[Cite as State v. Greene, 2026-Ohio-1551.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115111 v. :
WILLIAM GREENE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-694082-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mason McCarthy and Caroline Maver, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Wegman Hessler Valore and Matthew O. Williams, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
Defendant-appellant William Greene (“Greene”) appeals his
convictions and asks this court to reverse and remand to the trial court for a new
trial. We affirm the appellant’s convictions. After a jury trial, Greene was found guilty of two counts of gross
sexual imposition, third-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); and two
counts of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, a first-degree misdemeanor, in
violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), and a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2907.31(A)(3). Greene was sentenced to 36 months in prison.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Greene was accused of victimizing the two daughters of his girlfriend.
The victims, M.S. and K.S., were born November 17, 2010, and August 30, 2009,
respectively. The victims met Greene in 2018. Greene moved into the mother’s
home with her daughters in 2020. At trial, M.S. testified that Greene touched her
inappropriately two weeks after he moved in with them. Tr. 527. She stated that
she was sleeping and woke up to find Greene in front of her, wearing her mother’s
robe, touching his penis. The second incident, M.S. testified that Greene put his
penis in her hand. Tr. 530. M.S. stated that she awoke to Greene rubbing his penis
back and forth in her hand. Thereafter, M.S. texted her father. M.S. read the text
messages at trial, stating: “My mom boyfriend just put his penis — private part on
my hand. I woke up. And he tried to lie and say it was bedbugs in my bed.” Tr. 535.
The date of the text message was April 20, 2022. M.S.’s father told her to tell her
mother, and her father came to pick her up from the home. She stayed with him for
two weeks and then went back to live with her mother. Tr. 547. After returning
home, M.S. told her mother about the incidents. Despite informing her mother,
Greene continued to live in the home, making M.S. uncomfortable. M.S. testified that she was frustrated that Greene was not held accountable. As a result of her
stress, M.S. lied to the director of the recreational center she attended, stating that
her mother killed M.S.’s three-year old sister. M.S. stated that her intention was to
get people to listen to her so she would not have to live with Greene any longer.
After M.S.’s testimony, K.S. testified that from time to time, Greene
would come into her room naked. Tr. 631. One night, while K.S. was sleeping,
Greene put his penis in her hand. She also testified that after that night she
witnessed Greene masturbating and watching pornography on his phone while they
were both in the living room. After that incident, on another day, K.S. was in the
living room watching TV when she observed Greene sitting in the dining room on a
stool masturbating again. Tr. 644. When asked how old she was when the incidents
occurred, K.S. responded, “[p]robably, like, ten. I was in my double digits, ten or
eleven.” Tr. 636.
K.S. further testified that she reported the incidents to her
grandmother and her father. M.S.’s and K.S.’s grandmother and their respective
fathers took them to the police station to report Greene in 2022. Tr. 630. K.S.
stated, “We went to the police to talk about what happened between me, my sister,
and the boyfriend William Greene.” Id. Both K.S. and M.S. would have been under
13 years old. Their grandmother also took them to the hospital where a SANE
examination was conducted on the girls. The girls were also interviewed by
Stephanie Moore (“Moore”), an investigator in the sex-abuse department for the
Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”). Moore testified that she received a referral regarding inappropriate
touching of M.S. and K.S. Tr. 816. Moore initiated contact and interviewed the girls
on October 17, 2022. Tr. 727, 816, and 840. At trial, the State played video
interviews between Moore and each girl. Moore testified that M.S. disclosed that
Greene put his penis in her hand while she was in bed. Moore also testified that
during her interview with K.S., K.S. disclosed that Greene also put his penis her in
hand while she was sleep in her bed. K.S. also disclosed to Moore that Greene
masturbated twice in front of her. Moore conducted further investigations into the
allegations, she gave a disposition of substantiated in the case, and explained that
her disposition was based on the credible, consistent disclosures of the girls, the
consistency of the evidence from the FBI regarding the text messages from a phone
dump, and the information that was collected at the time of the investigation.
Tr. 836.
At the end of the trial, the jury found Greene guilty of two counts of
gross sexual imposition and two counts of disseminating matter harmful to
juveniles.
Greene filed this appeal, assigning three errors for our review:
1. The trial court erred prejudicing Appellant by admitting hearsay statements from forensic interviews of M.S. and K.S. which served no medical purpose and were clearly testimonial;
2. Appellant’s convictions for the Gross Sexual Imposition on K.S. and for Disseminating Matter Harmful to both M.S. and K.S. are not supported by sufficient evidence; and
3. Appellant’s Convictions are Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence. II. Hearsay Statements
A. Standard of Review
‘“The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a trial
court, and a reviewing court [will] not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence
of an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice.’” State v. Hutchinson,
2025-Ohio-4674, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Noling, 2002-Ohio-7044, ¶ 43.
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises ‘its judgment, in an
unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.’”
Id., quoting Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
B. Law and Analysis
In Greene’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
erred when it admitted portions of the forensic interview of K.S. and M.S. because
these interviews were conducted for the purposes of investigation and produced
testimonial and inadmissible statements. More specifically, Greene asserts that the
interviews that were produced served no medical purpose and were clearly
testimonial. Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Under Evid.R. 802, hearsay is
inadmissible unless the out-of-court statement falls within a recognized exception
to the hearsay rule. Evid.R. 803 sets forth several exceptions including
Evid.R. 803(4), which provides an exception for statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis and treatment. Evid.R. 803(4) provides: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character or the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.
Hutchinson at ¶ 22.
Greene cites State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, in support of his claim
that Moore’s forensic interviews of M.S. and K.S. contain nothing but inadmissible
hearsay. In Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a child’s hearsay
statements contained in a forensic interview violated the Confrontation Clause of
the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004), the United States Supreme
Court explained that the key question for determining whether a Confrontation
Clause violation has occurred is whether an out-of-court statement is “testimonial.”
If a statement is testimonial, its admission into evidence will violate the defendant’s
right to confrontation if the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. Id. at 53-56.
Because M.S. and K.S. testified at trial, the Confrontation Clause was
not implicated, and the Arnold decision has limited application in this case. State
v. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1459, ¶ 34-35, and 38 (8th Dist.), citing Crawford at 59, fn. 9 (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation
Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”).
Nevertheless, Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, is relevant for determining
whether the statements M.S. and K.S. expressed during the forensic interview were
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. In Arnold, the Court
explained that child-advocacy centers are unique because they involve
interdisciplinary teams of people who cooperate “‘so that the child is interviewed
only once and will not have to retell the story multiple times.’” Hutchinson, 2025-
Ohio-4674, at ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Arnold at ¶ 33. “‘Most members of the team
retain their autonomy’” such that “‘[n]either police officers nor medical personnel
become agents of the other.’” Id., quoting id. “However, to avoid the need for
multiple interviews, ‘the interviewer must elicit as much information from the child
as possible in a single interview and must gather the information needed by each
team member.’” Id., quoting id.
Thus, the interview serves dual purposes: (1) to gather forensic information to investigate and potentially prosecute a defendant for the offense and (2) to elicit information necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment of the victim. The interviewer acts as an agent of each member of the multidisciplinary team.
Id., quoting id.
As a result, some of M.S.’s and K.S.’s statements could have served an
investigative purpose while other statements could have been elicited for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment. Arnold at ¶ 34. In State v. Fears, 2017-Ohio-
6978, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.), this court held that “[t]o the extent a victim’s statement to a social worker is for investigative or prosecutorial purposes, the statement will not
fall within the hearsay exception under Evid.R. 803(4).” Id. at ¶ 38, citing State v.
Rose, 2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.).
Greene argues that the nature of the questioning and the information
elicited demonstrates an investigative purpose. He further contends that Moore
made no referrals, treatment decisions, or diagnosis for either girl.
However, courts have held that descriptions of sexual abuse itself and the identification of the perpetrator are within the scope of statements made for medical and treatment purposes when the interviewer is seeking to determine if the sexual abuse was indicated, whether the child victim remained at risk, and whether the child victim requires treatment. . . . (“[C]ourts have consistently found that a description of the encounter and identification of the perpetrator are within [the] scope of statements [made] for medical treatment and diagnosis.”).
Hutchinson at ¶ 25.
Greene contends that the interviews are testimonial statements of a
highly prejudicial nature and should not have been put into evidence. Although
some of the questions and answers regarding specific acts of abuse and the identity
of the perpetrator could be used for criminal prosecution, there is no evidence that
Moore conducted the interview solely for that purpose. And, as previously stated,
statements describing the abuse and identifying the perpetrator are considered
within the scope of treatment when the interviewer is seeking to determine if the
abuse is indicated or if the child remained at risk. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1459, at ¶ 42,
citing Fears, 2017-Ohio-6978, at ¶ 45; In re D.L., 2005-Ohio-2320, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). We conclude that the trial court did not err when it allowed
statements from the forensic interviews of M.S. and K.S. to be admitted at trial.
Therefore, Greene’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
An appellate court’s purpose when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sanders, 2023-
Ohio-1565, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph
two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing
id.
“In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge
questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing State v.
Armstrong, 2021-Ohio-1087, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). An appellate court examines the
entire record, “‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.’” Id., quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388 (1997). “A conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in
the most ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.’” Id., quoting id.
In Greene’s second and third assignments of error, he argues that his
convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are also against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, as it relates to the sufficiency of the
evidence, Greene contends that his conviction for gross sexual imposition on K.S.
was not supported by sufficient evidence without any specific offense dates in
evidence. Greene questions how the jury could reasonably find that the age element
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He further contends that his
convictions for disseminating matter harmful to K.S. and M.S. through performative
masturbation and disseminating harmful matter to K.S. by sharing pornography
were not supported by sufficient evidence. As to manifest weight, Greene argues
that the weight of the evidence does not support his conviction for gross sexual
imposition or for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles.
Greene was convicted of gross sexual imposition, in violation of
R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), which states: “No person shall have sexual contact with another
. . . when . . . [t]he other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen
years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.” In Greene’s
first issue, he argues that because there were no specific dates for the gross sexual
imposition, it cannot be demonstrated that K.S. was less than 13 years old. K.S.’s birthday is August 30, 2009. The girls testified that Greene moved into the home
with them in 2020, when M.S. was 10 and K.S. was 11. Although a specific date of
abuse was not given, K.S. testified that she recalled the abuse of Greene placing his
penis in her hand and moving back and forth occurring when she was around 10, 11,
or maybe 12. Tr. 365-636. K.S. went on to testify that she was “almost a mute” after
the incident. Tr. 637. K.S. did not tell anyone but stated that she eventually told her
grandmother who then called 696-KIDS. Tr. 652-654. K.S. testified that she and
M.S. went to the police in 2022 to report the incidents between the sisters and
Greene. Additional testimony indicates that Moore first interviewed the girls in
October 2022. Given this evidence it is clear from the record that K.S. was under 13
when Greene abused her. “‘Where such crimes constitute sexual offenses against
children, indictments need not state with specificity the dates of alleged abuse, so
long as the prosecution establishes that the offense was committed within the time
frame alleged.’” State v. Yaacov, 2006-Ohio-5321, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.
Barnecut, 44 Ohio App.3d 149, 152 (5th Dist. 1988); see also State v. Gus, 2005-
Ohio-6717 (8th Dist.). “This is partly due to the fact that the specific date and time
of the offense are not elements of the crimes charged.” Yaacov, citing Gus at ¶ 6.
“Moreover, many child victims are unable to remember exact dates and times,
particularly where the crimes involved a repeated course of conduct over an
extended period of time.” Id., citing State v. Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 296,
(2d Dist. 1994). “The problem is compounded where the accused and the victim are
related or reside in the same household, situations which often facilitate an extended period of abuse.” Id. “Thus, an allowance for reasonableness and inexactitude must
be made for such cases considering the circumstances.” Id. We find that there was
sufficient evidence presented that K.S. was under the age of 13.
Next, Greene argues that his convictions for dissemination matter
harmful to K.S. and M.S., through performative masturbation, were not supported
by sufficient evidence because he was masturbating in the hallway of a home and
not in public.
Greene was convicted of two counts of disseminating matter harmful
to juveniles, in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), one count a misdemeanor of the first
degree and one count a felony of the fourth degree with a furthermore clause, which
states: “No person, with knowledge of its character or content, shall recklessly . . .
[w]hile in the physical proximity of the juvenile . . . allow any juvenile . . . to review
or peruse any material or view any live performance that is harmful to juveniles.”
‘“Harmful to juveniles” means that quality of any material or performance describing or representing nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse in any form to which: (1) The material or performance, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of juveniles in sex; (2) the material or performance is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for juveniles; (3) the material or performance, when considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value for juveniles.
State v. Anderson, 2024-Ohio-1006, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2907.01(E).
M.S. testified that she woke up one night and observed Greene
touching his penis in front of her while he was wearing M.S.’s mother’s bathrobe.
Tr. 544-545. K.S. testified that she witnessed Greene masturbating and watching pornography on his phone while they were both in the living room. After that
incident, on another day, K.S. was in the living room watching TV when she
observed Greene sitting in the dining room on a stool masturbating again. Tr. 644.
Greene was not in the privacy of his room, but rather in rooms shared by the entire
family while he was masturbating. He was aware that K.S. was in the living room
both times and that M.S. was in her own room while he masturbated. Thus, we
determine that Greene’s acts of masturbating in front of both girls were harmful to
them. However Greene contends that his performance did not appeal to the
prurient interests of juveniles in sex and it fails to qualify as obscene.
“A ‘prurient interest’ is a ‘shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex,
or excretion . . . [which] goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters . . . .’” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State v.
Casto, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4124, *5 (9th Dist. Sept. 13, 2000). “‘Whether a work
appeals to the prurient interest or depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way
is governed by contemporary community standards.’” Id., quoting id.
Both girls testified that they witnessed Greene masturbating in their
presence. M.S. woke up to Greene masturbating in front of her in her bedroom, and
K.S. witnessed Greene masturbating in the dining and living rooms of their home
while she was in the living room on both occasions. Therefore, Greene’s convictions
for disseminating matter harmful to K.S. and M.S. through performative
masturbation, in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), are supported by sufficient
evidence. Next, Greene argues that his conviction for disseminating matter
harmful to juveniles, as it relates to showing K.S. pornography, is not supported by
sufficient evidence because K.S. gave no description of the video Greene was playing
on his phone aside from the words “pornography” and “inappropriate.”
The record reveals that K.S. testified that while she was on the small
couch Greene came into the living room, sat on the long couch, started masturbating
while watching an inappropriate video. Tr. 639. When asked what she meant by
inappropriate, K.S. stated that it was a “pornography video.” Tr. 642.
R.C. 2907.31 (A)(3) states in part that “no person, with knowledge of its character or
content shall recklessly do . . . [w]hile in the physical proximity of the juvenile . . . .”
It is uncontested that Greene, with knowledge of its content, was viewing a video
while masturbating and that K.S. was in close proximity. It is also uncontested that
K.S. saw the video out of the corner of her eye. Id. Finally, K.S. is a juvenile. There
is evidence that Greene allowed K.S. to view him masturbating while watching a
video, and it is reasonable for a trier of fact to have determined, under the
circumstances herein, that such a performance was obscene and/or harmful to
juveniles. See In re Z.C., 2006-Ohio-5378, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). We determine from these
facts that Greene’s watching pornography in K.S’s presence was harmful.
K.S.’s testimony could reasonably be construed as indicating that
Greene’s overt act of masturbation was not only a display, but that it tended to
represent masturbation as a mere object of Greene’s own sexual appetite. The self-
gratification component of masturbation is obvious, but defendant appeared to engage in masturbation for more than just physical self-gratification. Clearly, his
intent was to arouse his own lust by performing masturbation while watching
pornography, in front of a young child, rather than in private and was a patently
offensive act. “On these facts, we find the act of masturbation was obscene.” State
v. Zimmer, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1833 (8th Dist. Apr. 22, 1999). Furthermore,
there was no evidence that the material or performance, when considered as a
whole, had any artistic, literary, scientific, or political value for juveniles.
Therefore, we find that Greene’s convictions for disseminating
material harmful to juveniles as it relates to showing K.S. pornography was
supported by sufficient evidence.
Greene further argues that his convictions were against the manifest
weight of the evidence because he took numerous steps to make sure he was unseen
while masturbating. As previously stated, Greene masturbated in the common areas
of the home, the living room and dining room. He also masturbated in M.S.’s
bedroom in front of her. He was not in his bedroom or the bathroom. Again, Greene
was convicted of two counts disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, in violation
of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), which states: “No person, with knowledge of its character or
content, shall recklessly do . . . [w]hile in the physical proximity of the juvenile, allow
any juvenile to review or peruse any material or view any live performance that is
harmful to juveniles.”
“‘A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.
A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference
to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
such circumstances are likely to exist.’” Anderson, 2024-Ohio-1006, at ¶ 34 (11th
Dist.), quoting R.C. 2901.22(C).
K.S. testified that while she and Greene were sitting in the living
room, Greene was viewing a pornographic video. K.S. could clearly see the contents
of the video. Tr. 644. Greene then asked K.S. if she would help him with a favor, to
which she refused. Then Greene started masturbating in front of her. Thus,
Greene’s convictions for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles were not against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight
of the evidence, “we are conscious of the fact that determinations regarding the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the testimony are primarily for the trier of
fact.” State v. Robinson, 2018-Ohio-2058, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Bradley,
2012-Ohio-2765, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967).
“Undeniably, the trier of fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing
the credibility of the proffered testimony.’” Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-
2202, ¶ 24. “Here, the jury may take note of any inconsistencies and resolve them
accordingly, ‘believ[ing] all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.’” Id., quoting State v. Raver, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St.
61, 67 (1964).
Next, Greene argues that his convictions for gross sexual imposition
are against the manifest weight of the evidence because K.S.’s testimony was
borrowed from M.S., and M.S. lied about other things like her mother killing her
sister. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered at trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the
other.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed. 1990). “A manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility
of the evidence presented and questions whether the prosecution met its burden of
persuasion at trial.” State v. Rodriguez, 2021-Ohio-2580, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing
Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). “It ‘addresses the evidence’s effect of
inducing belief,’ i.e., whether the state’s or the defendant’s evidence is more
persuasive.” Whitsett at id., quoting Wilson at ¶ 25.
Regardless of whether there is some conflict between M.S.’s
testimony and K.S.’s testimony, there is no material inconsistency as to the evidence
that Greene committed the actual crimes of conviction. See State v. Hill, 2014-Ohio-
387, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.) (“A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
solely because the jury heard inconsistent testimony.”). Here, the jury heard the
testimony, including M.S.’s and K.S.’s accounts, and it chose to believe some or all
of their testimony with the alleged inconsistencies regarding the counts of gross
sexual imposition and dissemination matter harmful to juveniles. Based on the record before us we cannot say that the trier of fact clearly lost its way. Thus,
Greene’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Therefore, Greene’s second and third assignments of error are
overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR