[339]*339DENECKE, C. J.
We granted review in this and three other cases in order to attempt to clarify the law relating to the search and seizure of vehicles. State v. Fondren, 30 Or App 1045, 568 P2d 721 (1977); State v. Downes, 31 Or App 419, 571 P2d 914 (1977); State v. Groda, 32 Or App 287, 573 P2d 1269 (1978).
We are governed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and § 9, Art I, of the Oregon Constitution. With few exceptions not pertinent here, Oregon statutes do not attempt to cover searches and seizures without a warrant.
We must accord the defendant at least as much protection as he is entitled to under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. If § 9, Art I, affords more protection to the defendant than does the Fourth Amendment, this greater protection must be accorded defendant. In at least two aspects of search and seizure we have held that the Oregon Constitution affords no more protection than the United States Constitution. State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 182, 527 P2d 1202 (1974); State v. Flores, 280 Or 273, 279, 570 P2d 965 (1977). While the' defendant relies upon the Oregon Constitution as well as the United States Constitution, he does not point out any reasons why we should depart from the analysis that the United States Supreme Court has developed in its decisions. As we stated in Flores, supra (280 Or at 279), "we see no persuasive reason to do so.” Accordingly, we look to these decisions.
The scenario in this case starts with three armed men breaking into a residence, assaulting the occupants and stealing money, jewelry and other property. A neighbor was able to describe the car in which the thieves drove away, including the license number, and to generally describe the three men. The police established that the car belonged to a Beverly Stanton. The morning after the crime at 10:15 a.m. an officer went to the address listed for Stanton and a car fitting the [340]*340description given by the neighbor, including the license number, was parked in the residential driveway. Police started gathering near Stanton’s house shortly thereafter and they learned by inquiring of neighbors that several men matching the general descriptions of the men who committed the burglary lived in the Stanton house. Shortly after noon, the 14 officers then gathered broke into the house. Stanton and a friend were in the house, but the defendant and his alleged accomplices were not. The car was towed to the police station and searched. The police did not attempt to get a warrant for the search of the car or house. Several blood-stained items of clothing were found in the trunk. The blood type matched that of one of the victims who had been assaulted during the robbery.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court granted the motion as it pertained to the house search, but denied it as to the items found in the car. Defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, but reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the trial court’s failure to give a requested instruction. State v. Greene, 30 Or App 1019, 568 P2d 716 (1977).
If the search can be sustained, it must be on the basis of the doctrine of Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 45 Sup Ct 280, 69 L Ed 543, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The Court of Appeals sustained the search on that ground. The essence of the doctrine of Carroll v. United States, supra (267 US 132), is that a search of an automobile may be made without a warrant if (1) the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, stolen goods, evidence of crime, etc., and (2) that there are exigent circumstances present which require that the vehicle be searched without obtaining a warrant. Underlying both of these propositions is the overall principle repeatedly stated by the United States Supreme Court and this court that searches conducted without a [341]*341warrant are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few exceptions. For example, Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 357, 88 S Ct 507, 19 L Ed2d 576 (1967); State v. Miller, 269 Or 328, 334, 524 P2d 1399 (1974).
The first inquiry is, did the officers have probable cause? More specifically, did the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained some of the property stolen the night before or some evidence of the crime? The defendant did not strongly contend there was a lack of probable cause; however, we are of the opinion that it is a close question.
"Probable cause” is a reasonable belief that the car contains evidence. United States v. Kalama, 549 F2d 594, 595 (9th Cir 1977); State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 10, 456 P2d 67 (1969). The case cited by the Court of Appeals supporting its opinion that the officers in the present case had probable cause illustrates when the question of probable cause is easily answered. That case is State v. Poole, 11 Or App 55, 500 P2d 726 (1972). There, an officer received a broadcast that a burglary was in progress. The car involved was described, including the license number, a description of the burglars and their direction of travel. Six minutes after receiving the broadcast the officer saw the car described in the broadcast speeding in the direction stated in the broadcast. The officer followed and when the car parked, the officer stopped and searched the car. It appears obvious in these circumstances that the officer could reasonably believe that the car contained fruits or evidence of the crime.
The present case is not that obvious. The car was found the morning after the crime had been committed. It was found in the owner’s driveway and the owner had not been identified as being present at the crime. It is questionable whether thieves commonly leave stolen money, jewelry and weapons overnight in the trunk of a car parked outside.
As stated, we are of the opinion that probable cause is a close issue; however, we conclude that under the [342]*342facts of the present case, when a car used in a theft is found within hours after the theft at a house where persons matching the description of the thieves appear to reside, the circumstances provide probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of the crime.
The other requirement for search without a warrant is "exigent circumstances.” The principal contention of the defendant is that there were no exigent circumstances.
The exigent circumstances requirement is based upon practical necessity. The logic is as follows: Ordinarily, a search is not authorized without a warrant; however, a warrant is not necessary if there is probable cause and if any evidence that might be present likely will have disappeared if the officers cannot seize and search before securing a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42, 51, 90 S Ct 1975,26 L Ed2d 419 (1970).
The sharpness of this logic has been blurred by a statement in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56, 66, 70 S Ct 430, 94 L Ed 653 (1950), which has been repeated. "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.” Rabinowitz was overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 US 752, 768, 89 S Ct 2034, 23 L Ed2d 685 (1969). However, as late as 1976 in South Dakota v. Opperman,
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[339]*339DENECKE, C. J.
We granted review in this and three other cases in order to attempt to clarify the law relating to the search and seizure of vehicles. State v. Fondren, 30 Or App 1045, 568 P2d 721 (1977); State v. Downes, 31 Or App 419, 571 P2d 914 (1977); State v. Groda, 32 Or App 287, 573 P2d 1269 (1978).
We are governed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and § 9, Art I, of the Oregon Constitution. With few exceptions not pertinent here, Oregon statutes do not attempt to cover searches and seizures without a warrant.
We must accord the defendant at least as much protection as he is entitled to under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. If § 9, Art I, affords more protection to the defendant than does the Fourth Amendment, this greater protection must be accorded defendant. In at least two aspects of search and seizure we have held that the Oregon Constitution affords no more protection than the United States Constitution. State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 182, 527 P2d 1202 (1974); State v. Flores, 280 Or 273, 279, 570 P2d 965 (1977). While the' defendant relies upon the Oregon Constitution as well as the United States Constitution, he does not point out any reasons why we should depart from the analysis that the United States Supreme Court has developed in its decisions. As we stated in Flores, supra (280 Or at 279), "we see no persuasive reason to do so.” Accordingly, we look to these decisions.
The scenario in this case starts with three armed men breaking into a residence, assaulting the occupants and stealing money, jewelry and other property. A neighbor was able to describe the car in which the thieves drove away, including the license number, and to generally describe the three men. The police established that the car belonged to a Beverly Stanton. The morning after the crime at 10:15 a.m. an officer went to the address listed for Stanton and a car fitting the [340]*340description given by the neighbor, including the license number, was parked in the residential driveway. Police started gathering near Stanton’s house shortly thereafter and they learned by inquiring of neighbors that several men matching the general descriptions of the men who committed the burglary lived in the Stanton house. Shortly after noon, the 14 officers then gathered broke into the house. Stanton and a friend were in the house, but the defendant and his alleged accomplices were not. The car was towed to the police station and searched. The police did not attempt to get a warrant for the search of the car or house. Several blood-stained items of clothing were found in the trunk. The blood type matched that of one of the victims who had been assaulted during the robbery.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court granted the motion as it pertained to the house search, but denied it as to the items found in the car. Defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, but reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the trial court’s failure to give a requested instruction. State v. Greene, 30 Or App 1019, 568 P2d 716 (1977).
If the search can be sustained, it must be on the basis of the doctrine of Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 45 Sup Ct 280, 69 L Ed 543, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The Court of Appeals sustained the search on that ground. The essence of the doctrine of Carroll v. United States, supra (267 US 132), is that a search of an automobile may be made without a warrant if (1) the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, stolen goods, evidence of crime, etc., and (2) that there are exigent circumstances present which require that the vehicle be searched without obtaining a warrant. Underlying both of these propositions is the overall principle repeatedly stated by the United States Supreme Court and this court that searches conducted without a [341]*341warrant are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few exceptions. For example, Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 357, 88 S Ct 507, 19 L Ed2d 576 (1967); State v. Miller, 269 Or 328, 334, 524 P2d 1399 (1974).
The first inquiry is, did the officers have probable cause? More specifically, did the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained some of the property stolen the night before or some evidence of the crime? The defendant did not strongly contend there was a lack of probable cause; however, we are of the opinion that it is a close question.
"Probable cause” is a reasonable belief that the car contains evidence. United States v. Kalama, 549 F2d 594, 595 (9th Cir 1977); State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 10, 456 P2d 67 (1969). The case cited by the Court of Appeals supporting its opinion that the officers in the present case had probable cause illustrates when the question of probable cause is easily answered. That case is State v. Poole, 11 Or App 55, 500 P2d 726 (1972). There, an officer received a broadcast that a burglary was in progress. The car involved was described, including the license number, a description of the burglars and their direction of travel. Six minutes after receiving the broadcast the officer saw the car described in the broadcast speeding in the direction stated in the broadcast. The officer followed and when the car parked, the officer stopped and searched the car. It appears obvious in these circumstances that the officer could reasonably believe that the car contained fruits or evidence of the crime.
The present case is not that obvious. The car was found the morning after the crime had been committed. It was found in the owner’s driveway and the owner had not been identified as being present at the crime. It is questionable whether thieves commonly leave stolen money, jewelry and weapons overnight in the trunk of a car parked outside.
As stated, we are of the opinion that probable cause is a close issue; however, we conclude that under the [342]*342facts of the present case, when a car used in a theft is found within hours after the theft at a house where persons matching the description of the thieves appear to reside, the circumstances provide probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of the crime.
The other requirement for search without a warrant is "exigent circumstances.” The principal contention of the defendant is that there were no exigent circumstances.
The exigent circumstances requirement is based upon practical necessity. The logic is as follows: Ordinarily, a search is not authorized without a warrant; however, a warrant is not necessary if there is probable cause and if any evidence that might be present likely will have disappeared if the officers cannot seize and search before securing a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42, 51, 90 S Ct 1975,26 L Ed2d 419 (1970).
The sharpness of this logic has been blurred by a statement in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56, 66, 70 S Ct 430, 94 L Ed 653 (1950), which has been repeated. "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.” Rabinowitz was overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 US 752, 768, 89 S Ct 2034, 23 L Ed2d 685 (1969). However, as late as 1976 in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364,372-373, 96 S Ct 3092, 49 L Ed2d 1000 (1976), the majority quoted with seeming approval an opinion by Mr. Justice Black to this effect. The majority opinion in Opperman, however, did not depend upon the application of that statement from Rabinowitz and we are of the opinion that it is no longer a pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court which we are bound to follow in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Powell specifically so stated in his concurring opinion in Opperman at pp 377-378. The majority also specifically so held in United States v. United States District Court, 407 US 297, 315, 92 S Ct 2125, 32 L Ed2d 752 (1972).
[343]*343That leaves the question, could the officers reasonably have sought a search warrant? An ancillary question is, at what time should this be determined: when the car was initially seized at Stanton’s residence or when the car was searched at the police station? This question is answered by Chambers v. Maroney, supra (399 US 42). The facts in Chambers were that within an hour after the night robbery of a filling station by armed bandits, the police stopped a car matching a description of the car used in the robbery on a public street. The occupants were arrested and the car brought to the station and searched. The majority held the car could be searched when it was stopped "since there was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search.” 399 US at 52. The majority went on to reason that the right to search continues if the police choose to take the car to the station and make the search there.
The latter reasoning of the majority was based upon the premise that the alternative to taking to the station to search was a warrantless seizure of the car at the point of stopping and a denial of use or access to anyone while the officers attempted to secure a warrant and the opinion that such alternative action was a no lesser intrusion than a warrantless search. The majority stated: "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.” 399 US at 52.
The defendant and the amicus argue that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443,458-464,91S Ct 2022, 29 L Ed2d 564 (1971), governs this case and requires a decision that the evidence was unconstitutionally secured. We do not regard the decision in Coolidge, whether it be merely by a plurality or a majority, as being contrary to the general principle stated in Chambers. The Court held in Coolidge that the warrantless search of the car was invalid because there [344]*344were not such exigent circumstances that the officers were excused from attempting to get a warrant. That there was ample time to obtain a warrant is best proved by the fact that officers in Coolidge did get a warrant and made the search pursuant to the warrant. The reason the issue of whether the search would be valid without a warrant arose is that the Court held the warrant was constitutionally defective because it was issued by the Attorney General and not a judicial officer.
In addition to the actual issuance of a warrant, the other facts show the reasonableness of securing a warrant. As the plurality opinion observes, for two and one-half weeks the state was accumulating evidence on the defendant and the officers had known for some time of the probable role of the car in the crime.
In the present case the defendant contends the officers had ample time to apply for a warrant to search the car. He relies upon the fact that the car was first observed by an officer about 10:15 a.m. and was under constant observation for the next two hours by an increasing number of officers. A short time after 12:00 a.m. the officers went into the house and some time thereafter seized the car and took it to the station.
Defendant argues that if the defendant, the owner Stanton, or anyone else attempted to move the car or take anything out of it before a warrant to search was obtained, the officers were present to stop them.
This argument is similar to the argument made by the defendant in Chambers v. Maroney, supra (399 US 42), and rejected by the Court. The officers in this case had reason to believe that someone might come out of the house at any time and attempt either to drive the car away or remove something. The officers then would have the choice of either letting the evidence disappear or seizing the car despite the lack of a warrant. Chambers approved the latter procedure and equated it as no greater intrusion than a warrantless search.
[345]*345It may be suggested that the required course should be to attempt to secure a warrant for search and seizure in the hope that a warrant could be obtained before anyone attempted to remove the car or evidence in the car. We conclude that it would not be correct to determine Fourth Amendment rights on the happenstance of whether someone will try to remove a car or evidence before or after a warrant is obtained. The distinct possibility was present that someone might try to do so before a warrant could be obtained and that supplies the exigent circumstance.
We hold that there were exigent circumstances and the officers were justified in searching the car.
Affirmed.