[Cite as State v. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-5360.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BROWN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2025-03-004
: OPINION AND - vs - JUDGMENT ENTRY : 12/1/2025
DONALD W. GRIFFIN, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. CRB2400308
Zachary A. Corbin, Brown County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary McMullen, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Suhre & Associates, LLC and Joseph B. Suhre IV, for appellant.
____________ OPINION
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Donald Griffin, appeals his conviction in the Brown County
Municipal Court for aggravated menacing. For the following reasons, we affirm. Brown CA2025-03-004
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On May 2, 2024, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Griffin pulled into Tankers Gas
Station in Brown County, Ohio, intending to purchase diesel fuel for his tractor. Griffin,
who works as a plant service manager for the Adams County Regional Medical Center,
was running late for work that morning. When Griffin arrived, another vehicle blocked the
diesel pump. While waiting, Griffin observed Anthony Mitchell pull up, park at the adjacent
pump, and enter the gas station without purchasing fuel.
{¶ 3} As Mitchell walked back to his vehicle after dropping off his daughter, who
worked at the gas station, Griffin expressed his frustration. Griffin asked Mitchell words
to the effect of, "Did you really just go in to get food? You blocked the pump to go get
food?" A verbal exchange followed. Griffin's exchange with Mitchell was not pleasant;
Griffin later admitted he was frustrated that morning and running late.
{¶ 4} What happened next is disputed. According to Mitchell, after the verbal
altercation, he got into his vehicle and observed Griffin open his driver's door, reach in,
and pull a gun from the door. Mitchell testified that Griffin then "turned towards me after
he had reached in" and retrieved his gun. Mitchell explained, "It was almost as if to make
sure I saw that he had pulled a gun. Because if he hadn't turned at all, I would have never
seen the gun." Mitchell further testified that he both saw and heard Griffin "rack the gun"
by pulling the slide back. When asked directly what he thought when he saw this, Mitchell
stated, "When he pulled the slide back, I thought he was going to shoot me, to be honest."
{¶ 5} Mitchell testified that he immediately feared for his safety and his daughter's
safety. He moved his vehicle forward toward the front of the store, positioning himself
between his daughter inside and Griffin. He yelled at Griffin, "Did you just pull a gun on
me?" and called 911.
{¶ 6} Griffin presented a markedly different account. According to Griffin, after the
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verbal exchange, he attempted to purchase fuel but discovered that the credit card reader
at the pump was not working. He started to walk inside to pay but realized he had left his
firearm in his unlocked truck. Not wanting to leave the firearm unattended, Griffin returned
to his vehicle, retrieved the weapon from the door, and secured it in his waistband. Griffin
testified that he took deliberate steps to position himself between his truck and the gas
pump, keeping his back to Mitchell, to prevent anyone from seeing the firearm. Griffin
claimed that no one could have seen his gun and that his firearm was already loaded,
rendering it unnecessary to rack the slide. Griffin stated that Mitchell must have simply
guessed that he had a firearm based on his shoulder movements.
{¶ 7} Mitchell's 911 call was played in court and admitted into evidence. During
the call, Mitchell can be heard saying, "I don't care who you are, you shouldn't brandish
a gun because you don't like where somebody is parked. That's a threat on my life. I have
to worry about getting shot because I am parked at a gas pump."
{¶ 8} Brown County Sheriff's Deputy Benjamin Graham responded to the call. By
the time Deputy Graham arrived at the scene, both Griffin and Mitchell had departed.
Deputy Graham subsequently spoke with Griffin by telephone on the same day. When
questioned, Griffin's initial response was, "there's no proof." Griffin asked Deputy Graham
whether he had watched camera footage from the gas station. When Deputy Graham
indicated he had not yet done so, Griffin stated, "Well, you know, if there wasn't working
cameras, there pretty much wasn't nothing [the police] could do." Griffin did not provide
Deputy Graham with the explanation he would later offer at trial, instead stating he would
have his attorney present before giving his side of the story. The gas station's cameras
were not functioning at the time of the incident.
{¶ 9} Griffin was charged with one count of aggravated menacing in violation of
R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. A bench trial was held on January 2, 2025.
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The State presented testimony from Mitchell and Deputy Graham. Griffin testified in his
own defense and attempted to demonstrate for the court how he positioned the gun in his
waistband while re-tucking his clothing.
{¶ 10} At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the matter under advisement.
The trial court subsequently found Griffin guilty as charged. In its written decision, the
court explicitly stated, "The Court is not persuaded by the Defendant's version of events.
The Court finds the Victim to be credible."
{¶ 11} A sentencing hearing was held on February 5, 2025. The trial court
sentenced Griffin to serve 90 days in jail, with all 90 days suspended. Griffin was placed
on community control for a period of one year. As conditions of his community control,
Griffin was ordered to complete 24 hours of community service, successfully complete
anger management services, have no contact with the victim, and not own or possess a
firearm during the term of community control.
{¶ 12} Griffin appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 13} Griffin raises two assignments of error, which we address together as they
challenge the evidentiary basis for his conviction. In his first assignment of error, Griffin
contends that his conviction for aggravated menacing is not supported by sufficient
evidence. In his second assignment of error, he argues that his conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Both assignments turn on whether the State proved that
Griffin knowingly caused Mitchell to believe that Griffin would cause him serious physical
harm.
A. Standards of Review
{¶ 14} We begin with the applicable standards of review, which, though related,
serve distinct functions in our appellate analysis. "Whether the evidence presented at trial
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is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law." (Citation omitted.) State v.
Moore, 2021-Ohio-1856, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). "When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation omitted.) State v. Tenbrook, 2020-
Ohio-5227, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). The relevant inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61
Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. In conducting this review, we do
not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. See State v. Were, 2008-
Ohio-2762, ¶ 132. "Rather, we decide whether, if believed, the evidence can sustain the
verdict as a matter of law." (Citation omitted.) State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13.
{¶ 15} A manifest weight challenge, on the other hand, questions whether the state
has met its burden of persuasion. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-
Ohio-52. A manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the "inclination of the
greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue
rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). "When
considering whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence in a bench
trial, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction where the trial court could reasonably
conclude from substantial evidence that the state has proven the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Lowry, 2020-Ohio-1554, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), citing State v.
Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 59 (1988). In conducting our review, we examine the entire
record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trial court
"'clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
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must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). "The discretionary power to grant a new trial
should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the evidence weighs heavily against
the conviction." (Citation omitted.) State v. Applegate, 2014-Ohio-1697, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.).
B. The Essential Elements of Aggravated Menacing
{¶ 16} Griffin was convicted of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.
2903.21(A), which provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly cause another to believe
that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other
person, the other person's unborn, or a member of the other person's immediate family."
This statute "criminalizes a person's [knowing] threat of violence that creates fear or
causes apprehension of serious physical harm in another person." State v. James, 2024-
Ohio-621, ¶ 50 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 17} The statute requires proof of two essential elements. First, the defendant
must have acted "knowingly." Under R.C. 2901.22(B), "A person acts knowingly,
regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably
cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist."
Second, the victim must have had "a subjective belief of serious physical harm from the
offender." James at ¶ 47.
{¶ 18} A threat of physical harm may be implied through actions or conduct without
a verbal threat. State v. Pierce, 2024-Ohio-5357, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). The "key" is whether
the defendant's conduct causes the victim to genuinely believe that he is facing physical
harm to himself or to his immediate family. In re Burbrink, 2001-Ohio-8680, *2 (12th Dist.).
"Evidence of a person's belief that an offender will cause serious physical harm can be
proven with circumstantial evidence." (Citation omitted.) James at ¶ 47.
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C. Sufficiency of the Evidence: the Knowingly Element
{¶ 19} Griffin's central argument is that the State failed to prove he acted
knowingly. He contends that he took deliberate steps to prevent anyone from seeing his
firearm by positioning himself between his truck and a gas pump while keeping his back
to Mitchell. According to Griffin, he was merely engaging in the lawful act of securing his
firearm on his person, and he had no reason to believe that Mitchell would perceive this
as threatening.
{¶ 20} The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
established far more than the innocent act Griffin now claims. Mitchell testified that after
their verbal altercation, he saw Griffin open his driver's door, reach in, and pull a gun from
the door. Mitchell then both saw and heard Griffin rack the gun, pulling the slide back.
Critically, Mitchell testified that Griffin "turned towards me after he had reached in" and
retrieved his gun, explaining, "It was almost as if to make sure I saw that he had pulled a
gun. Because if he hadn't turned at all, I would have never seen the gun."
{¶ 21} This testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, establishes that Griffin was
aware his conduct would probably cause Mitchell to believe he would suffer serious
physical harm. The act of retrieving a firearm from a vehicle and racking it following a
heated confrontation is objectively threatening conduct. That Griffin turned toward Mitchell
after retrieving the weapon amplifies this inference. A rational trier of fact could conclude
that Griffin's decision to turn toward Mitchell with the gun, rather than simply securing it
discreetly while turned away, demonstrates awareness that his conduct would probably
cause Mitchell to fear serious harm.
{¶ 22} Griffin's testimony that he was merely securing his firearm and that his gun
was already loaded, rendering racking unnecessary, presented a factual dispute for the
trial court to resolve. Mitchell's testimony about seeing and hearing the gun being racked,
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combined with his observation that Griffin turned toward him, provides sufficient evidence
from which a rational trier of fact could find the knowingly element proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
{¶ 23} The context of the encounter further supports this conclusion. The incident
occurred immediately following a verbal altercation in which Griffin, by his own admission,
was frustrated and running late for work. This was not a case where Griffin was calmly
going about his business when someone happened to misinterpret innocent conduct.
Rather, tensions had already escalated through their exchange of words. A reasonable
person retrieving a firearm in such circumstances would be aware that displaying the
weapon, particularly after racking it, would probably cause the other party to believe
serious physical harm might follow.
{¶ 24} Griffin's contention that he took steps to hide his actions is contradicted by
the evidence the trial court credited. Mitchell testified that Griffin turned toward him. The
trial court was entitled to credit this testimony and to reject Griffin's claim that he carefully
concealed his actions. Moreover, even if Griffin attempted some concealment, the fact
remains that Mitchell saw and heard what was occurring, and the trial court could
reasonably infer that Griffin was aware his conduct would probably be perceived as
threatening given the circumstances.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Mitchell's Subjective Belief
{¶ 25} Griffin also challenges whether the State proved that Mitchell actually
believed Griffin would cause him serious physical harm. This challenge fares no better.
Mitchell testified multiple times that he feared for his and his daughter's safety and
believed Griffin was going to shoot him. When asked directly, Mitchell stated, "When he
pulled the slide back, I thought he was going to shoot me, to be honest." Mitchell's 911
call, played in court and admitted into evidence, captured his contemporaneous
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statements: "I don't care who you are, you shouldn't brandish a gun . . . . That's a threat
on my life. I have to worry about getting shot because I am parked at a gas pump."
{¶ 26} Mitchell's actions corroborated his stated fear. He immediately moved his
vehicle toward the front of the store, positioning himself between his daughter, who
worked at the gas station, and Griffin. He called 911. These are not the actions of
someone merely annoyed or upset. They are the actions of someone who genuinely
believed he faced a threat of serious physical harm.
{¶ 27} Griffin attempts to undermine this evidence by noting that Mitchell described
Griffin as "well put together" and not looking like "an aggressive type of person," and that
Mitchell continued talking to Griffin rather than fleeing. These observations, however, do
not negate Mitchell's clearly expressed fear. A person can simultaneously recognize that
another person appears outwardly composed while still fearing what that person might do
with a firearm following a confrontation. Mitchell's decision to continue engaging with
Griffin, rather than immediately driving away, may reflect his concern for his daughter's
safety, his attempt to defuse the situation, or simply his shock at what had occurred. None
of these considerations undermine the substantial evidence of his subjective belief that
he faced a threat of serious harm.
E. Distinguishing Contrary Authority
{¶ 28} Griffin relies heavily on this court's decision in State v. Fields, 84 Ohio
App.3d 423 (12th Dist. 1992), and the Sixth District's recent decision in State v.
Szafranski, 2025-Ohio-1104 (6th Dist.). These cases, however, are readily
distinguishable from the present matter.
{¶ 29} In Fields, an off-duty police officer ejected trespassers from property while
holding a firearm. Although she initially waved the gun, she did not verbally threaten the
trespassers or point the gun at them. Id. at 428. Significantly, one of the victims testified
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that the defendant was "pretty nice" during the encounter. Id. This court found insufficient
evidence to support an aggravated menacing conviction, concluding that the defendant's
actions did not constitute a threat and that the state failed to prove the victims were
threatened with serious physical harm. The Fields case involved a defendant who, despite
possessing a firearm, conducted herself in a manner that conveyed she was not
threatening harm. The victims' own characterization of her demeanor as "pretty nice"
undermined any claim that they genuinely feared serious harm.
{¶ 30} The present case stands in stark contrast. Here, Mitchell testified that Griffin
pulled a gun and racked it immediately following a heated verbal confrontation. Griffin did
not interact pleasantly with Mitchell, as the defendant did with the trespassers in Fields.
Rather, Griffin's conduct followed an exchange in which, by Griffin's own admission, he
was frustrated. Mitchell did not describe Griffin's behavior as "pretty nice." Instead, he
immediately feared for his life and his daughter's safety, moved his vehicle to a protective
position, and called 911. The qualitative difference between the defendant's conduct in
Fields and Griffin's conduct here is substantial.
{¶ 31} Similarly, Szafranski is distinguishable. In that case, the Sixth District
reversed a menacing conviction because the victim testified he was "'upset,' 'mad,' and
'angry'" but never indicated he was scared, afraid, fearful, concerned for his safety, or
thought the defendant would shoot him. Szafranski, 2025-Ohio-1104, ¶ 51. The victim in
Szafranski did not mention fear or harm when speaking with police, did not appear afraid
on body camera footage, and did not drive away from where the defendant was parked.
Id. at ¶ 52. The Sixth District concluded the city presented "absolutely no evidence" that
the victim subjectively believed the defendant was going to harm him. Id. at ¶ 51.
{¶ 32} Here, by contrast, Mitchell repeatedly testified he feared for his safety and
his daughter's safety. He stated he thought Griffin was going to shoot him. His 911 call
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contemporaneously expressed his belief that his life had been threatened. And he took
immediate protective action by repositioning his vehicle and calling emergency services.
This is not a case where the victim's statements and conduct suggested mere anger or
upset, as in Szafranski. Mitchell's testimony and behavior provided ample evidence of his
subjective belief in a threat of serious physical harm.
{¶ 33} Griffin's reliance on these cases ultimately founders on the facts. Both
Fields and Szafranski involved evidence that, even when viewed favorably to the
prosecution, failed to establish the essential elements of the offense. Here, the evidence
amply supports both that Griffin knowingly caused Mitchell's belief and that Mitchell
genuinely believed he faced a threat of serious harm.
F. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 34} Having concluded that sufficient evidence supports Griffin's conviction, we
turn to whether the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our review
of the entire record convinces us that it is not. The trial court, sitting as factfinder, was in
the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to
their testimony. State v. Brand, 2023-Ohio-557, ¶ 123 (12th Dist.). And "[w]e generally
defer to the factfinder on matters of witness credibility." Id. at ¶ 125. The trial court
explicitly found Mitchell credible and rejected Griffin's version of events. This credibility
determination finds ample support in the record.
{¶ 35} Mitchell's testimony was internally consistent and corroborated by his
contemporaneous actions and statements. His 911 call captured his immediate response
to the incident, providing real-time verification of his fear. His decision to reposition his
vehicle to protect his daughter demonstrated the sincerity of his concern. By contrast,
Griffin's testimony that he carefully concealed his firearm while securing it on his person
conflicted with Mitchell's testimony that Griffin turned toward him with the weapon. Griffin's
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claim that he did not rack the gun because it was already loaded conflicted with Mitchell's
testimony that he both saw and heard the gun being racked. These factual disputes
presented classic credibility questions for the trial court to resolve.
{¶ 36} Moreover, Griffin's statements to law enforcement raised further questions
about his credibility. When initially questioned by Deputy Graham, Griffin stated, "there's
no proof," rather than providing the explanation he offered at trial. When Deputy Graham
asked about camera footage, Griffin responded, "Well, you know, if there wasn't working
cameras, there pretty much wasn’t nothing [the police] could do." These statements
suggest a consciousness of wrongdoing and a hope that the absence of video evidence
would preclude prosecution, rather than the confident innocence one might expect from
someone who had merely secured a firearm discreetly.
{¶ 37} When conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the testimony
and evidence presented by the State. State v. Nelson, 2024-Ohio-5750, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.).
The trial court did not clearly lose its way in crediting Mitchell's testimony and rejecting
Griffin's alternative explanation. The evidence does not weigh heavily against the
conviction. This is not one of those exceptional cases where a manifest miscarriage of
justice requires reversal.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 38} For all these reasons, we conclude that Griffin's conviction is supported by
sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Griffin knowingly caused Mitchell to believe that
Griffin would cause him serious physical harm. The trial court's credibility determinations
are entitled to deference, and those determinations find substantial support in the record.
Griffin's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
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{¶ 39} The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
{¶ 40} BYRNE, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Brown County Municipal Court for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
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