246 S.E.2d 859 (1978); see also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); State v. Holliday, 255 S.C. 142, 177 S.E.2d 541 (1970); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 129 (2016) (“The illegality of an arrest does not preclude trial of the accused for the offense.”). Petitioner asked for his case to be dismissed with prejudice, a remedy that runs contrary to the established law of South Carolina. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, regardless of whether the underlying arrest was unlawful or committed lawfully by de facto sheriffs deputies.

Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ analysis, but affirm on the grounds set forth above.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

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PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Griffin, 413 S.C. 258, 776 S.E.2d 87 (Ct.App.2015). We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision as modified.

After the start of trial, Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the deputies involved in his arrest and detainment were not duly qualified pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. §§ 23-13-10 and -20 (2007), because: (1) they were not properly bonded; (2) their oaths of office were not properly *268 evidenced by a certifícate signed by the sheriff until after Petitioner’s arrest; and (3) the certificates acknowledging their appointments and oaths were not properly authenticated in the public record. The motion was denied.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding the deputies could be considered “de facto deputies despite their failure to comply with all of the requirements of sections 23-13-10 and 23-13-20,” because they: (1) were employed with the sheriffs office for a significant amount of time; (2) stated at trial they were bonded and had taken an oath to every sheriff for whom they had worked; (3) performed duties consistent with their appointments as deputies; and (4) were identifiable to Petitioner as deputy sheriffs who had the authority to act.

However, we find such an analysis unnecessary, as it is well established that “the illegality of an initial arrest [does] not bar the accused person’s subsequent prosecution and conviction of the offense charged.” State v. Biehl, 271 S.C. 201, 246 S.E.2d 859 (1978); see also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); State v. Holliday, 255 S.C. 142, 177 S.E.2d 541 (1970); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 129 (2016) (“The illegality of an arrest does not preclude trial of the accused for the offense.”). Petitioner asked for his case to be dismissed with prejudice, a remedy that runs contrary to the established law of South Carolina. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, regardless of whether the underlying arrest was unlawful or committed lawfully by de facto sheriffs deputies.

Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ analysis, but affirm on the grounds set forth above.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

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Bluebook (online)

785 S.E.2d 786, 416 S.C. 266, 2016 WL 2755844, 2016 S.C. LEXIS 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-griffin-sc-2016.

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